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This  thesis  represents  an  attempt  to  make  an  original  contribution  to  knowledge  about 
transatlantic  institutions  and  transatlantic  governance.  It  investigates  attempts  in  the 
1990s  to  foster  a  'new  transatlantic  dialogue'  between  the  EU  and  the  US,  through 
three  bilateral  agreements:  the  Transatlantic  Declaration  (1990),  the  New 
Transatlantic  Agenda  (1995)  and  the  Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership  (1998).  The 
thesis  questions  whether  and  to  what  extent  the  relationship  has  been  institutionalised 
into  a  structure  for  transatlantic  governance,  and  how  the  composition  of  transatlantic 
institutions  impacts  the  way  that  transatlantic  actors  govern.  Consideration  is  given  to 
both  'who'  governs  in  transatlantic  relations  and  'how',  as  evidence  is  sought  to  prove 
or  disprove  the  claim  that  a  decentralisation  of  decision-making  powers  has  resulted 
in  'policy  setting'  and  'policy  shaping'  by  lower  level  civil  servants  and  non-state 
actors  participating  in  trans  govemm  ental  and  transnational  institutions.  Three  policy 
sectors-  the  EU-US  anti-trafficking  in  women  campaigns,  the  EU-US  Mutual 
Recognition  Agreements  and  the  EU-US  banana  dispute-  serve  as  case  studies  for  the 
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vi Chapter  I 
Understanding  the  'New  Transatlantic  Dialogue' 
The  transatlantic  relationship  is  arguably  the  most  significant  relationship  in  the 
international  system.  Western  Europe  and  the  United  States  (US)  have  the  largest 
concentration  of  individual  and  combined  political  and  economic  power,  making  the 
European  Union  (EU)  and  the  US  each  other's  most  important  partner  world-wide. 
Common  values,  culture  and  history  have  combined  to  make  them  political  partners. 
The  EU  and  the  US  are  each  other's  largest  trading  partner,  accounting  for  20%  of 
each  others'  trade  in  goods  and  '13%  of  trade  in  services  (Berry  2001).  More 
importantly,  in  economic  terms,  they  are  the  recipients  of  around  half  of  each  other's 
Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI). 
Much  academic  attention  in  the  1990s  focused  on  relations  between  the  EU 
and  the  US  in  light  of  radical  structural  changes  to  the  international  economic  and 
political  orders  (see  Smith  and  Woolcock  (1993)  Featherstone  and  Ginsberg  (1996) 
Peterson  (1996)  Monar  (1998)  Gardner  (1997)).  The  end  of  the  Cold  War  visibly 
reduced  the  security  threat  on  which  the  transatlantic  alliance  previously  hinged. 
However,  geopolitical  and  economic  shifts  in  the  international  system,  caused'in  part 
by  increasing  flows  of  people,  capital,  and  goods,  created  a  number  of  new  incentives 
for  EU-US  co-operation  and  conflict.  The  transatlantic  relationship  was  viewed  as  a 
way  to  promote  xvestem  ideas  of  democracy  and  security  in  an  era  of  change  and 
'  In  the  last  measurable  year.  US  exports  to  Europe  totaled  S259  billion.  while  European  exports  to  the 
US  totaled  $293  billion.  Forei-n  Direct  Investment  is  an  important  tie  between  the  EU  and  the  US 
because  it  is  such  an  important  source  of  employment.  For  example,  European  investment  in  the  US 
supports  over  7  million  American  jobs  (FABC  2001).  American  investment  in  Europe  accounts  for 
about  3  million  European  jobs  (see  European  Committee  of  the  American  Chamber  of  Commerce's 
ý\  ebsite  littp:  '.  '\\  \\,  \,  v.  eucomrnittee.  be) uncertainty.  Deepening  European  integration,  including  the  creation  of  Common 
Foreign  and  Security  (CFSP)  and  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  (JHA)  pillars  under  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  (1992),  signalled  to  the  US  the  growing  capacity  of  the  EU  to  act  as 
a  foreign  policy  actor  in  its  own  right.  The  1990s  marked  the  first  time  in  the  history  of 
the  transatlantic  relationship  that  the  EU  and  the  US  faced  the  task  not  only  of  keeping 
the  'alliance'  together  but  of  facilitating  a  partnership  of  -  more  or  less-  equals 
(Peterson  1996). 
This  thesis  represents  an  attempt  to  make  an  original  contribution  to 
knowledge  about  how  and  why  the  transatlantic  partners  chose  to  'manage'  the 
relationship  by  creating  new  transatlantic  institutions  in  an  era  of  rapid  international 
change.  It  investigates  attempts  in  the  1990s  to  foster  a  'new  transatlantic  dialogue' 
between  the  US  and  the  EU,  rather  than  separate  EU  Member  States.  Central  to  the 
thesis  is  the  question  of  why  the  EU  and  US  chose  to  build  bilateral  institutional  ties 
outside  of  traditional  multilateral  institutions  such  as  North  Atlantic  Treaty 
Organisation  (NATO),  the  United  Nations  (UN)  and  the  World  Trade  Organisation 
(WTO).  The  focus  is  on  three  transatlantic  agreements:  the  Transatlantic  Declaration 
(TAD)  (1990),  the  New  Transatlantic  Agenda  (NTA)  (1995),  and  the  Transatlantic 
Economic  Partnership  (TEP)  (1998).  The  emphasis  on  transatlantic  economic  and 
political  relations  between  the  EU  and  the  US  in  the  thesis  reflects  the  focus  of  these 
agreements  on  expanding  the  scope  for  policy  co-ordination  and  co-operation  under 
the  agreernents.  2  It  is  not  meant  as  an  indication  that  multilateral  or  security  issues  are 
an),  less  important  to  the  larger  transatlantic  partnership.  Rather,  the  thesis  seeks  to 
gauge  the  significance  of  bilateral  attempts  to  re-invent  the  relationship  through  these  Z,  Z-1 
I-  Be  term  political  rather  than  security  here  indicates  the  focus  on  'soft'  rather  than  'hard'  security 
issues.  The  scope  for  policies  studied  in  this  thesis  is  largely  confined  to  those  incorporated  Linder  the  nI 
NTA.  For  transatlantic  security  studies  see  Haass  (  1999)  Bronstone  (1998),  Geipal  and  Manning  (1996) 
and  van  den  Broek  (1993). 
7 transatlantic  agreements,  which  themselves  are  both  bilateral  and  focused  almost 
entirely  on  policy  areas  other  than  traditional  security. 
These  transatlantic  agreements  warrant  study  because  they  mark,  to  a 
considerable  point,  a  break  from  the  pre-1990s  past  and  together  they  form  a  new 
framework  for  managing  the  transatlantic  relationship.  The  TAD,  the  NTA  and  the 
TEP  are  the  first  bilateral  agreements  signed  between  the  EU  and  the  US.  Despite 
earlier  attempts  to  foster  EU-US  rather  than  European-American  relations  in  the 
1960s,  and  1970s  (see  chapter  3)  the  1990s  was  the  first  era  to  be  characterised  by  the 
institutionalisation  of  a  structure  for  transatlantic  governance.  Unlike  President 
Kennedy's  Grand  Design  or  President  Nixon's  Atlantic  Charter,  the  agreements  were 
accompanied  by  institutional  arrangements  and  specific  policy  commitments.  The 
transatlantic  agreements  expanded  the  scope  for  bilateral  co-operation  to  a  range  of 
new  (largely)  non-traditional  security  and  economic  policy  areas. 
Specifically,  the  NTA  commits  the  EU  and  US  to  approach  jointly,  where 
possible,  rising  transnational  crime,  terrorism  and  environmental  degradation.  it 
acknowledges  the  role  that  the  transatlantic  partners  can  play  in  promoting  peaceful 
transitions  to  democracy  world-wide.  The  NTA  and  the  succeeding  TEP  contain 
strategies  for  facilitating  increased  economic  integration  and  dispute  management  in 
direct  response  to  competing.  forces  both  to  liberallse  trade  and  protect  domestic 
producers.  In  substantive  terms,  the  agreements  explicitly  acknowledge  the  capacity  of 
the  transatlantic  partners  both  to  promote  and  undermine  global  economic 
libcralisation.  EU-US  trade  and  investment  agreements  have  the  potential  not  only  to. 
open  the  transatlantic  marketplace  but  also  to  lead  the  way  for  further  liberalisation  at 
the  multilateral  level.  On  the  other  hand.  transatlantic  trade  disputes  and  a  lack  of 
solidarity  at  the  WTO  have  the  potential  to  undermine  the  multilateral  trading  system. In  short,  EU-US  relations  are  significant  because  the  transatlantic  partnership  can 
make  or  break  the  foundations  of  the  western  economic  and  political  orders. 
What  follows  in  this  chapter  is  an  introduction  to  a  study  of  the  capacity  of  the 
EU  and  US  to  respond  to  the  challenges,  or  to  effectively  'govern'  the  transatlantic 
marketplace  and  the  international  political  order  through  bilateral  transatlantic. 
agreements.  The  emphasis  is  on  the  creation  of  decision-making  structures  and  a 
framework  for  transatlantic  policy  making.  Section  I  discusses  the  primary  research 
questions  and  sets  out  the  main  hypothesis,  namely  that  these  transatlantic  agreements 
do  matter  because  they  have  established  a  transatlantic  governance  structure.  An 
examination  of  the  existing  literature  on  transatlantic  relations  in  section  two  reveals 
that  foundations  for  this  thesis  are  found  in  earlier  works.  It  also  seeks  to  establish 
what  light  a  decisionmaking  approach  sheds  on  EU-US  relations  generally  and  the 
NTA  framework  specifically.  Section  3  outlines  two  sub-hypotheses,  which  are  that 
transatlantic  relations  are  determined  not  only  by  transatlantic  structures  but  also  by 
how  transatlantic  actors  use  them;  and  that  transatlantic  institutions  -  however  fragile 
-  persist  because  each  side  has  a  clear  interest  in  ensuring  that  the  other  does  not 
defect  from  transatlantic  bargains.  Section  4  outlines  how  subsequent  chapters 
contribute  to  the  discussion. 
4 1)  The  Research  Question  and  the  Main  Hypothesis 
This  thesis  seeks  to  establish  what  impact  transatlantic  agreements  in  the  1990s  have 
had  on  EU-US  relations.  The  main  hypothesis,  which  is  divided  into  two  parts,  is  that 
these  transatlantic  agreements  have  altered  the  scope  and  depth  of  transatlantic  co- 
operation.  The  thesis  seeks  support  for  the  arguments  that, 
*  The  EU-US  relationship  has  been  institutionalised  in  the  1990s  through  the 
three  transatlantic  agreements  (the  Transatlantic  Declaration,  the  New 
Transatlantic  Agenda  and  the  Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership),  and 
e  that  the  institutionalised  networks  and  policy  framework  created  by  the 
transatlantic  agreements  form  the  basis  of  a  transatlantic  governance  structure 
which  has  produced  policy  outcomes  that  would  be  unimaginable  in  the 
absence  of  such  a  structure. 
Further  operationalisation  of  the  hypothesis  is  needed  to  clarify  precisely  what  kind  of 
evidence  is  needed  to  prove  or  disprove  the  claim.  The  first  part  of  the  hypothesis 
seeks  to  establish  the  ýinstitutionalisation'  of  the  relationship.  The  thesis  employs  a 
definition  of  institutionalisation  that  draws  on  the  work  of  scholars  such  as  Keohane 
and  Nye  (1993),  Ruggic  (1998)  and  Risse  (1995),  which  suggests  that  by  no  means 
should  vvc  expect  international  institutionalisation  always  to  result  in  supranational 
organisations.  Rather  many  international  institutions  are  in  effect  'regimes*  which  can  Z.  - 
be  broadly  defined  by  'patterned  behavior'  (see  Puchala  and  Hopkins  19833)  'specific 
rules'  (Keoliane  1989)  and  even  'principles  norms.  rules,  and  decision  making 
procedures*  (Krasner  198'1).  Thus.  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  institutionalisation is  a  process  whereby  a  co-ordination  and  pattern  of  behavior  between  actors  is 
established  and  developed  (see  also  Ruggie  1998:  54). 
The  second  part  of  the  hypothesis  seeks  to  establish  what  impact  transatlantic 
institutions  have  on  the  wider  relationship  between  Europe  and  America.  A  rich 
literature  now  exists  that  argues  firmly  that  *institutions  matter'  and  that  they 
constitute  the  'central  component  of  political  life'  (Peters  1999:  150;  see  also  March 
and  Olsen  1989).  However,  most  of  this  literature  focuses  specifically  on  politics  in 
domestic  political  settings.  Relatively  little  of  the  so-called  'new  institutional-ism'  is 
concerned  with  international  politics.  This  thesis  draws  on  Peters'  (1999:  18) 
definition  which  argues  that  institutions  generally  are  characterised  by 
*  formal  and  informal  structures,  including  networks  and  shared  norms 
*  patterned  and  sustainable  interaction  between  actors 
0  constraints  on  the  behaviour  of  its  members 
0  some  sense  of  shared  values. 
This  thesis  'borrows'  the  central  questions  raised  by  the  new  institutionalism  and 
applies  them  to  international  relations  and  transatlantic  relations  generally.  These 
questions  are:  do  institutions  matter,  particularly  in  determining  the  behaviour  of 
actors  -  public  and  private  -  who  are  stakeholders  in  US-EU  relations?  If  institutions 
do  matter,  how  much  do  they  matter?  And  how  do  we  measure  how  much  they 
matter?  This  thesis  questions  not  only  whether  the  creation  of  formal  transatlantic 
dialogue  structures  can  be  construed  as  institutions,  but  also  whether  the  institutional 
ties  created  in  the  I  990s  comprise  a  process  for  policy  co-ordination  or  joint  policy 
making.  In  other  xNords  it  questions  the  extent  to  which  actors  within  these  structures 
creat  a  policy  aocnda  or  simply  pursue  a  predetermined,  established  policy  agenda. 
6 The  test  for  transatlantic  governance  is  not  only  the  existence  of  transatlantic 
policy  output  but  also  of  attempts-  both  successful  and  unsuccessful-  to  accommodate 
the  interests  of  different  actors  input  in  the  policy  process  in  order  to  facilitate 
integration  and  manage  disputes.  The  examination  of  transatlantic  institutions  as 
decision-  making  forums  for  transatlantic  policy  making  ultimately  sheds  light  on  the 
capacity  of  the  EU  and  the  US  to  manage  the  transatlantic  dialogue  and  to  govern  in 
both  the  transatlantic  marketplace  and  the  international  political  order. 
2)  Governance  and  Institutions  in  EU-US  Relations 
'Governance'  is  a  term  that  is  now  widely  used  to  characterise  the  actions  of  actors  in 
the  international  arena.  What  is  ýgovernance'  and  how  do  we  study  it?  Eising  and 
Kohler-Koch  (1999:  5)  argue  that, 
ýgovernance'  is  about  the  structured  ways  and  means  in  which  the  divergent 
preferences  of  interdependent  actors  are  translated  into  policy  choices  'to 
allocate  values',  so  that  the  plurality  of  interests  is  transformed  into  co- 
ordinated  action  and  the  compliance  of  actors  is  achieved. 
For  his  part,  Rosenau  (1992:  4)  contends  that  governance,  'embraces  governmental 
institutions,  but  it  also  subsumes  informal,  non-governmental  mechanisms  whereby 
persons  and  organisation  within  it  purview,  move  ahead,  satisfy  their  needs,  and  fulfil 
their  wants'.  Simply  put,  governance  is  'the  imposition  of  overall  direction  or  control 
on  the  allocation  of  valued  resources'  (Peterson  and  Bomberg  1999:  5).  It  is,  in  all  of 
these  definitions,  seen  to  be  a  synthetic  process  in  that  a  variety  of  actors  -  not  all  of, 
them  uovernmental  -  are  involved  in  decisions  that  determine  who  gets  what.  when 
and  how. 
One  strategy  for  understanding  governance  is  to  'deconstruct'  it  (in  a  literal 
sense)  and  approach  it  as  a  process  of  making  individual  decisions.  Peterson  and  zn 
7 Bomberg  (1999:  4)  note  that,  'All  policies  are  the  product  of  decisions  about  what  to 
do,  how  to  do  it,  and  how  to  decide  what  to  do.  '  This  thesis  approaches  EU-US 
relations  as  a  process  of  decision-making  because  decision-making  as  an  analytical 
approach  helps  us  identify  who  governs  and  how,  and  who  or  what  determines  policy 
outcomes.  The  explanatory  power  of  a  number  of  variables  in  the  process  of 
transatlantic  policy  making  is  discussed  throughout  the  text.  Institutions  and  actors  are 
considered  as  important  factors  of  policy  input,  and  agreements  and  declarations  serve 
as  final  policy  outputs.  This  approach  to  transatlantic  governance  is  rooted  in  a  number 
of  earlier  transatlantic  studies. 
A  host  of  literature  in  the  early  1990s  sought  to  explain  the  nature  of  co- 
operation  and  conflict  in  relations  between  the  EU  and  the  US,  particularly  in  light  of 
shifts  in  the  balance  of  power  between  the  partners  and  growing  'complex' 
interdependence.  Interest  in  the  nature  of  international  regimes,  a  preoccupation  of 
international  scholars  in  the  1980s  (Keohane  and  Nye  1977;  Keohane  1989; 
Hasenclever  etc  all  1996;  see  also  Peters  1999),  was  resurrected  as  institutional 
approaches  to  politics  more  generally  began  to  flourish.  The  result  was  fresh  interest 
in  the  prospects  for  fostering  increased  transatlantic  co-operation  -  and  international 
co-operation  more  generally  --  through  new  institutions.  Key  to  the  discussion  was  the 
increased  potential  for  conflict  seen  to  accompany  the  breakdown  of  the  hegemonic 
system,  under  which  the  US  bad  acted  as  a  dominant  partner  over  the  Europe  in  a 
bipolar,  Cold  War  international  order.  The  rise  of  a  multipolar  order,  it  was  argued, 
increased  the  likelihood  that  a  united  Europe  had  the  capacity  to  act  as  a  more  equal 
partner  but  also  as  a  more  equal  competitor.  Scholars  such  as  Featherstone  and 
Ginsberg  (1996)  h1ohlighted  the  potential  for  diverging  interests  in  a  post-hegemonic  Z--  --  Z--  ZD 
8 system,  but  also  for  EU  and  US  interest  in  common  action  prompted  by  economic 
interdependence. 
Earlier  works  on  EU-US  relations  in  the  1990s  highlight  a  number  of  important 
themes  that  feature  in  the  current  study.  Authors  including  Smith  and  Woolcock 
(1993)  and  Peterson  (1996)  noted  that  diverging  interests  were  unavoidable  given  the 
growing  importance  of  domestic  actors  in  international  politics.  The  question  of  how 
to  manage  the  relationship  was  complicated  by  the  tendency  of  the  EU  to  boldly 
declare  that  it  was  ready  to  play  an  international  role  commensurate  with  its  economic 
nower  even  as  the  Union's  Member  States  showed  themselves  unwilling  to  vest  the 
r 
EU  with  the  resources  and  policy  instruments  needed  to  play  such  a  role.  The  result 
was  a  wide  gap  between  the  EU's  internal  capabilities  and  the  rest  of  the  world's 
expectations  (see  Hill  19931  1996),  with  no  international  partner  of  the  Union  more 
acutely  aware  of  the  gap  than  the  US.  Meanwhile,  the  'action  capacity'  of  the  US  was 
also  called  into  question  as  American  foreign  and  trade  policies  became  subject  to 
more  and  more  effective  domestic  pressures  than  had  been  imaginable  during  the  Cold 
War,  and  also  more  prone  to  complication  by  the  separation  of  powers  between 
institutions  at  the  federal  and  a  state  levels  (see  Smith  1997;  NicolaYdis  and  Howse 
2001). 
Institutionalist  approaches  to  EU-US  relations  in  the  early  1990s  highlighted 
the  importance  of  institutions  in  transatlantic  relations  (see  for  example  Keohane  and 
Nye  1993)).  It  was  argued  that  institutional  ties  could  manage  the  relationship  and 
overcome  diverging  interests.  Peterson  (1996)  argued  that  a  genuine  partnership  would 
require  'better-or0anized  exchanges'.  Smith  (1997)  argued  that  policy  co-ordination 
could  not  take  place  without  a  clear  allocation  of  political  authority  or  a  clear  legal 
frarneNAork.  both  of  which  required  considerable  institution-building. 
9 A  second  wave  of  EU-US  literature  in  the  1990s  focused  on  how  new 
transatlantic  institutional  structures  created  by  the  TAD  and  the  NTA  could  manage 
the  dialogue.  Studies  of  the  NTA  including  Krenzler  and  Schomaker  (1996),  Gardner 
(1997)  and  Monar  (1998)  and  Bail  et  at  (1997)  linked  policy  co-ordination  and  co-, 
operation  to  transatlantic  institutions,  but  mainly  described  the  prospects  for  such  co- 
ordination  and  co-operation  under  the  NTA,  in  part  because  they  were  released  before 
the  N'TA  had  produced  substantive  results.  Nonetheless,  these  studies  helped  provide 
a  bridge  to  a  new  wave  of  (quite  recent)  studies,  which  concentrate  more  narrowly  on 
transatlantic  policy  outputs  and  the  role  of  the  NTA  in  fostering  actual  co-ordination 
and  co-operation. 
This  thesis  seeks  both'to  build  upon  and  critique  this  most  recent  wave  of 
literature,  particularly  works  by  Pollack  and  Shaffer  (2001)  and  Philippart  and 
Winand  (2001).  These  works  concentrate  not  only  on  the  NTA  as  a  framework  for  co- 
operation  but  as  a  structure  of  transatlantic  governance.  They  explain  what  the  NTA  is, 
but  also  how  the  NTA  works  and  how  well  it  works.  Shaffer  and  Pollack  offer  an 
actor  based  explanation  for  who  governs  in  EU  and  US  relations  by  describing 
different  levels  of  intergovernmental,  trans  governmental  and  transnational  networks 
which  have  been  institutionalised  by  the  NTA.  Phillipart  and  Winand's  examination  of 
not  only  policy  making  but  policy  shaping  opens  the  policy  process  up  to  a  range  of 
actors  who  have  an  input  into  the  transatlantic  policy  process.  Their  policy-based 
study  tries  to  measure  the  success  of  the  NTA  by  applying  numerical  values  to 
individual  sectors  based  on  the  discrepancy  between  policy  goals  and  policy  output. 
In  inany  ways  the  decision  making  approach  taken  to  EU-US  relations  in  this 
thesis  seeks  to  combine  the  logic  of  these  two  approaches.  Chapter  two  outlines  a 
decision-making,  model  as  a  ,,,  aý  of  categorising  actor  input  into  the  transatlantic 
10 policy  process.  It  argues  that  intergovernmental,  transgovernmental  and  transnational 
actors  have  different  roles  in  making,  setting  and  shaping  transatlantic  policy.  Unlike 
Philippart  and  Winand's  study,  however,  this  thesis  does  not  try  to  present  a 
quantitative  measure  of  what  has  been  achieved  under  the  NTA,  for  a  number  of 
reasons.  First,  transatlantic  co-operation  or  co-ordination  was  being  pursued  in  many 
policy  areas  before  the  creation  of  specific  transatlantic  institutions,  thus  making  it 
difficult  to  establish  a  causal  relationship  between  the  NTA  framework  and  policy 
output.  Second.  it  is  difficult  to  measure  the  significance  of  policy  agreements  simply 
by  rely;.  -,,,  on  the  public  declarations  of  senior  transatlantic  policy-makers  - 
specifically  contained  in  so-called  'Senior  Level  Group  reports'  --  because  of  a 
tendency  by  transatlantic  policy  makers  to  'recycle'  and  'repackage'  their 
announcement  of  policy  successes.  3  'I'he  sbort-ten-n  pressure  to  produce  results  out  of 
the  NTA  reflects  the  political  cycles  which  govern  the  behaviour  of  governments  on 
both  sides:  'Quite  simply,  whilst  the  development  of  strategic  direction  in  US-EU 
relations  is  a  long-term  exercise  to  be  judged  over  a  period  of  years  if  not  decades, 
political  leaders  are  judged  over  periods  of  five  years  at  most'  (Smith  2001:  271). 
Third,  a  numerical  measure  of  successes  in  one  area  is  not  necessarily  comparable 
with  polices  pursued  in  another.  As  one  senior  EU  official  interviewed  for  this  study 
argued,  'how  do  you  compare  the  levels  of  success?  Is  it  more  important  that  the  EU 
and  the  US  go  to  Russia  with  a  common  position  on  food  aid  or  that  they  run  joint, 
trafficking  programmes  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE)? 
4 
L- 
Perhaps  above  all,  this  thesis  eschews  attempts  to  measure  quantitatively  the 
success,  or  not,  of  transatlantic  policy-making  because  it  is  concerned  with  process  as 
rriuch  as  policy:  it  emphasises  the  importance  of  not  only  policy  output  but  also  of  the 
The  St.  G  report  is  a  stock  take  of  co-operation  under  the  NTA  which  is  released  before  each  summit. 
See  chapter  four. process  of  policy  making.  Policy  agreements  are  important  measure  of  the  capacity  to 
govern  in  the  short  term,  but  so  too  is  the  creation  of  dialogue  structures  and  the  ability 
to  foster  long  term  strategies  of  co-operation.  As  such,  this  thesis  seeks  primarily  to 
make  clear  the  perceptions  of  actors  who  participate  in  the  policy  process  and  to  gauge 
the  impact  that  different  variables  -  including  the  creation  of  new  transatlantic 
institutions  --  have  had  on  the  policy  process.  This  thesis  primarily  relies  on  elite 
interviews  to  determine  the  relevance  of  transatlantic  institutional  structures,  their 
effect  on  the  actors  who  participate  within  them,  and  the  impact  on  the  policies  they 
seek  to  influence  in  the  over2l]  process  of  transatlantic  governance. 
3)  Transatlantic  Governance:  Decentralisation  and  'Privatisation'? 
The  validation  of  the  first  hypothesis  opens  up  the  discussion  on  transatlantic 
governance  to  a  number  of  sub-hypotheses  about  the  process  of  transatlantic  decision 
making.  If  the  relationship  has  been  institutional  i  sed  into  a  governance  structure,  what 
room  has  it  allowed  for  different  actors  (as  described  by  Shaffer  and  Pollack)  to 
influence  the  policy  process,  which  Phillipart  and  Winand  note  is  not  restricted  only  to 
making  policy  but  also  shaping?  In  other  words,  the  interest  is  not  only  in  the  big 
decisions  that  establish  the  scope  for  transatlantic  policy  co-ordination,  but  also  in  the 
decisions  that  determine  policy  details  and  policy  options  (see  chapter  2).  To 
generalise.  what  space  does  the  formal  transatlantic  structure  leave  for  agents,  both 
governmental  and  non  -governmental.  to  influence  the  co-ordination,  convergence  or 
mutual  recognition  of  transatlantic  policy?  Who  exercises  what  type  of  power  in  the 
transatlantic  process  and  NA-hen?  Two  further  hypotheses  are  presented  regarding  the 
role  of  different  actors  involved  in  transatlantic  policy  making. 
Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washin-ton  D.  C..  October  2000  (32).  1  Cý 
12 0  The  second  hypothesis  to  be  tested  by  this  thesis  is  whether  or  not,  and  to  what 
extent,  the  creation  of  an  institutional  framework  by  the  transatlantic 
agreements  has  led  to  a  decentralisation  of  decision  taking  powers  to  state 
actors. 
Put  another  way,  how  much  responsibility  for  actual  policy  making  has  been  delegated 
to  transgovernmental,  as  opposed  to  intergovernmental,  actors  (see  table  1.1;  see  also 
chapter  _'Iý 
Tli;  Q  liynothesi-s  us  to  be  concerned  not  only  with  the  making  of  .  ...  I  ..  v- 
'history-making'  political  decisions  by  so-called  'chiefs  of  government'  to 
institutional  ise  the  relationship  or  establish  the  scope  for  policy  reach.  Rather,  this 
thesis  seeks  to  determine  the  capacity  of  trans  governmental  actors  to  exercise  powers 
in  setting  and  shaping  policies.  Validation  of  this  hypothesis  requires  demonstrating 
that  a  range  of  different  civil  servants  have  both  participated  in  and  had  an  impact  on 
the  transatlantic  decision  making  process  through  formal,  institutionalised  channels. 
*A  third  hypothesis  examined  by  this  thesis  tests  whether  and  to  what  extent  a 
decentralisation  of  decision  taking  powers  has  been  devolved  to  privateas  well 
as  public  actors. 
The  study  of  non-state  actors  in  international  politics  is  not  new.  There  is  a  growing 
literature  on  the  impact  that  a  'third  sector'.  or  the  global  civil  society,  has  had  on 
international  governance  (see  chapter  2).  'the  growing  role  of  private  actors  is 
discussed  b,,,,  Keoharie  and  Nve  (1977,1989)  and  Shaffer  and  Pollack  (2001)  as  a 
transnational'  phenonienon. 
13 This  third  hypothesis  has  an  interest  in  the  capacity  of  private  groups  to 
influence  transatlantic  negotiations  not  only  through  national  channels,  but  through 
transnational  networks  of  European  and  American  corporations  and  non-governmental 
organisations.  The  question  here  is  not  whether  business  groups  and  NGOs  'make' 
policy  but  whether  there  is  evidence  to  support  the  claim  that  transnational  networks 
ýshape'  transatlantic  decisions.  Rittberger  (2000)  notes  that  a  great  problem  for 
researchers  is  how  to  measure  the  impact  of  these  actors.  The  thesis  looks  for  evidence 
that  non-state  actors  narrow  policy  options  or  'load'  the  decision-making  process  in 
favour  of  some  outcomes  rather  than  others,  through  either  advocacy  and  persuasion, 
or  through  the  withholding  or  provision  of  valued  resources. 
Table  1.1  Types  of  Transatlantic  Actors 
Intergovernmental  High  Level  contact  between  Chiefs  of  Government 
Transgovemmental  Day  to  Day  contact  between  Sub-Units  of  Government 
(Civil  Servants) 
Transnational  Contact  between  private  actors-  businesses  and  NGOs 
Based  on  Shaffer  and  Pollack  (2001) 
To  summarise,  this  thesis  seeks  to  contribute  to  the  larger  debate  on  how  the  VU  and 
US  manage  the  transatlantic  relationship.  It  focuses  on  the  'new  transatlantic  dialogue' 
established  by  the  TAD.  the  NTA  and  the  TEP  as  a  process  of  institutional  isation, 
%ýhich  has  created  a  formal  structure  of  (governance.  If  the  first  hypothesis  is  correct. 
the  transatlantic  agreements  have  created  institutional  structures  and  an  established 
policy  forum  through  xNhich  transatlantic  actors  ',  govern'.  It  Is  argued  that 
14 institutionalisation  has  taken  place  at  multiple  levels,  thereby  increasing  the  scope  for 
different  actors  to  influence  transatlantic  governance  in  different  capacities. 
The  second  and  third  hypotheses  seek  to  establish  the  role  played  by  lower 
level  civil  servants  and  non-state  actors  in  decentralised  and  privatised  decision  taking 
forums.  Chapter  2  helps  clarify  these  hypotheses  by  outlining  a  transatlantic  decision 
making  model  which  argues  that  intergovernmental  actors  'make'  decisions  which 
establish  transatlantic  institutions  and  a  policy  framework,  but  that  trans  goverm.  ental 
and  transnational  actors  impact  the  decision  making  process  by  'setting'  and  'shaping' 
transatlantic  policy.  Finally,  the  role  of  bureaucrats  and  non-govemmental  actors  in 
transatlantic  governance  raises  some  questions  about  the  transparency  of  decentralised 
decision  taking.  The  debate  on  the  legitimacy  of  transatlantic  governance  is  a  theme 
that  is  discussed  throughout  the  thesis. 
4.  An  Overview  of  the  Thesis 
The  decision  making  model  outlined  in  chapter  2  is  the  product  of  a  broad  theoretical 
debate  about  how  to  approach  EU-US  co-operation  generally  and  transatlantic 
governance  more  narrowly.  Chapter  2  draws  on  different  lines  of  political  theory  for 
explanations  as  to  why  the  EU  and  US  would  choose  to  pursue  a  policy  of 
'institutional  i  sation  '  and  how  they  have  subsequently  chosen  to  operate  within 
transatlantic  structures.  A  number  of  themes  are  developed  in  this  chapter  which 
inform  the  discussion  of  EU-US  policy  making  throughout  the  thesis.  First,  the  trend 
towards  decentralisation  of'  decision-making  power,  rather  than  the  centralisation  of 
power  at  the  interl2overnmental  level.  Is  highlighted.  That  this  process  has  taken  place 
is  evidenced  in  later  chapters.  which  describe  the  building  up  of  interstate  networks 
rather  than  the  creation  of  any  supranational  'transatlantic'  organisation.  Second, 
15 chapter  2  highlights,  following  Peterson  (1996)  and  Smith  (1997),  that  domestic 
structures  affect  the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  US  to  co-ordinate  action  at  a  transatlantic 
level.  It  is  argued  that  multi-level  governance  approaches  to  decision  making,  which 
are  usually  used  to  characterise  the  EU,  also  apply  to  the  US  which  shares  levels  of 
decision-making  competency  between  federal  and  state  institutions.  Finally,  an 
exploration  of  the  rational  ist-constructivist  debate  within  international  relations  theory, 
and  examination  of  both  global  governance  and  multi-level  governance  approaches,  - 
highlights  the  possibility  that  different  actors  may  be  capable  of  influencing  policy  at 
different  levels.  If  all  the  hypotheses  set  out  above  are  correct,  it  can  be  argued  that 
different  actors'  actions  are  driven  by  different  rationales.  Rationalist  explanations 
that  explain  top  political  decisions  do  not  necessarily  account  for  other  parts  of  the 
decision-making  process.  If  the  decentralisation  of  decision  making  allows  different 
actors  to  have  a  role  in  'shaping'  policy,  then  constructivist  claims  about  the  nature  of 
communication  according  to  agreed  rules  of  behaviour  (established  by  the  NTA 
framework)  may  bear  more  explanatory  weight. 
Chapters  3  through  5  set  out  evidence  to  support  the  three  hypotheses.  Chapter 
3  looks  at  the  three  transatlantic  agreements  and  seeks  evidence  to  support  the  claim 
that  the  relationship  has  been  institutionalised.  It  concentrates  on  the  build  up  of 
formal  institutional  ties,  which  serve  as  transatlantic  decision-making  structures.  The 
extent  to  which  policy  issues  have  been  placed  in  a  bilateral  forum  is  also  discussed  as 
a  means  of  establishing  the  scope  for  transatlantic  governance.  The  impact  of 
transatlantic  institutionalisation  and  the  capacity  of  transatlantic  institutions  to  act  as 
(,,  overning  structures  is  not  only  measured  by  the  output  of  policies  or  'deliverables" 
16 but  also  by  the  institutionalisation  of  communication,  argued  by  institutionalists  to 
foster  co-operation. 
The  remaining  chapters  seek  to  explore  the  sub-hypotheses.  How  is  it  that 
actors  govern  under  the  institutional  framework  created  in  the  1990s?  Chapter  four 
examines  the  process  of  transatlantic  decision  making,  setting  and  shaping.  It 
highlights  the  role  of  the  intergovernmental  EU-US  Summit  as  both  a  beginning  and 
end  point  of  the  policy  cycle,  but  also  concentrates  on  the  role  that  trans  governmental 
actors  play  in  setting  and  shaping  policies  at  a  sub-summit  level.  The  chapter 
highlight-,  the  coompplicated  nature  of  EU-US  decision  taking  which  has  become 
increasingly  institutionalised  in  order  to  incorporate  both  domestic  economic  and 
political  actors.  Chapter  four  also  seeks  to  test  the  second  hypothesis  by  questioning 
the  extent  to  which  transgovernmental  networks  provide  a  forum  for  decentralised 
decision  setting  and  shaping.  Finally,  given  the  implications  of  trans  governmental 
decision  setting  and  shaping  on  transatlantic  governance,  the  chapter  questions  the 
legitimacy  of  a  process  which  is  both  highly  decentralised  and  primarily  bureaucratic. 
Chapter  5  tests  the  third  hypothesis  against  a  number  of  formal  interest  based 
transnational  networks-  including  the  Transatlantic  Business  Dialogue  (TABD),  the 
Transatlantic  Consumer  Dialogue  (TACD)  and  the  Transatlantic  Environmental 
Dialogue  (TAED)-  which  have  been  asked  formally  to  participate  in  the  transatlantic 
policy  process.  It  seeks  to  establish  whether  the  behaviour  of  actors  within  these 
networks  provides  support  to  the  claim  that  decision-making  powers  have  been 
extended  to  non-state  actors.  The  legitimacy  debate  on  transatlantic  decision  making  is 
also  considered  in  light  of  the  unequal  access  that  different  actors  have  and  the  ZD 
S  Deliverables'  is  a  terin  used  by  EU  and  US  officials  to  describe  policy  output  in  the  NTA  process. 
Deliverables  ran-e  t-rorn  agreements,  to  joint  initiatives.  to  declarations. 
17 increased  demands  for  transparency  in  the  policy  process.  It  is  argued  that  the  capacity 
of  actors  to  shape  the  process  is  varied,  and  thus  too  is  support  for  the  hypothesis  that  a 
decentralisation  of  decision  tAing  to  private  sector  actors  has  occurred. 
Chapters  6  through  8  discuss  three  policy  sectors,  which  serve  as  case  studies 
for  the  three  hypotheses  and  for  EU-US  decision  making.  The  case  studies  were 
chosen  to  show  the  broad  range  of  the  new  transatlantic  dialogue  and  to  incorporate 
political  and  economic  issues  as  well  as  policy  areas  characterised  by  integration, 
interest  diversion  or  'system  friction'.  6  Chapter  6  looks  at  the  decisions  that  made,  set 
and  sbaped  transatlantic  policy  co-ordination  on  trafficking  in  women  in  CEF.  A  case 
study  of  the  EU-US  information  campaigns  on  trafficking  in  women  highlights  the 
type  of  low  key,  technical  decisions  that  are  facilitated  by  the  NTA.  The  discussion  on 
trafficking  in  women  begins  with  an  examination  of  the  intergovernmental  decision  to 
include  trafficking  in  women  in  the  institutional  framework  of  the  NTA.  It  also 
questions  whether  there  is  evidence  of  decentralised  decision  setting  and  shaping  by 
trans  governmental  actors  and  what  role  transnational  actors  have  played.  Trafficking 
in  women  is  also  examined  as  a  case  study  for  EU  external  co-operation  on  JHA 
issues,  an  area  where  the  EU  has  normally  been  considered  to  be  a  less  supportive  - 
partner  because  of  internal  institutional  gaps. 
Chapter  7  presents  a  second  case  study,  this  time  in  an  economic  policy  sector. 
It  examines  intergovernmental.  trans  governmental  and  transnational  actor  input  into 
the  EU-US  mutual  recognition  agreements  (MR-As),  according  to  which  the  regulatory 
standards  governing  the  production  of  goods  on  one  side  of  the  Atlantic  is  accepted  as  in 
le,  (-Yitimate  oi-i  the  other  side.  Like  the  trafficking  in  women  case,  the  MRAs  point  to  the 
existence  of  multi-level  governance  in  transatlantic  policy  making.  This  chapter  seeks 
('  This  term  is  used  by  Smith  (2001  )  to  describe  clashing  structures,  for  example  between  regulatory  or 
industrial  cultures. 
18 to  establish  the  impact  that  the  institutional  i  sation  of  the  NTA  and  the  decentralisation 
of  decision  setting  and  shaping  to  state  and  non-state  actors  has  had  on  actual  policy 
agreements.  The  chapter  also  demonstrates  a  policy  sector  where  the  EU  has  the 
capacity  to  act  more  coherently  than  the  US,  thus  revealing  that  the  capabilities- 
expectations  gap  often  ascribed  to  the  EU,  and  held  to  be  a  major  deterrent  to  effective 
EU-US  policy  co-operation,  is mirrored  by  a  similar  gap  on  the  American  side. 
Finally,  chapter  8  examines  a  trade  dispute  that  raged  for  most  of  the  1990s.  It 
considers  the  role  that  domestic  actors  on  both  sides  have  played  in  the  transatlantic 
banana  dispute  and  questions  how  effectively  NTA  institutions  have  been  in  managing 
this  conflict  (and  other  areas  of  trade  friction).  In  short,  it  moves  us  towards  an  answer 
to  the  question:  does  the  transatlantic  decision  making  model  apply  to  areas  of  dispute 
as  well  as  agreement?  The  chapter  develops  the  argument  that  the  banana  dispute  was 
an  ýoutlier',  or  a  case  where  transatlantic  institutions  have  been  criticised  for  not 
effectively  managing  a  dispute  The  banana  case  draws  attention  to  the  complicated 
task  of  facilitating  'governance'  where  interests  diverge  and  where  disputes  become 
legal  disputes  under  international  trade  rules.  But,  it  also  demonstrates  the  capaci  ty  of 
the  transatlantic  institutions  to  contain  policy  friction.  The  chapter  asks  what  the 
banana  case  can  tell  us  more  generally  about  the  capacity  of  the  new  transatlantic 
dialogue  to  overcome  competition  between  domestic  actors. 
To  conclude.  chapter  9  reviews  the  main  findings  of  the  thesis  and  'broadens 
ouC  to  consider  the  wider  implications  concerning  the  role  of  the  EU-US  relationship 
in  international  politics  and  the  place  of  institutions  in  international  relations  more 
generally.  It  the  evidence  presented  in  the  thesis  to  determine  whether  the 
three  hypothescs  laid  OLIt  above  point  to  an  institutionalisation,  clecentralisation  and 
privatisation'  of  transatlantic  decision  making.  It  also  questions  what  impact,  or  lack 
19 thereof,  new  decision  making  processes  have  had  on  the  overall  cycle  of  transatlantic 
governance.  In  short,  it  asks  not  only  who  governs  and  how,  but  what  difference  it 
makes?  To  what  extent  has  the  decision  making  structure  allowed  the  EU  and  US  to 
manage  relations  characterised  by  co-operation  and  competition,  and  at  what  price 
does  'effective'  management  of  the  dialogue  come?  In  other  words,  how  does 
transatlantic  decision  making  fare  in  the  debate  on  technocratic  governance?  The  anti- 
globalisation  protests  at  the  WTO  ministerial  meeting  in  Seattle  (1999),  at  the  EU 
Summit  in  G6teborg  (2001)  and  the  G-8  Summit  in  Genoa  (2001)  demonstrate  the 
general  lack  of  popular  support  for  governance  structures  which  exist  above  the 
nation-state.  Is  the  legitimacy  of  transatlantic  governance  undermined  by  the  absence 
of  a  broad  acceptance  of  transatlantic  institutions? 
20 Chapter  2 
Governing  through  the  NTA:  A  Decision-Making  Model 
Finding  a  single  theory  that  can  accurately  characterise  the  new  transatlantic 
relationship  is  difficult  because  the  NTA  encompasses  a  number  of  non-traditional 
security  and  economic  policy  areas.  Moreover,  EU-US  relations  span  a  number  of 
realms  of  theory,  including  various  international  relations  theories,  regional  integration 
theories,  and  transnational  or  global  governance  theories.  This  chapter  seeks 
theoretical  explanations  tor  EU-US  institution  'building  and  policy  making  trom  a 
number  of  different  sources.  The  study  examines  transatlantic  relations  at  the  highest 
level  of  interstate  negotiation  while  considering  transatlantic  policy  making  at  the 
most  micro  level,  thereby  not  limiting  itself  to  the  confines  of  either  the  international 
relations  or  comparative  politics  literatures.  In  order  to  address  the  multiple  layers  of 
analysis  that  exist  in  EU-US  relations,  it  is  necessary  to  draw  on  themes  and  concepts 
from  multiple  theoretical  approaches. 
One  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  determine  why  the  EU  and  the  US  decided  to  re- 
invent  the  relationship  in  the  1990s.  On  a  general  level,  this  means  questioning  how 
international  relations  are  structured  in  the  increasingly  globalised,  post  Cold  War  era. 
More  specifically,  the  focus  is  on  the  decisions  that  institutionalised  the  transatlantic 
relationship.  What  does  the  existing  literature  convey  about  why  institutions  emerge 
and  the  scope  for  co-operation  through  institutions  such  as  the  New  Transatlantic 
Agenda  (N'FA)'?  Transatlantic  institutions  are  characterised  not  just  as  a  forum  for  co- 
operation  but  as  a  process  designed  f'Or  conflict  mana(Tement  and  policy  output. 
A  second  anu  of  the  chapter  is  to  explore,  within  the  literature,  the  scope  for 
policy  co-ordination  through  the  transatlantic  institutions.  It  Is  argued  that  EU-US 
21 relations  extend  beyond  diplomatic  agreement  into  the  realm  of  global  governance.  An 
important  part  of  the  theoretical  debate  on  EU-US  relations  thus  extends  past  the 
question  of  why  states  co-operate  to  also  address  how  states  co-operate.  How  have  the 
EU  and  US  organised  decision-making  procedures  and  what  determines  how  and 
which  policies  are  pursued?  To  summarise,  this  chapter  develops  a  number  of  themes 
including:  the  process  of  institution  building,  communication  within  transatlantic 
institutions,  the  output  of  policy  co-ordination  and  the  role  of  the  NTA  and  TEP  as 
governance  structures. 
Section  I  examines  the  prospects  and  motivation  for  co-operation  through 
institutions  using  the  established  IR  debates  between  neorealists  and  neoliberal 
institutional  i  sts  and  between  rationalists  and  contructivists.  It  argues  that  rationalist 
and  constructivist  approaches  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  as  demonstrated  by  the  fact 
that  rationalist  approaches  offer  'sound'  social  science  explanations  for  interstate  co- 
operation  at  high  political  levels,  but  that  communication  between  other  actors  is 
under-emphasised.  Section  2  examines  EU-US  relations  not  just  as  a  process  of  co- 
operation,  but  as  a  process  of  governance.  The  reaction  of  states  to  globalisation  is 
considered,  as  is  the  role  of  policy  networks  in  the  process  of  global  governance. 
Section  33  extends  the  governance  debate  and  questions  the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  the 
US  to  govern  at  a  transatlantic  level  under  the  constraints  of  domestic  institutional 
structures.  It  is  argued  not  only  that  the  EU  but  also  the  US  suffers  from  a  capabilities- 
expectations  gap.  Finally,  in  light  of  the  complexities  of  'multi-level'  or  'federal' 
governance,  section  4  seeks  to  build  a  decision-making  model  for  transatlantic 
om,  ertiaiice  which  explains  both  who  governs  and  how.  Drawing  on  Pollack  and  Z__ 
Shaffer's  (2001  )  three  tiered  model  of  transatlantic  levels  and  Peterson  and  Bomberg's 
(1999)  model  of'  (FLj)  decisioii  inaking,  the  new  transatlantic  decision  making  model  L_ 
22 describes  a  process  whereby  intergovernmental,  transgovernmental  and  transnational 
actors  make,  set  and  shape  transatlantic  policy.  It  also  acknowledges  that  different 
theories  might  'best'  explain  different  stages  and  different  levels  of  the  transatlantic 
policy  making  process. 
1)  International  Relations  Theory:  Institutions,  Communication  and  Interests 
International  relations  (IR)  literature  is  a  logical  starting  point  for  a  theoretical 
discussion  on  the  transatlantic  relationship,  because  ultimately  transatlantic  relations 
are  the  result  of  diplomatic-strategic  relations,  cross  border  transactions  and 
communication  between  sovereign  powers.  7  Broadly,  international  relations  theories 
explain  fragmentation  (caused  by  political  and  economic  conflict)  and  integration 
(through  for  example  alliances,  treaties  and  agreements)  in  the  international  system.  In 
short,  IR  sheds  light  on  what  drives  co-operation  and  conflict  between  the  EU  and  the 
us. 
Different  IR  theories  offer  very  different  views  of  relationships  in  the 
international  system,  be  they  international,  inter-state,  intergovernmental  or 
transnational.  This  thesis  explores  debates  between  international  relations  theories- 
about  why  states  co-operate  generally  and  why  the  EtJ  and  US  chose  to  institutional  i  se 
the  relationship  in  the  1990s.  It  questions  further  not  only  why  they  should  choose  to 
co-operate  but  how.  What  does  the  outcome  of  individual  policy  agreements  and 
declarations  tell  us  about  the  purpose  of  the  new  dialogue  and  how  actors  operate 
within  it? 
I'liese  characteristics  are  dra%ý  n  from  Bro,,  N,  n's  (  1997)  definition  of  international  relations. 
23 The  Old  Dehate:  Neorealism  and  Neoliheralism 
Great  changes  in  the  international  political  and  economic  systems  that  marked  the 
1990s  launched  international  relations  theorists  into  a  frenzied  search  for  a  model 
qualified  to  explain  structural  shifts  away  from  the  Cold  War  towards  a  'new  world 
order'.  The  neoreal  1  st-neo  liberal  debate  emerged  in  the  early  1990s  as  an  extension  of 
the  Cold  War  discussions  about  the  prospects  for  co-operation  and  conflict  as 
determined  by  the  structure  of  the  international  system  and  the  process  of  international 
negotiations.  Most  international  relations  theorists  tried  explaining  post-Cold  War 
transformations  with  concepts  derived  from  realist  and  liberal  international  relations 
theories.  The  neorealist-neoliberal  discourse  revealed  the  first  signs  of  a  breakdown  in 
the  clear  divide  between  realist  and  liberal  paradigms  (with  realist  conceptions  of 
conflict  on  one  side  of  the  line  and  liberal  notions  of  co-operation  on  the  other),  but 
the  two  theories  have  always  maintained  different  assumptions  about  the  nature  of 
conflict  and  co-operation  between  the  EU  and  the  US. 
The  logic  of  neorealism 
Neorealism  is  based  on  a  clear  set  of  assumptions.  It  is  argued  that  the  structure  of  the 
international  system.  rather  than  the  decisions  made  by  individual  agents,  shape 
changes  and  determine  outcomes  in  international  politics  (Waltz  1986:  71).  The  state 
is  the  primary  level  of  analysis,  and  because  states  are  unitary  agents,  domestic  and 
non-state  actors  are  not  considered  major  players  in  international  negotiations.  Waltz 
(1986:  89-90)  argues  that  it  is  states  that  'set  the  scene'  and  'set  the  rules  of  the 
intercourse'. 
Neorealism  rests  on  the  logic  that  states  are  more  likely  to  be  in  conflict  than  to 
co-operate  because  decisions  are  determined  by  the  structure  of  the  international 
24 system  which  is  characterised  by  unrest  and  anarchy.  In  a  system  that  lacks  order, 
conflict  is  inevitable  because  states  are  preoccupied  with  material  gains  such  as 
security  and  power.  8  International  institutions  are  deemed  largely  unable  to  mitigate 
the  constraining  effect  of  anarchy  on  interstate  co-operation  (Baldwin  1993:  8). 
However,  neorealists  concede  that  states  may  bargain  mainly  when  they  wish  to  avoid 
the  high  cost  of  conflict,  to  preserve  the  peace  and  manage  economic  conflict  (Waltz. 
1979:  111-114,194-199;  Henderson  1998:  15).  Generally  the  scope  for  co-operation 
within  neo-realist  theory  is  limited. 
In  the  early  post  Cold  War  years  neorealists  argued  that  the  transatlantic 
relationship  was  not  defined  by  similar  cultures,  values,  ideology  and  historic  ties  but 
by  the  relative  distribution  of  power  between  the  allies  (Krasner  1993:  21).  EU-US  co- 
operation  was  viewed  as  a  reaction  to  structural  shifts  which  left  the  international 
system  less  predictable  and  more  dangerous  (Mearsheimer  1990b).  European  interest 
in  pursuing  the  new  transatlantic  dialogue  was  seen  as  a  way  to  keep  America  engaged 
in  European  security,  amidst  rising  fears  that  it  would  return  to  isolationalism-9  The 
US's  interest  in  co-operating  with  Europe  was  seen  as  a  way  to  maintain  'a  seat  at  the 
European  table'  and  gain  access  to  European  markets  in  light  of  the  growing  threat  of 
'Fortress  Europe.  '  10 
Whether  they  portrayed  the  international  system  as  hegemonic  (see  Keohane 
1984),  unipolar  (Huntington  1991)  or  multipolar  (see  Mearsheimer  1990a,  1990b), 
Waltz  (1986:  99)  argues  that,  'among  men  as  among  states,  anarchy  or  the  absence  of  govemment,  is 
associated  with  the  occurrence  of  violence'.  Grieco  (1990:  40)  adds,  'Wishing  to  remain  independent 
aaents,  states  always  assess  relationships  including  cooperative  arrangements  based  on  common 
interests-  in  terms  of  their  impact  and  their  relative  capacity.  '  Power  is  also  considered  to  be  fungible, 
so  it  is  argued  for  example  that  military  power  can  translate  into  economic  power. 
'Declinists'  argued  that  the  US  has  lost  its  'competitive  edge',  due  to  imperial  over-stretch  (Kennedy 
1989:  472)  and  the  relative  power  gains-such  as  monetary  reserves,  trade,  technology  of  its  allies  (Japan 
and  Germany)  (Krasner  1993:  22-23) 
"'  Fortress  Europe  \ý  as  a  phrase  used  in  the  late  I  980s  and  1990s  to  illustrate  the  fear  that  the  Single 
European  Market  would  build  a  common  external  tariff  wall  around  Europe  that  would  block  US 
imports. 
25 neorealists  tended  to  reject  the  possibility  of  a  true  transatlantic  partnership,  arguing 
that  power-motivated  behaviour  would  engender  mostly  conflict  in  EU-US  relations. 
Because  neorealists  characterise  the  relationship  in  terms  of  specific  deals  rather  than 
general  principles  (Krasner  1993:  41),  their  analyses  stress  individual  disagreements 
rather  than  overarching  agreements.  Disunity  in  the  Uruguay  Round  of  the  GATT 
provided  ample  ammunition  for  neorealist  attacks  on  the  transatlantic  partnership,  as 
did  the  EU-US  failure  to  agree  on  a  new  approach  for  the  Millennium  round  of  the 
WTO.  Neorealists  tend  to  downplay  the  expanded  scope  of  the  transatlantic 
relationship  through  joint  agreements,  in  areas  of  non-traditional  foreign  policy  co- 
operation,  such  as  human  rights,  energy  conservation,  trafficking  in  women,  and  the 
promotion  of  democracy  world-wide.  Rather  they  emphasise  state  attempts  to  maintain 
minimum  sovereignty  loss.  In  short,  neorealism  does  not  explain  patterns  of  co- 
operation  (Milner  1997:  7;  Haas  1992:  2)  and  in  doing  so  disregards  the  prospect  for 
transatlantic  institutional  isation.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  questions  whether 
neorealism  makes  the  relationship  seem  much  more  hostile  and  endangered  than  it 
really  is. 
The  logic  of  neoliberalism 
Neoliberal  institutionalists  share  many  realist  assumptions.  For  example,  they  agree  on 
the  primacy  of  the  state  and  of  international  over  domestic  politics.  However,  they 
contend  that  neorealists  were  too  pessimistic  about  the  prospects  for  co-operation,  both 
during  and  especially  after  the  Cold  War  (Keohane  1993b:  277;  Baldwin  1993:  5). 
Institutionalists  argue  that  states'  actions  are  still  very  much  interest  driven  but  they 
are  more  willing  to  admit  that  co-operation  is  likely  when  states  have  mutual  interests 
prompted  by  economic  and  ecological  interdependence  and  that  they  will  continue  to 
26 co-operate  as  long  as  global  threats  plague  the  international  environment.  'Complex 
interdependence'  connects  states,  and  the  build  up  of  institutions,  shared  values  and 
norms  are  seen  as  a  way  of  facilitating  co-operation  in  order  to  maintain  peace  and 
stability  (Keohane  and  Nye  1977;  1986).  11  Neorealists  and  institutionalists  hold 
similar  views  about  the  underlying  rationale  driving  international  co-operation. 
Institutional  i  sts  borrow  the  realist  conception  of  'distribution  of  power'  to  explain  the 
motivations  of  states.  Keohane  (1993:  288)  argues  that  political  leaders,  in  order  to 
serve  a  state's  interests,  must  anticipate  the  likely  actions  of  partners  or  foes  when 
seeking  to  maximise  expected  utility  gains. 
So  institutions  are  believed  to  be  a  way  for  leaders  to  make  the  international 
environment  more  predictable.  Institutional  i  sts  question  Waltz's  emphasis  on  the 
structure  of  the  international  system,  preferring  instead  to  concentrate  on  the  process 
of  international  politics,  which  they  see  as  a  process  for  the  management  of  conflict 
(Keohane  and  Nye  1993:  4-5).  Where  mutual  interest  exists,  international  institutions 
acting  as  'brokers  and  negotiators'  serve  state  interests  by  mediating  policy  co- 
ordination  among  powerful  actors.  They  influence  the  policy  agenda  by  opening 
channels  of  communication,  creating  value  networks  between  states  and  providing 
focal  points  of  co-ordination  (Keohane  et  al  1993:  8,  Keohane  and  Nye  1993:  3,7). 
International  institutions  also  reduce  the  likelihood  of  conflict  by  creating 
opportunities  for  negotiations,  reducing  uncertainty  about  others'  policies  and 
affecting  leaders'  expectations  of  the  future  (Keohane  19933b:  284). 
The  acceptance  by  neoliberals  that  collective  action  might  be  possible  through 
institutions-  albeit  qLialiFied  -  helps  explain  why  the  EU  and  US  would  undergo  a 
''  'Complex  interdependence'  is  defined  by  Keohane  and  Nye  (1989:  249)  as  'a  situation  among  a 
number  of  countries  in  which  multiple  channels  of  contact  connect  societies  (that  is,  states  do  not 
monopolize  these  contacts):  there  is  no  hierarchy  of  issuesý  and  military  force  is  not  used  by 
uovernments  towards  one  another.  ' 
27 process  of  institution  building  (through  the  TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TEP)  and 
institution  enlargement  (of  NATO  and  the  WTO).  Even  during  the  Cold  War,  the 
development  and  survival  of  post  war  institutions  such  as  the  IMF,  the  World  Bank, 
the  WTO,  NATO  and  the  EU  validated  institutionalism  (Keohane  1993:  284).  In  the 
early  post-Cold  War  years  Keohane  (19931:  285)  predicted  that  international 
institutions  would  increase  in  number,  scope  and  regulatory  reach.  NATO  has  not 
only  remained  involved  in  Europe  but  has  undergone  a  process  of  enlargement  and 
reinvigoration.  The  WTO  broadened  and  deepened  the  economic  principles  upheld  by 
the  GATT.  12  The  Treaty  of  Maastricht  increased  the  scope  and  depth  of  European 
institutions,  and  made  way  for  the  institutional  i  sati  on  of  the  transatlantic  relationship 
through  the  TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TER  EU  and  US  leaders  have  created  institutions 
to  try  and  diffuse  conflict  and  much  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue  is  conducted  through 
institutionalised  networks. 
Institutionalism  is  a  more  logical  analytical  framework-  than  neorealism-  for  a 
thesis  that  seeks  to  explain  why  the  EU  and  US  would  choose  a  strategy  of 
institutionalisation.  Institutionalism  accepts  that  states  have  an  interest  in  building 
'institutions'  and  that  states  choose  to  build  institutional  ties-  such  as  networks-  in 
order  to  foster  co-operation.  Institutionalism  is  more  limited,  however,  in  addressing 
the  second  question,  which  is  how  states  interact  within  those  institutions.  By 
downplaying  the  impact  that  domestic  actors'  have  on  international  politics,  it  fails  to 
recognise  the  range  of  actors  and  multiple  levels  of  networks  which  are  involved  in  the 
process. 
For  example.  the  WTO  membership  broadened  in  2001  to  141  countries  and  opened  up  negotiations 
with  China.  The  WTO  also  introduced  dispute  settlement  mechanisms  to  the  multilateral  trading,  system. 
28 The  New  Debate:  The  Rationalist-Constructivist  Divide 
A  number  of  approaches  to  international  relations  emerged  in  the  late  1990s  that 
questioned  the  shared  neorealist  and  neoliberal  assumptions  about  the  primacy  of 
international  decision  making  and  of  the  unitary  action  of  states.  Milner  (1997),  Risse 
(1995a)  and  Putnam  (1993;  1998)  stressed  the  importance  of  multiple  actors  and 
multiple  levels  in  international  negotiations.  The  idea  that  domestic  and  international 
politics  were  not  separable,  and  that  domestic  agents-  be  they  political  institutions, 
domestic  groups,  state  or  non-state  actors-  influenced  international  negotiations,  united 
a  number  of  emerging  IR  theories.  Co-operation  in  general  and  the  importance  of 
international  institutions  specifically  ceased  to  establish  a  clear  distinction  between 
paradigms.  A  new  debate  emerged  in  the  late  1990s  centring  .  around  actors' 
motivations  for  pursuing  institutional  arrangements.  Two  factors  contributed  to 
rationalist-constructivist  debate.  On  the  one  hand  Legro,  and  Moravscik  (1999)  argued 
that  the  divide  between  realist  and  liberal  camps  became  less  structured  as  realist, 
institutionalist  and  liberal  studies  'rallied'  around  the  idea  that  states  are  rational  actors 
motivated  by  self-interest..  It  was  argued,  'The  category  of  'realist'  theory  has  been 
broadened  to  the  point  that  it  signifies  little  more  than  a  generic  commitment  to 
rational  state  behaviour  in  anarchy-  that  is  "minimal  realism"'  (Moravscik  and  Legro, 
2000:  184). 
On  the  other  hand  the  rise  of  rationalism  was  countered  by  a  resurgence  of 
constructivist  approaches  to  international  relations.  Pollack  (2001)  argues  that 
contructivist  theories.  typically  criticised  by  rationalists  for  failing  to  produce 
rigorous,  'oood  social  science"  because  they  do  not  focus  on  empirical  work  or  testable  Zý  -- 
hypotheses.  had  by  the  end  of  the  1990s  significantly  matured  through  "Torks  such  as 
29 Hooghe  (1999a,  1999b)  and  Checkel  (1998;  1999).  13  Checkel  (1998)  noted  that 
constructivists  had  demonstrated  that  social  construction  matters-  if  not  when,  how 
and  why  it  occurs.  Ontological,  methodological  and  epistemological  differences 
remained  intact,  if  not  overstated.  But  constructivists  managed,  at  least,  to  broaden  the 
theoretical  debate  about  the  role  of  culture,  ideas  and  norms  in  international  relations 
(Risse  2000). 
14 
The  rationalist-  contructivist  divide  is  summarised  by  the  distinction  between 
the  logic  of  consequentialism  -  associated  with  rationalists-  and  the  logic  of 
appropriateness  -  used  by  constructivists  (who  themselves  have  'borrowed'  the 
concept  from  institutionalism:  see  March  and  Olsen  1999;  Peters  1999;  Boekle  et  al 
2000).  The  two  logics,  explained  below,  offer  competing  explanations  for  why  the  EU 
and  the  US  chose  to  establish  new  transatlantic  institutions,  and  why  under  those 
institutions  dialogue  has  been  encouraged  between  policy  makers  as  a  means  of 
attaining  interest  convergence  or  norm  compliance  in  a  number  of  policy  sectors.  Both 
constructivists  and  rationalists  concede  that  institutions  and  communication  'matter' 
between  agents  but  they  offer  different  explanations  as  to  why  (Checkel  1998,1999). 
The  'logic  of  consequentialism' 
The  logic  of  consequentialism  is  based  on  realist  assumptions  that  ultimately  the  goal 
of  actors  is  to  maximise  their  material  gains.  Rationalist  theories-  which  can 
incorporate  both  neorealist  and  neoliberal  approaches  to  international  relations-  are 
united  by  claims  that  actors  are  motivated  by  self  interest.  They  seek  to  realise 
Ile  aroues  that  scholars  like  Checkel  and  Hoo-he  have  sou-1u.  to  understand  conditions  under  which 
norms  constitute  actors  and  sutýject  their  hypotheses  to  falsification. 
14  Generally.  rationalists  ar-ue  that  there  are  ontological,  methodological  and  epistemological  n 
differences  bemeen  rationalism  and  constructivism.  Constructivists  are  criticised  for  failing  to  maintain 
falisfiable  h,,  potheses  or  employ  causal  explanations.  Onotoloaical  and  methodological  differences  stem 
30 preferences  and  use  strategic  action  to  attain  utility  maximisation.  Game  theorists 
have  attempted  to  bridge  the  gap  between  domestic  and  international  politics  to 
explain  the  outcome  of  interstate  bargaining.  Moravcsik  (1998)  argues  in  the  context 
of  the  EU  that  preferences  are  formed  prior  to  interstate  bargaining  between  chiefs  of 
government.  Putnam  (1993:  70-7  1)  describes  diplomacy  as  a  'two  level'  game  where 
leaders  simultaneously  try  to  rationally  calculate  strategies  that  successfully  appease 
both  levels.  Putnam's  dual  game  theory  envisions  America's  position  during 
international  negotiations  as  a.  product  of  international  and  national  interest  and  the 
E-ropean  Union's  as  a  reconciliation  of  the  global,  the  Community  and  the  national  Ew 
levels  (Putnam  19931:  80).  The  underlying  thesis  of  the  logic  of  consequentialism  is 
that  the  EU  and  the  US  choose  to  co-operate  only  where  it  is  in  their  best  interest  to  do. 
so.  The  decisions  to  pursue  the  Transatlantic  Declaration,  the  New  Transatlantic 
Agenda  and  the  Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership  can  be  characterised  as  interstate 
bargains  that  represent  both  EU  and  US  attempts  to  secure  gains-  be  they  security 
assurances  or  economic  welfare. 
The  'logic  of  appropriateness' 
Constructivists  argue  that  the  logic  of  consequentialism  oversimplifies  the  decision 
making  process.  While  rationalists  tend  to  focus  on  the  behaviour  and.  policy 
outcomes,  social  constructivists  tend  to  concentrate  on  the  larger  process  characterised 
by  communicative  action  and  discourse  between  actors  (Risse  1995b:  6-7). 
Constructivists  argue  that  self-interest  is  not  the  sole  instigator  of  international  politics, 
rather  they  emphasise  common  values.  norms  and  institutionalised  decision-  making 
procedures  that  determine  the  way  democracies  interact  in  the  international  system 
frorn  constructivists'  focus  oil  individuals  rattler  than  state  behaviour.  Risse  (2000)  and  Checkel  (1998) 
araue  however  that  the  ,  ap  between  rationalist  and  constructivist  methodologies  is  shrinking. 
31 (Lumsdaine  1998:  6).  15  The  logic  of  appropriateness  suggests  that  actors  are  guided 
not  by  material  gain  but  by  a  desire  to  adhere  to  'rule-based'  systems.  The  rules  that 
actors  follow  are  directly  tied  to  their  identities  which  are  determined  by  shared  ideas 
and  norms.  Like  institutionalists,  constructivists  argue  that  norms  and  shared 
information  can  foster  co-operation.  Norms  are  not  a  product  of  actors'  interests  but 
rather  precede  them,  and  states'  interests  are  defined  through  social  communication 
(see  also  Boekle  etal  1999;  Ruggie  1998).  Under  the  logic  of  constructivism,  policy 
transfers  -  through  the  exchange  of  expertise  and  ideas  -  are  part  of  a  process  of  policy 
learning  where  agents'  beliefs  may  be  altered  through  the  dialogue  process  (Stone 
2000).  16 
Constructivists  emphasise  the  importance  of  communication  and  Risse  (2000) 
argues  that  'communicative  action'  extends  beyond  the  logic  of  appropriateness  to 
encompass  a  'logic  of  truth  seeking  or  arguing.  '  He  argues  that,  'international 
institutions  create  a  normative  framework  structuring  interaction  in  a  given  issue  area. 
They  often  serve  as  arenas  in  which  international  policy  deliberation  can  take  place' 
(Risse  2000:  15).  The  transatlantic  community  is  viewed  as  sharing  a  collective. 
identity,  as  well  as  values  and  norms  which  arguably  constitute  the  'common  life 
world'  discussed  by  Risse.  Transatlantic  institutions,  such  as  the  NTA,  which  act  as 
policy  forums,  make  up  the  structured  'normative"  framework  *and  the  'new 
transatlantic  dialogue'  fulfils  a  number  of  conditions  which  precede  'truth  seeking' 
behaviour.  One  is  the  institutionalisation  of  issue  areas;  a  conscious  effort  by  actors  to 
construct  a  'common  lifeworld'  through  the  build  up  of  dialogues.  These  dialogues 
seek  to  compensate  for  the  uncertanity  of  interests  or  a  lack  of  knowledge  between 
1ý  Norms  are  defined  bN  Peterson  a  rid  Bom  ber-  (1999:  53)  as  'principles  of  'right  action'  saving  to 
pide,  control  or  regulate  proper  and  acceptable  behaviour  in  a  group. 
Policy  transfer  refers  to  a  process  NNhereby  actors  learn  frorn  one  another  about  'best  practices.  ' 
32 actors  in  certain  policy  sectors  and  the  build  up  of  non-hierarchical  relations  within 
dense,  informal,  network-like  settings  (Risse  2000:  19). 
Multi-level  Communication,  Multiple  Motives? 
Both  rationalist  and  constructivist  approaches  to  international  relations  shed  light  on 
the  transatlantic  decisions  under  scrutiny,  particularly  those  which  established 
transatlantic  institutions  in  the  1990s  and  sought  policy  convergence  in  areas  of  shared 
interest.  Checkel  (1999)  argues  that  both  rationalists  and  constructivists  capture  and. 
explain  important  elements  of  the  norm  compliance  process-,  and  that  the  two 
paradigms  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  Could  it  be  that  different  levels  of  interstate 
interaction  are  driven  by  different  rationales? 
Rationalist  explanations  for  co-operation  are  more  convincing  than 
constructivist  explanations  at  high  political  levels  where,  for  example,  institution 
building  and  overarching  agreements  arc  clearly  the  results  of  interest  driven 
cost/benefit  calculations.  It  is  argued  in  this  thesis  that  these  agreements  are  a  way  to 
maintain  the  alliance  between  Europe  and  America,  which  both  sides  had  an  interest  in 
protecting.  Transatlantic  leaders  worked  under  the  knowledge  that  common  values 
were  not  enough  to  keep  the  alliance  together.  Under  a  rationalist  institutionalist 
approach  to  IR,  it  can  be  argued  that  transatlantic  institutions  were  created  as  a  wav  of 
fostering  shared  interest  in  co-operation  and  establishing  norms.  The  TAD,  the  NTA, 
and  the  TEP  were  stressed  as  ways  to  facilitate  goals  such  as  liberalising  the 
transatlantic  marketplace,  burden  sharing  in  Eastern  Europe  and  combating 
transnational  challenges.  Chapter  33  discusses  in  more  detail  the  establishment  of  these  Z7 
institutions  and  the  interests  that  drove  them. 
33 On  the  second  point  of  interest-  the  conduct  of  dialogue  and  production  of 
policies  under  transatlantic  institutions-  constructivist  arguments  are  harder  to  dismiss. 
The  NTA  specifically  outlines  a  number  of  policy  sectors  where  the  EU  and  US  have  a 
broad  interest  in  co-operating.  It  can  be  argued,  however,  that  this  agreement  forms  the 
boundaries  or  establishes  the  rules,  for  actor  compliance  17  on  a  number  of  shared 
norms.  At  the  level  of  daily  interaction  between  actors  through  transatlantic  dialogue, 
the  emphasis  is  on  communication  and  information  sharing.  An  important  test  for 
constructivism  comes  from  examining  the  level  of  importance  of  the  transatlantic 
dialogue.  The  distinction  between  rationalist  and  constructivist  explanations  for 
communication  between  actors  is  summarised  by  Checkel's  (1999:  10)  statement, 
Using  different  language  to  make  the  same  point  many  rational  choice  scholars 
emphasise  so-called  simple  learning,  where  agents  acquire  new  information  as 
a  result  of  interaction.  At  a  later  point  (that  is,  after  the  interaction),  this 
information  may  be  used  to  alter  strategies,,  but  not  preferences,  which  are 
given.  Not  surprisingly,  all  this  rationalist  theorizing  reduces  communication  2-1 
and  language,  which  are  central  to  any  process  of  social  learning,  to  the  'cheap 
talk'  of  agents  with  fixed  identities  and  interests.  The  result  is  to  bracket  the 
interaction  context  through  which  agents  interests  and  identities  may  change. 
One  the  other  hand, 
Specifically,  the  contructivist  value  added  should  be  to  explore  complex  social 
learning,  which  involves  a  process  whereby  agent  interests  and  identities  are 
shaped  through  and  during  interaction.  So  defined,  social  learning  involves  a 
break  with  strict  forms  of  methodological  individualism. 
From  a  theoretical  perspective  this  thesis  seeks  to  test  whether  the  construction  of  the 
NTA  has  resulted  in  a  process  xvIiere  communication  between  transatlantic  actors  is 
,  cheap  talk"  xNhich  may  be  used  to  foster  a  general  sense  of  co-operation  but  not  to 
Compliance  is  defined  by  Checkel  (  1999:  3)  as  the  extent  to  which  agents  act  in  accordance  with  and 
fulfilment  of  the  prescriptions  contained  in  international  rules  and  norms-  and  not  socialisation. 
34 change  preferences  (as  rationalists  explain)  or  if,  as  constructivists  contend,  we  find  a 
complex  social  learning  process  whereby  agents'  interests  and  identities  are  shaped 
through  and  during  interaction  (distinction  made  by  Checkel  1999:  10).  The  real 
question  is  whether  actors  have  'fixed'  preferences  in  negotiating  agreement  under  the 
NTA  or  whether  the  output  of  policy  agreements  under  the  NTA  is  actually  shaped 
through  transatlantic  dialogue? 
To  summarise,  (see  table  2.1)  it  is  argued  here  that  the  decision  to  build  a 
framework  for  co-operation  is.,  as  explained  by  rationalists,  interest  driven.  However, 
the  NTA  common  norms  2nd  constnicted  a  rule  based  svstem  within  which 
the  actors  have  communicated  on  specific  issue  areas.  It  is  then  possible  that 
transatlantic  policy  decisions  are  the  result  of  communicative  action  and  fulfil  norm 
compliance  within  a  rules  based  system.  In  short,  the  argument  is  that  the  decision  to 
establish  a  rules  based  system  is  rational  (as  discussed  in  chapter  3)  but  the  jury  is  out 
on  how  actors  operate  within  that  system.  The  goal  of  this  thesis  is  to  determine 
whether  the  communication  between  transatlantic  actors  leads  to  a  convergence  of 
preferences  or  is  simply  a  means  of  fostering  co-operation  through  understanding. 
Table  2.1  Transatlantic  Decisions  in  Theory 
Decision  to  Co-operate  -NTA  Agreement  00  Policy  Making  Decisions 
(Interest  Driven)  (Established  Norms)  (Goal:  Norm  Compliance) 
(Process  of  communicative  action) 
2)  The  Governance  Literature:  Responses  to  Globalisation 
In  both  the  comparative  politics  and  European  studies  literatures,  interstate  co- 
operatiori  is  viewed  not  only  as  the  product  of  political  and  economic  shifts  in  the 
Compliance  research  locuses  on  centrally  on  short  term  processes  coercion,  sanctions  etc. 
35 international  system,  but  also  as  a  policy  response  to  a  structural  shift  in  power  from 
goverm-nents  to  markets.  Increased  transnational  movement  of  goods,  services,  money, 
people,  technology  and  ideas  have  made  it  increasing  difficult  to  govern  as  individual 
states.  Globalisation  presents  a  number  of  economic  and  political  challenges  to  the 
way  that  states  govern  as  the  movement  of  production  and  capital  blurs  the  lines  of 
control  between  the  state  and  the  market.  It  is  not  just  the  relative  power  of  other  states 
that  matter,  but  the  impact  of  market  forces  and  transnational  actors,  such  as 
multinational  corporations  and  transnational  terrorists.  The  literature  on  global  or 
tr,  qnsn.  qtinn,  9l  go-vernance  questions  how  states  balance  the  goals  of  economic 
liberalisation,  through  the  deregulation  of  markets,  without  undermining  the  capacity 
of  the  state  to  deliver  public  goods  such  as  social  welfare  and  law  enforcement.  Global 
governance  approaches  to  international  politics  shed  light  on  why  the  EU  and  US  have 
chosen  to  emphasise  the  importance  of  policy  co-ordination  in  individual  policy 
sectors,  particularly  dealing  with  economic  liberalisation  and  'global  challenges', 
under  the  NTA. 
The  new  challenges  that  arise  from  globalisation  have  led  some  to  argue  that 
state  is  'shrinking",  (Sbragia  2000)  or  being  hollowed  out  (Strange  1996).  The  reality  is 
that  individual  states  are  becoming  increasingly  unable  to  govern  alone  in  a  world 
characterised  by  rising  transnational  challenges  and  increasing  economic 
interdependence.  Political  integration  is  one  way  to  secure  collective  action,  however, 
state  reluctance  to  give  up  sovereignty  means  formal  integration  arrangements-  except 
and  even  in  the  case  of  the  EU-  are  limited.  Attempts  to  integrate  the  transatlantic 
marketplace  cconornicalk,  through  various  agreements  have  been  r  jected  by  states,  Z-  el 
mainly  France.  given  the  underlying  fear  of  lost  sovereignty  (see  chapter  3)).  Looser 
Forms  of  'governance"  at  ari  international.  regional  or  plurilateral  level  are  a  way  of 
36 coping  with  external  challenges  that  the  state  cannot  manage  alone  (Rosenau 
1992:  19).  18  International  governance  denotes  a  shift  in  authority  from  the  state  to  the 
international  level,  but  where  is  authority  transferred  to  and  what  decision-making 
forums  serve  as  means  of  governing?  How  do  different  institutional  arrangements 
allow  actors  to  perform  the  functions  of  governance  at  a  global  or  transnational  level? 
It  is  argued  that  global  or  transnational  governance  is  conducted  on  three  main  levels, 
first  through  formal  international  institutions,  second  through  government-to- 
government  networks  and  finally  through  private  and  public  policy  networks. 
Governance  without  Government:  State  Extension,  not  Extinction 
Traditionally  global  governance  was  seen  to  emanate  from  international  institutions.  In 
the  early  post  Cold  War  years,  the  concept  of  a  'New  World  Order'  was  promoted  by 
President  George  Bush  (Senior)  who  argued  that  a  new  form  of  collective  governance 
would  emerge  in  the  1990s  based  on  co-operation  within  international  organisations. 
International  institutions  were  championed  as  a  way  to  deregulate  barriers  to  trade 
while  regulating  global  markets  in  labour,  money,  goods,  and  ideas.  Murphy 
(2000:  794)  notes,  however,  that  rising  globalisation  and  integration  did  not  coincide 
with  a  clear  cut  growth  in  the  autonomy  of  international  organisations.  The  putative 
ideological  foundations  of  the  New  World  Order  --  democracy  and  economic 
liberalism  --  were  not  enough  to  intluence  states  to  give  up  sovereignty.  Instead  of 
shifting  up  to  a  supranational  system  of  government,  'governing'  functions  were 
shifted  down  to  public  networks  at  both  an  intergovernmental  and  tra  risgovernmental 
level  (see  section  4  below). 
The  term  plurilateral  is  used  by  Pel4,,.  amns  (  1998)  to  describe  co-operation  between  regions,  in  this 
case  between  the  EIJ,  which  is  a  regional  form  of  governance  and  the  US. 
37 The  question  of  whether  states  could  govern  without  a  central  authority  has 
been  confronted  by  scholars  preoccupied  with  the  idea  of  'governance  without 
government'.  For  example,  Rosenau  (1992:  51).  holds  that  informal  governmental 
mechanisms  --  as  well  as  international  organisations  --  can  exercise  governance.  He 
argues  that,  'Governance  without  government,  based  on  shared  norrns,  does  not 
require  the  exclusion  of  national  or  sub-national  governments  from  the  analysis,  but  it 
does  presume  the  absence  of  some  overarching  governmental  authority  at  the 
international  level  (Rosenau  1992:  7).  The  functions  of  governance  may  be  limited 
when  compared  to  goverm-nent's  rules  because  networks  lack  soverei2n  authority  and 
are  not  established  by  law  or.  are  enforceable  through  the  police.  Still,  Finkelstein 
(1995:  357)  agrees  that  global  governance  can  encompass  many  of  the  functions  that 
governments  perform  at  home.  19  Furthermore,  governance  above  the  state  can  be 
conducted  not  only  through  formal  rules  and  regulations  (see  Cable  1999)  but  through 
shared  norms,  values  and  ideas  (see  Haas  1992)  even  in  the  absence  of  formal 
international  organisations. 
Given  the  lack  of  centralisation  of  authority  at  an  international  level,  many 
scholars  began  to  recognise  that  broader  forms  of  institutionalised  networks  perform 
the  functions  of  governance  (see  Ruggie  1998:  88).  The  emergence  of  public  Z, 
networks-  made  up  of  state  actors-  reinforced  the  idea  that  the  state  was  not,  as  the 
New  World  Order  suggested,  due  to  disappear  but  rather  as  Slaughter  (1997)  argued 
likely  to  disaggregate  (see  also  section  4).  That  the  NTA  is  an  attempt  to  impose 
governance  through  national  bureaucrats  supports  the  argument  made  by  NicolaYdis 
"'  The  list  Of  Such  functions  is  quite  a  long  one.  It  includes  information  creation  and  exchange-, 
forinUlation  and  promulgation  of'  principles  and  promotion  of  consensual  knowledge  affecting  the 
,,  eneral  international  order,  re-ional  orders,  particular  issues  on  the  international  agenda,  and  efforts  to 
influence  the  domestic  rules  and  behaviour  of  statesý  good  offices,  conciliation,  mediation  and 
conipulsor\  resolution  ot'disputes:  regirne  formulation,  tending  and  execution:  adoption  of  rules,  codes, 
38 and  Howse  (200  1:  1)  that  'In  the  long  term,  the  nation-state  may  prove  to  be  more 
resilient  than  many  argue,  but  -only  if  it  is  able  to  adapt,  evolving  or  accepting  modes 
of  governance  that  permit  both  legitimate  and  effective  accommodations  with  the 
many  entities,  both  above  and  below  the  state  which  increasingly  shape  the  public 
world  in  our  centuryý. 
Delivering  Public  Goods  via  Private  Actors 
One  way  states  have  adapted  to  the  growing  need  for  transnational  governance  is 
+1,  --U- 
Lmo  gh  t1ne  employment  of  private,  or  non-state,  as  well  as  public  institutions.  Modes 
of  governance  include  decision-making  forums  such  as  policy  networks  which  bring 
together  state  and  non-state  actors,  particularly  in  regulating  economic  activity  which 
is  increasingly  borderless.  Murphy  (2000:  795)  highlights  the  role  of  private 
authorities  in  regulating  transnational  economic  and  social  life  through,  for  example, 
private  bond  rating  agencies,  global  oligopolies,  global  and  regional  industry  cartels, 
international  mafias.  He  adds  that 
much  of  the  impetus  for  contemporary  public  international  regulation  comes  from 
transnational  interest  groups,  including  associations  of  progressive  firms 
attempting  to  impose  the  same  costs  for  environmental  and  social  standards  on 
their  competitors,  and  or  course,  traditional  consumer  groups,  labour  groups, 
environmentalists,  and  so  forth. 
This  thesis  examines  how  these  types  of  interest  groups  have  played  a  role  in 
regulating  the  transatlantic  marketplace  and  influencing  transnational  governance  . 
It 
should  be  noted  that  niany  political  as  , vell  as  economic  services  are  provided  by  non- 
state  actors.  For  example  NGOs  run  refugee  camps,  provide  disaster  relief  and  carry 
and  reoulationsý  allocation  of  material  and  programme  resources,  provision  of  technical  assistance  and 
39 out  development  projects  (see  Murphy  2000).  Ronit  and  Schneider  (1999:  244)  agree 
that  'where  control  by  neither  market  nor  state  is  possible  or  desirable,  mainly  because 
these  forms  of  control  are  less  cost  effective  or  less  legitimate,  global  governance 
mechanisms  alternatively  can  be  created  by  private  organisations  which  make  efforts 
to  influence  the  policy  process'.  That  concept  is  explored  in  chapter  6,  where 
ccontracting  out'  to  NGOs  is  examined  in  the  EU-US  anti  -trafficking  in  women  policy. 
'Effective'  Governance:  Private  and  Public  Input  in  Policy  Networks 
In  order  to  'govern'  at  a  transnational  level,  actors  usually  must  participate  in 
institutional  i  sed  forums.  The  decentralisation  of  global  governance  means  that  many 
public  and  private  networks  of  actors  perform  the  functions  of  governance.  The  policy 
networks  literature  tries  to  come  to  grips  with  the  shift  from  a  strong  executive  to  a 
more  segmented  mode  of  governance  characterised  by  bargaining  within  and  between 
networks  (Phodes  1997:  4),  at  the  national  and  international  levels. 
A  policy  network  is  a  forum  where  numerous  actors,  all  of  whom  have  the 
ability  to  affect  policy  outcomes,  exchange  resources  and  information  in  order  to 
facilitate  reconciliation,  settlement  or  compromise  between  different  interests 
(Peterson  1995:  77;  Rhodes  1997:  11).  Policy  networks  are  based  on  the  premise  that 
agents,  be  they  regulatory  agencies,  interest  groups,  enterprises,  think  tanks  or 
academics,  participate  in  the  policy  process  by  working  as  partners  on  joint  problem 
solving  (Jachtenfuchs  and  Kohler  Koch  1995:  9).  A  variety  of  specialised 
-communities*  of  agents  may-  form  alliances  and  collectively  try  to  control  or  influence 
decision-inaking  xNitlun  policy  neoxorks.  These  include  epistemic  communities  which, 
as  Haas  (1992:  31)  explains,  are  networks  'of  professionals  with  recognised  expertise 
development  programs:  relief,  h  Liman  itarian,  energy,  disaster  activitiesý  maintenance  of  peace  and  order. 
40 and  competence  in  a  particular  domain  and  an  authoritative  claim  to  policy  relevant 
knowledge  within  that  domain  or  issue-area'. 
A  strong  case  can  be  made  to  suggest  that  policy  networks  and  epistemic 
communities  can  effectively  become  'institutions',  provided  they  are  characterised  by 
substantial  stability,  patterns  of  expectations  between  actors  (that  is,  interest  groups 
expect  to  be  consulted  and  governmental  actors  may  even  relie  on  them  for 
information  and  advice  in  policy  making)  and  a  membership  that  holds  common 
values  (see  Peters  1990:  119).  The  test  for  transatlantic  networks-  at  both  a 
transgovernmental  and  a  transnational  level-  is  whether  they  display  these  properties. 
Another  question  this  thesis  asks  is:  of  what  significance  is  the  organisation  of 
actors  in  policy  networks?  The  literature  on  policy  networks  and  epistemic 
communities  is  consistent  with  the  institutionalist  literature  insofar  as  all  are 
fundamentally  concerned  with  norms  such  as  shared  knowledge,  information  and 
communication.  Institutions.  policy  networks  and  epistemic  communities  are  all 
functionally  similar  in  that  they  are  believed  to  facilitate  co-operation  by  defining 
problems,  identifying  compromises  between  different  interests  and  devising 
international  solutions  for  government  (Haas  1992:  15;  Peterson  1996:  29;  Keohane  et 
al  1993).  Policy  networks  and  epistemic  communities  are  also  identified  by 
constructivists  forums  which  can,  in  effect,  institutional  1  se  ýpolicy  learning'.  For 
example,  Stone  (2000:  66)  notes  that  think  tanks  act  as  'policy  entrepreneurs'  by 
providing  some  of  the  conditions  for  policy  transfer:  developing  knowledge,  assessing 
policy  options  and  drawing  lessons.  In  essence  they  try  to  promote  policy  learning  by 
teaching'  goý'ernrncnts  about  preferred  policy  outcomes.  Policy  networks  are  visible 
at  the  domestic  level  2  ('ý  the  EU  level2'  and  the  transatlantic  leve  122  (see  below)  as 
20  See  Marsh  and  Rhodes  1992  and  Rhodes  1997. 
2'  See  Peterson  1995,  Peterson  and  Bomberg,  1999. 
41 structures  of  governance  (Rhodes  1997:  57).  Policy  networks  are  often  considered  to  be 
a  more  'effective'  mode  of  governance  than,  say,  formal  international  institutions, 
because  they  bypass  political  problems  by  concentrating  on  bureaucratic  and 
technocratic  policy  collaboration.  They  bring  different  interest  groups  into  the  policy 
making  process  and  provide  a  forum  for  many  state  and  non-state  -actors,  thereby 
trying  to  compensate  for  the  complexity  of  multi-level  decision  making.  Peterson  and 
O'Toole  (2001:  46)  note  that  policy  networks  are  likely  to  remain  and  even  increase  in 
importance  in  both  Europe  and  America  because,  'Policies  dealing  with  ambitious  or 
comt)lex  issues  are  likely  to  require  networked  structures  for  execution  and  complex 
issues  will  continue  to  be  on  the  policy  agenda.  '  A  growing  interest  in  resolving 
technical  disputes,  for  example  over  biotechnology,  and  in  harmonising  and  mutually 
accepting  regulatory  standards,  means  that  policy  networks  are  also  likely  to  remain  as 
important  features  in  transatlantic  governance. 
If  policy  networks  have  become  an  important  new  mode  of  transatlantic 
governance,  one  effect  is  to  raise  new  questions  about  the  'legitimacy'  of  EU-US 
decision-making  forums.  Peterson  and  Bomberg  (1999:  269)  argue  that,  'governance 
by  policy  networks  is  not  very  democratic:  the  same  type  of  'democratic  deficit'  which 
plagues  the  EU  is  becoming  visible  in  many  of  the  world's  most  important  zn 
international  institutions'.  Where  policy  networks  are  powerful,  the  policy-making 
process  is  typically  very  technocratic  and  yields  debate  that  is  high  above  the  head  of 
average  citizens.  It  also  shifts  problems  from  the  political  arena,  where  they  are  dealt 
with  by  elected  officials.  to  the  technocratic  arena,  where  bureaucrats  have  more  room 
for  rnanocu,,  ýre.  The  technical  need  to  facilitate  'effective'  governance  has  been 
challenged  by  demands  of  legitimacy.  and  broader  influence,  particularly  from  private 
See  Peterson  1996:  29. 
42 interest  groups  (Peterson  and  O'Toole  2001:  328).  In  the  case  of  transatlantic 
governance,  the  Commission  and  the  US  Administration  have  attempted  to  make  the 
process  more  open  and  transparent  by  allowing  a  wider  range  of  actors  to  participate. 
Chapters  4  and  5  show  that  these  attempts  are  considerably  undermined  by  an 
imbalance  of  power  and  resources  between  business  and  non-governmental 
organisations  and  by  the  limited  participation  and  influence  of  legislators'  networks. 
Nonetheless,  as  discussed  in  section  3  below,  networks  are  an  important  means  of 
facilitating  co-operation  between  two  polities  that  lack  centralised  authority  to  govern 
at  either  a  domestic  or  international  level. 
3)  Transatlantic  Governance:  Capabilities  and  Expectations 
Transatlantic  policy  making  is  both  a  product  of  institutional  i  sation  and  a  process  of 
transnational  governance.  In  order  to  understand  how  the  EU  and  the  US  collectively 
govern  at  the  transatlantic  level,  however,  we  turn  first  to  the  composition  of  EU  level 
and  US  domestic  decision-making  processes  in  order  to  determine:  who  speaks  for 
Europe  and  who  speaks  for  the  US  in  transatlantic  negotiations?  The  nature  of 
transatlantic  decision  making  is  complex  because  both  powers  are  characterised  by 
multiple  layers  of  actors  that  impact  on  the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  the  US  to  act  as 
external  actors.  Two  lenses  can  be  used  to  characterise  the  complex  nature  of  the  EU 
and  US  systems  of  governance. 
First,  multi-level  governance  approaches  to  the  EU  challenge  rationalist,  state- 
centric  theories  such  as  intergovernmcntalism  (see  Moravsick  1998)  which  presume 
that  EU  decision-making  is  dominated  by  Member  States.  Marks  et  al  (1996:  '342) 
argue  that.  'An  alternative  vie,,  N-  is  that  European  integration  is  a  polity  creating 
process  xduch  authority  and  policy-niaking  influence  are  shared  across  multiple  levels 
43 of  government  --  subnational,  national  and  supranational'.  In  this  view  decisions  are 
the  result  of  shared  competencies  between  multiple  layers  of  actors.  Recently  scholars 
have  also  begun  to  apply  this  approach,  which  has  traditionally  been  restricted  to  the 
study  of  the  EU,  to  the  US.  Thus,  it  is  argued  that  it  too  can  be  considered  a  multi- 
level  system  of  governance  due  to  shared  competencies  between  separate  national  as 
well  as  state  institutions  (Smith  1997;  Peterson  and  O'Toole  2001). 
Another  way  to  compare  the  EU  and  the  US  is  through  the  'federal  vision' 
which  according  to  NicolaYdis  and  Howse  (2001)  stresses  the  'process  of  governance 
between  multi-ole  lavers  of  competency'.  'Cooperative  federalism',  in  which  powers 
and  competencies  are  shared  and  treated  as  shared  between  levels,  is  another  way  of 
characterising  the  shared  competencies  of  domestic  actors,  which  the  authors  argue 
implies  shared  authority.  Peterson  and  O'Toole  (2001:  300)  note  that,  'federalism 
usually  gives  rise  to  less  formal  intricate  structures  within  which  a  large  number  of 
actors,  each  wielding  a  small  slice  of  power,  interact.  ý 
Both  approaches  stress  multiple  layers  of  decision  making  and  the  input  of 
multiple  actors  into  a  process  of  'shared'  competency  and  'shared'  governance.  The 
EU  clearly  has  become  a  multi-level  polity  characterised  by  an  intermeshing  of 
European  and  national  institutions  and  with  competencies  that  are  shared  by  actors  at 
different  levels  (Blank  et  al  1994:  3-7,39-40).  The  US  foreign  policy-making  process, 
contrary  to  state-centric  decision-making  models,  is  also  characterised  by  a  separation 
of  powers  between  domestic  institutions.  The  input  of  non-governmental  groups  is 
substantial  and  often  formally  guarenteed.  meaning  that  multiple  actors  are  involved  in  17, 
the  process  of  US  preference  formation.  One  important  effect  is  to  make  transatlantic 
decision-making  an  extremely  complicated  process. 
44 Who  Speaksfor  Europe? 
A  revealing  barometer  of  the  extent  to  which  competencies  are  shared  between 
European  institutions  in  foreign  policy  making  is  the  number  of  articles  that  have  the 
basic  objective  of  determining  'who  speaks  for  Europe'  ?  23  In  external  relations 
competency  is  shared  between  the  Member  States  and  the  Community  and  between 
24 
the  Commission  and  the  Council  (and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  EP) 
. 
In  the  Common 
Foreign  and  Security  Policy  (CFSP),  Europe  lacks  a  clear  spokesperson  -  despite  the 
appointment  of  a  High  Representative,  Javier  Solana  --  because  pillar  two  is 
fundamentally  intergovernmental  (see  Allen  1998).  From  the  viewpoint  of  this  thesis, 
which  deals  primarily  with  trade  or  low  politics,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the 
Commission  has  more  competence  in  foreign  economic  policy.  On  trade  policy  the 
Commission  has  exclusive  competence  to  negotiate  on  behalf  of  the  Community,  but 
even  then  the  EU  does  not  speak  with  one  voice  when  negotiating  with  US,  or  with 
any  external  actor  (see  table  2.2  and  Meunier  and  NicolaYdis  1999:  482).  While  the 
Commission  acts  as  trade  negotiator,  it  is  subject  to  the  Council's  approval  of  a 
negotiating  mandate  and  then  ratification.  In  areas  of  mixed  competency  the 
Commission  is  subject  to  more  intervention  by  the  Members  States,  including  in  a 
number  of  areas  where  it  has  agreed  to  co-operate  with  the  US  for  example  on  services 
and  intellectual  property.  Smith  (1998:  79)  has  argued  that  shared  competencies  in  the 
external  trade  policy  of  the  Union  result  in  a  'negotiated  order'  where  responsibility  is 
shared  and  action  is  the  result  of  a  *negotiated  process'. 
21  See  for  example  AI  len  (1998)ý  Meunier  and  NicolaYdis  (1999):  Meunier  (2000). 
2'  See  for  example  Piening  (1998)  Peterson  and  SJursen  (1998). 
45 Table  2.2  Competency  in  EU  Decision  Making 
Article  133  Authorisation  Representation  Ratification 
Exclusive  Competence  133  Committee,  Commission  Council  (QMV) 
*Most  Trade  Policy  Council  (QMV)  informal  veto 
Mixed  Competence  133  Committee  Commission  Council,  - 
*Services  and  IP  Council  Parliamentary 
ratification 
Based  on  Meunier  and  Nicoloadis  1999:  491 
Rivalry  between  the  Commission  and  the  Council  and  between  EU  institutions  and 
the  Member  States  compounds  claims  that  the  EU  is  a  semi-formed  polity  because  it 
lacks  the  political  authority  to  conduct  a  coherent  foreign  policy  (Laffan  1997:  4). 
Multiple  layers  of  decision-making  create  problems  of  boundary  control  and  boundary 
definition  (Smith  and  Woolcock  1993:  19).  Although  the  Commission  is  able  to 
exercise  strategic  authority  in  some  areas  of  policy  making,  it  is  clear  that  institutional 
deficits  and  the  lack  of  a  single  EU  negotiating  authority  adds  to  the  EU's 
'capabilities-expectations  gap'  (see  Hill  1993),  1996). 
Two  sets  of  negotiations  in  particular  highlight  the  incapacity  of  the 
Commission  to  'deliver*  in  negotiations  with  the  US  in  light  of  Member  State 
intervention.  For  example  in  1.992  the  French  forced  a  watering  down  of  the  original 
Blair  House  Agreement,  on  extending  international  trade  rules  to  agriculture,  after  US 
officials  leaked  its  content.  Commissioner  Brittan  was  reprimanded  by  the  Council  and 
reminded  by  the  French  Prime  Minister  of  his  role  as  a  'servant  of  the  Council'  (see 
also  Meunier  and  Nicola*fdis  1999).  Commissioner  Brittan  again  ran  into  problems 
with  the  French  when  negotiating  the  New  Transatlantic  Marketplace  Agreement  of 
1998.  After  blocking  the  agreemcnt.  the  French  Prime  Minister  accused  Brittan  of 
'runnim,  off  to  negotiate  a  Free  trade  agreernent  \,  vithout  a  mandate. 
46 In  particular,  the  recent  growth  in  the  power  of  the  European  Parliament  - 
including  in  EU  relations  with  the  US  --  has  made  the  governance  of  the  transatlantic 
relationship  a  more  ýmulti-level  exercise'.  A  good  recent  example  is  European 
legislation,  supported  strongly  in  the  EP,  to  regulate  airline  hush-kits,  which  prompted 
a  bitter  EU-US  trade  dispute  (see  chapter  4).  In  short,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  EU's 
emergence  as  a  multi-level  polity  considerably  complicates  transatlantic  governance. 
Who  speaksfor  America? 
EU  negotiators  are  not  the  only  ones  with  their  'hands  tied'  in  transatlantic 
negotiations.  It  can  be  argued  that  the  US  is  also  a  multilevel  system  of  governance 
because  power  is  shared  between  federal  and  states  levels  (see  Smith  1997).  Power 
shifts  take  place  between  the  executive  and  legislature  and  between  state  and  national 
institutions.  Political  parties  complicate  US  decision  making  by  exerting  power 
through  separate  institutions,  exemplified  by  the  friction  between  a  Republican 
Congress  and  a  Democratic  executive  during  the  Clinton  era.  25  Many  scholars  have 
claimed  that  divided  government  in  the  US  impedes  international  co-operation, 
undermines  trade  agreements  and  slows  economic  liberalisation  (see  also  Milner  1997; 
Lohman  and  O'Halloran  1994).  For  example  Karol  (2000:  826)  notes  that  the,  varied 
levels  of  support  political  parties  have  for  liberalisation  affects  US  decision-making,  as 
does  Congressional  approval  of  Executive  powers,  such  as  Fast  Track  negotiating 
authority. 
While  the  Executive  has  the  capacity  to  make  foreign  policy,  Congress  has  a 
role  in  shaping  it  (Peterson  2001  a).  Congress  passes  the  laws  that  are  often  at  the  heart 
of  EU-US  disputes.  For  example  it  introduced  US  extraterritorial  legislation  (see 
2ý  For  discussions  on  the  role  of  US  politics  in  transatlantic  relations  see  Smith  and  Woolcock  1993; 
I'leuser  1996:  Peterson  1994.19W  Smith  1997. 
47 chapter  3)  and  the  Carousel  Retaliation  Act  (see  chapter  8)  which  exacerbated  the 
Helms-Burton  and  banana  disputes.  Congress  also  has  the  power  to  'make  or  break' 
projects  which  require  approval  of  budget  lines.  Chapter  5  discusses  for  example  how 
the  Senate  Finance  committee  undermined  the  State  Department's  attempts  to  fund  the 
Transatlantic  Environmental  Dialogue.  Finally,  the  federal  system  of  government  in 
the  US  means  that  state  legislators  also  have  the  capacity  to  shape  foreign  policy. 
Again,  the  MRA  negotiations  were  complicated  by  state  control  of  the  regulation  of 
services  sectors  and  by  domestic  regulatory  agencies  (see  chapter  7).  In  short  it  is 
arv-ued  here  that  the  US  also  suffers  from  the  capabilities-expectations  gap  which  is 
usually  applied  exclusively  to  the  EU,  particularly  when  the  administration  is  unable 
to  contain  disputes  fuelled  by  Congress  or  Implement  regulatory  agreements. 
Overcoming  the  Capabilities  Expectations-  Gap? 
A  basic  argument  developed  in  this  thesis  is  that  domestic  politics  matter  in 
transatlantic  negotiations.  To  understand  transatlantic  governance,  the  dialogue  must 
be  understood  not  only  as  a  diplomatic  interaction  but  as  a  complex  decision  making 
process,  which  takes  place  at  multiple  levels  and  involves  multiple  actors.  Multi-level 
governance  approaches  are  helpful  in  explaining  how  domestic  actors  influence  the 
transatlantic  process  and  why  negotiations  between  the  Commission  and  the  US 
Administration  are  often  much  more  complicated  than  they  at  first  appear. 
Multi-level  governance  also  reinforces  the  usefulness  of  policy  networks  as 
analytical  tools.  Networks  are  a  way  for  EU  and  US  negotiators  to  accommodate  the 
interests  of  nianý  domestic  actors  before  final  decisions  are  reached.  Peterson  and 
O'Toole  (2001:  101)  note  that  networks  have  become  -default  institutions',  because 
both  the  EU  and  US  are  multi-level  systerns  of  governance  but  also  because  both  sides 
48 are  decentralised  rather  than  centralised  systems  of  governance,  with  the  EU 
ostensibly  governed  by  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  and  the  US  governed  by 
federalism.  The  next  section  examines  in  more  detail  the  types  of  networks  that  have 
been  facilitated  by  the  new  transatlantic  dialogues  and  how  those  networks  operate 
within  a  transatlantic  system  of  governance. 
4)  A  Transatlantic  Decision  Making  Model 
This  thesis  is  not  only  interested  in  the  potential  for  policy  co-operation  or  the  capacity 
fior  nolitio,  91  ýolidaritv  in  transatlantic  relations,  but  also  with  the  transatlantic  dialogue 
as  an  evolving  process.  To  understand  transatlantic  governance  it  is  essential  to 
examine  not  only  the  big  decisions  that  mould  the  contours  of  the  process,  but  also  the 
day  to  day  decisions  which  determine  the  policy  output.  This  section  seeks  to  build  a 
decision  making  model  that  can  account  for  different  levels  of  actor  interaction  and 
different  stages  of  the  policy  process.  The  transatlantic  decision-making  model  * 
outlined  below  seeks  to  explain  not  only  who  governs  but  also  how  they  govern. 
To  distinguish  who  governs  it  is  useful  to  draw  on  and  Pollack  and  Shaffer's 
(2001)  model  of  transatlantic  governance,  which  describes  three  levels  of  co-operation 
created  by  the  NTA.  At  the  intergovernmental  level  the  high  level  contacts  between 
chiefs  of  government  (COG)  lead  to  decisions  which  are  constrained  by  the  domestic 
process.  The  day  to  day  contact  between  lower-level  officials  takes  place  at  the 
trans  governmental  level.  Here  civil  servants  work  with  their  counterparts  to  determine 
ways  to  co-ordinate  and  harmonise  policies.  Finally,  the  transnational  level  is  occupied 
by  the  direct  people  to  people  links  created  by  the  *building  bridges'  chapter  of  the 
NTA.  This  is  where  private  actors  work  through  the  civil  society  process  to  coordinate 
strategies  through  net,,,,  -orks  such  as  the'YABD.  the  TACD  and  the  TAED. 
49 To  understand  how  these  different  types  of  actors  participate  in  the 
transatlantic  policy  process  it  is  useful  to  draw  on  Peterson  and  Bomberg's  decision 
making  model  which  argues  that  different  types  of  decisions  are  made  at  different 
levels  by  different  sets  of  actors  exercising  different  rationale  (see  Peterson  1995). 
Peterson  and  Bomberg  (1999: 
. 
10)  explain  in  the  context  of  the  EU  that  history-making 
decisions  transcend  the  day  to  day  policy  process,  establish  the  scope  for  policy 
making  and  address  questions  of  change  in  governance  (see  table  2.3).  Policy  setting 
decisions  determine  which  choice  of  action  should  be  pursued  by  policy  makers.  In 
other  words  policy  setting  decisions  determine  which  policy  option  will  be  pursued. 
Finally,  policy  shapers  determine  how  to  address  policy  problems.  By  formulating 
different  policy  options  they  address  the  problem  of  'how  do  we  do  itT  (Peterson 
1995:  73-74;  Peterson  and  Bomberg  1999:  16).  The  decision  making.  model  outlined 
below  argues  that  these  intergovernmental,  transgovernmental  and  transnational  actors 
exercise  decision  'making',  'setting'  and  'shaping'  capabilities  through  transatlantic 
institutions. 
Table  2.3  A  Categorisation  of  Decision  Making 
History-  Making 
Decisions 
Policy  Setting  Decisions  Policy  Shaping  Decisions 
Transcend  the  day  to  determine  which  involves  decisions 
day  policy  process  choice  of  action  should  about  how  policy 
Alter  legislative  be  pursued  by  policy  problems  can  be 
procedures,  rebalance  makers  addressed 
the  relative  power  of  deal  with  specific  involves  day  to  day 
institutions  details  of  policy  communication 
take  place  at  the  are  taken  at  the  takes  place  at  the  sub- 
highest  political  level  systemic  level,  deal  systemic  or  meso-  level 
and  with  very  specific  of  policy  making  and 
are  political  decisions  details  of  policy  and  can  be  shaped  by  state 
are  thus  as  well  as  non-state 
are  technocratic  actors 
decisions 
tiasea  on  reterson  anci  tiomt)erg  (1999) 
50 Intergovernmental  Policy  Making 
In  the  context  of  transatlantic  dialogue,  intergoverm-nental  actors  represent  the  highest 
level  of  government  at  EU-US  Summits  (Pollack  and  Shaffer  2001).  The  President  of 
the  United  States,  the  Commission  President  and  the  leader/s  of  the  Council 
Presidency  represent  the  intergovernmental  level.  It  is  at  this  highest  level  of 
exchange  that  the  most  significant  transatlantic  decisions  are  made.  In  the  context  of 
the  transatlantic  relationship  these  actors  are  policy  makers,  because  they  are 
responsible  for  'history  making  decisions'.  History  making  decisions  in  the 
transatlantic  policy  process  are  those  which  form  the  pillars  of  EU-US 
institutional  isation.  They  create  transatlantic  institutions  and  establish  the  scope  for 
policy  reach  by  outlining  broad  intergovernmental  commitments  to  co-operation  in 
certain  policy  sectors.  In  other  words  history-making  decisions  in  the  context  of  the 
transatlantic  relationship  are  decisions  that  conclude,  'we  will  co-operate.  '  The  TAD, 
the  NTA  and  the  TEP  were  all  products  of  such  decisions,  even  if  these  institutions 
now  in  themselves  are  largely  responsible  for  determining  where  the  transatlantic 
process  will  move  and  at  what  pace  it  would  do  so. 
High  level  political  decisions  made  at  the  intergovernmental  level  are  best 
explained  in  the  transatlantic  policy  process  by  rationalists.  26  Decisions  made  at  the 
transatlantic  level  are  the  product  of  rational  decisions  made  on  behalf  of  the 
Americans  by  the  US  President  and  of  Europeans  by  the  President  in  office  of  the 
Council  and  the  President  of  the  Commission.  Power  relations  were  obviously  at  play 
during  the  proposed  New  Transatlantic  Marketplace  agreement,  in  which  a  lesser 
agreement  (or  lowest  common  denominator  bargain)  was  agreed  to  at  the  interest  of 
'6  Peterson  and  Bomberg  (1999:  9)  identify  liberal  intergovernmental  ism  and  neo-functionalism  as  'best' 
theories  for  explaining  and  predicting  decision-making  at  what  they  call  the  EU's  'super-  system  i  c' 
level,  where  history-making  decisions  are  taken. 
51 the  French.  EU  support  for  the  TEP  was  used  as  a  bargaining  tool  to  get  the  US  to 
make  concessions  on  Helms-Burton  (see  chapter  3). 
Intergovernmental  ism  sheds  light  on  one  part  of  the  transatlantic  process,  but 
cannot  account  for  the  whole  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue.  While  rationalists  offer 
suitable  explanations  for  big  decisions  taken  at  the  highest  level,  they  do  not 
necessarily  account  for  interaction  between  trans  governmental  or  transnational  actors. 
More  emphasis  needs  to  be  placed  on  how  decisions  taken  at  the  top  are  constrained 
by  decisions  at  the  bottom.  Drawing  on  Moravcsik's  (1993:  25)  intergovernmental 
logic,  Pollack  and  Shaffer  (2001)  note  that  COGs  can  restrain  domestic  actors 
(including  Member  States)  by  altering  the  domestic  ratification  process,  or  in  the  case 
of  the  NTA  and  the  TEP  by  avoiding  it  altogether.  They  can  influence  domestic 
groups  through  side  payments  (for  example  making  concessions  on  US  sanctions  in 
order  to  get  member  state  support  for  the  TEP)  and  through  manipulating  information 
about  the  agreements.  Nonetheless,  both  sides  are  constrained  by  a  lack  of  consensus 
at  the  top  because  EU  and  US  negotiators  often  find  their  'hands  tied'  in  transatlantic 
negotiations  by  trans  governmental  and  transnational  actors  who  exert  pressure  on 
leaders'  decisions  and  influence  the  process  directly  through  policy  setting  and  policy 
shaping.  Intergovernmental  ism  is  less  suited  for  explaining  the  day  to  day  process 
which  determines  policy  options  and  policy  details  (Peterson  1995-,  Peterson  and 
Bomberg  1999). 
52 Table  2.4  Actors  in  the  New  Transatlantic  Dialogue 
Intergovernmental  Transgovernmental  Transnational 
Actors  Actors  Actors 
President  of  the  US  EU  Ministers-  US  Cabinet  TABD 
President  of  the  SLG  TACD 
Commission 
NTA  Task  Force  TAED 
Council  Presidency 
Leader  Transatlantic  Working  TALD 
Groups 
Transatlantic  Legislators 
Dialogue 
Europol-  FBI 
Transgovern  mental  Decision  Setting 
The  scope  for  influencing  the  transatlantic  policy  process  extends  well  beyond  the 
intergovernmental  level  because  transgovernmental  and  transnational  actors  are  -able  to 
'set'  some  policies  -  that  is,  to  make  choices  between  policy  altematives  -  as  well  as 
to  shape  policy,  or  to  determine  which  options  are  permissiable  (or  not)  and  what  their 
detailed  content  will  be.  The  decisions  to  agree  the  TAD,  NTA  and  TEP  'made 
history'  in  that  they  institutional  1  sed  a  number  of  trans  governmental  and  transnational 
networks  (see  table  2.4-,  chapter  4).  In  trans  governmental  networks,  state  actors  on 
either  side  now  work  directly  with  their  transatlantic  counterparts.  Slaughter's  (1997: 
184)  conception  of  trans  governmental  ism  explains  how  states  have  adapted  to  new 
global  challenges  NAithout  transferrim,  authority  to  non-state  actors.  She  argues  that 
states  have  dissagregated  into  separate.  functionally  distinct  parts.  These  parts-  courts. 
regulatory  agencies,  executives,  and  even  legislatures-  are  networking  with  their 
53 counterparts  abroad,  creating  a  dense  web  of  relations  that  constitutes  a  new, 
transgovernmental  order. 
Between  the  EU  and  the  US,  these  networks  are  formed  by  exchanges  between 
the  EU  Foreign  Ministers,  the  EU  Commissioners,  and  the  US  Cabinet.  These 
transgovernmental  networks  were  institutionalised  originally  in  the  Transatlantic 
Declaration  and  have  continued  to  take  place  on  a  regular  basis.  In  addition,  exchange 
has  taken  place  between  the  Commission  and  the  USTR,  the  European  Parliament  and 
the  US  Congress,  and  the  FBI  and  EUROPOL  under  the  NTA  framework 
Trans  governmental  networks  are  responsible  for  policy  setting  and  shaping 
decisions.  The  power  to  set  policy  typically  rests  with  state  actors  such  as  agencies  of 
the  state  in  the  US  and  EU  ministries  represented  in  the  Council.  The  US  Cabinet,  EU 
Council  Presidency  and  EU  Commissioners  effectively  set  policy,  through  for 
example  (see  also  below)  the  MRA  agreement  (signed  by  the  USTR  and  the  then  DG  I 
Commissioner)  and  the  Positive  Comity  Agreement  (signed  by  the  US  Attorney 
General,  the  Federal  Trade  Commission,  the  Commissioner  for  Competition  and  the 
President-in-Office  of  the  Industry  Council).  27  Certain  agency  directors  can  also  set 
policy  in  some  capacities.  For  example,  the  Implementing  Arrangement  for  Co- 
operation  in  the  Fields  of  Metrology  and  Measurement  Standards  was  signed  by  the 
National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology  Director  and  the  EU  Commission's 
D  irector-  General  for  Research  (see  chapter  4). 
In  other  cases  the  role  of  agency  directors  and  DGs  are  confined  to  shaping 
policy  throupli  various  EU-US  dialoaucs.  The  SLG  Steering  Group  shapes  policy  by 
settino  the  agenda  for  summits.  as  do  the  TEP  Steering  Group  and  the  Troika  political 
directors'  dialogue.  The  *expert  level'  dialooues.  (i.  e.  the  transatlantic  working  groups,  LI 
17  The  Commission's  *settin(,,  '  decisions  are  still  subject  to  ratification  by  the  Council  and  the  European 
Parliament  tinder  EU  decisions  makin-  rules  (see  Peterson  and  Bomber-  1999). 
54 the  NTA  Task  Force  and  the  TEP  working  groups)  shape  the  agenda  by  identifying 
and  working  towards  specific  deliverables  and  by  suggesting  possible  policy  solutions. 
Other  'building  bridges'  dialogues  also  serve  a  shaping  function.  For  example 
exchanges  between  Europol  and  the  FBI  have  been  launched  with  the  intention  of 
finding  joint  solutions  to  deal  with  transnational  crime.  Networks  of  aid  officials  have 
co-ordinated  EU  and  US  projects  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  Africa. 
Table  2.5  Transatlantic  Decision  Making 
of  Actor 
Intergovernmental 
Transgovernmental 
Transnational 
of  Decision 
History  Making 
Policy  Setting  and  Policy  Shaping 
Policy  Shaping 
Transgovernmentalism  has  been  pursued  by  states  because  it  is  a  pragmatic  approach 
to  international  governance.  It  compartmental  i  ses  the  state  into  functional  units  that 
then  serve  as  effective  .  problem  solving  mechanisms  (Slaughter  1997:.  195). 
Trans  governmental  networks  are  effective  because  they  bring  relevant  parties  together, 
and  they  are  more  flexible  than  international  institutions.  Most  importantly,  they 
introduce  a  bias  towards  compromise  in  foreign  policy  making  by  expanding  the  reach 
z:  1  _, 
loss  of  sovereignty  to  a  minimum.  The  logic  behind  of  replations  "Thile  keeping 
transoovernmental  networks  represents  a  new  mode  of  transnational  governance, 
v,  hereby  networks  of'  sub-national  and  supranational  counterparts,  who  performs  the 
55 functions  of  a  world  government,  create  a  genuinely  new  world  order  (Slaughter  1997: 
195). 
Whatever  the  underlying  rationale-  to  be  determined  later  in  this  thesis-  the 
creation  of  institutions  below  the  intergovernmental  level  allows  states  to  decentralise 
some  parts  of  the  decision  making  process.  The  decentralisation  of  decision  making 
aids  the  process  of  transatlantic  governance,  because  as  Slaughter  (1997:  195-196) 
argues  the  disaggregation  of  the  state  'makes  it  possible  to  create  networks  of 
institutions  engaged  in  a  common  enterprise  even  as  they  represent  distinct  national 
interests.  '  It  creates  opportunities  for  domestic  institutions  to  establish  common  causes 
with  their  counterparts,  sometimes  against  the  will  of  fellow  branches  of  government. 
Still,  these  networks  often  do  not  reflect  the  growing  scope  and  depth  of  the 
transatlantic  policy  making  process.  Strictly  transgovernmental  networks  alienate 
important  non-state  actors  from  the  policy  making  process,  thereby  limiting  both  their 
effectiveness  and  legitimacy  (Slaughter  1997:  197).  The  fact  that  most  important 
negotiations  are  now  surrounded  by  a  mixture  of  transnational  and  transgovernmental 
agents,  working  together  as  transatlantic  policy  networks,  illustrates  another  growing 
trend. 
Transnational  Decision  Shaping 
Whereas  trans  governmentalism  represents  a  disaggregation  of  the  state,  the  rise  of 
transnational  networks  highlights  the  increased  role  played  by  non-state  actors.  Non- 
(Yovernmental  actors  influence  transatlantic  decisions  taken  at  the  top  by  exerting 
pressure  through  the  domestic  process  and  participating  in  institut,  networks. 
Tlic  Transatlantic  Business  Dialogue  (TABD).  the  Transatlantic  Consumer 
Dialooue  (TACD).  and  the  Transatlantic  Frivironment  D'alogue  (TAED)  are  all 
56 examples  of  transnational  policy  networks.  The  transatlantic  dialogues  are 
transnational  networks,  in  that  they  are  composed  of  non-state  actors  who  have  an 
interest  or  an  expertise  in  the  given  area.  Their  role  is  to  advise  EU  and  US  state 
actors  on  problems  and  to  provide  expertise  in  respective  policy  sectors.  These 
dialogues  can  also  be  characterised  as  policy  networks  because  they  bring  government 
and  interest  groups  to  one  table.  Epistemic  communities  are  also  gaining  prominence 
in  transatlantic  governance,  due  to  the  very  technical  nature  of  policies  addressed  at 
the  transatlantic  level,  particularly  within  the  regulatory  sector.  Peterson  (1996:  76) 
recognizes  as  epistemic  communities  three  bilateral  working  groups  formed  in  . 1994 
on  foreign  policy  co-ordination,  Eastern  Europe,  and  international  crime  and  identifies 
joint  panels  of  experts  that  have  been  assembled  to  devise  cooperative  strategies  on 
issues  related  to  trade,  science,  technology  and  environmental  protection  (Peterson 
1994:  418).  Expert  level  meetings  and  seminars  have  also  been  employed  to  combat 
cyber-crime,  the  financing  of  international  terrorism,  organized  crime  in  Eastern 
Europe  and  the  informational  society  (SLG  1997). 
Transatlantic  policy  networks  play  an  important  role  in  'shaping'  transatlantic 
policy.  Their  influence  is  typically  exerted  in  early  stages  of  the  transatlantic  policy 
making  process  where  decisions  about  the  substance  of  the  transatlantic  agenda  are 
decided.  It  is  at  the  sub-systemic  or  meso  level  (see  Peterson  1995)  of  policy  making 
that  policy  shapers  provide  the  government  with  specialised  knowledge  required  to 
negotiate  PolicY  agreements.  At  the  transatlantic  level,  the  TABD,  the  TACD  and  the 
TAED  each  present  the  EU  and  US  governments  with  suggested  policy  routes.  The 
goal  of  these  networks  is  to  find  areas  where  they  feel  the  government  can  co-operate 
and  provide  tran  so  ov  crn  mental  actors  with  'ready  made*  policy  solutions. 
57 Different  theoretical  explanations  explain  the  role  played  by  transnational 
networks.  Schaffer  and  Pollack  concentrate  on  IR  theory  and  the  question  of  why 
transnational  networks  emerge.  They  draw  on  scholars  such  as  Keohane  and  Nye 
(1977)  and  Risse  (1995)  who  seek  to  explain  the  role  of  non-state  or  society  actors 
with  liberal  international  relations  theories.  Risse  argues  that  domestic  structures  and 
varying  abilities  build  coalitions  between  NGOs  and  international  institutions  affect 
the  capacity  for  society  actors  to  build  transnational  networks.  Peterson's  interest  in 
policy-shaping  decisions  leads  him  to  concentrate  not  so  much  on  why  networks  form 
but  what  function  they  perform  once  they  do.  Peterson  and  Bomberg  (1999)  explain 
policy  shaping  in  the  context  of  policy  network  literature.  They  argue  that  this  level  of 
decision  making  is  technocratic  due  to  the  specialised  knowledge  required  to  decipher 
policy  details  and  formulate  policy  solutions  (Peterson  and  Bomberg  1999:  21). 
Drawing  on  both  liberal  international  relations  theory  and  policy  network  analysis 
helps  one  understand  how  transnational  actors  come  together,  and  what  benefits  are 
reaped  from  governance  through  networks. 
Towards  a  Synthesis 
Rationalist  and  constructivist  approaches  within  international  relations  theory  agree 
that  institutions  matter.  but  they  offer  different  motivations  for  why  they  are  pursued 
by  states.  It  has  been  argued  that  different  types  of  decisions  may  be  best  explained  by 
different  types  of  rationale.,  so  rationalists  and  constructivists'  approaches  may  best 
offer  explanations  for  different  actors'  decisions.  Rationalists  offer  perspective  on  high 
level  political  or  history-n-iaking  decisions  that  are  interest  driven.  while 
constructivists  may  better  explain  the  role  of  lower  level  civil  servants'  'setting'  or 
shaping'  decisions. 
58 The  existence  of  multiple  types  of  actors  and  multiple  types  of  decisions  points 
to  the  difficult  task  faced  by  transatlantic  actors  trying  to  govern  in  an  increasingly 
transnational  world.  Networks  are  one  way  that  states  seek  to  co-operate.  In  the  case  of 
EU-US  relations,  networks  are  formed  to  accommodate  different  levels  of  dornestic 
actors,  including  state  and  non-state  actors,  Multi-level  governance  in  the  EU  and  the 
US  highlights  the  fact  that  negotiators  have  to  contend  not  only  with  their  foreign 
counterparts  but  with  domestic  rivals.  One  of  the  aims  of  the  NTA  has  been  to  take 
domestic  actors  and  make  them  transatlantic.  The  result,  it  is  argued,  is  a  complex 
structure  of  dialogues  comprised  of  intergovernmental,  transgovernmental  and 
transnational  actors  who  'make,  'set'  and  'shape'  policies.  In  order  for  shaping 
decisions  to  take  place,  however,  at  least  some  logic  of  constructivist  thinking  must  be 
present.  In  order  for  actors  to  jointly  shape  a  decision,  their  dialogue  must  extend 
beyond  the  realm  of  cheap  talk.  Thus,  EU-US  relations  offer  an  interesting  test  case 
for  the  rational  i  st-constructivist  debate. 
Finally  understanding  how  the  EU  and  US  'govern'  means  exploring  how 
different  actors  influence  policy  negotiations.  Thus,  the  remaining  chapters  of  the 
thesis  are  designed  to  track  the  input.,  and  where  possible  the  policy  output,  of  different 
transatlantic  actors.  Chapter  3)  starts  by  examining  the  role  of  intergovernmental 
decision  'makers'  through  three  history  making  decisions  -  those  that  created  the 
TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TEP  --  and  thus  established  the  institutional  and  policy  reach 
of  the  new  transatlantic  dialogue.  Chapter  4  examines  in  more  detail  the  role  that 
transgovernmental  networks  play  in  policy  negotiations.  and  chapter  5  discusses  the 
participation  of  formal  transnatiotial  networks  in  transatlantic  decision  shaping. 
59 Chapter  3 
Yhe  Institutionalisation  of  EU-US  relations  in  the  1990s 
This  chapter  traces  the  institutionalisation  of  the  transatlantic  relationship  in  the  1990s, 
focusing  in  particular  on  two  factors.  It  assesses  the  extent  to  which  policy  issues  have 
been  placed  in  a  bilateral  policy  forum.  The  chapter  examines  the  creation  of  formal 
EU-US  dialogue  structures  to  underpin  the  'new'  transatlantic  dialogue.  Thus,  the 
focus  is  on  bilateral  agreements  between  the  US  and  the  EU,  which  are  the  result  of 
intergovernmental  history  making  ulecisions,  and  on  the  bui-Ild  up  of  interstate 
institutions,  including  formal  intergovernmental,  transgovernmental  and  transnational 
networks  .28 
Three  questions  are  crucial  to  understanding  the  institutionalisation  of  the 
transatlantic  relationship.  First,  how  was  the  relationship  institutionalised?  Second, 
why  was  it  institutionalised?  And  finally,  what  are  the  repercussions  of  the  EU-US 
institution  building  strategy? 
We  first  consider  how  EU-US  relations  were  institutionallsed.  Three 
transatlantic  agreements  signed  in  the  1990s  form  the  pillars  of  EU-US 
institutionalisation:  the  Transatlantic  Declaration  (1990),  the  New  Transatlantic 
Agenda  (1995),  the  Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership  and  the  adjoining 
Transatlantic  Partnership  on  Political  Co-operation  (1998).  These  agreements  marked 
a  shift  in  the  focus  of  European  -American  relations.  While  the  Cold  War  was 
characterised  by  either  multilateral  relations  within  NATO,  the  UN  or  the  GATT,  or 
by  bilateral  relations  bet-ween  the  ITS  and  individual  Member  States,  the  creation  of 
transatlantic  IIIStItUtions  in  the  1990s  marked  the  beginning  of  a  formal  bilateral 
Z:! 
dialogue  bct,  ýNeen  the  US  and  the  EU. 
60 The  second  question  addressed  in  this  chapter  concerns  the  motivation  for 
institutionalisation.  Successive  agreements  expanded  the  relationship  in  scope  and 
substance,  suggesting  that  the  political  will  and  institutional  capacity  to  pursue 
agreements  increased  over  time.  In  that  respect  each  subsequent  agreement  can  be 
characterised  as  a  step  or  'building  block'  in  a  long-term  process  of  institutionalisation 
and  transatlantic  policy  integration.  29  Notably,  this  strategy  reflects  the  nature  of 
integration  within  Europe.  As  Frost  (1997:  71)  argues,  'Just  as  Jean  Monnet's  vision  of 
a  united  Europe  found  initial  expression  in  small  practical  steps,  supporters  of  a 
building-blocks  approach  argue  that  more  ambitious  steps  could  be  undertaken  at  a 
later  date'. 
Finally,  this  chapter  seeks  to  establish  whether  and  how  much  transatlantic 
institutions  matter.  Here,  we  come  to  grips  with  the  most  basic  shortcoming  of 
institutionalist  theory  (see  Peters  1999):  the  inability  to  gauge  precisely  how  much  the 
behaviour  of  social  actors  are  shaped  or  altered  by  institutional  structures.  We  are 
unable  to  provide  a  causal  analysis  of  the  effect  of  transatlantic  institutions  on  the 
nature  of  co-operation  between  the  EU  and  the  US,  but  rather  offer  evidence  based  on 
interviewees'  perceptions  about  the  effect  that  institutionalisation  has  had  on  the 
transatlantic  process.  We  rely  not  only  on  the  capacity  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue  to 
produce  concrete  policy  output  or  'deliverables,  but  also  on  the  capacity  of 
transatlantic  institutions  to  forge  the  channels  of  communication  which,  according  to 
institutionalist  theory,  act  to  foster  co-operation. 
Is  , The  emphasis  is  on  formal  established  decision-i-nakin!  z  networks  rather  than  ad  hoc  contact  between 
actors. 
'9  The  term  is  embedded  in  jargon  taken  from  a  European  Commission  (1995) 
strategy  paper  (See  also  F.  Uracorn  September  1995.  It  refers  to  the  transatlantic  strategy  to  secure  closer 
relations  and  increase  the  scope  for  co-operation  gradually  through  the  incremental  removal  of  specific 
obstacles  to  economic  liberalisation  and  modest  committal  to  political  projects. 
61 The  chapter  is  divided  into  four  sections.  Section  I  examines  the  'old' 
transatlantic  relationship  from  the  post  World  War  11  period  until  the  end  of  the  Cold 
War.  The  following  sections  examine  the  three  agreements  that  established  the 
boundaries  of  a  'new'  transatlantic  dialogue.  Section  2  examines  the  launch  of  the 
TAD,  and  the  creation  of  the  first  formal,  bilateral,  transatlantic  institutions.  Section  3 
discusses  the  expansion  of  institutionalisation  to  the  transgovemmental  and 
transnational  levels  and  the  establishment  of  a  more  comprehensive  framework  for  co- 
operation  under  the  NTA.  Section  4  considers  the  further  institutional  isation  of  EU-US 
relations  via  the  blossoming  economic  dialogue  through  the  TER  Each  section 
considers  why  transatlantic  leaders  chose  to  further  institutionalise  the  relationship  and 
how  the  agreements  were  designed  to  meet  their  preferences.  Each  also  considers  the 
significance  of  the  new  transatlantic  institutional  framework. 
1)  European-American  Relations  through  the  Cold  War 
America  and  Europe  chose  to  co-operate  under  the  Western  Alliance  throughout  the 
Cold  War,  yet  bilateral  initiatives  between  the  US  and  EU  did  not  materialise  despite 
the  Community's  agreements  with  numerous  external  actors  (see  table  3.1).  Two 
attempts  were  made  to  forge  a  more  equal  'partnership'  first,  through  Kennedy's 
Grand  Design  and  second,  with  Nixon's  New  Atlantic  Char-ter,  but  both  initiatives 
failed. 
American  Hegemony  in  the  Post  War  Period 
Europe  and  America  set  out  in  the  early  post  War  years  to  build  a  transatlantic 
partnership  that  would  forge  and  subsequently  reinforce  multilateral  institutions 
governed  by  western  ideals  and  dominated  by  European  and  American  power. 
62 America  took  a  leading  role  in  the  1950s  in  constructing  an  international  order  based 
on  democracy  and  capitalism.  The  US  vision  for  Europe  was  one  in  which  American 
ideals  could  be  exported,  and  Europe  became  a  partner,  albeit  the  weaker  or  junior 
partner,  in  building  the  security,  economic  and  political  institutions  that  anchored  the 
western  order  including  the  Bretton  Woods  monetary  system  (1944)  30  the  GATT 
(1947),  the  UN  (1944)  31  and  NATO  (11947). 
During  this  period  American  power  superseded  that  of  any  other  state.  The 
dollar  dominated  the  economic  system.  NATO,  although  technically  an  agreement 
between  rnoýjor  powers  (Calvocoressi  1991:  175),  was  practically  controlled  by 
American  military  power.  The  US's  leading  role  in  the  Western  order  led  to  the 
depiction  of  the  early  post-war  years  as  a  rising  period  of  American  hegemony  (see 
Keohane  1984;  1989).  The  international  economic  system,  according  to  hegemomc 
stability  theory,  was  able  to  develop  into  a  liberal  order  because  of  the  presence  of 
American  supremacy  (Ruggie  1998:  64;  Keohane  1989).  It  was  not  only  US 
leadership  that  defined  the  relationship,  but  also  Europe's  willingness  to  co-operate  to 
protect  its  shared  interests,  as  noted  by  Featherstone  and  Ginsberg  (1996:  6).  Thus,  in 
the  foundational  period  of  the  current  transatlantic  relationship  Europe  was  a 
dependant  partner  (Smith  1990:  104,1996:  90). 
Diverl4inV,  Interests  and  Kennedy's  Grand  Desil4n 
Western  Europe  gradually  became  a  stronger  partner  within  the  Europ  ean-  American 
alliance.  as  it  pursued  economic  and  political  integration  through  the  Western 
The  Bretton  Woods  system  created  in  international  financial  order  by  establishing  a  systern  of  fixed 
exchanoe  rates  and  the  principle  of  currency  convertibility.  This  new  type  of  economic  management 
introduced  new  institutions,  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and  the  World  Bank,  which 
developed  ne,  ýv  codes  of  conduct  for  international  monetary  and  financial  affairs  (Eichengreen  1995:  26, 
James  1987:  95). 
63 European  Union  (1948),  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  (1952),  the  European 
Economic  Community  (EEC)  (1957)  and  the  atomic  energy  community  (Euratom) 
(1957).  The  US  supported  European  integration  because  American  policy  makers 
considered  European  unity  crucial  to  strengthening  democracies  against  communism, 
resolving  Franco-German  differences,  reintegrating  Germany,  salvaging  America's 
export  markets  and  reinforcing  efforts  to  build  a  new  multilateral.  trading  system 
(Hogan  1984:  6).  32 
The  US  first  began  to  take  serious  notice  of  the  new  EEC  during  the  Dillon  Round 
of  the  GATT  when  trade  negotiators  encountered  the  new  Common  Agriculture  Policy 
(CAP),  which  imposed  variable  levies  on  certain  sectors  affecting  foreign  imports,  for 
example  the  poultry  trade.  The  US  chose  to  pursue  bilateral  retaliation  against  the  EEC 
during  the  'chicken  war'  33  (see  Piening  1997:  106),  but  despite  the  ongoing  disputes 
over  this  and  other  products,  US  negotiators  chose  to  conclude  the  Dillon  Round 
without  securing  a  suitable  compromise  over  the  CAP.  At  this  stage  in  European- 
American  relations  US  commitment  to  European  unity,  the  Western  Alliance  and  the 
multilateral  trading  system  took  precedence  over  the  domestic  interests  of  American 
chicken  farmers  (Curtis  and  Vastine  1971:  23-25). 
The  divergence  of  European  economic  interests  was  coupled  with  growing 
independence  on  foreign  policy  issues.  The  Berlin  Crisis  (1961)  increased  tension 
between  the  US  and  West  Germany.  34  However,  the  most  notable  cause  for  drift  in  the 
"  Despite  Russian  membership,  the  UN  kvas  perceived  as  a  Western  dominated  society  (Vadney  1987: 
41). 
The  US  promoted  European  integration  through  the  Marshall  Plan,  an  aid  package  worth  S12.4 
billion.  The  US  supplied  financial  aid  for  recovery  and  redevelopment  in  Europe  on  the  condition  that 
decisions  about  allocating  the  funds  be  rnade  jointly  by  European  states  (see  Calvocressi  1991  ý  Duigan 
and  Gann  1994:  34-60;  Eichengreen  1995ý  Frellel  1996:  25-44;  Hoffman  and  Maier  1984ý  Hogan  1984 
Curtis  and  Vastine  (  197  1:  21)  note  that  the  system  of  variable  levies-  the  central  idea  of  which  is  that 
the  price  of  an  import  will  always  be  raised  to  at  least  an  equal  level-  is  a  barrier  to  trade  because  it 
creates  uncertainty  for  US  exporters  who  can  never  be  sure  of  their  costs  of  entry  into  the  EEC  market. 
ý4  While  the  latter  strongly  favOLired  German  unification.  the  American  position  recognised  that  a 
division  between  Fast  and  West  Gernianý  was  crucial  to  maintaining  stability  in  US-USSR  relations. 
64 Atlantic  Alliance  was  the  anti  -Americanism  of  the  French  President  Charles  De 
Gaulle.  Kennedy's  vision  of  an  outward  looking  Europe  directly  contradicted  De 
Gaulle's  'protectionism'  (Lundestad  1998:  61).  De  Gaulle's  opposition  to  'American 
imperialism'  directly  interfered  with  the  American  desire  to  see  Britain  become  a 
member  of  the  EEC.  In  1963,  De  Gaulle  rejected  the  UK  application,  questioned 
British  motives  for  joining  and  described  the  UK  as  'America's  Trojan  horse' 
(Lundestad  1998:  65-67).  The  transatlantic  security  alliance  became  subject  to  severe 
transatlantic  tensions  when  De  Gaulle  withdrew  France  from  NATO's  integrated 
military  command  in  1966. 
Amidst  concern  about  the  weakening  alliance,  President  Kennedy  announced 
the  'Grand  Design'  in  1962,  a  two-part  plan  designed  to  foster  'a  partnership  of 
equals'  between  Europe  and  the  United  States.  The  first  component  of  Kennedy's  plan 
was  the  Trade  Expansion  Act  (TEA)  passed  by  Congress  in  1963.  The  TEA  was 
- 
35  designed  to  rapidly  boost  the  liberalisation  of  trade  in  agriculture  and  industry 
. 
The 
second  component  of  the  Grand  Design  was  an  envisioned  'declaration  of  inter- 
dependence'  between  the  United  States  and  a  united  Europe.  Kennedy's  Grand  Design 
was  symbolic  in  recognising  first,  the  new  role  of  the  EEC  in  the  international 
economy  and  second,  the  need  to  re-forge  the  weakening  security  alliance. 
The  Grand  Design  had  only  marginal  effects.  New  trade  measures  helped  make 
the  Kennedy  Round  of  the  GATT  a  success.  Tariff  levels  were  cut  by  36-39  percent 
as  a  result  of  the  five-year  negotiations  affecting  $40  billion  of  world  trade  (Curtis  and 
Vastine  1971:  230).  However,  controversy  surrounding  EEC  agriculture  policy 
I  lenry  Kissinger  (  1994:  577)  reports  in  his  mernoirs  that  encounters  with  the  West  German  Chancellor 
Konrad  Adenauer,  *painfullý  served  to  bring  home  to  me  the  extent  of  the  distrust  which  the  Berlin 
crisis  had  cri-endered  between  heretofore  close  allies.  ' 
The  TEA  airned  to  facilitate  a  more  comprehensive  agreement  on  the  reduction  of  tariffbarriers  to 
trade.  It  created  the  position  of  Special  Representative  for  Trade  Negotiations,  a  cabinet  level  position 
desioned  to  deal  with  US  trade  interests  and  it  established  the  office  of  the  USTR.  The  position  gave  I  -- 
65 remained.  A  cohesive  agriculture  policy  led  to  a  strong  European  negotiating  position, 
and  it  became  increasingly  clear  that  American  and  European  interests  diverged  in  the 
economic  arena.  The  EEC's  single  voice  in  GATT  negotiations  marked  the  shift  in  the 
balance  of  power.  Curtis  and  Vastine  (1971:  23  1)  explain  that, 
The  United  States  found  itself  seated  across  the  negotiating  table  from  tough- 
minded  representatives  of  a  strong  and  truly  independent  new  economic  unity. 
Perhaps  the  Kennedy  Round  was  the  first  major  post-war  economic  negotiation 
in  which  the  United  States  found  itself  confronted  with  a  bargaining  partner  of 
equal  strength. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  lack  of  overall  political  unity  in  Europe  contributed  to  the 
downfall  of  Kennedy's  political  declaration  (Peterson  1996:  36).  While  the  President 
spoke  of  'an  alliance  among  equals',  it  was  widely  believed  that  the  US  had  an 
interest  in  maintaining  its  position  as  world  leader  by  making  Western  Europe  a  tightly 
integrated  junior  partner  (see  also  Carroll  and  Herring,  1996).  De  Gaulle  rejected  the 
notion  of  an  'equal'  partnership.  The  failure  of  the  US  and  France  to  agree  on  a 
political  framework  agreement  points  to  differing  views  of  the  international  order. 
During  this  early  period  of  fragmentation,  Smith  (1990:  107;  1996:  90)  argues  that  the 
EU  took  on  the  role  of  a  'putative  partner'.  The  alliance  forged  in  the  1950s  remained, 
but  the  1960s  marked  an  era  of  interest  diversification  and  developing  tension  in  the 
transatlantic  partnership. 
Political  and  Economic  Friction  and  the  New  Atlantic  Charter 
European-Arnerican  relations  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  faced  further  challenges  that 
undermined  communication  and  co-operation  in  transatlantic  relations.  Between 
1970-3  Nixon  employed  new  economic  policies  to  compensate  for  the  baldrice  of 
payments  problem  caused  by  US  military  spending  in  Vietnam.  A  unilateral  decision 
US  trade  neg,  otiators  standin-g,  equal  to  that  of  their  European  equivalent  and  gave  the  President  new 
66 to  devalue  the  dollar  and  end  the  Bretton  Woods  system  returned  international 
currencies  to  a  fluctuating  rather  than  fixed  rate  system.  The  'Nixon  shocks'  caused  a 
rift  in  European-  American  relations  and  provoked  a  fresh  attempt  to  reinvest  in  the 
transatlantic  relationship.  In  1972,  the  European  leaders  called  for  a  'constructive 
dialogue'  between  the  US  and  the  European  Community.  36 
Nixon  made  another  attempt  to  refocus  transatlantic  relations  and  put  the 
partners  back  on  track  by  declaring  19731  the  'Year  of  Europe'.  In  the  spirit  of  the 
Grand  Design  he  called  for  a  'structure  of  peace'  and  a  'New  Atlantic  Charter'.  The 
+  wass  intended  too  minimise  contlict,  einlimce  securlLy  Lies  and  -increase 
economic  co-operation  (Landes  1977:  22;  Smith  1984:  17).  Yet,  like  the  Grand 
Design,  the  Year  of  Europe  failed  under  the  pressure  of  diverging  economic  and 
political  interests  (especially  in  the  Middle  East)  and  the  breakdown  of  the 
international  monetary  system.  In  19733  the  decision  to  back  different  sides  in  the 
Israeli-Arab  war  soured  US-Eyropean  political  relations,  and  the  resulting  oil  crisis 
had  adverse  affects  on  economic  relations  not  least  because  it  was  followed  by  deep 
37 
global  recession  (Peterson  1996:  39;  Smith  1984:  17;  Tsoukalis  1986:  14). 
Trade  relations  were  also  bedevilled  by  large  fluctuations  in  the  value  of  the 
dollar.  Europe  faced  high  stagfiation  38  and  grew  short-tempered  with  the  US  policy  of 
'benign  neglect'.  39  Europe  employed  emergency  protectionist  measures  to  protect  its 
industries,  and  trade  wars  broke  out  over  cheese  and  textiles  (Smith  19.84:  17;  Wallace 
and  Young  1996:  13  1).  Meanwhile,  the  EC  made  attempts  to  consolidate  its  voice  and 
tariff  cutting  powers  which  Kennedy  hoped  to  use  in  the  GATT  Round  (Curtis  and  Vastine  1971:  9-14). 
6  In  1966  the  EEC  si,  _,  ned  a  treat%  mer-in-  the  executives  of  the  European  communities.  The  result 
bein-  one  Commission  and  one  Council  but  different  rules  (,  overnin,,  both.  The  narne  of  the  EEC  also 
changed  to  the  European  Community  (FC). 
The  US  supported  the  Israeli  g  ,  overnment  in  the  Israeli-Arab  war,  while  European  states  chose  not  to 
follow  suit  in  order  to  protect  econornic  interests  in  the  Middle  East. 
Sta-flation  is  used  to  describe  a  combination  of  hi-h  inflation  and  high  unemployment  in  an  economy. 
67 strengthen  its  foreign  policy  position  in  the  early  1970s  through  the  creation  of  the 
European  Political  Community  (EPQ  and  the  European  Monetary  System  (EMS)40 
After  the  failure  of  the  Atlantic  Charter,  EC-US  relations  in  the  1970s 
resembled  a  'partnership  of  rivals'  (Mally  1974:  xv)  or,  at  best,  an  'uneasy 
partnership'  (Dahrendorf  1974:  67).  The  relationship  became  more  competitive  as 
American  hegemony  started  to  decline  (Featherstone  and  Ginsberg  1996)4  1  and  the 
roles  of  Europe  and  the  US  in  the  transatlantic  relations  shifted  again.  Smith  and 
Woolock  (1993:  5)  argue  that  the  US  attitude  towards  the  international  system  turned 
from  one  of  guardianship  to  one  of  ambivalence. 
Discord  in  the  1980s 
Perhaps  the  most  critical  period  in  European-American  relations  came  during 
Reagan's  presidency  (1980-88),  a  period  that  accelerated  the  shift  away  from  the  early 
post-war  co-operation  to  a  relationship  polluted  with  more  hostility,  uneasiness  and 
confrontation.  Supply-side  economics,  the  US  budget  deficit,  high  interest  rates  and 
the  over-valued  dollar  met  with  opposition  on  Continental  Europe  (Smith  1984:  219; 
Tsoukalis  1986:  7-12).  42  Industrial  and  agricultural  trade  disputes  over  steel,  Airbus, 
oilseeds,  feed  grain,  pasta,  citrus  fruit  and  beef  caused  'dangerous'  levels  of  trade 
friction  (Touskalis  1986:  2).  The  Uruguay  Round  got  off  to  a  shaky  start  in  1986  and 
fear  of  potential  European  protectionism  heightened  with  agreement  on  the  Single 
19  Tsoukalis  (  1986:  9)  describes  'benign  neglect'  as  the  American  failure  to  entertain  European  calls  for 
international  economic  co-operation  in  light  of  the  adverse  reaction  of  European  economies  to  US 
unilateral  policies. 
4(  '  The  EMS  was  a  systern  of  linked  currencies  often  referred  to  as  the  'snake'.  This  was  an  attempt  to 
combat  the  disorder  in  European  currencies  brought  on  by  the  end  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate  system. 
11  As  discussed  in  chapter  two,  the  concept  of  US  he-emonic  decline  is  controversial.  Some  observers 
downplay  the  fall  of  American  power.  In  response  to  claims  of  America's  declining  hegemony  Susan 
Strange  1982:  119)  argued  that,  'The  US  authorities  make  decisions  that  rock  the  markets  and  dislodge 
foreign  governments,  but  none  of  these  can  deflect  the  dollar  from  its  course.  ' 
68 European  Act  in  1987  (Smith  1984:  219).  The  single  market  initiative  was  commonly 
suspected  to  be  a  device  to  create  a  'Fortress  Europe',  which  restricted  market  access 
for  US  imports. 
Furthermore,  foreign  policy  differences  arose  over  Afghanistan,  the  Middle 
East  and  martial  law  in  Poland.  The  latter  triggered  a  dispute  over  the  use  of 
extraterritorial  legislation  when  the  US,  in  an  attempt  to  punish  Soviet  behaviour, 
contemplated  extraterritorial  sanctions  against  European  companies  involved  in 
building  the  Siberian  Pipeline.  The  EC  protested  over  the  American  ban  on  trade  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  and  as  a  result  the  embargo  was  lifted  after  a  Jew  months  (see 
Demaret  1986:  133-  134-,  Touskalis  1986:  12-14). 
Some  argue  that  the  1980s  were  the  'coolest'  period  ever  in  EC-US  relations 
(Lundestad  1998:  111).  While  the  overarching  security  interests  prevented  a  complete 
disintegration  of  the  transatlantic  partnership,  the  relationship  in  the  1980s  bore  little 
resemblance  to  that  started  in  the  1950s.  Thus,  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  found  the 
partners  growing  further  apart  rather  than  closer  together. 
The  Cold  War 
To  summarise,  European-American  relations  underwent  clear  shifts  throughout  the 
Cold  War.  What  started  as  -a  solid  foundation  based  on  European  dependency, 
developed  into  a  more  balanced  partnership  as  the  EC  grew  in  size  and  strength.  As 
the  balance  of  power  shifted,  conflicts  over  trade  disputes  and  foreign  policy 
increased.  These  problems  were  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  little  communication  took 
place  betAxcen  European  and  American  policy  inakers.  The  need  for  dialogue  was 
recognised  through  the  creation  of  ad  hoc  structures  in  conjunction  with  European 
II  Some  monetarý  co-operation  did  occur  through  the  Plaza  Agreement  of  1985,  whereby  the  G-5 
agreed  to  devalue  the  dollar,  and  the  Louvre  Accord  of  1987,  when  the  G7  which  attempted  to  stabilise 
69 Political  Co-operation  in  1974  (Frellesen  2001:  4).  Dialogue  was  conducted  through 
other  fora  such  as  NATO,  the  GATT  or  on  the  margins  of  the  UN  General  Assembly 
(Gardner  1997:  9).  However,  both  Kennedy's  declaration  of  interdependence  and 
Nixon's  New  Atlantic  charter  failed,  leaving  the  transatlantic  allies  without  fonnal 
bilateral  channels  of  communication  until  the  1990s. 
Poor  communication  meant  that  tension  in  European-American  relations  went 
unmanaged;  often  policy  disputes  escalated  because  there  were  no  mechanisms  for 
containing  them.  Featherstone  and  Ginsberg  (1996:  28)  argue  that,  'American  policy 
flip-flopped  between  ign  ring  or  discount  ting  Europeans  and  overpowering  them  with 
calls  for  co-operation.  The  EC  for  its  part  cried  out  for  recognition  of  its  interest  but 
failed  to  develop  a  coherent  policy  towards  the  US'. 
Nonetheless.  the  partnership  was  held  together  by  a  common  interest  in 
protecting  democracy  and  economic  liberallsation.  Multilateral  institutions  served  as 
anchors  for  the  western  alliance  and  the  international  political  and  economic  orders. 
An  equally  important  source  of  cohesion  was  the  common  security  threat  and  the 
military  alliance  built  to  safeguard  western  values.  Common  values  and  common 
threats  formed  the  'glue'  that  kept  the  partnership  intact. 
2)  Breaking  Ground  -  The  Transatlantic  Declaration 
The  remainder  of  this  chapter  focuses  on  the  creation  of  new  transatlantic  institutions 
after  1990.  What  influenced  the  decision  to  build  specific  bilateral  institutions?  How 
did  the  Transatlantic  Declaration,  unlike  the  Grand  Design  or  the  Year  of  Europe, 
facilitate  further  steps  to  fortify  the  relationship  throughout  the  I  990s? 
exchange  rates  (Sm  ith  1984:  2  19). 
70 The  context  of  European-American  relations  changed  in  the  late  1980s  in 
direct  response  to  radical  transformations  in  the  international  political  system.  As 
noted  in  chapter  I  the  geopolitical  shifts  resulting  from  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  (1989) 
and  the  international  i  sation  of  the  economic  system  altered  the  playing  field  of  EC-US 
relations.  The  withdrawal  of  Soviet  power  from  Eastern  Europe  raised  questions 
generally  about  the  future  of  the  transatlantic  alliance  and  specifically  about  the  role  of 
NATO.  Increased  capital  flows,  global  investment  and  foreign  trade  sparked  greater 
interdependence.  The  single  market  programme  enhanced  the  EC's  effectiveness  in 
international  trade  negotiations  thus  making,  it  a  more  competLILIVe  partner  for  the  US. 
C, 
These  changes  created  uncertainties  and  transposed  perceptions  about  how  the 
transatlantic  relationship  should  be  defined. 
Towards  Institution  alisation 
Common  ideas,  values,  culture  and  multilateral  institutions  were  the  foundation  of  the 
transatlantic  relationship  throughout  the  Cold  War.  When  the  Cold  War  -ended, 
however,  leaders  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  recognised  that  'nostalgia'  could  not  be 
the  only  binding  force.  43  The  withdrawal  of  a  common  security  threat  widened  the  gap 
between  the  EU  and  the  US. 
On  the  EU  side  fears  arose  over  the  possibility  of  an  American  return  to 
isolationism.  Isolationist  tendencies  in  the  US  political  arena  represented  by  vocal 
minorities,  particularly  in  the  US  Congress,  were  mostly  exaggerated.  Although 
President  Bush  was  perceived  as  more  Europe  friendly  than  Reagan,  the  Deputy 
Secretary  of  State.  LaNNrence  Eagleburger  dismissed  the  prospects  for  equal  C, 
partnership: 
71 Regardless  of  how  big  the  EC  gets,  or  what  issues  European  governments 
devolve  to  common  decision-making,  the  need  for  a  strong  American  voice  in 
Western  affairs  will  not  be  diminished....  While  we  expect  Europe  to  shoulder 
more  of  the  burden  for  the  West's  defence...  the  (US)  President  will  remain 
the  pre-eminent  spokesman  for  the  free  world  in  the  decade  ahead  (quoted  in 
Devuyst  1990:  13). 
Although  education  about  the  single  market  diminished  American  perceptions  of 
Fortress  Europe,  there  was  recognition  that  the  1992  programme  made  the  EC  a  more 
competitive  political  force  in  the  international  system.  In  contrast  to  the  Cold  War 
period,  American  politicians  found  it  increasingly  difficult  to  justify  economic  trade 
losses  with  Western  Europe  to  the  domestic  population.  The  dissipated  security  threat 
of  the  Cold  War  meant  that  the  US  now  held  less  bargaining  power  over  its  allies,  but 
was  also  less  willing  to  compromise  its  economic  interests  for  the  sake  of  the  political 
alliance  (Devuyst  1995:  15). 
While  transatlantic  leaders  realised  that  common  ideas  by  themselves  could  not 
be  the  basis  of  a  transatlantic  partnership,  they  identified  mutual  interests  in  promoting 
democratic  transitions  in  CEE  and  the  NIS  and  in  protecting  the  multilateral 
institutions  established  to  maintain  the  international  political  and  economic  order.  In 
particular  it  was  clear  that  EU  and  US  co-operation  clearly  was  needed  to  complete  the 
Uruguay  Round  of  trade  talks,  'and  both  sides  had  incentives  to  encourage  Japan  and 
other  Asian  economies  to  liberalise  and  open  their  markets  (Peterson  1996:  122). 
The  TAD  was  not  the  first  attempt  to  build  a  transatlantic  partnership.  but  the 
first  to  emerge  with  the  EU  able  to  act  as  an  actor  in  its  own  right  (Frellesen  2001).  By 
this  time,  the  Eli  had  also  extensively  engaged  in  dialogue  through  bilateral  co- 
operation.  commercial  and/  or  frce  trade  relations  with  a  number  of  third  countries  (see 
4',  One  of  the  most  widely  quoted  persons  on  this  point  is  the  former  US  Speaker  of  the  House  Newt 
Gingrich.  fie  claimed  in  1995  that,  -we  will  drift  apart  unless  we  have  projects  large  enough  to  hold  us 
together...  We're  not  (loina  to  stav  together  out  of  nostalgia...  '  (quoted  in  Gardner  1997:  62). 
72 table  3.1).  Perhaps  above  all,  the  re-unification  of  Germany  was  a  clear  signal  to  the 
US  that  the  EU  could  stand  as  a  'pole  of  attraction'  for  Central  and  Eastern  Europe 
(CEECs),  thereby  promoting  democracy  and  economic  liberalisation  in  the  region 
(TPN  1995:  4).  The  US  welcomed  the  prospects  of  burden  sharing  due  to  constraints 
on  its  foreign  affairs  budget,  which  increasingly  made  it  a  ýsuperpower  on  the  cheap' 
(Peterson  1996,  Heuser  1996).  President  Bush  recognised  the  important  role  of  the  EC 
in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  at  the  G-8  Summit  in  1989,  prior  to  the  signing  of  the 
Transatlantic  Declaration.  He  declared: 
We  belfievc  a  sLrong,  united  Europe  means  a  strong  America 
....  a  resurgent 
Western  Europe  is  an  economic  magnet,  drawing  Eastern  Europe  closer, 
toward  the  commonwealth  of  free  nations  (quoted  in  Gardner  1997:  6). 
A  month  after  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  wall  in  1989,  Bush's  Secretary  of  State,  James 
Baker,  made  a  memorable  speech  in  Berlin  outlining  plans  for  a  policy  of  'New 
Atlanticism'  to  compliment  Bush's  'New  World  Order'  (see  table  3.2). 
The  concept  of  closer  transatlantic  co-operation  was  clearly  supported  by  the 
President  of  the  European  Commission,  Jacques  Delors,  who  wished  to  see  Europe's 
political  links  upgraded  along  with  the  Commission's  status  in  Washington.  44  The 
Irish  Presidency  of  the  EUs  Council  of  Ministers  also  displayed  great  interest  in 
closer  transatlantic  ties,  with  the  Irish  Prime  Minister,  Charles  Haughey,  engaging  in 
negotiations  with  President  Bush  on  a  structure  for  consultation,  which  was  later 
incorporated  into  the  TAD  (Deyuyst  1990,  Peterson  1996). 
To  surnmarise,  there  was  widespread  recognition  in  the  early  1990s  that  better 
mechanisms  ývere  needed  to  manage  a  relationship  characterised  by  complex  L- 
interdependence  (see  Featherstone  and  Ginsberg  1996).  A  number  of  factors  helped 
create  a  favourable  atmosphere  for  the  launch  of  a  new  phase  in  transatlantic  relations 
73 in  the  1990s:  the  political  will  expressed  by  European  and  American  leaders;  the 
realisation  of  common  interest  in  securing  the  multilateral  trading  system;  and  the 
need  to  tackle  the  security  threat  posed  by  Instability  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe. 
Table  3.1 
A  HISTORY  OF  EC  TRADE  AGREEMENTS 
1975-1995 
1975 
The  Lom6  Convention  (including  65  African,  Caribbean  and 
Pacific  countries)  Israel,  M----,;,  -o,  Sri  Lanalka 
1976 
China,  Algeria,  Morocco  and  Tunisia  (the  Magherb  countries, 
Pakistan,  Canada 
1977 
Egypt,  Jordan  and  Syria  (the  Mashreq  countries),  Lebdnon 
1980 
ASEAN  countries  (Agreement  of  South  East  Asian  Nations), 
Yugoslavia,  Australia,  Brazil 
1981 
India 
1983 
Bolivia,  Colombia,  Ecuador,  Peru  and  Venezuela  (the  Adean  Pact 
countries) 
1984 
Yemen 
1988 
Central  and  Eastern  European  countries 
1990 
The  United  States* 
*  In  contrast  to  the  other  agreements  pursued  by  the  Commission, 
the  TAD  was  not  strictly  a  trade  agreement. 
II  In  contrast  to  its  predecessors,  Bush 
-granted 
Delors  head  of  state  treatment  when  he  visited 
74 The  Transatlantic  Declaration,,  and  its  emphasis  on  bilateral  consultation,  marked  the 
beginning  of  the  institutional  isation  of  the  EU-US  relationship.  Signed  on  23 
November  1990,  the  TAD  is  a  short  document  that  identifies  common  goals  and 
transnational  challenges.  The  partners  recognised  common  interest  in  pursuing. 
economic  liberalisation,  educational,  scientific  and  cultural  co-operation  and  in 
fighting  international  crime,  terrorism  and  environmental  degradation.  While  it  briefly 
identified  goals  and  'principles'  of  this  partnership,  it  failed  to  provide  even  a 
proposed  agenda  for  meeting  those  goals.  Its  significance  lies  not  in  its  content,  which 
has  been  described  as  cosmetic,  (Featherstone  and  Ginsberg  1996)  superficial,  (TPN 
1999)  'minimalist',  (Peterson  1996)  and  lacking  in  substantive  innovations  (Devuyst 
1990).  Rather,  the  TAD  served  two  important  functions.  First,  it  symbolically  restored 
a  mutual  political  commitment  to  transatlantic  partnership.  Secondly,  it  introduced  an 
institutional  structure  to  the  transatlantic  dialogue. 
Table  3.2  -  Main  Recommendations  of  James  Baker's  'New  Atlanticism'  Speech 
(1989) 
foster  institutional  and  consultative  links  that  would  keep  pace.  with  European 
integration  and  institutional  reform 
create  regular  and  intensive  bilateral  consultations  to  contain  trade  disputes 
initiate  consultation  between  EPC  working  groups  and  the  US 
conduct  more  formal  consultation  on  the  environment 
secure  greater  US  input  on  the  discussion  of  common  European  technical 
standards 
instigate  closer  bilateral  co-operation  on  the  distribution  of  aid  in  East  European 
economies 
Washington  in  June  1989  (Gardner  1997:  6). 
75 An  Infrastructure  of  Co-operation 
The  political  commitments  outlined  by  the  TAD  were  not  'new'  ones.  They  had  long 
been  a  part  of  western  diplomatic  jargon.  The  distinguishing  factor  of  the  TAD  was 
found  in  the  document's  'Institutional  Framework  for  Consultation'  where  a  bilateral 
structure  of  co-operation  for  transatlantic  relations  was  outlined.  The  TAD  gave  birth 
to  a  number  of  transatlantic  'institutions'.  First,  it  formalised  three  sets  of  bilateral 
meetings  between  the  Presidents  of  the  United  States  and  the  European  Council,  the 
EC  Foreign  Ministers  and  the  US  Secretary  of  State  and  the  EC  ComMission  and  the 
111,  Cabinet.  Second,  it  included  provi-,  i--.  ---  fior  infon-nall  ad  'hoc  consultations  beLween 
the  Presidency  Foreign  Minister  or  the  Troika  and  the  US  Under-Secretary  of  State. 
Third,  it  called  for  briefings  made  by  the  Presidency  to  US  Representatives  on 
European  Political  Co-operation  meetings  at  Ministerial  level.  Finally  it  recognised 
the  need  for  dialogue  between  European  and  US  legislators  (see  table  3.3  ).  45 
Table  3.3 
The  Institutional  Framework  Created  by  the  Transatlantic  Declaration 
Formal  structure 
President  of  the  European  Council  President  of  the  United  States 
EC  Foreign  Ministers  US  Secretary  of  State 
EC  Commission  US  Cabinet  (later  sub-cabinet) 
Ad  Hoe  Dialogue 
US  Under-secretary  of  State  ý-->  Presidency  Foreign  Minister 
(Troika) 
Briefings  on  European  Political  Co-operation 
Council  Presidencv  =>  US  Representatives 
1ý  Prior  to  the  I  990s,  ad  hoc  meetings  were  conducted  between  Troika  political  directors  and  US 
Under-secretaries  and  annual  meetings  between  Troika  political  directors  and  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State  for  European  Affairs  (Gardner  1997:  9). 
76 Although  purely  consultative  in  nature,  the  TAD  constructed  'an  infrastructure  of  co- 
operation',  which  laid  the  foundation  for  a  stronger  EU-US  relationship  in  the  1990s 
(Smith  1997:  20;  Smith  and  Woolcock  1993:  111).  The  logic  behind  the  TAD 
assumed  that  the  institutional  framework  for  consultation  would  open  lines  of 
communication,  create  networks,  result  in  information  sharing  and  hopefully  reduce 
the  impact  of  disputes  in  transatlantic  relations.  It  was  the  first  step  in  the  creation  of  a 
political  framework  specifically  geared  for  EC-US  relations,  and  it  symbolised  that  a 
I  new'  era  tin  transatlantic  relations  had  finally  begun  (see  Gardner  1997). 
A  Faulty  Design? 
While  the  TAD  did  get  the  ball  rolling.  it  shortcomings  were  clearly  visible.  In 
addition  to  lacking  substance,  the  mechanisms  introduced  by  the  TAD  were 
ineffective.  Summits  tended  to  be  isolated  events  that  did  not  build  on  one  another  and 
showed  no  clear  line  of  progre.  ss,  not  least  due  to  the  rotating  EU  Council  Presidency 
and  the  changing  priorities  of  different  Member  State  S.  46  Bilateral  cabinet  meetings 
were  abandoned  in  1991,  because  they  were  found  to  be  redundant  of  multilateral 
meetings.  Consultations  at  this  level  tended  to  take  the  form  of  briefings  rather  than, 
exchanges  of  dialogue  (Gardner  1997:  11-13). 
The  lack  of  substance  and  relatively  weak  mechanisms  were  the  result  of 
domestic  restrictions  on  both  sides.  Underdevelopment  of  the  Community's  first  pillar 
and  Member  State  sensitivity  over  national  sovereignty  undermined  the  TAD. 
Although  the  concept  of  a  European  'Common  Foreign  and  Security  Policy'  had  been 
introduced  prior  to  1990,  the  mechanisms  for  CFSP  were  not  negotiated  until  the 
-41  Gardner  (  1997:  12)  notes  that  although  Presidencies  such  as  the  Dutch,  Luxembourg  and  Spanish 
ýNere  positive  for  transatlantic  relations,  but  the  French  delayed  or  blocked  every  concrete  initiative  to 
improve  US-EU  consultations,  'because  of  a  Gaullist  hyper-sensitivity  about  Washington's  droit  de 
regarýl  over  European  affairs'. 
77 Maastricht  Treaty  was  signed  in  1991,  and  pillar  two's  intergovernmental  structure  did 
not  produce  a  unified  European  voice  on  foreign  policy  issues.  Member  States  and  the 
European  Commission  turned  their  attention  towards  pillar  one  issue  s,  most  notably 
the  internal  negotiations  on  a  draft  treaty  for  EMU  and  the  necessary  directives  for  a 
unified  common  market  (Featherstone  and  Ginsberg  1996:  32).  The  decision  to  sign 
the  TAD  but  not  to  follow  up  on  its  pledges  increased  US  perceptions  of  the  EU's 
ýcapabilities-expectation  gap'. 
Some  Member  States,  led  by  France,  showed  a  blatant  lack  of  interest  in  a  new 
transatlantic  C-On"MitInent.  Given  the  EEC's  new  status  as  a  IlUreign  policy  actor,  there 
was  apprehension  about  being  overshadowed  by  the  US  (Featherstone  and  Ginsberg 
1996:  32).  A  Commission  official  argued  that,  '(The  EC)  wanted  to  make  sure  it  kept 
its  own  identity.  There  was  no  interest  in  looking  for  partners  at  the  political  level  and 
no  interest  in  what  was  being  done  by  others'  47 
Despite  its  shortcomings,  the  TAD's  architects  acknowledged  its  role  as  a 
starting  point.  The  TAD  was  created  as  a  'living  document',  in  other  words  it 
encouraged  the  addition  of  further  'building  blocks'  to  its  foundation.  48  By  1994 
49  leaders  on  both  sides  were  already  discussing  propositions  to  build  on  the  TAD 
. 
Three  expert  working  groups  were  set  up  at  the  Berlin  EU-US  Summit  in  July  1994  to 
identify  political  areas  where  the  EU-US  could  pursue  joint  co-operation  (see  table 
3 3.4).  A  group  on  international  crime,  which  was  strongly  supported  by  Germany,  the 
US,  and  the  European  Commission.,  considered  how  EU-US  co-operation  could 
coi-nbat  problems  of  drug  traffickiiia.  nuclear  smuggling  and  money  laundering  in  light  Z_  I 
1ý  Interview  with  Commission  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (6). 
48  In  particular  the  Declaration  states,  'Both  sides  are  resolved  to  develop  and  deepen  these  procedures 
for  consultation  so  as  to  reflect  the  evolution  of  the  European  Community  and  its  relationship  with  the 
United  States'  (TAD  1990). 
41)  See  statements  rnade  by  Clinton,  Santer  and  Delors,  to  the  EU-US  Surnmit  (1994). 
78 of  growing  black  markets  in  the  former  Soviet  Union.  50  The  CFSP  group,  pushed  by 
the  US  State  Department,  sought  ways  to  improve  consultation  and  burden  sharing 
with  the  EU  on  potential  geopolitical  hot  spots.  Finally,  the  group  on  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe  assessed  the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  the  US  to  work  together  in 
promoting  economic  and  political  reform  in  CEE  (Gardner  1997:  57-58). 
Table  3.4  The  Berlin  Working  Groups 
Working  Group  Task 
7 
International  Study  the  potential  for  EU-US  co-operation  on  drug 
Crime  trafficking,  nuclear  smuggling  and  money  laundering 
Common  Foreign  Detect  ways  that  the  EU  and  the-US  could  react  to  the 
and  Security  outbreak  of  hostilities  and  co-ordinate  humanitarian 
Policy  assistance  to  troubled  areas,  particularly  in  the  Third  World 
Central  and  Assess  the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  the  US  to  encourage 
Eastern  Europe  political  and  economic  reform  through  co-ordinated  foreign 
aid  and  technical  assistance 
The  results  were  mostly  disappointing.  The  working  group  on  international  crime 
immediately  met  with  suspicion  by  EU  Member  States  that  feared  it  was  an  attempt  by 
the  Commission  to  exercise  control  over  JHA.  'rhe  CFSP  working  group  was  unable  to 
agree  on  a  inechanism  for  consultation,  thus  exposing  the  weaknesses  of  the  second  as 
SO  Germaný  favoured  co-operation  on  international  crime  due  to  its  close  proximitý,  to  CEE  and  the 
Commission  saw  it  as  a  means  of-etting  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  (JHA)  policy  in  through  the  back 
door  (Gardner  1997:  56).  US  State  Department  and  Commission  officials  argued  that  the  push  for  JHA 
co-operation  came  from  the  US  side  since  its  introduction  into  the  EU  through  Maastricht.  Interviews 
with  US  Embassy  Official,  Dublin  July  1998  (1),  the  European  Commission,  Brussels,  September  1999 
(6)  and  the  US  Mission,  Brussels,  September  1999  (7). 
79 well  as  the  third  pillar.  The  working  group  on  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  was  able  to 
identify  areas  of  potential  co-operation  but  backed  down  from  making  substantive 
proposals  due  mainly  to  internal  EU  divisions  on  the  role  of  the  Commission  (Gardner 
1997:  57-59).  Although  the  working  groups  were  set  up  as  a  temporary  mechanism, 
their  failure  to  agree  on  concrete  proposals  exposed  weaknesses  in  the  dialogue 
structure  and  helped  leaders  recognise  the  need  to  tie  together  loose  ends  (Frellesen 
2001;  Gardner  1997:  60).  The  consensus  was  that  a  stronger  political  commitment  to  a 
transatlantic  partnership  was  needed. 
3)  The  NTA-  The  Cornerston.  e  of  the  Transatlantic  Foundation 
If  the  TAD  was  the  groundbreaking  move  to  create  a  structured  dialogue,  the  New 
Transatlantic  Agenda  (NTA)  can  be  described  as  the  cornerstone  of  this  transatlantic 
architecture.  The  NTA  gave  new  structure,  focus  and  drive  to  transatlantic  relations.  . 
It  introduced  new  mechanisms  for  monitoring  progress  and  implementing  change,  and 
produced  a  dedicated  agenda,  thereby  adding  substance  to  transatlantic  relations. 
A  Widening  Gap 
The  NTA  arose  amidst  calls  for  the  further  development  of  transatlantic  relations, 
based  in  part  on  the  realisation  that  the  TAD  had  failed  to  revolutionise  the 
relationship  as  well  as  the  emergence  of  new  transatlantic  tensions.  The  widening  gap 
between  the  EU  and  the  US  was  innamed  by  the  obvious  lack  of  transatlantic  unity  in 
the  Gulf  War  and  Bosma,  both  of  xvIiich  resulted  in  bilateral  (involving  the  US  and 
individual  EU  states)  but  not  transatlantic  political  and  military  actions  (Peterson 
80 1996:  67-  73  ).  51  Old  as  well  as  new  baggage  interfered  with  attempts  to  close  the 
Uruguay  Round.  Disputes  over  agriculture  subsidies,  beef,  bananas,  oilseeds,  canned 
fruit  and  Airbus  meant  that  there  was  much  talk  in  the  early  1990's  of  looming  trade 
wars 
52 
The  war  in  Bosnia  was  particularly  damaging  for  Europe,  because  the  failure  to 
come  to  a  common  position  exposed  the  weakness  of  the  CFSP.  The  lack  of  European 
cohesion  also  spilled  over  into  monetary  and  trade  policy.  The  Maastricht  Treaty  was 
not  ratified  on  the  first  attempt  in  Denmark  and  was  controversial  in  other  European 
countries.  European  monetary  co-ordination  was  stalled  by  serious  recession  in 
European  economies.  As  noted  in  chapter  2,  France  refused  to  sign  the  Blair-House 
agreement  after  the  Commission  negotiated  a  deal  on  agriculture  subsidies  with  the  US 
to  facilitate  closure  of  the  Uruguay  Round.  One  Commission  advisor  recalled,  'This 
was  not  a  good  time  in  EU-US  relations.  [Blair-  House]  created  a  very  bad 
53 
atmosphere'  . 
The  1992  US  Presidential  election  also  exposed  a  shift  in  the  focus  of 
American  politics.  Clinton'  s  domestically  focused  campaign,  the  lack  of  European 
experts  in  the  Cabinet  and  the  White  House's  failure  to  deal  with  the  Union  on  an 
equal  basis  were  seen  as  discouraging  signs  for  EU-US  relations.  54  For  example, 
when  President  Delors  asked  for  a  meeting  with  President  Clinton  to  resolve  the  Blair- 
House  dispute  he  was  initially  granted  only  15  minutes  (Smith  and  Woolcock  1994: 
470).  The  capacity  of  the  US  to  act  decisively  on  the  international  stage  was 
diminished  further  wheri  the  1994  US  Congressional  election  returned  a  Republican 
"I  This  point  is  disputed  by  Piening  (  1997:  45)  who  claims  that  Gulf  War  was  a  truly  international  action 
due  to  the  fact  that  EC  backing  was  an  essential  precondition  for  US-led  military  action.  He  notes, 
however,  that  a  weak  security  dimension  in  European  integration  meant  the  EC's  contribution  was  up  to 
individual  states  rather  than  the  Community. 
ý2  Interview,  US  Embassy  London,  Januarý  2000  (16). 
ý3  Interview  Commission  Secretariat,  Brussels,  September  1999  (16). 
81 majority  in  both  Houses  of  Congress,  thus  introducing  institutional  rivalry  fuelled  by 
party  politics  into  US  foreign  policy  (see  also  Heuser  1996:  77).  Fears-arose  in  Europe 
once  again  of  a  shift  to  isolationism  in  US  foreign  policy  (see  also  Peterson  2001  a). 
The  New  Transatlantic  Agenda 
Domestic  opposition  on  both  sides  to  the  idea  of  a  comprehensive  political  or 
economic  agreement  discouraged  the  US  Administration  and  the  European 
Commission  from  pursuing  ambitious  proposals,  including  one  for  a  Transatlantic 
Free  Trade  Area-  iTAUTAI,  ,z 
55  C":  11  : 
ý-.  l,.,  m  111/11/1-411-5.  Sull,  irnportant  actors  on  both  sides 
acknowledged  the  need  to  at  least  reinvest  in  a  more  effective  transatlantic 
relationship.  They  played  a  key  role  in  the  New  Transatlantic  Agenda  negotiations. 
Perhaps  surprisingly,  given  initial  doubts  about  his  commitment,  Clinton  himself 
emerged  as  an  advocate  of  a  transatlantic  partnership.  He  generally  engaged  with 
European  issues  and  was  able  to  develop  a  personal  rapport  with  Delors  that  had  not 
existed  with  Bush  (Gardner  1997:  6,  Lundestad  1998:  117).  Stuart  Eizenstat,  then 
Ambassador  of  the  US  Mission  to  the  EU  in  Brussels,  pushed  both  sides  relentlessly  to 
54  Clinton's  campaign  slo-an,  'It's  the  economy  stupid!  ',  seemed  to  emphasise  the  shift  in  focus  from 
nn 
foreign  policy  to  trade  policy. 
55  Although  the  TAFTA  was  the  subject  of  a  Commission  feasibility  study  and  supported  by  the  US 
Speaker  of  the  House  Newt  Gingrich,  German  Foreign  Minister  Klaus  Kinkel,  and  Commissioner  - 
Brittan  it  was  not  pursued  because  it  was  feared  that  TAFTA  would  not  comply  with  international  or 
domestic  commitments.  It  was  argued  that  the  TAFTA  ran  the  risk  ofalienating  Asian  economies  and 
creating  an  exclusive  'rich  men's  club'ý  that  it  would  have  to  have  included  difficult  sectors  such  as 
agriculture  and  audiO-ViSLial  services  in  order  to  comply  NN  ith  GATT  rules:  and  that  domestic  opposition 
to  a  comprehensive  treaty  curbed  the  debate  on  the  TAFTA.  FU  Member  States,  most  notably  the 
French.  feared  'Washington's  insinuation  into  EU  policy  making'  (Gardner  1997:  55),  while  Congress 
opposed  infringements  on  American  sovereignty.  Peterson  (  1996:  115)  notes  that  during  the  Uruguay 
Round,  'Congressional  Republicans,  led  by  Senator  Dole,  voiced  alarm  about  the  threat  posed  to  US 
sovereignt)  by  the  WTO,  and  initiated  a  debate  which  in  some  respects  resembled  Europe's  struggle  to 
ratifýN  Maastricht'.  For  more  oil  TAFTA  see  Frost  1997ý  Gardner  1997i  76-78;  Heuser  1996:  82,105- 
107,  Flindlev  1999. 
82 sign  the  NTA.  On  the  EU's  side,  the  Spanish  Council  Presidency  of  late  1995  injected 
new  enthusiasm  into  the  process  of  negotiating  the  NTA.  56 
The  New  Transatlantic  Agenda  was  signed  at  the  EU-US  Summit  in  Madrid  in 
December  1995.  It  was  a  six-  page  document  that  recognised  the  need  to  strengthen 
the  transatlantic  partnership  in  light  of  new  challenges.  As  depicted  in  table  3.5,  the 
NTA  created  four  chapters  of  EU-US  co-operation  that  built  on,  but  did  not  replace, 
the  TAD. 
The  NTA  outlined  a  common  agenda  or  framework  for  co-operation  under 
each  of  the  lhea-dings  shown  in  t--kl--  3.5.  The  J-.;  -t  Action  Plan  (JAIP) 
outlined  specific  areas  where  the  partners  could  pursue  deeper  co-operation  and 
identified  priorities.  The  New  Transatlantic  Agenda  had  a  significant  impact  on  the 
process  of  transatlantic  institutionalisation  because  it  created  new  scope  for  policy  co- 
ordination  and  new  institutions  to  administer  the  policy  making  process.  The 
individual  chapters  of  the  NTA  established  policy  sectors  and  issue  areas  where  the 
EU  and  US  aimed  to  co-operate  and  produce  'deliverables',  in  the  form  of  joint 
agreements,  statements  and  initiatives. 
Table  3.5  THE  FOUR  CHAPTERS  OF  THE  NTA 
Promoting 
peace, 
stability, 
development, 
and 
democracy 
around  the 
world 
Responding 
to  global 
challenGes 
Contributing 
to  the 
expansion  of 
world  trade  & 
promoting 
closer 
economic 
relations 
Building 
Bridges 
Across  the 
Atlantic 
S6  ,  Fhe  Spanish  are  credited  \N  ith  being  verý'  Supportive  of  the  NTA,  in  part  perhaps  because  it  was seen 
as  a  -deliverable'  and  a  merit  to  their  Presidency.  Interview,  Commission  official,  Brussels,  September 
1999(g). 
83 The  transatlantic  partners  have  had  varied  success  in  producing  deliverables  under  the 
NTA.  Bilateral  co-operation  between  the  EU  and  the  US  under  the  first  NTA  chapter 
only  became  possible  after  the  creation  of  the  Community's  pillar  2  (CFSP)  in  1993, 
thus  when  the  NTA  was  signed  in  1995  the  initial  scope  for  joint  action  was  limited. 
Since  1995  the  EU  and  the  US  have  issued  a  number  of  joint  statements  on  co- 
operation  (see  table  3.6).  However,  the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  US  to  act  on  issues  has 
been  restricted.  Phillipart  and  Winand  (2001:  452)  argue,  for  example,  that  projects  in 
Africa  were  limited  to  areas  of  low  politics,  such  as  health  care  and  democracy 
building.  and  that  at  its  core  the  'vinhal  nartnershiln'  k  re-nily  riqtrifti-ci  to  European 
regional  issues.  On  the  other  hand  development  co-operation  and  humanitarian 
assistance  are  cited  as  two  of  the  most  successful  policy  sectors  of  the  NTA. 
The  EU  and  the  US  were  also  been  able  to  pursue  a  number  of  low  key  projects 
under  the  global  challenges  chapter  of  the  NTA,  which  like  the  first  chapter,  was  pre- 
empted  by  the  Masstricht  Treaty  and  the  creation  of  the  EU  Justice  and  Home  Affairs 
Pillar.  The  scope  for  global  challenges  co-operation  under  the  NTA  is  broad  if  not 
deep.  Many  initiatives,  statements  and  declarations  have  arisen  out.  of  the  chapter, 
however  the  concrete  rewards  of  individual  projects  are  often  limited  (see  below). 
Nonetheless,  the  partners  have  co-operated  in  creating  the  international  law 
enforcement  centre  in  Budapest,  the  Italian  Judiciary  Training  Centre,  the  anti- 
trafficking  in  women  information  campaigns  in  CEE  (see  chapter  6)  and  regional 
environmental  and  energy  projects  in  Russia,  the  Ukraine  and  Modlova.  Efforts  to 
fight  drug  trafficking  included  the  Caribbean  Drugs  Initiative  and  the  Precursor 
Chemicals  A,,  rcernent.  A  ina  Jor  set  back.  however,  was  failure  to  address 
environmental  challenges  by  reaciiing  an  agreement  over  the  Kyoto  Protocol. 
84 Table  3.6  Examples  of  NTA  Deliverables 
NTA  STATEMENTS,  DECLARATIONS,  AGREEMENTS 
CHAPTER 
-Joint  Statement  on  South  East  Europe  (2000) 
-Joint  Statement  on  Northern  Europe  (1999) 
-Joint  Statement  on  Chechnya  (1999) 
-Declaration  on  the  Middle  East  Peace  Process  (1998) 
-Joint  Statement  on  Co-operation  in  the  Western  Balkans  (1998) 
-Energy  Research  Co-operation  Agreement  (200  1) 
-Statement  on  Communicable  Diseases  in  Africa  (2000) 
-EU-US  Biotechnology  Consultative  Forum  (2000) 
-Declaration  on  the  Responsibilities  of  States  or,  Transparency  Regarding  Arms 
Exports  (2000) 
-Joint  Statement  on  Common  Principles  on  Small  Arms  and  Light  Weapons 
(1999). 
-Statement  on  EU-US  Shared  Objectives  and  Close  Co-operation  on  Counter  --- 
Terrorism  (1998) 
-Declaration  on  Common  Orientation  of  Non  -Proliferation  Policy  (1998) 
-Statement  on  Caspian  Energy  Issues 
-Precursors  Chemical  Agreement  (1997) 
-Joint  Initiative  on  Trafficking  in  Women  (1997) 
-Caribbean  Drugs  Initiative  (1996). 
-Regional  Environmental  Centers  Ukraine,  Russia, 
-  Safe  Harbour  Agreement  (2000) 
-  The  Veterinary  Equivalency  Agreement  (1999) 
-  The  Positive  Comity  Agreement  (1998) 
-  Statement  on  Co-operation  in  the  Global  Economy  (1998) 
-The  Mutual  Recognition  Agreement  (1997) 
-Customs  and  Co-operation  Agreement  (1996) 
IV: 
-Statement  on  Building  Consumer  Confidence  in  e-Commerce  and  the  Role  of 
Alternative  Dispute  Resolution  (2000) 
-Statement  on  Transparency  and  the  New  Transatlantic  Agenda  Dialogues  (1999) 
-Science  and  Technology  Agreement  (1998) 
-Higher  Education  and  Training  Agreement  (1997) 
-TALD  (1998),  TAED  (1998);  TACD  (1998);  TABD  (1995) 
The  economic  chapter  of  the  NTA  was  arguably  the  most  ambitious  and  where  the 
most  concrete  results  have  been  produced.  Under  the  NTA  the  EU  and  the  US  signed 
agreements  to  remove  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  in  the  form  of  certification  and 
testing  requirements  through  the  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  (1998)  (see  also 
85 chapter  7)  and  the  Veterinary  Equivalence  Agreement  (1999),  of  competition  rules 
through  the  Positive  Comity  Agreement  (1998),  of  customs  requirements  in  the 
Customs  and  Co-operation  Agreement  (1996)  and  on  data  protection  through  the  Safe 
Harbour  Agreement  (2000) 
. 
57  They  made  headway  at  the  multilateral  level  through 
the  TRIP  agreements  and  the  Information  Technology  Agreements.  Economic  co- 
operation  was  also  re-enforced  through  the  Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership 
(1998). 
Finally,  the  fourth  chapter  of  the  NTA  focuses  on  'building  bridges'  across  the 
Atlantic  -;  --  tic  ainwd  to  broaden  science  and  technology  co-operation,  people  to  people  links 
across  the  Atlantic,  information  exchanges  and  culture  and  parliamentary  links  (NTA 
1995;  JAP  1995).  Under  the  'building  bridges'  chapter  the  EU  and  the  US  have 
fostered  co-operation  between  scientists  (through  the  Science  and  Technology 
Agreement,  1997).,  58  and  educators  (through  the  Higher  Education  Agreement,  1998). 
The  main  achievement  of  the  chapter  however,  has  been  the  creation  of  interest  group 
'dialogues'  such  as  the  TACD,  TAED  and  TALD  to  rival  the  Transatlantic  Business 
Dialogue  (see  chapter  5)  and  the  strengthening  of  parliamentary  ties  through  the 
Transatlantic  Legislators  Dialogue  JLD)  (see  chapter  4). 
To  facilitate  policy  output  under  the  policy  framework  for  co-operation,  the 
NTA  also  introduced  new  transgovernmental  institutions  to  manage  the  new 
57 
a  Each  of  these  agreements  seek  to  increase  trade  through  the  removal  of  NTBs  to  trade.  The  Customs 
and  Co-operation  Agreement  (see  above)  simplifies  customs  procedures  making  it  easier  to  import  and 
export  products  with  the  transatlantic  marketplace  (EU  Press  Office  1996:  1  ).  The  bilateral  Positive 
Comity  Agreement  (  1998)  enhanced  co-operation  between  EU  and  US  competition  agencies.  The 
Veterinary  Equivalency  Agreement  (  1999)  applies  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  to  veterinary 
standards  and  increases  exchan-c  between  the  US  Department  of  Agriculture  and  the  EU  Commission 
for  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  in  order  to  increase  the  trade  in  animals  through  mutual 
reco-nition  ofstandards.  I-lie  Mutual  Recognition  agreements  seek  to  eliminate  duplicate  testing 
standards  to  -oods  and  services. 
The  Science  and  Technolo-ý  Agreement  (  1997)  draws  on  a  number  of  actors  as  it  seeks  a  means  of 
co-operation  (be  thatjoint  task  forces,  studies.  conferences.  training.  information  exchanges)  in  a 
number  ofareas  where  scientific  standards  form  barriers  to  trade.  for  example  in  agriculture,  fisheries, 
communication,  intellectual  property,  and  biotechnology  policies. 
86 transatlantic  dialogue  and  to  seek  out  deliverables.  The  NTA  added  two  main 
mechanisms-  the  Senior  Level  Group  (SLG)  and  the  NTA  Task  Force-  to  help  drive, 
co-ordinate,  organise,  monitor  and  implement  the  agenda  for  EU-US  Summits  (see 
chapter  4). 
The  Scope  and  Depth  of  the  NTA  Framework 
The  underlying  purpose  of  the  NTA  is  to  generally  fortify  the  transatlantic  partnership 
and  specifically  re-enforce  commitments  to  shared  interests  in  promoting  economic 
liberalisation,  -Increascul  'SOILIC  secumity  and  t-he  spr-e-a-d  --%. 
f'  Does  the  NTA 
.1 
achieve  this  aim?  Three  factors  serve  as  indicators  of  the  success  of  the  NTA:  the 
proficiency  for  conflict  resolution,  the  reach  of  bilateral  policy  co-ordination  and  the 
build  up  of  institutions. 
First,  the  failure  of  the  EU  and  the  US  to  resolve  or  'rnanageý  transatlantic 
trade  disputes  within  the  NTA  framework  is  widely  believed  to  be  a  downside  of  the 
system.  The  NTA  specifically  re-emphasises  the  need  to  resolve  bilateral  trade 
disputes  and  to  seek  'amicable  and  co-operative  solutions  to  our  disputes  and  to  the 
smooth  functioning  of  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  mechanism.  '  Despite  attempts  to 
create  an  'early  warning  system'  (see  chapter  4)  that  could  effectively  curb  differences 
before  they  become  disputes,  coverage  of  the  EU-US  relationship  in  the  1990s  was 
overshadowed  by  talk  of  transatlantic  trade  wars  on  bananas  (chapter  9),  beef  (see  also 
Skogstad  forthcoming),  GMOs  (see  Young  2001).  Foreign  Sales  Corporations  (FSCs)  Z71  t-- 
(see  also  Stehmann  2000)  and  hush  kits  (see  also  Peterson  2001  a).  The  EU  and  the  US 
were  accused  of  failin,,  ý  to  manage  potential  trade  wars  and  of  undermining  the  C, 
multilateral  trading,  rules. 
87 On  the  other  hand,  have  trade  disputes  over  bananas  and  beef,  for  example, 
threatened  to  sever  ties  between  the  EU  and  the  US?  The  general  consensus  among 
interviewees  is  that  while  co-operation  and  conflict  in  transatlantic  relations  are 
inseparable,  disputes  have  not  undermined  the  overall  effectiveness  of  the  NTA.  One 
US  official  argued  that  the  disputes  have  had  little  impact  on  the  NTA.  59  European 
officials  have  argued  the  importance  of  minding  the  discrepancy  between  first,  the 
scope  of  disputes  vis-d-vis  co-operation  and  second,  of  media  coverage  for  dispute  vis- 
d-vis  the  NTA  agreements.  60  A  Commission  (2001:  6-7)  report  states  that, 
At  most,  1-2%  of  the  trade  and  investment  flow  is  attected.  Such  questions, 
however,  tend  to  attract  media  attention  far  beyond  their  economic  importance. 
As  a  result,  trade  irritants  are  sometimes  blamed  for  casting  a  shadow  over 
other  aspects  of  the  relationship  between  the  European  Union  and  the  United 
States.  In  reality  there  is  little  risk  of  negative  spill-over  from  individual 
disputes  into  the  overall  political  relationship  which  is  broader  and  deeper  than 
ever  before. 
Another  US  official  argued  that  the  NTA  has  been  useful  for  information  exchanges 
on  technical  disputes,  for  example  through  the  Biotechnology  Consultative  Forum.  61 
The  NTA  process  has  been  less  successful  in  resolving  bigger  disputes-  such  as 
bananas  and  beef-where  EU  and  US  domestic  interests  directly  collide.  A  Council 
Presidency  official  argued,  'where  there  are  disputes,  our  hands  are  usually  tied  at  a 
political  level.  62  The  key,  however,  is  in  the  capacity  of  transatlantic  institutions  to 
manage  disputes  in  the  *amicable'  fashion  outlined  by  the  NTA.  President  Prodi 
acknowledged  that  this  was  one  area  where  more  work  was  needed  when  he  admitted 
59  InterviexN,  USTR,  bý  telephone.  2001  (58). 
60  Interview,  FUrOpCan  Commission.  DG  Trade,  Brussels,  1999  (15)ý Council  Presidency  Official, 
Brussels,  1999  (5),  Commission  Delegation  to  the  US,  Washington  2000  (3  1). 
Interview,  US  Congress  Staff  Member,  Washington  2000  (39), 
Interview.  Finnish  Council  Presidency,  BrLISSelS,  1999  (5). 
88 after  the  June  2000  EU-US  Summit  that,  'We  decided  that  megaphone  diplomacy 
63 
would  be  replaced  by  telephone  diplomacy' 
. 
Nonetheless,  a  positive  attribute  of  the  NTA  process  is  that  EU-US  officials 
continued  regular  dialogue  throughout  the  trade  disputes,  and  that  the  NTA  process 
continued  to  churn  out  'deliverables.  One  EU  Commission  official  argued,  'The  NTA 
became  the  new  'glue'  in  transatlantic  relations.  '  64 
The  second  measurement  of  the  NTA's  success  centres  on  the  substance  of  the 
transatlantic  dialogue.  Philippart  and  Winand  (2001:  50)  argue  that  the  NTA  creates  a 
frqm,  -Ixt%ru  for  -tion  -4  wid-  the  wope  of'  the  relafi  -1-  I.  -  "I"  I  L11  i  lkill3illp. 
one  of  the  main  purposes  .  of  the  NTA  is  to  seek  out  issue  areas  where  EU-US  co- 
operation  is  feasible,  policy  output  is  an  important  measure  of  the  NTA.  The  result,  as 
noted  in  table  3.6,  is  a  mixture  of  joint  agreements,  statements  and  declarations.  The 
quality  of  'deliverables'  has  however  been  criticised  first,  because  joint  action  is 
limited  in  comparison  to  joint  consultation.  65  Donfried  (1996:  8)  indicates  for  example 
that,  'Even  some  officials  have  criticised  the  plan  as  a  glorified  laundry  list  that  is  long 
on  rhetoric  and  short  on  substance.  The  two  sides  agree  on  many  principles  and 
general  goals  but  few  specific  initiatives  are  outlined'.  Second,  an  argument  can  be 
made  that  the  NTA  deliverables  are  fairly  insignificant  given  that  many  of  them  were 
already  being  discussed  in  other  policy-making  forums.  For  example  the  Positive 
Comity  Agreement  builds  on  a  previous  competition  agreement  signed  in  1991,  the 
MR-As  were  under  discussion  as  early  as  1992  and  one  Council  official  argued  that  the 
SLG  sin-iply  hi  lacked  the  success  of  individual  departments.  66  Pollack  and  Shaffer 
6  ý"  FilhHh'i(II  Times  (2000)  'NeNý  Tact  but  EU-US  Disputes  Remain',  I  June. 
Interview,  Commission  Official,  DG  External  Relations.  Brussels  1999  (6). 
lntervie,,  k,  Commission  Official.  DG  External  Relations,  Brussels  1999  (9). 
One  Commission  official  notes  in  the  case  of  competition  policy,  that  many  within  the  department 
preferred  to  remain  separate  from  the  NTA,  fearing  its  broad  agenda  would  undermine  the  departments 
specific  agenda  (2). 
89 (2001)  describe,  'a  repackaging  of  existing  bilateral  initiatives.  '  Thus,  it  can  be  argued 
that  the  NTA  warrants  claims  that  it  is  both  broad  and  boring. 
The  policy  output  is,  on  its  own,  an  inadequate  measure  of  the  scope  of  the 
NTA.  Officials  argue  that  an  over-emphasis  is  placed  on  deliverables.  Some  argue  the 
document  was  specifically  designed  to  be  non-controversial  in  light  of  domestic 
opposition  to  a  more  comprehensive  treaty.  67  Peterson  (1996:  16)  argues  that,  'it 
(NTA)  reflected  a  conscious  effort  by  administrations  on  both  sides-  -particularly  the 
American-to  find  and  exploit  as  many  productive  areas  of  co-operation  as  possible 
without  aMaLLilný--;  -widei  aLL(:  IILI(-)Il  I  he  NTA  did  not  create  a  new  bilateral 
organisation.  Rather  it  stressed  the  need  to  funnel  ideas  through  existing  multilateral 
institutions  such  as  NATO,  OSCE,  the  G-7  (8)  and  the  WTO  where  possible.  On  the 
other  hand  it  sought  to  establish  a  common  threshold  of  co-operation  between  the  EU 
and  the  US  in  a  range  of  policy  sectors.  Negotiating  between  bureaucrats,  rather  than 
legislators,  increases  the  threshold  for  co-operation  particularly  on  'technical'  policies 
as  it  de-politicises  the  process. 
Finally,  the  institutionalisation  of  the  structure  is  arguably  the  most  visible  and 
most  significant  change  brought  by  the  NTA  (see  also  chapter  4).  Both  EU  and  US 
officials  stressed  the  important  role  of  the  NTA  in  'bringing  everyone  to  the  table'  and 
establishing  dialogue  through  regular  contacts.  68  A  US  official  argued  that  increased 
information  exchanges,  brought  more  wisdom  to  negotiations.  A  Commission  official  z:  1  I 
argues  that  understanding  one  another's  policies  and  preferences  was  a  pre-requisite  to 
acting  on  them.  69  Finally.  one  Commission  official  conceded  that  the  NTA  process 
served  to  manage  the  'clay  to  claý'  relations  between  the  EU  and  the  US  suggesting 
Interview,  EU  Commission  Dele-ation.  Washington  2000  (3  1)ý  US  State  Department,  Washington 
2000(41). 
68  Interviews,  Finnish  Council  Secretariat,  US  Mission  and  European  Commission,  (2,5,4)  September 
1999. 
90 that,  'Closer  contact  and  more  consultation  slowly  breeds  more  broad 
understanding.  '  70 
Overall,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  NTA  symbolised  a  renewed  commitment  to 
the  EU-US  partnership  (see  also  Philppart  and  Winand  2001:  50).  The  new 
mechanisms  in  the  NTA  represented  a  shift  from  joint  consultation  to  joint  or  parallel 
action.  The  NTA-  JAP  framework  identifies  areas  of  collaboration  and  sets  an  agenda 
for  further  increased  transatlantic  co-operation.  The  new  institutional  mechanisms 
gave  new  direction  to  the  summits,  making  them  more  useful  mechanisms.  As  a 
whole,  the  NITA  placed  re-iiewed  locus  on  transatlaralc  relations  and  increased  'the 
prospects  for  co-operation  by  creating  an  ever-increasing  drive  for  deliverables.  The 
institutional  i  sation  of  the  relationship  provides  greater  capacity  for  the  management  of 
technical  disputes.  In  short,  the  NTA  gives  the  relationship  more  shape  and  direction.  71 
Still,  it  has  been  widely  acknowledged  that  there  are  gaps  in  the  NTA.  As  an 
architect  of  the  NTA,  US  Ambassador  Eizenstat  (1997)  argued  the  NTA  deserved  '  a, 
'B+,  a  good  solid  grade  with  room  for  improvement'.  An  EU  negotiator  clarified  in 
terms  of  substance  that  the  NTA  deserved  a  C,  if  not  lower,  but  agreed  that  the 
institutional  aspects  of  the  NTA  warranted  an  A.  Thus,  like  the  TAD  the  NTA  is  a 
living  document,  because  it  sets  flexible  goals  in  different  issue  areas.  Although  it 
does  add  a  more  or  less  permanent  structure  (Frellesen  2001),  it  is  organic  in  the  sense 
that  the  mechanisms  in  place  ensure  the  agenda  can  grow  with  the  dialogue. 
4)  Adding  On:  The  TEP 
Fhere  \Nas  a  PLISII  to  facilitate  doser  co-operation  in  the  economic  chapter  of  the  NTA. 
after  the  six  month  report  card  (May  1996)  revealed  that  Madrid's  expectations  had 
')  Interview  31 
'o  Interview  6. 
91 not  been  met  in  a  number  of  areas,  particularly  in  the  attempt  to  build  the  New 
72  Transatlantic  Marketplace 
. 
The  lack  of  concrete  deliverables  prompted  claims  that 
the  NTA  had  run  out  of  steam.  However,  those  working  within  the  NTA  process 
acknowledged  the  merit  of  further  institutionalisation.  Agreements,  particularly  in  the 
economic  sector,  helped  build  confidence  between  EU  and  US  negotiators  and  the 
TABD.  Finally,  the  continued  disputes  over  bananas,  beef  and  extraterritorial 
sanctions  reaffirmed  the  need  for  further  transatlantic  commitment  as  a  means  of 
facilitating  trade  and  containing  conflict. 
Deb-U-tes  ragedd  On  throughout  11997  and  1197978  over  how  to  deepen  the 
transatlantic  economic  commitment.  73  On  March  11,1998  the  European  Commission 
approved  Brittan's  proposal  for  a  comprehensive  trade  treaty,  the  New  Transatlantic 
Marketplace  Agreement  (NTMA).  74  The  NTMA  plan  proposed  a  comprehensive 
agreement  that  would  remove  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade  across  the  Atlantic;  commit 
the  EU  and  the  US  to  eliminate  industrial  tariffs  through  multilateral  negotiations  by 
the  year  2010;  establish  a  free  trade  area  in  services;  and  lead  to  further  bilateral 
liberalisation  in  areas  such  as  government  procurement  investment  and  intellectual 
property.  Brittan  argued  that  the  NTMA  agreement  was  an  opportunity  to  adapt  and 
71  Argued  by  US  Mission  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (7). 
72  Gardner  (1997:  89)  notes  that  while  these  reports  were  premature  given  the  scale  of  commitments  and 
timely  process,  they  exposed  shortcomings  in  the  following  areas;  the  testing  and  certification  on 
telecommunications  equipment,  telecommunications  terminal  equipment,  information  technology, 
electrical  safety,  electro-inagnetic  compatibility,  pleasure  boats  and  veterinary  biologicals, 
pharmaceuticals,  telecommunications  and  international  maritime  transport. 
7"  '  Assistant  Secretary  of  Economic  Affairs  Larson  demanded  a  New  Transatlantic  Marketplace  initiative 
that  would  secure  open  and  honest  markets  and  specifically  liberalise  the  telecommunications,  aviation 
and  capital  sectors  (Larson  1997).  US  Secretary  of  Commerce,  William  Daley,  spoke  ofjoint  efforts 
bet"een  the  political  and  business  communities  to  define  the  meaning  of  a  barrier-free  'transatlantic 
marketplace',  to  establish  realistic  targets  and  to  designate  further  steps  in  the  process  (Daley  1997). 
Grossman  (  1998)  pragmatically  identified  the  need  for  consultations  with  Congress,  the  private  sector 
and  non-go,.  crinnerital  organisations  in  order  to  clarify  an  American  position  on  the  NTM  initiative. 
4-  Flic  initiative  siý,  Iits  the  advantages  in  a  single  comprehensive  agreement,  ... 
designed  to  use  an 
economic  instrument  to  (live  a  much  broader  inipetus  to  the  overall  political  relationship;  to  produce 
important  economic  beriefits  and  to  provide  a  new  mechanism  and  stronger  incentives  to  prevent  and 
resolve  disputes'  (European  Commission  1998:  3-4).  The  aggressive  nature  of  Brittan's  proposal 
represented  his  lon(,  mg  to  see  the  EU  display  leadership  in  the  international  system.  Brittan  himself 
92 apply  the  lessons  learned  form  the  SEM  to  the  EU-US  process  of  economic 
liberalisation.  However,  while  the  EU  and  the  US  had  incentive  to  pursue  further 
institutional  i  sati  on,  there  was  domestic  opposition  to  anything  that  resembled  first,  the 
TAFTA  and  second,  the  Commission  taking  too  much  control  of  external  negotiations. 
A  decision  taken  by  the  EU  General  Affairs  Council,  one  month  before  the 
London  Summit,  ensured  that  the  Commission's  NTMA  proposal  never  made  it  onto 
the  summit  agenda.  It  was  opposed  by  the  Member  States,  mainly  France,  75  who 
argued: 
9  th-at  bilatcral.  (mather  than  -multilateral)  market  opening,  particularly 
through  the  use  of  a  transatlantic  dispute  settlement  mechanism,  undermined  the 
WTO; 
9  that  the  agreement  was  not  feasible  in  light  of  the  ongoing  extraterritorial  Helm- 
Burton  dispute  surrounding  the  US  Helms-Burton  law 
e  that  the  agreement  would  carry  negative  implications  for  EC  audio-visual  services 
and  agriculture  policies 
*  that  the  Commission  did  not  have  a  mandate  to  negotiate  the  agreement.  76 
The  French  rejection  ofthe  proposal  was  troublesome  for  a  Commissioner  so  intent  on 
equalizing  the  credibility  of  the  EU  as  a  partner  for  the  US.  Brittan  had'earlier 
claimed,  *It  is  inevitable  that  we  should  now  face  the  United  States  as  an  increasingly 
cited  the  unanimous  approval  of  the  proposal  in  the  Commission  as  evidence,  'that  the  European  tiger  is 
beginning  to  roar'  (Brittan  1998). 
75  But  also  Germariv,  The  Netherlands.  Italy  and  Spain. 
-6  French  President  Chirac  commented  at  a  press  conference  shortly  before  the  General  Affairs 
Council's  discussion  that  the  NTMA  represented  'a  personal  initiative  by  Sir  Leon  Brittan  who  all  alone 
went  off  to  negotiate  a  free  trade  area  between  the  United  States  and  Europe,  without  a  mandate' 
Adding,  'It  is  unacceptable  for  a  Commissioner  to  negotiate  without  a  specific  mandate  from  the 
Council.  This  must  be  clearly  stated  so  it  does  not  happen  again'  (quoted  in  Sheil  1998:  4).  One 
government  Source  adds.  'The  French  felt  like  the  whole  thin(I  was  thrown  in  their  face,  '  Taken  from  an 
interview  with  a  US  Official  conducted  July  1998  (1).  (See  also  That  Awkward  Relationship  1998:  1; 
Buckley  1998:  1) 
93 equal  partner,  sharing  world  leadership  more  and  more  as  we  develop  still  our  own 
capacity  to  act  together  in  a  united  and  effective  way'.  77  Instead,  the  Commissioner's 
attempts  to  prove  that  the  EU  could  take  a  leading  role  in  transatlantic  relations 
backfired,  and  his  worst  fears  about  the  action  capacity  gap  of  the  Union  were  brought 
to  the  surface  by  internal  bickering.  78 
Table  3.7  THE  THREE  PRONGS  OF  THE  TEP 
ACHIEVE  NEAR  MARKET  ACCESS  GAINS  FOR 
GOODS  AND  SERVICES  AND  AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTS 
PROMOTE  MULTILATERAL  AND  BILATERAL 
TRADE  LIBERALISATION  OF  GOODS,  SERVICES 
AND  CAPITAL 
EXPAND  AND  DEEPEN  THE  TRANSATLANTIC 
DIALOGUE  BETWEEN  NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANISATIONS,  PARLIAMENTARIANS  AND 
GOVERNMENT  ON  TRADE  AND  INVESTMENT  - 
The  Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership 
The  conflicting  pressure  (mainly  from  the  Americans)  to  secure  some  type  of 
economic  agreement  at  the  1998  London  Summit,  coupled  by  the  lack  of  domestic 
support  for  a  comprehensive  treaty  saw  the  launch  of  another  compromise,  the 
Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership  (TEP).  The  TEP  ensured  that  neither  party  went 
77  Quoted  in  Eurocorn,  Maý  1997,  available, 
http:,  '/www.  eurunion.  ot,,,,,  ý'llekvs/  I CUrecorn/l  997/ecomO597.  htm 
g  Had  the  dispute  made  it  onto  the  May  1998  Summit  Agenda.  it  would  have  been  unlikely  to  pass  US 
approval  either.  The  initially  positive  American  response  to  the  NTMA  proposal  soon  turned  lukewarm 
because  Brittan's  proposal  failed  to  address  aggriCUlture.  Interview,  US  Embassy,  Dub-lin  July  1998  (1). 
94 away  empty  handed  from  the  summit,  and  it  maintained  many  of  the  goals  of  the  NTM 
while  avoiding  the  political  controversy  associated  with  Brittan's  proposal. 
The  TEP  aimed  to  tackle  bilateral  regulatory  barriers  to  trade  and  to  find 
common  positions  for  the  Seattle  Round  of  the  WTO.  It  set  the  goal  of  reducing 
barriers  to  billions  of  dollars  of  trade  through  a  three  pronged  market  opening 
approach  (see  table  3.7).  The  year  2000  was  set,  somewhat  over-ambitiously,  for 
substantive  developments  in  a  number  of  specific  sectors  (see  table  3.8).  Finally,  the 
TEP  looked  to  the  expansion  and  deepening  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue  between  non- 
gowl,  ler.  n.  m.  -Int-all 
-f'f-,  t-i  Ic  c)n  tra  de  and 
investment  issues  (US  Mission  1998).  In  this  sense  the  agreement  complimented  the 
market  opening  objective  with  a  'commitment  to  the  highest  labour,  health  and 
environmental  standards'  (Pickering  1998:  4). 
The  TEP  was  followed  in  September  1998  by  the  TEP  Action  Plan,  which  like 
the  NTA  Joint  Action  Plan  sets  a  more  specific  agenda  but  also  includes  target  dates 
for  actionable  goals.  Building  on  the  success  of  MRA's,  the  TEP  Action  Plan 
highlighted  the  need  for  mutual  recognition  agreements  in  services,  particularly  in 
intellectual  property,  food  safety  and  biotechnology.  It  also  contained  sections  on 
regulatory  co-operation  and  harmonisation  of  standards  to  facilitate  the  removal  of 
technical  barriers  to  trade. 
In  addition,  the  TEP  Action  Plan  added  to  the  transatlantic  institutional 
structure  by  creating  the  TEP  Steering  Group,  a  construct  which  is  similar  to.  the  NTA 
Task  Force  but  which  deals  only  with  economic  issues.  The  TEP  Steering  Group  was 
charged  NN,,  ith  monitoring.  implementing  and  reviexing  TEP  objectives.  providing  a  zl--  C, 
'horizontal"  forum  for  transatlantic  civil  society  and  a  mechanism  for  early  warning  on 
95 potential  trade  disputes.  It  also  established  specialised  TEP  working  groups  at  the 
expert  level  (see  chapter  4). 
The  TEP  represented  another  compromise  in  the  transatlantic  partnership 
building.  It  was  announced  parallel  to  the  Transatlantic  Partnership  on  Political  Co- 
operation  (TPPC)  agreement,  which  represented  a  commitment  to  intensify 
consultations  for  more  effective  political  co-operation  and  established  a  new  set  of 
principles  for  applying  economic  sanctions.  Specifically  the  TPPC  secured  a  US 
commitment  to  end  extra-territorial  sanctions  against  EU  companies.  In  an  act  of 
'rreativi-  onnfliot  mqnao,  -m,  -it'  PT  T-1  Ns  If-qilprz  rnqnq(ypti  tri  m  it 
longstanding  disputes  over  the  US  extraterritorial  legislation  and  secondary  boycott 
provisions  of  the  Iran-Libya  Sanctions  Act  (ILSA)  and  the  Helms-Burton  Act  in  order 
to  gain  the  Member  States'  approval  for  the  TEP  (Krenzler  and  Wiegand  1999:  14)79 
Under  the  TPPC  the  US  maintained  the  right  to  use  sanctions  when  diplomatic  and 
political  options  failed  and  the  EU  agreed  that  maximum  effort  be  taken  to  ensure  that 
economic  sanctions  remained  multilateral  rather  than  unilateral.  Consultation  at  senior 
levels  was  stressed  as  a  prerequisite  to  imposing  sanctions  and  a  number  of  guidelines 
were  set  out  to  govern  situations  warranting  action  by  the  EU  and  the  US. 
In  return  for  the  US  compromise  on  Flelms-Burton,  the  EU  also  made  further 
political  commitments  on  JHA  co-operation,  an  area  that  the  US  was  eager  to  pursue 
further.  Statements  on  non-proliferation  and  counter-terrorism  lead  to  some  joint 
efforts  in  Iran,  but  the  majority  of  the  language  used  only  uttered  vague  commitments 
to  pursue  co-operation  in  other  regions.  There  are  still  glaring  foreign  policy  gaps  in 
transatlantic  relations,  which  surfaced  most  obviously  during  the  crisis  in  Kosovo. 
ý9  The  use  of  the  word  inana 
, ged,  not  resolved,  should  be  stressed  here  because  Helms  Burton  Act  was 
not  actualk  repealed.  That  would  have  required  an  act  of  Congress.  Krenzler  and  Wiegand  (1999:  16) 
noteý  'Of  course  nothing  guarantees  that  Congress  will  refrain  frorn  passing  such  sanctions,  thus 
ignoring  the  Administration's  wishes  in  conducting  US  foreign  policy'. 
96 Wh  at  good  is  th  e  TEP? 
The  troubled  TEP  negotiations  revealed  something  about  its  content  and  its 
implementation.  The  TEP-was  criticised  for  its  substance,  particularly  by  Europeans 
who  had  favoured  a  more  comprehensive  agreement.  It  was  argued  that  the  TEP  was 
ýnot  overly  ambitious,  80  that  the  agreement  was  the  'result  of  bad  political  thinking'  81 
and  that  'it  would  never  work  properly.  '  82 
First,  the  TEP  was  scrutimsed  for  failing  to  manage  trade  disputes,  in  particular 
the  hamn2  and  beef  disnutes  which  overshadowed  the.  December  IQQx 
Summit  (see  also  chapter  8).  Unlike  the  NTMA,  however,  the  TEP  did  not  contain  a 
dispute  settlement  mechanism,  rather  it  committed  both  parties  to  jointly  approach  the 
WTO  Dispute  Settlement  review  in  order  to  increase  the  transparency  and  functioning 
of  the  panel  (FEP  Action  Plan  1998).  Second,  the  TEP  was  perceived  as  a  forum  for 
reaching  EU-U  S  consensus  before  the  Seattle  Round.  Frost  (1998:  3)  argued  that,  'The 
failure  of  the  Brittan  initiative  may  have  cleared  the  way  for  more  focused  thinking 
about  global  trade  liberalisation  in  the  WTO',  but  here  too  the  TEP  failed  as  the  lack 
of  EU-US  consensus  in  Seattle  contributed  to  the  demise  of  the  Round.  Finally,  the 
TEP  was  opposed  by  NGOs  who  feared  the  lack  of  transparency  in  the  decision 
making  process.  The  controversy  surrounding  the  content  of  the  TEP  led  the 
transatlantic  decision  makers  to  promote  two  new  'civil  society'  dialogues-  the  TAED 
and  the  TACD-  in  con  junction  with  the  trade  agreement  under  both  the  NTA's  fourth 
chapter  and  the  TEP's  third  prong  (see  chapter  5).  L- 
Interview.  British  MEP.  September  1999  (17) 
Interview,  Commission,  September  1999  (16). 
Intervie\N,  Commission  official.  Washington,  October  2000  (32). 
97 Faith  in  the  TEP  was  undermined  further  in  the  first  years  of  its 
implementation.  In  1999  it  appeared  that  the  TEP  had  either  stalled  or  died.  83  The  TEP 
demonstrated  that  the  EU  and  the  US  were  still  grappling  with  different  visions  of  the 
transatlantic  partnership.  Americans  argued  that  the  Europeans  were  ambivalent  to  the 
TEP  because  they  thought  the  agenda  should  be  more  ambitious.  One  USTR  official 
argued.  'It  is  hard  to  succeed  when  they  load  it  with  topics  that  are  not  going 
anywhere!  '  On  the  other  hand  Europeans  argued  that  the  Americans  were  unable  to 
deliver'  particularly  in  the  services  sector.  84  MRAs  negotiations  were  held  up  by  the 
US  because  individual  states,  rather  than  any  centralised  body,  had  control  over 
services  certification  and  the  US  Administration  was  unable  or  unwilling  to  seek 
legislation  from  Congress  to  uphold  the  TEP  (see  also  chapter  7).  85  EU  officials  also 
argued  that  US  officials  were  stalling  in  working  groups.  86  A  British  MEP 
complained,  'The  US  cannot  guarantee  that  every  state  will  be  on  board.  The  reality  is 
the  opposite  of  usual  perception  that  the  process  is  upheld  by  Community  decision 
making.  '8  7 
The  limited  scope  of  the  TEP  and  the  initial  problems  implementing  it  also 
pointed  to  a  lack  of  political  will  in  EU-US  relations.  At  the  time,  it  was  argued  that 
there  was  little  interest  in  Brussels  or  Washington  for  new  transatlantic  initiatives 
(Frost  1998).  The  EU  was  preoccupied  with  enlargement  and  the  launch  of  the  Euro. 
American  politics  were  divided  between  the  Republican  Congress  and  Democrat 
Administration  over  the  Clinton  scandal,  and  both  sides  were  pre-occupied  by  the  US 
election. 
ý  11  IntervieNN  s  at  the  Europcan  Commission,  Brussels,  September  1999  (9,15)  and  the  Comm  ission 
Delegation,  Washington,  October  2000  (32) 
84  Intervie-,  N.  2,6,17. 
8ý  Interview  9,20. 
86  Interviews  at  the  Council  Secretariat.  the  Commission,  and  TABD  officials.  Brussels,  September 
1999  (3,6,18,20). 
98 Table  3.8 
SECTORS  COVERED  BY  THE  TEP 
improving 
,  science  and  regulatory 
co-operation 
reducing  regulatory  barriers 
lowering  red  tape  costs  to  benefit 
consurners 
working  to  keep  electronic  commerce 
duty  fi-ce 
e  advaricing  core  labour  standards 
developing  common  approaches  to  trade 
related  environmental  areas 
recoanising  the  central  role  of 
intellectual  property  rights  as  a  basis  for 
econornic,  scientific,  and  artistic 
creativity 
opening  transatlantic  econornies  to 
include  a  wider  variety  of  interests 
Source:  TEP  1.998. 
By  the  time  President  Bush  took  office,  it  seemed  the  TEP  was  back  on  track.  The 
TEP  Steering  Group  was  making  regular  reports  to  the  EU-US  Summits,  and  the 
progress  on  science  and  regulatory  co-operation  overshadowed  the  fact  that  no 
progress  had  been  made  on  agriculture  or  audio-visual  services.  Negotiations  for  new 
MRAs  in  goods  and  in  services  were  underway  in  2001  (see  also  chapter  7).  The  TEP 
process  produced  EU-US  Gui  del  ines/Principles  on  Co-operation  and  Transparency  in 
Establishing  Technical  Regulations  (2000),  aimed  at  improving  the  transparency  and 
87 
Interview  17. 
99 effectiveness  of  planning  and  developing  regulatory  proposals.  In  addition,  the  EU-US 
Biotechnology  Consultative  Forum  was  established  to  head  off  an  upcoming  dispute 
over  GMOs. 
Conclusion 
The  underlying  thesis  of  this  chapter  was  that  EU-US  relations  have  changed  in  the 
1990s  as  a  result  of  three  agreements  the  TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TEP.  These 
im-el  the  institiltionalisation  of  the  tranznthqntir  relationshin  C)n  q  MC)r  agreements  ens 
equal  basis  outside  the  confines  of  NATO.  Each  agreement  added  a  'block'  to  the 
transatlantic  'framework'  by  outlining  principles  and  goals  for  co-operation  and  by 
establishing  institutions  to  manage  policy  co-ordination. 
Domestic  opposition  to  an  overarching  transatlantic  treaty  ensured  that  the  EU 
and  the  US  strategy  for  co-operation  focused  on  relatively  'safe'  or  'soft'  policy 
objectives.  As  a  result  the  NTA  process  is  often  criticised  on  the  basis  of  that  its 
deliverables  are  non-controversial  . 
88  However,  the  real  weight  behind  the  TAD,  the 
NTA  and  the  TEP  is  not  only  its  'deliverables-  which  are  an  important  part  of 
'focusing'  the  dialogue  (see  chapter  4)-  but  rather  in  its  capacity  to  forge  a  formal 
dialogue  structure.  The  agreements  ensured  the  creation  of  networks  which  foster 
communication  between  political  leaders,  officials  and  business  and  civil  society  on 
both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  In  theory.  it  is  these  'institutions'  that  increase  the  threshold 
for  co-operation.  One  Commission  official  argued,  'The  logic  of  the  NTA  is  similar  to 
8'  The  term  'NTA  process'  is  used  throughout  the  text  to  generalise  about  the  transatlantic  process,  as  it 
is  the  most  comprehensive  of  the  three  agreements. 
loo the  thinking  behind  the  EU.  If  we  are  constantly  talking,  it  is  less  likely  that  we  will  be 
fighting.  '89 
The  reality  is  that  the  institutionalisation  of  the  relationship  in  the  1990s 
created  a  new  forum  for  transatlantic  policy  making.  However,  the  TAD,  the  NTA  and 
the  TEP,  as  'history  making'  agreements,  only  indicates  a  general  direction  for  policy 
co-ordination  rather  than  specific  agreements.  It  is  the  transgovernmental  and 
transnational  institutions  that  are  charged  with  'setting'  and  'shaping'  transatlantic 
polices.  The  next  chapters  note  that  even  where  the  political  will  exists  at  the  top,  the 
no  inflnence.  ci  from  the  bottom  up  licy  n------  1-  V, 
,0  IntervieNN,  Commission  Official.  BrLISSeIS.  May  2000  (29). 
101 Chapter  4 
Setting  and  Shaping  the  Transatlantic  Dialogue: 
The  Transgovernmental  Policy  Process 
Transatlantic  institutional  i  sation  has  altered  the  way  the  EU  and  the  US  interact.  In 
contrast  to  the  traditional  style  of  international  diplomacy  that  characterised  the  Cold 
War,  there  is  now  a  'political  process'  that  surrounds  EU-US  decision-making.  The 
transatlantic  agreements  created  institutions  for  enhanced  dialogue  between  the  EU 
and  the  US.  T.  hese  meellanisms  -,  vcrc  designed  Lo  foster  co-operation  and  curb  conflict 
in  the  transatlantic  relationship.  Their  olýjective  is  to  produce  'deliverables',  provide  a 
forum  for  dispute  settlement  and  foster  co-operation  through  increased  dialogue  and 
information  exchange.  The  institutions  created  by  the  TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TEP 
form  the  structure  of  the  transatlantic  policy  process  and  the  pillars  of  transatlantic 
govemance. 
This  chapter  examines  both  the  mechanisms  and  the  procedures  that  make  up 
the  trangovernmental  policy-making  process  and  the  trans  governmnetal  actors  that 
operate  within  it.  In  reference  to  the  second  hypothesis  outlined  in  chapter  1,  it  seeks 
to  establish  the  extent  to  which  the  new  institutions  provide  a  forum  for  decentralised 
policy  setting  and  shaping.  What  role  do  transgovernmental  actors  play  in  the 
transatlantic  policy  making  process?  In  other  words  what  room  has  the 
institutionalised  EU-tJS  structure-establ  i  shed  by  intergovernmental  decisions-  allowed 
for  other  governmental  actors  to  influence  transatlantic  formation?  It  argues  that  the 
scope  for  actor  access  is  vast,  given  the  corriplex  nature  of  EU,  US  and  transatlantic 
decision  making  structures.  Z:  ý 
102 This  chapter  is  approached  in  the  following  way.  Section  I  examines  EU-US 
Summits,  where  intergovernmental  and  transgovernmental  agreements  are  announced. 
The  remaining  sections  evaluate  the  'sub  summit'  procedures,  in  other  words  the 
mechanisms  and  process  that  deal  with  early  stages  of  decision  making.  Section  2 
explores  the  'political  process',  the  'economic  process',  and  the  'NTA  process',  and 
describes  the  structure  of  dialogue  created  by  these  processes.  Section  3  evaluates  the 
trade  dispute  settlement  process  established  in  part  by  the  'Early  Warning  System' 
(1999).  Finally,  section  4  evaluates  the  impact  of  the  transgovernmental  process.  It 
questions  why  the  decentralisation  of  transgovernment-all  decision  setting  and  shaping  I  fn 
ýrnatters'  in  the  context  of  transatlantic  governance. 
1)  The  EU-US  Summit 
The  biannual  EU-US  Summit  is  the  primary  forum  for  intergovernmental  exchange  in 
the  NTA  process,  consisting  of  the  highest  level  of  contact  between  the  Presidents  of 
the  US,  the  Commission  and  the  Council  Presidency.  As  established  under  the  TAD, 
these  intergovernmental  meetings  were  originally  designed  as  stand  alone  events. 
However  as  the  NTA  process  emerged,  a  number  of  ministerial  level  meetings  held  in 
conjunction  with  or  in  close  proximity  to  the  summits  also  became  institutionalised. 
The  preparation  for  summits  became  more  complex  with  the  creation  of  economic,  as 
well  as  political  institutions  under  the  TER  EU-US  Summits  developed  into  an  event 
rather  than  a  meeting  whereby  economic  and  foreign  policy  ministers,  US  Cabinet 
officials  and  EU  Commissioners  held  separate,  parallel  talks,  followed  by  a  joint 
plenary  session  and  finally,  the  actual  summit  meeting.  90 
90  The  attendance  of  I-  U-US  summit  fluctuates  depending  on  where  the  summit  is  held.  For  example  the 
US  Secretary  of  State  attends.  but  other  US  Cabinet  members  may  not  if  the  summit  is  held  outside 
Washin.  -ton  D.  C..  The  Vice  President  attends  only  when  the  US  hosts  the  summit. 
103 The  EU-US  Summit  has  two  important  functions.  First,  it  is  a  forum  for 
intergovernmental  consultation.  It  brings  together  top  'political'  officials  and  places 
topical  or  timely  issues,  including  disputes,  on  the  table  for  discussion.  The  idea  is  that 
the  EU  and  the  US  try  to  come  to  a  common  position  on  how  to  approach  situations  in 
third  areas.  They  use  summits  to  discuss  means  of  co-ordinating  diplomatic  co- 
operation  in  hotspots  such  as  the  Balkans,  Kosovo,  East  Timor,  Chechnya  and  the 
Middle  East  and  for  discussing  strategic  issues  such  as  the  European  Security  and 
Defence  Policy  (ESDP)  and  its  relationship  with  NATO.  The  summit  is  also  used  to 
d'-,  cuss  pendinp  disnute-,  over  hnnnnn-  hf-ef  qn(i  FTJ  Airkiiz 
Summit  was,  for  instance,  crucial  to  the  settlement  of  the  Helms  Burton  dispute  over 
US  extraterritorial  legislation.  91 
The  second  function  of  EU-US  Summits  is  to  both  initiate  and  assess  policy 
output  in  issue  areas  incorporated  under  the  NTA  framework.  The  transatlantic  policy 
process  is  a  cycle  of  decision  making  that  begins  and  ends  with  the  biannual  summit.  It 
is  where  decisions  are  'made'  about  the  general  scope  for  co-operation  and  where 
deliverables  are  announced  (see  figure  4.1).  Deliverables  are  an  important  part  of  the 
process  and  a  major  goal  of  summit  leaders  because  they  legitimise.  the  process  by 
producing  concrete  results.  As  one  US  official  argues,  'Advisors  have  to  keep  telling 
leaders  why  they  are  doing  this  (attending  EU-`US  SUMMitSy.  92  The  summits 
encourage  foreign  policy  and  economic  policy  co-ordination  because  they  create 
deadlines  for  progress  reports  and  exert  pressure  on  lower  level  officials  to  produce 
results. 
91 
EU  and  US  officials  use  the  summit  to  flag  Important  issues  for  further 
91  lntervic\ý.  Commission  official  Brussels,  1999  (1  1)ý  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels,  1999  (7). 
9,  Interview,  Commission  Secretariat  official,  Brussels.  September  1999  (16). 
g-,  Interview.  US  State  Department,  Washington  DC  2000  (33). 
104 development.  94  In  short,  as  one  Council  official  observed,  'The  summits  are  a  good 
way  to  see  where  we  arC  95 
EU  and  US  officials  generally  describe  the  summit  as  a  useful  mechanism,  at 
least  rhetorically.  96  However  the  enthusiasm  for  the  event  varies  depending  on 
domestic  political  arenas,  the  quality  of  potential  deliverables  and  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  EU  Presidency.  For  example,  Clinton  was  accused  of  being  distracted  during  the 
December  1998  Summit  when  Congress  was  simultaneously  voting  on  whether  to 
impeach  him  over  the  Lewinsky  affair.  97  Similarly  the  EU's  attention  to  the  summit 
waned  durinia  the  Santer  Commission  scandal  and  there  was  no  real  interest  on  the  1-11', 
side  in  meeting  Commissioners  before  the  hand-over  to  Prodi.  98  The  December  2000 
Summit  also  served  as  more  pleasantry  than  purpose,  while  the  EU  awaited  the  arrival 
of  the  new  US  Administration. 
EU-US  Summits  are  a  way  to  keep  the  EU  Presidencies,  and  thus  the  European 
Council,  engaged  in  the  transatlantic  dialogue  because  the  host  state  actively  prepares 
the  summit,  which  is  hosted  in  every  other  Presidencies  national  capital.  99  It  is  a 
mechanism  for  small  states  to  assert  their  role  as  international  actors.  For  example  the 
Finnish  Presidency  was  able  to  address  'Nor-them'  issues  in  the  December  1999 
Summit.  100  Many  interviewees  noted  the  varied  importance  that  individual  EU 
Presidency's  attach  to  the  EU-US  Summit.  For  example  the  Irish,  Dutch,  and  -British 
Presidencies  were  credited  with  successful  summits  given  their  good  channels  of 
communication  with  the  US.  Another  US  official  argued  that, 
94  lntervieýN.  Commission  official.  Washin',  ton  DC  2000  (3  1 
lntervic\ý,  Council  Presidency.  September  1999  (5). 
96  Interviews  1.2.3ý  4,5.6,7,9.11,15.16.18,22ý  3  1,33,4  1,44,45. 
I)-  Similar  accusations  have  been  made  about  banana  negotiations  which  also  took  place  in  December 
1998  (see  chapter  8). 
98  Interview,  Commission  Brussels.  September  1999  (11). 
91)  Expressed  in  intcrvie,  ýýs  vith  US  State  Department  and  Commission  officials,  Brussels,  1999,2000 
(7,33). 
100  Interview,  Commission.  Brussels,  September  1999  (9). 
105 Generally  small  Member  States  have  better  Presidencies.  They  recognise  their 
limitations  with  resources,  and  prepare  years  in  advance.  The  Finns  are  a  great 
example.  They  are  very  good  at  organisation  and  set  realistic  agendas.,  01 
Critics,  on  the  other  hand,  have  downplayed  the  importance  of  EU-US 
Summits,  claiming  they  had  become  mere  'photo  opportunities'  rather  than  decision 
making  forums.  Reporting  on  the  May  1998  Summit  in  London,  the  Economist 
claimed  that  EU-US  Summits  'might  normally  be  expected  to  produce  a  batch  of 
dreary  photo-calls  and  a  heap  of  pointless  platitudes.  '  EU  foreign  ministers  have  been 
accused  of  participating  in  the  summits  because,  'it  is  fun  to  be  in  a  picture  with  the 
US  President.  102  Further  scrutiny  has  come  from  NGOs  who  claim  that  EU-US 
Summits  are  a  place  for  TR  statements'  and  'parade  shows'.  103  Despite  conflict  over 
which  private  actors  attend  the  summit  (see  chapter  5)  it  is  acknowledged  by  NGOs 
that  attendance  is  more  of  a  symbolic  gesture  than  a  serious  lobbying  forum. 
EU-US  Summits  are  also  criticised  for  having  too  broad  an  agenda  and  not 
producing  substantial  joint  action.  A  TAED  official  argued  that,  'The  summit  is  not  a 
vehicle  for  getting  things  done,  the  agenda  is  too  broad.  '  104  A  limited  number  of 
themes  are  usually  highlighted  at  the  summits.  However,  issues  receive  only 
superficial  attention  at  the  intergovernmental  level  due  to  time  constraints.  Meetings 
usually  end  up  being  only  2-3)  hours  long,  which,  officials  point  out,  is  not  enough 
time  to  work  through  the  technical  details  of  policies.  Furthermore  the  frequency  of 
summits  is  blamed  for  creating  a  'trcad  mill'  process  whereby  deliverables  arc 
recycled  and  resold  (see  also  below).  10-5  A  Commission  Report  (2001)  argued  that,  'to 
make  co-operation  rnore  action-orientated,  EU-US  Summits  need  to  become  more 
lntervie,  ýk,  US  Mission  official,  Brussels.  September  1999  (7). 
102  Interviekk.  Commission  official,  BrLISSeIS,  September  1999  (2). 
liitervic,  ýý,  TACD  Secretariat.  London,  January  2000  (23). 
Interview,  US  NGO,  Washington.  October  2000  (30). 
10ý  Interview,  Commission  official,  BrLISSCIS,  September  1999  (9)  (15). 
106 focused  and  to  define  clear  priorities.  Efforts  should  concentrate  on  the  most  important 
challenges-strategic  thernes-  facing  the  EU  and  the  US  today.  ' 
The  point  is,  however,  that  EU-US  Summits  alone  cannot  facilitate  the  number 
of  goals  established  by  the  NTA.  In  addition  to  the  time  constraints  on 
intergovernmental  actors,  many  heads  of  state,  and  even  those  in  ministerial  positions, 
do  not  hold  the  expertise  required  to  formulate  technical  policies,  for  example  in  the 
area  of  regulatory  co-operation.  The  consensus  among  interviewees  is  that  while  the 
summit  is  a  focal  point  of  the  policy  process,  most  contact  takes  place  below  the 
intergovernmental  level.  106  One  Commission  official  argued  that  the  summit  'launches 
the  practical  arrangements'  for  seeking  out  specific  policies.  107  It  is  argued  here  that 
EU-US  decision  making  must  be  considered  in  the  broader  context  of  the  policy 
making  process.  This  process  begins  at  a  much  lower,  'sub-summit'  level  where  junior 
officials  play  an  important  role.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  therefore  examine 
different  types  of  'sub-submit'  ex6ange  where  policy  proposals  are  scrutinised  and 
debated  by  transgovernmental  actors  before  final  decisions  are  made. 
Figure  4.1  The  NTA  Policy  Cycle 
Intergovernmental  Actors 
'Make'  Big  Decisions  That  Establish  'Scope'  for  Policies 
Intergovernmental  Actors 
Announce  Summit  Deliverables 
Transgovernmental  Actors 
Set'  Policies 
Transgovern  mental  Actors 
'Shape'  Policy  Agenda  and 
Search  for  new  deliverables 
106  Interview,  TABD  September  1999;  Interview  Commission  official,  Washington  2000  (3  1). 
107  Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  October  2000  (3  1). 
107 2)  The  NTA  Processes:  Political  and  Economic  Decision  'Taking' 
While  intergovernmental  actors  make  decisions  that  indicate  where  transatlantic  co- 
operation  will  be  pursued,  it  is  trans  governmental  actors  who  decide  how  the  EU  and 
the  US  can  co-operate  through  the  decision-making  processes  established  by  the 
NTA/TEP  framework.  The  'plurality'  of  processes  is  stressed  because  the 
transatlantic  decision  making  process  mirrors  EU  decision-making  structures.  The 
TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TEP  have  established  three  branches  of  governmental  dialogue 
to  accommodate  the  different  competencies  of  EU  external  negotiators. 
Generally,  the  idea  behind  the  sub-summit  process  is  that  specific  policies  for 
co-ordination  within  the  reach  of  the  NTA/TEP  framework  are  'fetched'  from  the 
bottom  ranks  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue  and  are  passed  up  through  lower  levels  of 
consultation,  finally  making  their  way  onto  the  agendas  of  EU-US  Summits.  The 
economic  ministerial  dialogue,  the  foreign  policy  ministerial  dialogue  and  the  SLG 
form  the  head  of  three  separate  branches  of  transgovernmental  dialogue  (see  figure 
4.2).  This  section  explains  these  three  transgovernmental  processes  and  discusses  how 
the  TAD,  NTA  and  TEP  mechanisms  have  created  a  formal  process  for.  decision 
setting  and  shaping  at  a  sub-summit  level. 
The  Political  Process 
The  political  process  refers  to  the  process  of  dialogue  built  upon  TAD  mechanisms.  It 
begins  when  the  new  Council  Presidency  assumes  its  role  in  the  Council  of  Ministers, 
shortly  after  the  previous  EU  Surni-nit  and  EU-US  Summit  have  concluded.  Once  the 
hand  over  takes  place  the  political  dialogue  is  initiated  in  a  meeting  between  EU-US 
foreign  ministers  and  the  EU  Commissioner  for  External  Relations.  Events  and 
108 circumstances  may  dictate  further  contact  at  the  ministerial  level  (prior  to  the  summit) 
either  under  this  framework  or  through  ad  hoc  Troika  dialogues.  109 
A  number  of  US-Troika  dialogues  were  established  after  1990  to  support  the 
foreign  policy  dialogue.  In  addition  to  the  ministerial  Troika  dialogue,  there  is  now 
interaction  at  the  political  director  level  and  at  working  group  level.  These 
transatlantic  working  groups  mirror  the  CFSP  working  groups  in  the  Council  and  are 
significant  because  they  are  the  only  cross  pillar  working  groups.  109  These  groups 
were  established  in  1995  as  an  extra  level  of  expert  exchange,  and  they  deal  with  a 
range  of  issues  outlined  in  table  41110  Fin.  911v  the  Trt-)ikn  ciinlnone  i-,  qnrhnri-cj  hy 
regular  exchange  between  Heads  of  Mission  and  US  Ambassadors. 
Table  4.1 
The  Transatlantic  Working  Groups 
*Law  Enforcement  Co-operation  *  Middle  East  Experts  *  United  Nations  e  Security  e 
OSCE  *Iran  Trilateral  *  Human  Rights  e  Turkey,  Cyprus  and  Malta  0  Consular  Affairs 
Soviet.  /  Newly  Independent  States  41  Latin  America  e  Non-proliferation  East  and 
South  Asia  *  Conventional  Arms  Exports  9  Terrorism  9  Central  Europe  Western 
Balkans  9  Africa  *  Drugs  9  Disarmament 
Combined  these  dialogues  form  the  'traditional'  political  dialogue  (see  also  Frellesen 
2001)  and  the  first  branch  of  EU-US  co-operation.  The  traditional  political  dialogue  is 
a  unique  process.  The  Troika  dialogue  reflects  the  complex  structure  of  EU  decision- 
making,  and  the  foreign  policy  dialogue  is  particularly  important  because  it  covers 
issues  that  remain  under  Member  States*  control. 
""  The  Troika  f-orrnat  traditionally  included  the  Commission,  the  successor,  the  predecessor  and  current 
Council  Presidency.  Under  Amsterdam,  however  the  'new'  Troika  includes  the  Presidency,  the 
Commission  and  the  nexN  CFSP  Ifigh  Representative,  Javier  Solana  Madariaga. 
109  Interview,  Council  Secretariat,  Brussels,  September  1999  (3). 
11o  Interviews,  Council  Secretariat  and  Finnish  Presidency,  Brussels,  27  September  1999  (3,5). 
109 The  Economic  Process 
According  to  Article  133  of  the  EU  treaties,  the  Commission  has  the  competence  to 
act  on  behalf  of  the  Union  in  trade  negotiations  providing  it  works  within  the 
Council's  mandate.  The  TEP  emphasises  new  areas  of  trade  which  fall  into  'grey' 
areas,  or  areas  of  mixed  competence  in  EU  decision  making.  There  was  thus  the  need 
to  add  new  mechanisms  to  the  transatlantic  economic  dialogue.  The  TEP  Steering 
Group  (SG)  and  the  TEP  working  groups  were  established  by  the  TEP  Action  Plan  to 
StWv  Qpc-torc  fc)r  fiirther  lihernliqqtion  Thp..,  ýe  mechani-.  ms  form  the  economic  hranch 
of  the  transatlantic  dialogue  under  the  ministerial  level  dialogue. 
The  members  of  the  TEP  Steering  Group  hold  a  similar  rank  to  participants  in 
the  NTA  Task  Force.  The  Steering  Group  consists  of  the  US  Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary,  the  DG  Heads  of  Unit  for  Trade  and  a  Council  Presidency  Representative, 
usually  the  head  of  external  relations  for  trade.  It  meets  two  or  three  times  during  the 
course  of  a  Presidency  and  reports  directly  to  the  SLG.  It  can  also  filter  into  the 
economic  ministerial  dialogue  through  the  structure  of  the  independent  agencies. 
The  TEP  Steering  Group  deals  with  economic  points  in  detail,  and  its  purpose 
is  to  fulfil  the  goals  of  the  TEP  by  fostering  multilateral  as  well  as  bilateral  trade.  In 
that  respect,  the  TEP  Steering  Group  was  originally  designed  to  find  compatible 
strategies  for  the  WTO  round,  to  identify  areas  where  transatlantic  services  could  be 
liberalised  and  to  act  as  an  'early  warning'  system  (see  section  3)  by  identifying 
possible  areas  of  conflict.  It  also  fulfils  the  task  of  fostering  EU-US  economic  co- 
operation  and  prevcriting  contlict  more  generally.  In  a  style  similar  to  the  SLG  report  Z-- 
(see  below),  the  Steering  Group  Report  takes  stock  of  EU-US  economic  relations  and 
the  progress  in  achieving  TEP  goals.  cl  Lý 
110 Figure  4.2  The  Structure  of  the  Transatlantic  Pialogue 
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-  ----------- The  Steering  Group  is  assisted  by  the  TEP  working  groups  which  are  sector  specific 
and  thus  mirror  the  sectors  laid  out  by  TEP  including,  agriculture,  trade,  services, 
global  electronic  commerce,  etc.  These  groups,  like  the  transatlantic  working  groups, 
meet  prior  to  the  summits  and  their  contacts  increase  as  the  cycle  nears  completion. 
Their  main  task  is  to  find  areas  where  the  EU  and  the  US  can  work  together  under  the 
TEP  framework  and  to  report  any  progress  or  problems  to  the  Steering  Group. 
The  NTA  Process 
The  NTA  added  new  filter  mechanisms  to  the  trans2flantic  policy  prores,  The  level  nf 
exchange  and  the  capacity  to  produce  'deliverables'  was  stepped  up  by  these  new 
mechanisms.  The  Senior  Level  Group  (SLG)  and  the  Task  Force  serve  as  the  contacts 
between  the  economic  and,  the  political  or  Troika  dialogues  and  as  focal  points  of  the 
process.  They  form  the  supporting  branch  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue. 
It  is  the  job  of  the  SLG  to  'shop  for  deliverables',  determine  what  should  be  on 
EU-US  Summit  agendas  and  monitor  the  implementation  of  the  NTA.  Its  purpose  is 
therefore  to  help  correct  the  problems  that  incurred  under  the  TAD  format  by  being  a 
force  of  focus  and  continuity  in-between  EU-US  Summits,  thereby  ensuring  that 
summits  do  not  become  separate  unrelated  meetings. 
SLG  membership  is  less  exclusive  than  EU-US  Summits  but  is  nonetheless 
limited.  There  are  roughly  six  members  of  the  SLG.  US  representatives  include  Under- 
Secretaries  for  political  and  economic  affairs  in  the  State  Department,  and  the 
Commission  delegates  are  drawn  from  the  Directorates  General  for  external  relations 
and  trade.  III  The  Council  Presidency  has  political  and  economic  delegates  that 
represent  the  Member  States.  meaning,  SLG  membership  varies  depending  on  the 
112 country  holding  office.  Additionally  representatives  of  the  Article  133  committee, 
which  deals  with  detailed  trade  issues,  and  foreign  ministers  may  be  present  depending 
on  the  topics  on  the  agenda. 
The  SLG  meets  twice  every  six  months.  The  first  meeting  takes  place  soon 
after  the  Presidency  switches  hands  to  'get  things  moving'.  The  second  is  held  closer 
to  the  summit  date  to  finalise  the  agenda  and  confirm  the  contents  of  the  SLG  Report. 
The  SLG  report  is  a  report  card  of  EU-US  progress  that  is  compiled  before  the  the  EU- 
US  Summit.  In  addition  to  scrutinising  NTA  progress,  the  report  card  has  been 
employed  as  a  means  of  drawing  positive  public  attention  to  the.  NTA  process  in  order 
to  combat  negative  media  coverage  of  trade  disputes.  112  The  SLG  serves  an 
administrative  function  by  taking  a  broader  number  of  issues,  30  or  40  points,  and 
slimming  down  the  agenda  prior  to  the  summit.  It  identifies  issue  areas  that  are  most 
likely  to  produce  deliverables  and  slots  these  into  the  summit  agenda. 
The  SLG  is  aided  in  its  quest  for  economic  deliverables  by  the  TEP  Steering 
Group  and  for  political  deliverables  by  the  NTA  Task  Force.  The  Task  Force  passes 
potential  deliverables  up  through  the  NTA  structure  to  the  attention  of  the  SLG.  While 
the  SLG  is  the  link  between  both  the  political  dialogue  and  the  economic  dialogue,  the 
NTA  Task  Force  is  a  fiision  point  between  the  traditional  political  dialogue  and  the 
NTA  process.  The  NTA  Task  Force  works  closely  with  the  transatlantic  working 
groups  in  its  search  for  possible  deliverables.  It  may  instruct  the  working  groups  to 
pursue  co-operation  in  a  particular  sector  or  be  alerted  to  progress  by  the  working 
groups  in  advance.  The  Task  Force  then  investigates  and  passes  on  details  to  the  SLG. 
11  1  Before  the  Structural  chan 
'g 
es  made  by  Prodi  to  the  Comm  ission  in  1999,  the  Commission  typically 
put  torward  the  appropriate  DGs  Chef  de  Cabinet  (Interview,  Commission  official,  Brussels,  September 
1999(9). 
112  This  practice  has  not  been  overly  effective,  as  fewer  people  access  government  web  sites  than  media 
sources.  One  Commission  official  summed  up  the  public  scope  of  the  SLG  report  by  describing  its 
113 In  addition  to  seeking  out  deliverables,  the  Task  Force  deals  with  the  day  to 
day  monitoring  of  transatlantic  relations.  It  meets  four  or  five  times  per  presidency  and 
communicates  via  additional  videoconferences.  Other  expert  meetings  are  also 
conducted,  usually  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  depending  on  events,  and  individual  working 
groups  have  been  set  up  by  the  Task  Force  to  investigate  potential  co-ordination  of 
specific  policies.  For  example-there  is  a  high  level  consultation  on  humanitarian  aid 
and  a  Task  Force  on  communicable  diseases.  113 
Task  Force  meetings  are  much  larger  meetings  than  those  conducted.  at  SLG 
level,  and  the  membership  for  these  meeting-,  is  not  formalised.  Regular  attenclees 
include  US  Deputy  Assistant  Secretaries  in  the  State  Department,  DG  Heads  of  Unit 
and  various  Council  Presidency  representatives.  114  A  number  of  aids,  interpreters  and 
departmental  officials  also  tend  to  sit  in  on  Task  Force  meetings.  Thus,  a  system  of 
rotating  chairs  is  usually  adopted  to  accommodate  different  participants  depending  on 
the  nature  of  the  topics  being  covered. 
Prior  to  the  institutionalisation  of  transatlantic  relations  both  the  political  and 
the  economic  processes  were  confined  to  the  hierarchy  of  government  structures 
meaning  lower  level  civil  servants  influenced  the  summit  agenda  only  through  their 
own  ministers.  Now  direct  access  has  been  designated  to  'sub  summit'  level  contacts 
through  the  Senior  Level  Group,  which  sets  the  agenda  for  the  EU-US  Summit.  The 
TEP  Steering  Group  and  the  Troika  dialogues  influence  the  summit  by  filtering  into 
both  the  ministerial  level  and  the  SLG.  The  TEP  Steering  Group  reports  directly  to  the 
purpose  as  -all  to  convince  the  six  or  seven  academies  who  care  to  read  the  report'  (Interview,  Brussels, 
September  1999  (6). 
1131  Interviews  with  EU  and  US  officials,  Brussels,  27-30  September  1999.  See  also  Frellesen  2001. 
114  The  Finish  delegation  sent  the  Director  General  for  the  Department  of  external  economic  relations, 
and  the  Germans  were  represented  by  the  head  of  the  external  EU  department  and  the  head  of  bilateral 
desk  for  Gernian-Aincrican  relations.  The  Austrian  delegation  sent  the  head  of  North  America  positions, 
and  the  British  presidency  was represented  by  Dick  Stay,  the  head  of  external  relations  and  the  man 
who  services  council  work.  Interview  Commission  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (9). 
114 SLG  as  does  the  Troika  political  dialogue,  and  the  Transatlantic  Working  Groups 
funnel  into  both  the  NTA  Task  Force  and  the  SLG.  The  result  is  that  the  three 
branches  of  governmental  dialogue  work  both  separately  and  in  sync  and  that  a  dense 
layer  of  networks  has  been  created  to  support  and  assist  transatlantic  policy  makers  in 
seeking  out  new  areas  of  co-operation.  The  NTA  institutions,  including  the  SLG  and 
the  NTA  Task  Force,  are  cross  pillar  institutions  (see  also  Frellesen  2001),  assisted  by 
the  Task  Force  the  SLG  'monitors'  or  'manages'  the  process  in  order  to.  facilitate 
increased  co-operation. 
3)  The  Early  Warning  System  process 
In  addition  to  serving  as  forces  of  'integration,  a  number  of  EU-US  trade  disputes 
have  highlighted  the  need  for  transatlantic  institutions  to  act  as  dispute  settlement 
mechanisms.  The  concept  of  an  'Early  Warning  System'  had  been  an  underlying 
theme  in  the  institutional  i  satl  on  process  since  the  Transatlantic  Declaration.  In  the  past 
this  simply  meant  that  at  sub-  cabinet  level  meetings,  items  on  the  agenda  were  ear- 
marked  for  consideration.  Under  the  NTA  and  the  TEP,  the  SLG,  NTA  Task  Force 
and  TEP  Steering  Group  meetings  set  aside  time  for  raising  'friction  points'  before 
they  become  major  disputes  (Devuyst  2001:  296).  The  Bonn  Summit  (1999)  tried  to 
make  the  Early  Warning  System  more  pragmatic  by  establishing  'institutional  ised' 
rules  and  procedures. 
It  was  agreed  that  existing  institutions,  the  TEP  Steering  Group  and  the  NTA 
Task  Force.  xvould  serve  as  the  primary  mechanisms  for  early  warning,  with  the 
Steering  Group  covcring  trade  and  investment  issues  and  the  Task  Force  covering 
political  issues.  The  Senior  Level  Group  would  review  early-warning  items  in  its 
preparation  for  the  EU-US  Summit.  The  TEP  Steering  Group  and  NTA  Task  Foree 
1  15 were  then  charged  with  assigning  contact  points,  facilitating  consultations  and 
agreeing  on  timelines  for  reporting  back  on  items  highlighted  as  potential  transatlantic 
policy  frictions  (see  figure  4.3),  Early  Warning 
Figure  4.3  The  Early  Warning  Mechanisms 
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The  logic  behind  the  Early  Warning  System  tits  into  the  larger  institutionalist  thesis 
identified  in  chapter  2.  First  it  is  argued  that  by  identifying  conflict,  exchanging 
information  and  creating  awareness  at  an  early  stage,  possibly  contentious  legislation 
may  be  avoided  in  order  to  prevent  conflict  in  EU-US  relations.  One  US  mission 
official  argues  that,  'We  need  to  tell  people  in  advance  that  the  problem  is  coming, 
then  we  will  be  ready  when  the  regulation  comes  into  effect.  "'  5 
The  case  most  cited  by  EU  and  US  officials  that  highlights  the  need  for  early 
warning  system  was  the  dispute  over  -hush  kits.  The  hush  kit  dispute  revolved  C, 
around  EU  legislation  banning  planes  from  being  fitted  with  devices  that  reduced  the 
noise  levels  emitted  by  older  aircraft.  By  the  time  US  industry  and  Washington  woke 
'1ý  Interview,  US  Mission  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (7). 
116 up  to  the  fact  that  this  legislation  hampered  US  trade  (US  companies  exclusively 
manufacture  hush  kits),  it  was  already  in  its  second  reading  in  the  European 
Parliament  (see  Peterson  2001).  Many  officials  contend  that  had  the  EWS  system  been 
in  place,  early  dialogue  could  have  prevented  the  dispute.  One  US  official  even  claims 
to  have  been  told  by  MEPs,  'that  had  they  known  they  would  have  written  the 
legislation  differently.  '  116  The  hush  kits  case  highlights  two  important  features  of 
transatlantic  dispute  resolution,  first,  the  role  of  the  legislators  in  the  transatlantic 
process  and,  second,  the  power  of  domestic  economic  interests. 
Another  underlying  feature  behind  the  early  warning  concept  is  the  desire  to 
get  both  EU  and  US  domestic  policy  makers  to  consider  the  external  implications  of 
internal  policies.  117  Legislators  are  central  players  in  the  early  warning  system, 
because  decisions  made  by  them  go  far  towards  determining  the  capacity  that 
international  negotiators  have  to  negotiate  agreements,  particularly  in  the  US.  Thus, 
the  early  warning  system  emphasises  the  need  to  'beef  up'  the  Transatlantic 
Legislators  Dialogue  (TLD),  another  product  of  the  NTA's  'building  bridges'  chapter. 
The  TLD  brings  legislators  together  at  the  committee  level  and  creates  awareness  in 
Congress  and  the  European  Parliament  of  the  impact  of  decisions  made  in  either 
House.  118  EU  and  US  officials  argue  that  the  TLD  has  a  crucial  role  to  play  in  the 
early  warning  system.  119 
The  implementation  of  the  early  warning  process  was  slow  moving  following 
the  Bonn  Summit  statement.  Initially,  the  strategy  was  to  get  people  talking  and  to 
assess  ways  in  which  the  Early  Warning  mechanisms  might  operate.  The  Commission 
'"'  Interview.  US  Mission  official.  Brussels,  September  1999  (7). 
j  17  Interview,  EU  Commission  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (4). 
118  In  June  200  1a  Commission  official  noted,  'The  TLD  is  in  a  state  of'impasse'  after  the  election  of  tile 
new  US  Congress.  The  Ell  is  working  to  reactivate  it.  '  (interview  62). 
Interview  with  Commission  and  European  Parliament  September  1000  (10,18)  and  US  TLD 
October  2000  (40). 
117 discussed  the  possibly  of  employing  a  strategy  of  'impact  assessment'.  120  Derived 
from  Article  133  committee  discussions,  impact  assessment  would  mean  having 
proposed  policies  stamped  with  a  trade  impact  'clean  bill  of  health'.  The  idea  was  to 
increase  communication  between  internal  DGs  and  for  US  policy  makers  to  ensure 
that  national  US  interests  were  considered  in  the  EU's  internal  policy  processes.  121  us 
officials  stressed  the  importance  of  transparency  in  the  Early  Warning  System, 
suggesting  that  the  Transatlantic  Regulatory  Guidelines  (2000)  were  a  means  of 
furthering  early  dispute  resolution.  As  one  official  stressed,  'We  are  interested  in  more 
regulatory  to  regulatory  discussion  of  eventual  trade  disputes.  it  works  into  the  early 
warning  mechanisms  by  ensuring  we  catch  things  early  on.  '  122 
The  early  warning  system  is  also  designed  to  keep  both  sides  informed  of 
potential  threats  posed  by  Congress  and  the  European  Parliament.  123  The  system 
sparks  an  inter-agency  process  that  identifies  the  domestic  issues  that  should  be  raised 
for  the  Task  Force,  the  TEP  Steering  Group,  the  SLG  and  the  Summit.  Officials  on 
both  sides  stressed  the  importance  of  the  early  warning  system  as  a  means  of 
developing  contacts,  comparing  notes,  exchanging  information,  pulling  together  a  vast 
array  of  contacts,  elevating  issues  from  the  bottom  up  and  highlighting  potential 
problems. 
However,  the  early  warning  system  is  criticised  as  an  ineffective  conflict 
resolution  mechanism.  Although  the  Commission  (2001)  report  states  that  the  early 
warning  mechanism  for  trade  and  investment  under  the  TEP/NTA  mechanisms  works 
-satisfactorily',  the  need  for  a  more  structured  process  of  conflict  resolution  has  been 
highli,  Ated  by  EU  and  US  officials.  One  US  official  argued  that,  'The  SLG  gets 
L-  Z1.7 
110  Interviews  with  Commission  officials,  Brussels,  September  1999  (2,9). 
121  Interviews  US  Mission  officials.  Brussels,  September  1999  (4,7). 
12'  Interview.  USTR,  October.  2000  (41). 
118 contentious  issues  on  table,  but  neither  side  follows  up  on  the  Early  Warning  System 
to  take  things  off  the  agenda.  The  system  needs  to  be  more  action  orientated,  to 
concentrate  on  finding  solutions.  '  A  TABD  official  observed  that,  'On  the  practical 
application  of  the  Early  Warning  System,  the  government  had  this  great  idea.  It 
basically  made  a  commitment  to  principles  but  has  not  followed  through  on  it.  '  124  The 
lack  of  concrete  action  has  led  a  number  of  officials  to  argue  that  the  system  is  'hot 
125 
air  , 
'blown  up  to  look  big  for  the  summit',  and  'a  publicity  stunt'. 
Doubts  surrounding  the  Early  Warning  System  are  rooted  in  a  number  of 
ath9ntic  dispute  resolution  technical  and  political  obstarles,  to  the  application  of  trnn- 
mechanisms.  On  a  technical  level,  it  is  questionable  whether  an  impact  assessment 
process  would  be  either  feasible  or  effective.  Cross  checking  all  new  domestic 
legislation  poses  impossible  time  constraints  and  entails  a  large  amount  of  paper  work. 
As  one  Commission  official  notes,  'The  real  Early  Warning  System,  if  it  were  to  work, 
would  develop  such  close  links,  '  for  example  that  the  guys  who  make  chimney 
regulations  would  know  each  other  and  sit  down  together  before  hand  to  work  out 
regulations.  This  is  unrealistic.  '  126  In  addition  US  officials  have  noted  resistance  from 
the  Commission  and  Member  States  to  increased  transparency  in  the  early  stages  of 
domestic  decision  making.  127  A  European  Parliament  official  pointed  out  that  the 
European  environmental  committee  does  not  like  the  idea  of  catering  to  the  US.  128  A 
Commission  official,  by  contrast.  notes  that,  'no  one  wants  to  mark  legislation  WTO 
129 
incompatible'  . 
lntcrvicý,  Ns  at  the  US  State  Department,  USTR.  Council  Presidency.  and  Council  Secretariat  1999- 
2000  (33A  1.5,3). 
III  Interview,  US  TABD.  Washington,  March  2000  (53). 
12  5  Interview,  Commission  officials,  Brussels.  September  1999.  (6,11 
Interview  with  former  member  of  the  US  deleoation  to  Washington,  Brussels,  September  1999  (6). 
Interview,  USTR  Official.  October  2000  (41 
Interview,  European  Parliament  Secretariat.  September  1999  (10). 
129  Interview  with  Commission  official.  Brussels,  September  1999  (9). 
119 A  more  fundamental  problem  for  transatlantic  dispute  resolution  is  the  view 
that  no  amount  of  dialogue  will  eliminate  conflict  rooted  in  deep  political  interest. 
Specifically,  the  Early  Warning  System  will  not  work  in  areas  where  disputes  are 
interest  driven  because  transatlantic  dialogue  will  not  change  the  domestic  opinions  of 
actors,  particularly  actors  who  do  not  participate  in  the  transatlantic  dialogue.  The 
Financial  Times  reported  that, 
The  EU  knew  its  ban  on  hormones-treated  beef  and  its  bananas  regime  would 
infuriate  Washington-  but  imposed  them  all  the  same.  Bill  Clinton  signed 
sanctions  laws  penalising  investors  in  Cuba,  Iran  and  Libya,  even  though  the 
EU  had  repeatedly  warned  that  doing  so  would  strain  relations.  130 
Likewise  a  Commission  official  notes,  '  We  are  quite  convinced  that  if  we  look  at 
audio  visual  policy,  problems  with  fundamental  ethical  issues,  or  consumer  policy, 
that  the  Early  Warning  System  will  not  take  away  conflict.  '  131  '  The  consensus  among 
officials  is  summarised  by  the  statement  of  one  UK  official  who  argued  that,  'The 
Early  Warning  System  is  only  strong  as  the  political  will  behind  it'.  132 
The  US  Congress,  as  a  staunch  protector  of  US  domestic  interest,  has  been 
identified  as  a  major  obstacle  to  the  Early  Warning  System.  The  potential  to  resolve 
conflict  through  early  contact  was  disregarded  by  a  Commission  official  who  stated 
that: 
(The  Early  Warning  System)  won't  control  Congress.  Early  Warning  works 
betweeri  Administrations  but  not  Congress.  Congress  is  unpredictable.  One  or 
two  Senators  can  wreck  the  system  and  Congress  does  not  care  about  Europe- 
for  example,  they  knew  Helms  Burton  would  upset  Europeans  but  in  Congress 
international  relations  do  not  change  constitutional  make  up  and  domestic 
political  habits  are  hard  to  overcome.  133 
1"0  Quoted  frorn  Jaw-.  jaw.  Financial  Tinies.  23  June  1999. 
Interview,  Commission  official,  Brussels  1999  (2). 
Interview,  UK  Foreim  Office,  January  2000  (2  1). 
Interview  Commission  delegation,  Washinoton  2000  (3  1 
120 A  US  official  agreed  that  the  Early  Warning  System  was  not  tied  to  Congress  'but  to 
the  desire  for  the  Administration  to  get  in  early  and  deal  with  things  cooked  up  in  the 
Commission.  '  1  34 
Nonetheless,  many  EU  and  US  officials  have  argued  that  the  TLD  should  be 
directly  linked  to  the  Early  Warning  System.  It  is  argued  that  the  shortcomings  of  the 
system  are  tied  to  the  limited  scope  and  weak  institutionalisation  of  the  TLD.  As  the 
TLD  is  mostly  an  extension  of  the  permanent  US  and  EU  delegations  in  Congress  and 
the  European  Parliament,  membership  is  limited  to  members  with  a  transatlantic 
interest.  There  is  no  contact  between  relevant  committees-  or  between  the  Senate  and 
the  European  Parliament,  and  insufficient  contact  between  the  TLD  and  the  SLG.  135 
TLD  officials  have  complained  about  the  lack  of  access  to  the  EU-US  SUMmit.  136  The 
limited  reach  of  the  TLD  in  the  US  Congress  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  a  senior 
staff  member  for  the  Subcommittee  on  Trade  in  the  House  was  unaware  that  the  TLD 
existed.  It  was  argued  that,  'If  we  are  out  of  the  loop  as  trade  people,  they  may  be  mis- 
targeting  resources.  '  It  can  be  argued  that  the  TLD  fails  to  raise  awareness  of  relevant 
people  and  cannot  compensate  for  the  domestic  interests  of  Congress,  for  example  in 
the  banana  dispute  (see  chapter  8).  Commission  officials  have  described  the  TLD  as  a 
'dialogue  of  the  dear  and  TLD  officials  admit  that  while  the  dialogue  has  the  potential 
to  defuse  disputes,  such  as  the  hush  kits  case,  it  has  not  solved  any  policy  disputes.  137 
In  short,  the  Early  Warning  System  is  mostly  a  bureaucratic  tool  that  seeks  to 
raise  awareness.  It  has  yet  to  bring  legislators  together,  thus  undermining  its  capacity 
to  act  as  a  concrete  dispute  prevention  or  resolution  forum.  European  and  American 
policy  makers  accept  that  the  Early  Warning  System,  as  exerci  sed  bN  the  NTA 
Interview,  TLD  Secretariat,  Washington  2000  t40). 
Interview.  US  Congress.  Washin(jon,  October  2000  (40).  1  --  ,  lntervieýw,  Luropean  Parliament,  September  1999  (10). 
121 institutions,  will  not  be  a  solution  to  all  'political'  transatlantic  disputes-  such  as  the 
banana  or  beef  cases-  but  argue  that  increased  dialogue  between  experts  could  defuse 
technical  disputes.  Expert  level  contact  through,  for  example,  the  Biotechnology 
Forum,  is  regarded  as  useful  for  preventing  a  fully  blown  dispute  over  GMOs.  '  38  At 
this  stage  of  transatlantic  integration  it  may  well  be,  that  the  early  warning  system  has 
done  little  more  than  'give  these  experts  a  does  of  'transatlanticism'  (Frellesen  2001). 
4)  Decentralised  Policy  Setting  and  Shaping 
To  summarise,  this  chapter  has  outlined  the  existence  of  trans  governmental  actors  and 
the  roles  they  play  in  the  transatlantic  decision  making  process.  This  section  seeks  to 
determine  the  extent  to  which  transgovernmental  actors  are  involved  in  policy  setting 
and  policy  shaping.  It  is  argued  here  that  the  existence  of  dense,  sub-summit  level 
networks  illustrates  the  important  role  that  transgovernmental  actors  play  in  the  policy 
process. 
First,  while  intergovernmental  actors  'make'  the  decisions  that  establish 
policies  through  history  making  agreements,  transgoven-Imental  actors,  at  a  ministerial  C, 
level,  'set'  transatlantic  decisions  by  signing  policy  agreements  between  the  EU  and 
the  US.  For  example,  the  Mutual  Recognition  Agreement  was  set  by  the  USTR  and  the 
then  DG  I  Commissioner);  the  Positive  Comity  Agreement  was  set  by  the  US  Attorney 
General.  the  Federal  Trade  Commission,  the  Commissioner  for  Competition  and  the 
President-in-Office  of  the  Industry  Council  and  in  the  case  of  the  Implementing 
Arrangement  for  Co-operation  in  the  Fields  of  Metrology  and  Measurement  Standards, 
I,,  -  lntcrvicý%s  with  US,  EU  TLD  officials  and  Commission  officials,  September  1999;  October2000(10, 
4-0,11.18). 
1  ""  Interview.  I-louse  Subcommittee  on  Trade,  October  2000  (39). 
122 agency  directors  for  the  National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology  and  the  EU 
Commission's  Director-General  for  Research  'set'  the  transatlantic  policy. 
The  limited  number  of  transatlantic  agreements  signed  suggests  that  a  small 
number  of  actors  actually  set  agreements,  but  many  more  transgovernmental  actors 
play  a  role  in  shaping  transatlantic  decisions  through  the  institutions  characterised  in 
this  chapter.  When  asked  the  general  question,  'who  shapes  transatlantic  decisions', 
interviewees  returned  a  wide  range  of  responses.  Some  pointed  to  domestic  agencies  - 
the  USTR,  the  State  Department,  DG  Trade,  DG  External  Relations,  and  actors  such 
as  the  Article  133  Committee  and  the  Council  Working  Groups-  others  to  indiyiduals. 
For  example  a  Commerce  Department  official  suggested  that  Charles  Ludolph  was 
instrumental  in  getting  the  MRAs  moving  in  the  US,  while  a  US  State  Department 
official  credits  one  anonymous  official  with  keeping  US  interest  in  combating 
trafficking  in  women.  Most  indicated  and  went  to  great  lengths  to  explain  the  roles 
played  by  NTA  institutions.  Thus,  the  second  question  addressed  by  this  section,  why 
do  these  transgovernmental  institutions  matter? 
The  Intergovernmental  Summit 
To  recap,  the  EU-US  Summit  is  the  focal  point  of  the  transatlantic  calendar.  It  has  two 
main  functions:  Intergovernmental  actors  use  the  summits  to  discuss  topicat  issues, 
political  hotspots  and  trade  disputes.  On  a  technocratic  level  it  is  the  place  for  policy 
initiation  and  policy  output.  As  an  event.,  the  summit  creates  the  impulse  to  produce 
deliverables  every  six  months.  In  short  it  is  a  decision  'making'  forum. 
The  EU-UJS  Summit  is  highly  criticised,  particularly  in  the  EU,  where  there  has 
been  a  push  to  make  it  a  more  effective  policy  producer.  It  is  argued  that  the  summit 
structure  undermines  the  quality  of  NTA  deliverables.  Deliverables  lack  substance 
123 because  the  pressure  to  produce  them  leads  officials  to  try  to  co-ordinate  as  long  a  list 
of  potential  deliverables  as  possible.  '  39  The  pressure  to  produce  deliverables  every  six 
months  means  that  many  statements  and  declarations  are  superficial  or  re-cycled.  The 
frequency  of  the  summits  has  been  highlighted  by  a  number  of  officials  as  a  source  of 
'NTA  fatigue'.  140  Officials  argue  that  time  consuming  preparation  for  meetings  and 
the  short  time  span  between  summits  undermines  the  quality  of  deliverables.  A 
Commission  official  argued  that,  'We  cannot  deliver  in  six  months!  It  turns  the 
process  into  a  conveyor  belt;  deliverables  get  resold  or  turned  into  sudo  deliverables.  ' 
14  1A  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council  (2001)  suggested  that  an 
annual  summit  should  replace  the  biannual  format.  142 
EU-US  Summits  are  where  'big  decisions'  are  made,  but  the  scope  for 
intergovernmental  decision  taking  is  limited  by  time  constraints.  The  Commission 
Communiqu6  (2001)  made  the  case  for  summits  being  more  focused,  having  clearer 
priorities  and  a  limited  number  of  strategic  policy  themes.  The  need  to  'manage'  the 
dialogue  highlights  the  important  role  played  by  the  NTA  institutions  at  a  sub-summit 
level,  specifically  the  Senior  Level  Group.  The  densest  level  of  contacts  take  place  at 
lower  levels  between  the  political  and  economic  working  groups.  In  what  resembles  a 
pyramid  structure  the  SLG  connects  the  'expert'  level  and  the  'political'  level.  It  pulls 
the  NTA  process  together.  Z71 
""'  Intervie\N,  Commission  official,  September  1999  (6). 
140  Arguments  to  this  eff-ect  made  by  Commission  officials  in  Brussels  (1999)  and  Washington  (2000) 
(6,4,15.3  1.33.55)  as  well  as  a  Finnish  Council  Presidency  Representative,  Brussels,  September  1999 
(5)  and  a  US  State  Department  Official.  Washington  2000  (44). 
"'  lnterýie\ý,  Commission  official,  Brussels,  1999  (9). 
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The  importance  of  NTA  institutions  is  further  highlighted  by  the  fact  that  transatlantic 
decisions  are  complicated  by  technical  as  well  as  political  differences.  Even  where  the 
EU  and  the  US  agree  at  an  intergovernmental  level  to  pursue  co-operation,  facilitating 
joint  action  is  difficult.  Both  the  EU  and  the  US  have  demonstrated  'capabilities- 
expectations  gaps'  in  different  policy  sectors.  For  example,  US  officials  argue  that  the 
weak  EU  JHA  pillar  blocks  more  aggressive  EU-US  co-operation  under  the  global 
challenges  chapter  of  the  NTA,  whereas  EU  officials  argue  that  the  US  federal  system 
blocks  co-operation  on  TEP  services.  143 
Given  the  many  obstacles  to  policy  co-ordination,  caused  by  for  example  structural 
differences,  the  NTA  institutions  are  designed  to  get  experts  talking  and  to  get 
transgovernmental  actors  to  assess  how  the  EU  and  the  US  can  co-operate  under  the 
I  mandate'  of  the  NTA.  The  vast  range  of  working  groups,  which  are  unparalleled  in 
any  other  dialogue,  identify  areas  'where  the  EU  and  the  US  can  co-ordinate  efforts 
(see  chapters  6  and  7).  The  SLG  is  the  filter  of  the  process.  It  is  a  cross-cutting 
institution  that  brings  together  political  and  economic  officials  and  facilitates 
interagency  co-ordination.  Overall,  one  Commission  official  argues,  'It  means  getting 
bureaucrats  to  work  on  new  subjects  and  new  challenges.  '  144 
Like  the  summit,  there  has  been  some  debate  recently  on  the  effectiveness  of  the 
NTA  institutions.  In  principle  the  SLG  should  serve  as  the  'engine'  room  of  the  NTA, 
driving  the  process  by  seeking  out  deliverables  and  elevating  them  to  the  political 
level  it.  Others  have  argued  that  the  SLG  is  more  like  a  waiting  room  or  a  'mailbox' 
particularly  for  issues  areas  that  do  not  make  it  onto  the  summit  agenda.  In  addition  it 
14'  One  Commission  official  aroued.  however  that  the  Council  favours  the  biannual  format  so  that  each 
inember  state  has  the  opportunitý  to  head  the  FJJ-US  Sunimit.  (Interview  9).. 
14',  Interviews,  US  Mission,  Council  Secretariat  and  Commission  September  1999  (3,6,7,  ). 
144  Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (3  1  ). 
125 has  been  argued  that  the  SLG  could  be  more  fruitful  if  there  was  better  follow  up  on 
deliverables.  145  However,  enforcing  the  follow  up  of  all  issues  Is  time  consuming  and 
resource  intensive.  The  Commission  (2001)  argues  that  the  NTA  process  should  be 
adjusted  to  increase  the  managerial  role  of  the  SLG  and  to  give  the  NTA  Task  Force  a 
more  operational  responsibility.  The  push  from  the  Commission  to  decentralise  more 
'shaping'  duties  is  demonstrated  by  its  argument  that,  'The  Senior  Level  Group  should 
provide  the  oversight  and  drive  while  the  Task-Force  is  responsible  for  monitoring  and 
ensuring  the  operational  follow-up'  (Commission  2001). 
Finally  the  Early  Warning  System  outlined  in  section  3  demonstrates  the  need  to 
fortify  stronger  conflict  resolution  and  prevention  systems  in  EU-US  relations. 
Although  in  theory  the  system  is  designed  to  foster  dialogue  and  exchange  information 
which  may  prevent  future  conflicts,  over  for  example  hush  kits,  in  practice  the  system 
is  most  likely  to  on  technical,  rather  than  political,  issues  controlled-by  bureaucrats. 
Although  legislators  can  potentially  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  early  warning  system,  the 
system  as  it  is  designed  does  not  foster  enough  contact  between  NTA  institutions  and 
legislators.  The  weak  TLD  and  the  domestic  orientation  of  the  US  Congress  is  also 
blamed  for  the  ineffective  system.  In  reality  it  is  legislators  that  have  a  more  vested 
interest  in  protecting  domestic  over  international  or  transatlantic  interests. 
Trangovernmental  networks,  technocrats  and  transparency 
The  new  type  of  governance  employed  at  the  transatlantic  level  marks  a  distinct 
change  from  traditional  diplornacy.  Decisions  are  now  being  made  by  a  variety  of 
actors  at  various  levels  ot'decision  making.  What  has  developed  is  both  a  bottorn  up 
and  a  top  down  process.  Much  more  emphasis  has  been  placed  on  decision  'shaping' 
14S  Intervie\N,  US  State  Depatinient.  Washington  DC.  October  2000  (44). 
126 and  'setting,  thus  a  degree  of  control  over  the  decision  making  process  has  been 
transferred  to  the  transgovernmental  level. 
Trans  governmental  communication  is  seen  as  a  means  of  facilitating  increased  co- 
operation  because  technocratic  decision  setting  and  shaping  lowers  the  threshold  for 
disagreement  between  actors,  in  part  because  the  NTA  process  is  designed  to  find 
areas  where  the  EU  and  the  US  can  co-operate.  In  short  it  de-politicises  issues  by 
placing  them  in  the  hands  of  policy  experts.  Undemocratic  decision  making  has  been 
somewhat  intentionally  melded  into  the  transatlantic  policy  making  process.  As 
discussed  in  chapter  3,  some  of  the  steps  towards  transatlantic  institutionalisation  were 
purposely  designed  not  to  attract  attention.  They  are  bureaucratic  agreements  that 
avoid  legislation  and  the  involvement  of  Congress.  The  method  of  institutionalisation 
used  by  the  EU  and  the  US  is  comparable  to  European  integration  by  stealth.  Thus, 
like  the  EU,  transatlantic  decision  making  encounters  similar  problems  of  legitimacy. 
The  nature  of  the  policies  pursued  by  the  NTA  further  illustrates  the  function  of 
the  bureaucratic  decision  taking.  New  technology  and  concentration  on  regulatory 
standards  means  that  the  policy  making  process  has  become  very  technocratic  and 
tends  to  yield  debates  high  above  the  head  of  average  citizens.  Policy  networks  and 
epistemic  communities  have  been  employed  to  assist  decision-makers.  The  need  for 
'expert  ,  consultation  and  the  employment  of  transgovernmental  rather  than  strictly 
intergovernmental  networks  means  that  policy  makers  often  rely  on  non-elected  bodies 
to  'shape'  decisions  that  affect  the  general  population.  Still,  many  transgoverpmental 
institutions  deal  with  'low'  rather  than  'high'  security  issues.  Co-ordinating 
humanitarian  aid.  lav,  -  enforcement  co-operation  and  education  can  be  facilitated  by 
dialogue  between  policy  experts  rather  than  politicians. 
127 Technocratic  decision  making  under  the  NTA  has  highlighted  the  need  for 
transparency  in  the  process  and  the  input  of  civil  society.  The  next  chapter  identifies 
how  transnational  networks  have  been  brought  into  the  NTA  as  a  means  of  increasing 
transparency  in  the  policy  making  process,  thereby  securing  the  wider  legitimacy  of 
transatlantic  decisions. 
Conclusion 
The  transatlantic  mechanisms  created  in  the  process  of  institutional  i  sation  have  led  to 
the  creation  of  dense  networks  between  the  EU  and  the  US.  These  networks,  in  turn, 
became  transatlantic  decision  making  forums.  Here,  communication  between  EU  and 
US  counterparts  forms  the  closest  thing  there  is  to  a  transatlantic  'policy  process'. 
The  transatlantic  structure,  however,  has  had  to  accommodate  different 
competencies  of  decision  making  in  the  EU  and  the  US  and  thus  separate  processes 
have  been  established.  As  a  result,  there  are  multiple  layers  of  contact  in  the 
transatlantic  dialogue,  represented  by  three  different  branches  of  governmental 
dialogue.  While  the  EU-US  Summit  is  the  intergovernmental  forum  for  decision 
making,  many  trans  governmental  actors  influence  the  process  in  a  shaping  and  setting 
capacity  at  the  sub-summit  level.  These  institutions,  particularly  the  Senior  Level 
Group,  formulate  the  impulse  for  co-operation  by  seeking  out  deliverables,  and  by 
producing  a  forum  for  conflict  prevention  under  the  early  warning  system. 
As  noted  in  chapter  '),  the  capacity  of  the  NTA  process  to  facilitate  co- 
operation  and  prevent  conflict  is  highly  criticised.  This  chapter  discussed  the  limits  of 
I  isputes  and  to  the  NTA  institutions.  It  was  argued  that  the  ability  to  defuse  political  di 
make  transatlantic  policies  rests  on  the  political  will  of  intergovernmental  actors. 
Many  more  actors  liave  a  capacity  to  shape  and  set  the  policy  details  under  the 
128 'mandate'  of  policy  reach  established  by  history  making  decisions.  The  need  to  co- 
ordinate  many  different  tiers  of  policy  shaping  highlights  the  important  role  that  NTA 
institutions  play  in  'managing'  the  transatlantic  dialogue. 
Finally,  the  technocratic  nature  of  bureaucratic  decision  shaping  and  setting 
has  raised  some  questions  about  the  legitimacy  of  the  process.  The  next  chapter 
discusses  transatlantic  attempts  to  'legitimise'  the  process  by  giving  transnational 
actors  an  institutionalised  role  in  shaping  transatlantic  policies. 
129 Chapter  5 
Transnational  Policy  Shaping  and  the  Transatlantic  Civil  Society 
The  institutions  created  by  the  New  Transatlantic  Agenda  (NTA)  have  increased  the 
scope  for  transgovernmental  actors  to  influence  transatlantic  decisions.  This  chapter 
examines  how  the  NTA  and  the  Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership  (TEP)  have  also 
encouraged  the  build  up  of  transnational  networks.  Ad  hoe  dialogues  between,  for 
example,  educators  and  scientists  were  sponsored  through  the  NTA  process  as  a  way 
of  'building  bridges'  across  the  Atlantic.  This  chapter  focuses  on  interest  groups  that 
were  formally  invited  to  participate  in  the  policyrnaking  process,  including  the 
Transatlantic  Business  Dialogue  (TABD),  the  Transatlantic  Consumer  Dialogue 
(TACD),  the  Transatlantic  Environmental  Dialogue,  (TAED)  and  the  Transatlantic 
Labour  Dialogue  (TALD).  The  chapter  discusses  the  implications  of  the  input  of 
business  and  'civil  society'  into  the  transatlantic  decision  making  process  and 
questions  whether  these  dialogues  point  to  a  'decentralisation'  of  transatlantic  decision 
'shaping'  to  private,  transnational  networks.  It  is  argued  that  while  all  of  these 
dialogues  clearly  participate  in  the  process,  only  the  TABD  is  a  true  policy  'shaper.  ' 
The  main  aims  of  this  chapter  are  to  analyse  the  institutionalisation  of  the 
networks,  the  level  of  formal  access  they  are  given  to  transatlantic  decision  takers  and 
the  impact  they  have  had  in  'shaping'  transatlantic  decisions.  The  organisation  and 
orientation  of  the  dialogues  is  discussed,  as  is  the  frequency  of  contact  with 
transgovernmental  and  intergovernmental  actors.  Measuring  the  'Impact'  of  these 
dialognics  is  more  dill-IcLilt.  As  this  research  is  interview  driven.  the  success  of  these 
dialogues  is  measured  b)  the  impact  that  both  their  member  and  EU  and  US  officials 
'perceive"  them  to  have  had  on  the  transatlantic  policy  process. 
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transatlantic  relations,  this  chapter  questions  why  the  transatlantic  dialogues  make  a 
difference  to  the  transatlantic  policy  process.  What  encouraged  the  transatlantic 
architects  to  offer  government  sponsorship  of  private  networks,  particularly  in  the  US 
where  this  runs  against  the  norm?  It  is  argued  that  the  dialogues  were  seen  as  useful 
additions  to  the  NTA  process  first,  as  a  way  to  gain  effective  policy  solutions,  and 
second,  as  a  means  of  making  the  policy  process  more  open  and  transparent. 
Section  I  examines  the  TABD.  Section  2  looks  at  the  TACD  and  TAED  and 
section  33  discusses  the  TALD,  or  lack  thereof  Each  section  outlines  the  creation  of  the 
dialogues,  their  structures  and  policy  recommendations,  their  access  to,  and  impact  on, 
the  transatlantic  process.  Section  4  assesses  the  capacity  of  these  groups  to  serve  as 
policy  advisors.  It  is  argued  that  the  inclusion  of  multiple  groups  with  a  variety  of 
interests  and  varied  access  to  the  process  creates  problems  for  policy  'setters,  '  but  that 
issue  orientated,  multi-dialogue  task  forces  are  one  way  to  facilitate  consensus 
building  between  the  dialogues. 
1)  The  Transatlantic  Business  Dialogue 
The  Transatlantic  Business  Dialogue  is  the  most  established  of  the  transatlantic 
dialogues.  It  was  conceived  (in  1994)  and  launched  (in  1995)  before  the  NTA,  but  has 
been  hailed  as  a  major  success  story  of  the  new  transatlantic  dialogue. 
. 
The  TABD  was  the  invention  of  the  late  US  Commerce  Secretary  Ron 
Brown.  146  A  formal  business  dialogue  was  seen  as  a  means  of  securing  greater  US 
business  support  for  the  Commerce  department.  which  was  under  threat  from 
Congress,  and  a  way  to  boost  the  impact  of  European  business  on  EU  level 
1ý  "  Brown  (  1994)  ar 
m 
aued,  in  a  speech  to  the  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Brussels  that  EU-US 
business  co-ordination  on  transatlantic  trade  issues  was  an  important  part  ofliberalisation. 
131 negotiations.  The  TABD  was  also  conceptualised  as  a  way  to  secure  greater  support 
for  the  US  in  transatlantic  negotiations.  As  Cowles  (2001:  232)  argues,  'US 
government  officials  were  convinced,  moreover,  that  their  negotiating  position  would 
coincide  much  more  closely  with  the  US-EU  business  communities  stance  than  would 
that  of  the  European  Commission.  ' 
Although  the  creation  of  the  TABD  was  initially  controversial  in  the  US,  the 
main  challenge  was  to  gain  European  support  for  the  process.  1  47  Cowles  (2001:  238) 
notes  that  European  business  lacked  organisation  at  the  EU  level.  The  Commission's 
DGI  initially  opposed  the  creation  of  a  business  dialogue  without  labour,  consumer  or 
environmental  dialogues.  The  Transatlantic  Policy  Network  (TPN),  a  dialogue 
between  legislators  and  businesses,  was  influential  in  getting  European  industry  and 
officials  involved.  The  TPN  was  able  to  draw  on  its  extensive  European  business 
contacts,  and  active  TPN  members,  such  as  Ford,  Xerox,  Daimler  Chrysler,  EDS  and 
AOL,  also  became  heavily  involveý  in  the  TABD.  148 
In  the  end,  it  was  the  support  of  US  Commerce  Secretary  Brown, 
Commissioner  Brittan  (External  Relations)  and  Commissioner  Bangemann 
(Enterprise)  that  facilitated  the  inauguration  of  the  TABD.  They  invited  industry 
leaders  to  comment  on  the  creation  of  a  transatlantic  business  forum.  The  Commerce 
Department  and  the  Commission  also  actively  participated  in  the  first  TABD  meeting 
in  Sevi  e. 
149 
Despite  differences  European  and  American  business  approaches  to  the 
dialogue.  the  launch  was  deemed  a  success  and  the  group  reached  consensus  on  over 
"-  CoýN  les  (see  200  1  and  1996)  argues  that  American  businesses,  the  State  Department  and  the  USTR 
were  initialk  lukexarni  to  the  idea.  In  particular  the  US  a(,  encies  feared  it  was  a  way  for  the  Commerce 
Department  to  shape  trade  negotiations. 
The  close  relationship  between  the  TABD  and  TPN  is demonstrated  in  part  by  the  fact  that  they 
share  office  space  as  well  as  contact  lists. 
132 70  joint  recommendations.  A  few  months  later  roughly  60%  of  the  TABD 
recommendations  resurfaced  in  the  NTA  and  the  Joint  Action  Plan  noted  the 
governments'  intent  to  take  the  recommendations  of  the  TABD  into  consideration 
when  creating  the  New  Transatlantic  Marketplace  (see  also  Cowles  2001). 
How  the  TABD  works 
The  TABD  is  not  a  traditional  lobbying  organisation.  Rather,  it  is  a  forum  for 
consensus  reaching  between  European  and  American  business  with  the  aim  of 
boosting  trade  and  investment.  The  overall  purpose  of  the  TABD  is  to  assist  the 
government  in  facilitating  trade  liberalisation.  I  ýOAs  one  TABD  official  argued, 
PoliC  'Industry  consensus  is  a  'y  tool.  ý  151  Since  its  creation  the  TABD  has  aimed  to 
promote  integration  between  the  EU  and  the  US  by  providing  progress  reports  of 
where  the  American  and  European  industry  feel  co-operation  is  both  necessary  and 
feasible.  It  produces  biannual  recommendations  on  specific  policy  sectors.  152  It  exerts 
political  pressure  on  USTR  and  the  Commission  to  follow  up  on  recommendations. 
Following  the  EU-US  Bonn  Summit  (1999),  the  TABD  also  decided  to  participate  in 
the  Early  Warning  System,  expanding  its  policy  reach  to  areas  of  potential  dispnte.  It 
is  credited  with  convincing  the  Commission  to  push  back  policy  changes  on  metric 
labelling  and  a  gelatine  ban,  both  of  which  had  the  potential  to  erupt  into  EU-US  trade 
disputes. 
Throughout  the  1990s,  the  TABD  became  both  highly  institutional  1  sed  and 
organised.  Despite  the  insistence  by  its  participants  that  the  TABD  is  a  process  as 
""'  Cowles  (200  1:  243)  notes.  for  example,  that  American  business-people  arrived  at  the  mectings 
carrvin-  Commerce  Department  briefing  packs. 
I  ntervieývv.  TABD  Participant,  Brussels,  September  1999  (20). 
"'  IntervieNN,,  TABD  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (14) 
"'  These  include  but  are  not  limited  to  the  Information  Technology  Agreement,  E-Commerce, 
Intellectual  Property  Ri-ghts  and  the  Mutual  Recognition  A-g-reernents. 
133 opposed  to  an  organisation,  it  has  nevertheless  developed  into  a  transatlantic 
'institution'.  153  It  held  annual  CEO  meetings  since  1995  (see  also  table  5.1).  154 
established  two  small  secretariats  (with  less  than  five  permanent  staff)  in  Washington 
and  Brussels  and  appointed  rotating  company  chairs  (CEOs),  one  American  one 
European,  to  lead  the  dialogue  in  annual  terms.  '  55 
The  TABD  chairs  are  just  a  fraction  of  the  many  companies  who  have.  a  stake 
in  the  TABD.  Growing  participation,  from  an  initial  60  to  200  CEOs,  gave  the  process 
broader  legitimacy.  The  TABD  is  carried  by  a  number  of  companies  who,  as  active 
members,  participate  more  regularly  in  specific  policy  sectors  through  TABD  working 
groups.  A  TABD  official  admits  that  in  some  sectors  the  number  of  companies 
involved  is  small,  but  that,  'in  general  if  a  corporation  lends  their  CEO  to  something, 
they  are  highly  engaged.  '  Membership  of  the  TABD  is  open,  but  it  has  been  criticised 
in  the  past  for  excluding  certain  sectors-  such  as  generic  pharmaceutical  firms  and 
small  and  medium  sized  enterprises.  156 
The  build  up  of  TABD  structures  points  to  a  growing  interest  in  eff6ctively 
managing  the  process.  1  'ý7  Each  of  the  TABD's  company  chairs  (see  table  5.4)  has 
153  Interview,  TABD  participant  Brussels,  September  1999  (20).  See  also  Cowles  2001. 
"'  The  meetings  were  held  in  Seville,  in  Chicago  (1996),  Rome  (1997),  Charlotte  (1998),  Berlin  (1999) 
Cincinnati  (2000)  and  Stockholm  (2001). 
155  The  TABD  chair  companies  provide  office  space  for  the  American  secretariat  (in  Europe  the 
secretariat  is  housed  with  the  TPN)  and  provide  the  budget  for  TABD  costs.  The  precise  figure  of  the 
budget  is  difficult  to  pinpoint.  It  varies  from  year  to  year  depending  on  the  co-chair  companies,  and  can 
vary  from  $250,000-$500,000.  This  sum  funds  the  EU  and  US  TABD  offices,  the  secretariat  salaries  and 
TABD  functions.  However,  the  total  costs  of  the  TABD  are  difficult  to  quantify  because  the  funding 
arrangement  between  the  TABD  and  the  participant  companies  are  based  on  a  'loose  structure'.  Mid 
Year  Meetings,  receptions  and  conference  costs  often  have  separate  sources  of  funding,  in  the  case  of 
the  conference  there  is  local  sponsoring  from  the  host  cities.  Interviews,  US  TABID,  EU  TABD  and 
TABD  participant,  Brussels  and  Washington  1999,2000  (14,20,53). 
15  '  Generic  firms  initially  complained  that  they  had  been  kept  out  of  the  process,  but  were  later  brought 
into  the  TABD  pharmaceutical  working  group  and  Small  and  Medium  Sized  Enterprises  (SME)  were 
given  a  voice  in  the  process  through  the  Transatlantic  Small  Business  Initiative  and  the  priority  group 
on  SMEs.  The  Transatlantic  Small  Business  Initiative  was  launched  for  companies  that  were  outsized  in 
the  TABD.  It  holds  summit  meetings  and  operates  on  a  working  group  structure,  but  is  larpely 
represented  in  the  political  arena  by  the  TABD. 
Originallý,  the  TABD  was  based  on  four  workin  groups-  (I  regulatory  issues  (2)  trade  91, 
liberalisation  (3)  investment  and  (4)  third  country  relations.  Following  the  Seville  meeting  15  working 
groups  were  established.  The  Tenneco  and  Mead  leadership  (1997)  introduced  more  issue  managers  to 
134 played  a  role  in  developing  the  dialogue.  159  In  2001,  the  TABD  chairs  created  a  CEO 
level  'Leadership  Team'  to  deal  with  developing  'priority  issue'  areas  (see  figure  5.1). 
In  addition,  17  4experC  level  groups,  an  expert  Steering  Group  and  Issue  Managers 
were  established  to  interact  with  working  level  government  contacts  in  a  range  of 
policy  sectors. 
The  new  TABD  structure  aimed  to  'create  more  energy  in  the  dialogue  by 
focusing  CEO  and  government  attention  on  more  defined  and  actionable  issues.  "  59 
The  leadership  team  encouraged  proposals  from  TABD  members  to  bring  forward 
proýjccts,  that  were  specific  and  detailed.  Business  leaders  feared  that  the  TABD  would 
develop  into  a  chat  shop  rather  than  a  decision  shaping  forum.  160  Thus,  the  TABD 
chairs  stressed  the  importance  of  concrete  action-  through  strategic  action  and  detailed 
policy  recommendations.  The  new  structures  were  designed  to  take  technical  issues 
and  elevate  them  to  higher  political  levels.  The  goal  was  to  produce  'ready  made' 
policy  solutions,  thus  increasing  the  'impact'  or  shaping  capacity  of  the  TABD.  The 
introduction  of  the  Early  Warning  priority  issues  reaffirmed  the  TABD  commitment  to 
dispute  management  and  the  new  expert  groups  demonstrated  the  focus  on  monitoring 
not  only  ongoing  policy  negotiations  but  also  implementation.  For  example,  six  of  the 
groups  dealt  with  policy  sectors  where  MR-As  had  been  or  were  being  negotiated  (see 
chapter  7). 
(let  more  companies  involved  and  put  the  working  groups  under  three  core  areas-  the  Transatlantic 
Advisory  Committee  on  Standards,  Business  Facilitation  and  Global  Issues,  By  2000  the  structure  of  the 
TABD  expanded  to  five  working  groups  and  roughly  40  issue  groups,  each  of  which  was  also  co- 
chaired  by  an  American  and  a  European  company. 
'ý'  Cowles  (200  1)  notes  for  example  that  the  Tenneco-Philips  team  (1997)  tried  to  make  the  TABD 
more  efficient  by  getting  more  companies  involved  at  a  higher  level.  Daimler-Benz  AG  and  Warner- 
Larnbert  (1998)  focused  on  the  implernentation  of  TABD  recommendations  and  introduced  the  TABD 
Scorecard  (see  below).  Xerox  and  Suez  Lyonnaise  des  Eaux  tried  to  re-enforce  small  informal  contact 
between  CEOs  and  hi-h  level  decision  makers  as  well  as  expert  level  contacts  between  TABD 
participants  and  Agency  Directors,  such  as  the  Secretary  of  Commerce. 
's"  See  wý,  vv,  -.  tabd.  Coiu 
'6"  Interview,  TABD  participant.  Brussels,  September  1999  (20). 
135 The  TABD  process  centres  around  the  annual  CEO  conference,  which 
typically  takes  place  a  month  before  the  EU-US  Summit.  The  meeting  is  used  first,  to 
identify  areas  of  business  consensus,  and  second  as  a  forum  for  CEOs  to  meet  with 
high  level  officials  in  the  US  Administration,  the  Commission,  Congress  and  the 
European  Parliament.  161  TABD  formally  presents  its  recommendations  to  officials 
after  the  meetings.  In  addition.  TABD  chairs  have  had  the  opportunity  to  discuss 
issues  with  intergovernmental  actors  at  numerous  EU-US  Summit  meetings  (see  table 
5.2). 
While  the  EU-US  Summits  are  useful  for  publicity  and  even  for  short 
discussion  of  key  issues,  the  real  point  of  access  for  TABD  members  lies  elsewhere. 
The  importance  of  expert  level  talks  is  demonstrated  by  the  appointment  of  issue 
managers  and  working  level  government  contacts,  which  also  take  place  at  the  annual 
meeting.  Expert  discussions  are  incorporated,  with  the  results  of  the  CEO  dialogue,  in 
the  CEO  Conference  Report.  Another  mechanism  that  incorporates  both  CEO  level 
and  'expert  level'  input  is  the  Mid  Year  meeting  and  annual  TABD  Scorecard,  which 
monitors  government  follow  up  on  TABD  proposals.  Further  policy  recommendations 
are  produced  as  a  result  of  frequent  working  group  and  issue  group  meetings.  Each 
issue  manager  has  an  EU  and  US  government  contact  and  the  US  Administration  has 
created  an  interagency  task  force  to  work  with  the  TABD.  The  TABD  structure  results 
in  dense  levels  of  formal  and  informal  government-business  contacts. 
What  an  impact 
Establishing  a  causal  relationship  between  TABD  recommendations  and  transatlantic 
policies  is  troublesome.  not  least  because  much  contact  between  the  TABD  and  the 
16  1  Government  attendees  of  the  TABD  surnmit  have  included  the  EU  Commissioner  for  Trade,  the  EU 
Commissioner  for  Enterprise  and  Information  Society.  the  US  Commerce  Secretary,  the  USTR,  the  US 
136 EU  and  US  goverm-nents  is  conducted  informally  or  behind  closed  doors.  162 
Government  response  to  policy  recommendations  is  arguably  important,  but  do  the 
acknowledgement  of  those  proposals,  the  initiation  of  policy  changes,  or 
implementations  of  recommendations  define  success?  One  accomplishment  was 
simply  the  establishment  of  a  European-American  business  dialogue.  However,  the 
many  perceptions  about  the  TABD,  outlined  below,  emphasise  the  capacity  of  the 
dialogue  to  impact  transatlantic  policy  making. 
The  TABD  Scorecard  is  one  attempt  to  assess  where  the  EU  and  the  US  have 
acted  or  failed  to  act  on  the  basis  of  formal  TABD  recommendations.  The  1999 
Scorecard  estimated  that  the  governments  had  taken  concrete  action  on  several  of 
TABD's  policy  proposals.  A  TABD  participant  suggested,  'About  one-third  our 
proposals  are  solidly  on  their  way.  Another  one-third  have  not  necessarily 
implemented  [yet]  but  are  by  definition  successes.  '  163  US  Vice  President  Al  Gore 
reaffirmed  the  success  of  the  TABD,  claiming  the  governments  had  implemented  50% 
of  129  TABD  recommendations.  164  The  overall  majority  of  interviewees  argued  that 
the  TABD  had  played  an  important  role  in  the  NTA  process.  '  65  A  testimony  to  the 
value  of  the  TABD  is  the  continued  business  and  government  commitment.  to  the 
process  five  years  on.  166  The  TABD  is  arguably  an  important  part  of  the  business 
community, 
167 
a  powerful  lobby 
168 
and  an  important  player  in  the  NTA  process. 
169 
Vice  President  and  the  WTO  Director. 
162  Access  to  the  annual  meeting  between  officials  and  CEOs  is  closed  to  both  the  press  and  academic 
observers.  Access  became  more  restrictive  with  the  Berlin  CEO  Conference  as  CEO  demand  for 
invitations  increased.  The  author  was  offered  access  to  the  press  core,  but  not  to  working  group  or 
plenary  meetings  in  either  1999  or  2000. 
Interview  TABD  participant,  Brussels,  September,  1999  (20). 
Speech  -iven  to  TABD  at  Charlotte  Meetino  1998. 
Includin-  TABD  officials  and  participants.  EU  and  US  officials  and  NGOs. 
166  A  Commerce  Department  official  noted  for  example  that  at  least  three  staff  members  in  the  Europe 
office  devoted  50  per  cent  of  their  time  to  the  TABD  prior  to  its  annual  meeting. 
IntervieýN.  Brussels,  September  1999  (20). 
Interview  TABD  office  and  US  Mission  Brussels,  September  1999  (14,4). 
169  Interview,  US  Mission.  Brussels,  September  1999  (7). 
137 Officials  argued  that  it  provided  leadership  and  direction  in  NTA  negotiations  and 
facilitated  the  MR-As  (see  chapter  7),  the  Safe  Harbour  Agreement  and  multilateral 
agreements  on  intellectual  property  rights  and  Information  Technology.  170  A 
Commission  official  argued  that,  'the  TABD  plays  an  important  and  positive  role.  It 
helps  determine  priorities,  keeps  us  on  track  and  makes  us  deliver  on  time  or  else 
explain  why  we  cannot.  '  171  The  Journal  of  Commerce  stated,  'Organised,  plugged-in 
and  persistent,  the  business  dialogue  has  been  setting  the  tone  for  trade  talks  between 
Brussels  and  Washington.  172  Cowles  (2001:  230)  contends  that,  'the  TABD  has  played 
a  critical  role  not  merely  in  setting  the  agenda  for  transatlantic  trade  discussions,  but 
also  participating  in  US-EU  negotiations  and  shaping  domestic-level  support  for  their 
agenda.  ' 
A  number  of  TABD  members  initially  complained  about  the  slow  government 
response  to  many  of  its  proposals,  but  they  came  to  realise  that  full  implementation  of 
it  recommendations  would  be  timely  (Cowles  2001).  A  TABD  participant  argued  that, 
'traditionally  members  are  permanently  grumbling  about  the  reaction  time,  but  we  are 
still  on  board.  '  173  Generally,  TABD  participants  are  impressed  with  the  level  of  access 
that  TABD  membership  allows  and  the  impact  that  the  dialogue  has  had  on  the  policy 
process.  The  benefits  to  one  company-  EDS-  were  summarised  by  a  representative 
who  argued  that,  'Taking  TABD  leadership  has  both  provided  credibility  for  EDS  staff 
in  their  consequent  and  subsequent  involvement  in  actual  negotiations  with 
government.  and  led  to  tangible  results.  For  example,  the  ongoing  moratorium  on 
'-"See  also  Cowles  (1996:  21).  ar-ues,  'Lconornically.  the  TAB  D  has  provided 
-government 
leadership 
with  clear  neg-otiating  direction  and  has  improved  the  prospects  for  trade  liberalisation.  Politically,  the 
TABD  has  emerged  as  an  important  component  of  larger  transatlantic  relations'. 
Interview,  Commission  Dele-ation  Washin-ton,  October  2000  (35).  1  Zý  17'  Journal  of  Commerce,  5  February  1998 
1,  Interview,  TABD  participant,  Brussels.  September  1999  (20). 
138 imposing  tariffs  on  E-commerce  would  probably  not  have  occurred  without  the  TABD 
or  some  other  vehicle.  "  74 
A  voice  of  dissent  in  the  appraisal  of  the  TABD  comes  in  response  to  claims 
that  business  has  played  a  dominant  role  in  the  policy  process  vis-ý-vis  other  dialogues 
(I  see  also  below).  In  particular,  Commission  officials  have  argued  that  the  TABD  is  not 
as  important  as  it  perceives  itself  to  be.  It  has  been  accused  of  being  self- 
congratulatory  and  a  product  of  government  rhetoric.  '  75  Another  Commission  official 
added  that  it  was  impossible  to  tell  if  transatlantic  polices  were  the  result  of  TABD.  A 
USTR  official  agreed,  stating  that,  'things  are  not  just  happening  because  the  TABD 
says  so.  "  76  Nonetheless,  even  sceptics  agreed  that  the  TABD  was  'shaping'  if  not 
'making'  policy.  One  NGO  argued,  'even  if  they  are  not  as  powerful  as  they  say,  they 
still  have  extra  CIOUt., 
177 
2)  The  Transatlantic  Consumer  and  Environmental  Dialogues 
Building  'people  to  people'  links  was  identified  by  the  NTA  as  an  important  tool  for 
securing  broad  public  support  for  the  transatlantic  partnership.  Originally,  the  idea  was 
to  create  a  civil  society  dialogue  that  could  incorporate  business,  trade  unions  and 
citizens  associations.  178  The  TEP  invited  consumer  and  environmental  groups  to 
participate  in  the  process  4on  issues  relevant  to  international  trade  as  a  constru  . ctive 
contribution  to  policy  making.  '  179 
Intervie\ý.  TABD  Participant.  Brussels.  via  ernail  1999  (27). 
Interview,  Commission  official,  September  1999  (6). 
17(,  Interview,  IJ  STR  official,  October  2000  (42). 
17,7  Interview,  US  NGO.  October  2000  (50). 
178  The  idea  rose  OLIt  Of  a  1999  NTA  'building  bridges'  conference.  People  to  People  Conference 
Report. 
139 Figure  5.1  The  TABD  Structure  (2001) 
Policies  Mechanisms  Process 
Annual  Conference  CEO  Priority 
Issues  Leadership  Team 
Capital  Markets 
CEO  Level  CEO  Plenary 
Dispute  Management 
Networked  Economy  Expert  Level  Dialogue 
Regulatory  Policy 
WTO 
SME  Perspective 
Steering  Groups 
Expert  Groups 
Issue  Managers 
Mid  Year  Report 
Expert  Groups,  Issue  Managers 
Aerospace 
Leadership  Input 
Automotive  Steering  Group  Input 
Climate  Change 
Cosmetics 
Customs 
Dietary  Supplements 
EETIS 
Export  Controls  and  Economic  Sanctions 
Heavy  Equipment  Industries 
Intellectual  Property  Rights 
International  Personnel  Mobility  Working  Level 
Medical  Devices 
Pharmaceuticals 
Recreational  Marine  Issue  Manager/ 
Refrigerants 
NTA  Task  force 
Taxation 
Telecommunication  Services  level  and  below 
"I  Italics  added  by  author. 
140 The  decision  to  include  consumers,  environmentalists  and  workers  in  the 
transatlantic  dialogue  was  the  result  of  pressure  from  NGOs,  the  European 
Commission  and  eventually  the  US  State  Department.  The  success  of  the  TABD 
sparked  criticism  from  the  NGO  community  who  in  1995  argued  that  the  decision- 
making  capacity  of  the  TABD  within  the  NTA  was  unbalanced  by  an  absence  of  civil 
society  input.  '  80  The  initial  push  from  NGOs  for  access  to  the  TABD  was  denied,  but 
NGO  lobbying  efforts  raised  awareness  in  the  EU  and  US  administrations  of  the 
growing  need  to  legitimise  the  Process.  191 
Consumers  International  (CI)  lobbied  the  Commission,  particularly  DOI,  who 
Cowles  (2001:  242)  contends,  had  previously  advocated  participation  from  the  'wider 
public  interest.  '  The  Commission's  mandate  to  support  consumers  and 
environmentalists  increased  with  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  and  DGI  gained  support  for 
civil  society  dialogues  from  the  Health  and  Consumer  Protection  and  Environmental 
Protection  DGs  (Bignami  and  Charnovitz  2001:  24).  Growing  opposition  from  the  US 
NGO  Public  Citizen  to  the  TABD  and  increasing  demands  from  environmental  groups 
put  pressure  on  the  US  State  Department.  182  Finally,  NGOs  used  formal  channels  to 
respond  to  the  US  Federal  Register  notice  on  the  TEP.  1  83 
Although  the  main  push  for  the  civil  society  dialogues  came  from  the 
Commission,  the  State  Department  was  crucial  in  securing  US  funds  for  the  consumer 
and  environmental  dialogues.  Unlike  the  business  dialogue,  the  NGO  dialogues  could 
not  be  launched  without  a  financial  commitment  from  the  governments.  Funding  was 
found  with  relative  ease  on  the  European  side  where  the  Commission  had  a  history  of 
180  1 Fhe  TACD  (Doc  1-99)  ar,  --,  Lies  that  public  interest  groups  demands  since  1995  to  participate  in  the 
process  did  not  result  in  formal,  or  even  inconsistent  informal  dialogue  despite  government  support  for 
the  TABD. 
...  Interviews.  TACD  Secretariat.  London,  January  2000  (23-24).  Commission  Delegation,  Washington, 
October  2000  (34). 
is,  lntervicýk.  TACD  Secretariat,  January  2000  (23-24). 
141 funding  NGOs.  However,  the  US  government  does  not  generally  fund  the  private 
sector.  In  this  case  the  US  Information  Agency  (USIA)  within  the  State  Department 
was  able  to  find  funds  for  both  the  TACD  and  the  TAED  under  a  scholarship  budget 
line  subject  to  approval  by  the  Senate  Finance  Committee.  '  94  Consumer  International- 
the  designated  grant  receiver  for  the  TACD-  was  given  roughly  $60,000  from  USIA 
and  110,000  euros  from  the  Commission.  The  US  based  National  Wildlife  Federation 
(NWF)  and  Brussels  based  European  Environmental  Bureau  were  . given  $100,000 
from  USIS  and  200,000  euros  from  the  Commission. 
Government  sponsorship  of  the  TACD  and  TAED  in  general  and  the  use  of 
public  funds  specifically  enabled,  but  also  undermined,  the  initial  attempts  to  build 
both  dialogues.  Unlike  European  NGOs,  many  US  groups  were  not  accustomed  to 
receiving  public  funds  and  few  organisations  allowed  government  funding:  185  us 
NGOs  feared  that  the  consumer  dialogue  and  environmental  dialogues  were  attempts 
to  legitimise  the  liberalisation  policies  employed  under  the  New  Transatlantic 
Marketplace.  The  Corporate  European  Observer  (CEO),  which  had  developed  into  a 
NGO  'TABD'  watchdog,  argued  that  the  consumer  and  environmental  dialogues 
symbolised  attempts  to  'greenwash'  the  TER  186  TAED  and  TACD  members  objected 
to  being  hired  to  patronise  government  policies  or  to  act  as  'contracted  civil 
societyý.  1  87  The  TAED,  which  contained  no  pro-globalisation  NGOs,  stressed  that  its 
creation  in  response  to  bilateral  government  initiatives  under  the  NTA  was  in  no  way 
intended  to  legitimise  these  procedures  (TAED  Press  Release,  May  3,1999).  The 
'g'  A  NWF  Trade  Discussion  Paper  1998  argues  that  the  TEP  seems  to  be  largely  the  result  of  TABD 
input. 
N4  Interview,  TAED  participant,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (30). 
185  The  TAED  had  problerns  finding  a  US  NGO  to  manage  the  grant  before  the  NWF  reluctantly  agreed 
to  accept  the  funds.  Three  quarters  of  the  TACD  original  Steering  Groups'  charters  prohibited  public  Zý 
funds.  Interview,  TACD  Secretariat,  via  telephone  March  2000  (24);  TAED  official,  Washington 
October  2000  (30). 
186  CEO  1998aý  I  998b.  see  also  De  Brie  1998. 
142 European  Environmental  Bureau  (EEB)  stressed  in  its  funding  application  to  the 
Commission  that,  'financial  support  for  the  TAED  should  not  lead  to  management  of 
the  agenda  of  TAED  by  the  sponsors,  but  rather  by  the  participants.  "  88  Public  Citizen 
President  Ralph  Nader  tried  to  block  the  creation  of  the  TACD  by  arguing  that  it 
would  create  the  'illusion  of  consultation  and  participation'  and  be  misused  as  a  public 
relations  ploy. 
189 
The  divide  within  the  consumer  dialogue  on  the  issue  of  trade  liberalisation 
surfaced  at  its  first  meeting  in  September  1998,  which  was  attended  by  roughly  50 
consumer  vroups.  The  meeting  was  overshadowed  by  the  dispute  between  Public 
Citizen  (led  by  Ralph  Nader),  which  opposes  trade  liberalisation,  and  Consumer  Union 
(led  by  Rhona  Karpatkin),  which  supports  it  as  a  means  of  increasing  consumer 
choice.  190  A  'devastating'  speech  by  Nader  and  three  outbursts  from  American 
consumer  groups  during  the  first  meeting  led  one  EU  official  to  argue  that,  'the 
meeting  was  a  disaster.  The  groups  needed  to  figure  out  how  to  organise  themselves.  ' 
191  In  the  end,  the  vote  to  establish  the  TACD  was  won  by  a  narrow  margin.  Faced 
with  the  decision  to  be  on  the  inside  or  outside  of  the  process,  Public  Citizen  became  a 
Steering  Group  Member.  192 
The  TAED  experienced  similar,  if  not  as  dramatic,  challenges  in  getting  off  the 
ground.  It  held  its  first  official  meeting  in  May  1999.  Again,  there  was  some 
disagreement  on  whether  government  officials  should  participate  (see  Bignami  and 
Charnovitz  2001).  An  American  NGO  indicated  that,  'there  was  a  lot  of  hesitation  at 
"-  Interview.  European  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC.  2000  (34).  TACD  Secretariat, 
London,  January  2000  (23). 
18s  A  Draft  Political  Assessment  of  on  Year.  TAED  Mav  2000. 
See  also  Bignami  and  Charnovitz  (2001). 
Interview  European  Commission  Delegation  and  US  State  Department  October  2000  (34,47).  See 
also  Bianami  and  Charnovitz  200  1. 
'9'  Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (34). 
Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC.  October  2000  (34).  1  Zý 
143 first  about  the  TAED  on  the  US  NGOs  side,  and  there  is  still  a  great  deal  of  uneasiness 
about  what  the  governments  have  in  mind  for  these  dialogues.  '  193 
European  NGOs  pushed  hard  for  the  TAED.  In  the  letter  of  invitation  to  join, 
the  leader  of  the  EEB,  John  Horletz,  argued  that  the  TAED  could  increase  the 
effectiveness  of  co-operation  and  joint  action  among  groups,  provide  highly  effective 
mechanisms  for  challenging  concerns  to  policy  makers  and  enable  NGOs  to  serve  its 
members  and  the  public  with  up  to  date  information.  TAED  membership  was 
officially  opened  to  all  NGOs,  but  no  attempt  was  made  to  recruit  'free  market' 
environmentalists  (Bignami  and  Charnovitz  2001:  40).  Public  Citizen  also  took  a 
TAED  Steering  Committee  seat.  Friends  of  the  Earth  (1999)  argued  that  TAED 
participation  members  should  monitor  the  use  of  the  TEP  to  promote  a  new  WTO 
Round  and  unbalanced  power  relations  between  actors  in  the  process. 
The  difficult  birth  of  the  TAED  and  TACD  highlights  differences  in 
approaches  to  private-public  relations  in  Europe  and  the  US.  Most  problems  setting  up 
the  dialogues  stemmed  from  the  culture  of  interaction  between  NG.  Os  and  the  US 
Administration,  which  is  generally  described  as  'hostile',  'adversarial'  and  guided  by 
great  distrust'.  194  One  US  State  Department  official  pointed  out  that,  'The  concept 
that  TACD  should  make  decisions  with  the  US  government  goes  against  everything 
US  NGOs  stand  for.  '  19  -  The  US  Administration  is  required  to  publicly  seek  and  accept 
comments  from  non-governmental  actors  under  the  Federal  Administrative  Procedures 
Act,  but  many  NGOs  were  not  accustomed  to  receiving  government  response  to  their 
recommendations  unless  they  had  demonstrated  the  capacity  to  block  trade  initiatives 
or  make  a  public  impact  (Bignarm  and  Charnovitz  2001:  41).  The  result  is  that 
11)  ý11  April  1999,  TIES  intervicýN  kNith  Jake  Caldwell. 
19ý  lntervie\A  TACD  participant  and  USTR  official  Washington  DC  October  2000  (42,50). 
19ý  Interview,  State  Department  official,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (47). 
144 American  NGOs  are  more  accustomed  to  using  lawsuits  than  dialogue  to  shape 
po  liCy.  196 
The  initial  response  of  American  officials  to  the  TACD  and  TAED 
demonstrated  the  poor  relationship  between  NGOs  and  the  US  government.  197  Early 
problems  with  the  TACD  were  attributed  to  its  management  by  USTR,  which  was 
accused  of  being  critical  and  belittling  of  the  dialogue.  198  Part  of  the  problem  was  that 
the  TACD  co-ordinator  was  charged  with  fostering  a  dialogue  that  -  at  times-  went 
against  the  grain  of  USTR's  trade  agenda.  The  shift  of  the  TACD  co-ordinator  to  the 
State  Department-  where  the  TAED  was  co-ordinated-  helped  to  foster  better  dialogue. 
TACD  officials  argue  that  the  State  Department  was  more  diplomatic  and  granted 
consumers  more  meetings.  199  The  Bureau  for  Business  and  Economic  Affairs,  led  by 
Tony  Wayne,  and  the  Under  Secretary  of  State  for  Global  Affairs,  Frank  Loy,  are 
credited  with  supporting  the  dialogues  and  overcoming  gaps  between  NGOs  and  the 
US  Administration. 
Still,  the  general  perception  is  that  TAED  and  TACD  were  quickly  able  to  gain 
a  better  rapport  with  the  Commission.  European  NGOs  were  perceived  to  have  a  better 
working  relationship  with  each  other  and  with  the  Commission  because  private-public 
dialogue  is  arguably  an  important  part  of  the  European  decision  making  process. 
European  groups  are  described  as  having  a  more  'cordial'  relationship  with  the 
Commission  200  and  the  Commission  works  under  the  assumption  that  it  needs  civil 
society  input.  -'  01  One  US  official  argued  tliat,  'there  is  greater  sympathy  among  both 
196  Interview,  TACD  participant.  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (50).  See  also  Cowles  1997 
19"  The  comments  of  one  official  dernonstrate  the  extreme  position  that,  'There  is  nothing  we  can  learn 
from  TACD.  TAED.  '  Interview  US  Ernbassy  London  January  2000  (22).  Others  argued  that  the  TACD 
and  TAED  simply  existed  to  oppose  the  TABD.  Interview,  USTR  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (4  1). 
lntervie,  ýý,  European  Commission  De)etyation,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (34). 
'9"  Interview.  TACD  Secretarial,  London.  Januarý  2000  (23). 
100  lntervieý,  ý,  TACD  Participant,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (50). 
Interviews,  USTR,  Washington  October  2000  (42)  and  Council  Secretariat,  Brussels,  September 
1999(3). 
145 sides  of  consumers  for  the  way  things  are  done  in  Europe.  The  EC  has  a  different  way 
of  dealing  with  consumers.  US  Consumers  believe  they  get  more  access  and  respect  in 
Europe.  ,  202 
Once  more,  the  Commission  exerted  pressure  on  US  actors  in  the  NTA  Task 
Force  and  SLG  meetings  to  'establish  the  consumer  and  environmental  dialogues, 
because  the  interests  of  civil  society  coincided  with  European  positions  on  several 
looming  trade  disputes  with  the  US.  The  TAED  and  TACD  have  made 
recommendations  that  support  many  of  the  Commissions'  policies  on  food  safety, 
privacy,  electrical  waste  and  the  Precautionary  Principle.  203  A  TACD  official  argued 
that,  'where  there  is  EU-US  policy  stalemate,  civil  society  comes  nearer  to  EU 
positions.  Politically  it  is  in  the  interest  of  EU  to  have  US  consumer  movement  on  its 
side.  ' 
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Interviews,  TACD  Secretariat  and  US  Embassy  London.  2000  (23,22).  Commission  Delegation. 
TACD  Participant,  Washington  2000  (34,50)  and  Council  Secretariat  and  Commissioner,  Brussels, 
September  1999  (3,11  ). 
'04  Interview,  TACD  Secretariat.  London,  January  2000  (23). 
146 In  general,  Commission  support  helped  legitimise  the  TAED  and  TACD  process  in  the 
eyes  of  US  NGOs,  as  groups  in  America  realised  they  could  draw  on  the  success  of 
their  European  counterparts.  205  After  initially  releasing  a  joint  press  release  that 
criticised  the  TEP  Action  Plan,  the  TACD  and  TAED  began  -making  policy 
recommendations,  on  a  range  of  issue  areas,  to  EU  and  US  officials  (see  figure  5.3, 
5.4).  TAED  focused  on  safe  energy  sources,  biotechnology,  waste  management  and 
emissions  standards.  206  The  TACD,  despite  its  shaky  start,  was  also  able  to  make  over 
20  concrete  recommendations  at  its  second  meeting,  focusing  on  e-commerce,  food 
safety  and  multilateral  investment  rules  (see  table  5.5  ).  207 
Organisation  in  the  TACD  and  TAED 
Institutional  is  ing  the  consumer  and  environmental  dialogues  was  a  complicated  task. 
Suspicion  of  government  involvement  meant  that  the  groups  chose  to  organise 
themselves,  but  the  shaky  start  to  both  dialogues  delayed  the  establishment  of 
organisational  structures.  American  NGOs,  who  had  less  experience  working  at  an 
205  Interview  USTR  and  US  State  Department  October  2000  (42,47). 
206  To  summarise,  the  TAED  recommended  the  removal  of  subsidies  for  environmentally  unfriendly 
energy  sources  (such  as  coal),  demanded  that  sustainability  assessments  be  applied  to  a  number  of  WTO 
agreements  and  expressed  it  opposition  to  the  multilateral  TRIPs,  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  and  SPS 
Agreements.  It  aired  concerns  about  biotechnology,  eco-labelling  and  the  Precautionary  Principle,  the 
MRAs  and  Chemical  and  Electrical  Waste  Management  (WEEEs)  It  stressed  transparency  in 
transatlantic  and  multilateral  decision  making,  urged  both  governments  to  support  the  Kyoto  Treaty  and 
to  stop  challenging  environmental  legislation  at  the  WTO.  The  message  to  the  EU-US  Summit,  Lisbon 
May  3  1,2000  was  that,  'Until  such  time  as  parity  exists  between  environmental  governance  and 
multilateral  trade  rules,  we  demand  that  both  the  United  States  and  the  European  Union  immediately 
agree  to  mutual  moratorium  on  WTO  challenges  and  threatened  challenges.  ' 
2"  The  TACD  has  had  a  more  technical  focus  on  the  transatlantic  process  because  many  consumer 
concerns  are  with  regulatory  issues.  It  made  recommendations  on  consumer  protection  and  E- 
Commerce,  and  in  particular  urged  the  EU  and  US  to  abandon  the  Safe  Harbour  agreement.  It  sided 
with  the  Commission  on  disclosure  information  for  E-Commerce,  argued  GMOs  should  be  labelled  to 
ensure  consumer  choice,  opposed  the  use  of  animal  antibiotics  and  Bovine  Growth  Hormones  and  stated 
that  the  precautionary  principle  should  apply  in  scientific  cases  where  the  evidence  is  not  conclusive. 
While  European  scientists  argue  that  the  hormone  is  associated  with  different  types  of  cancer  the  FDA 
claims  Bovine  Sornatotropin,  or  BST  presents  a  'manageable  risk'.  The  US  supports  using 
biotechnology  while  European  governments  have  argued  with  consumer  and  environmentalists  in 
favour  of  the  precautionary  principle  and  of  mandatory  labelling 
n, 
147 international  level,  had  to  establish  how  to  work  together  (Bignami  and  Charnovitz 
2001  ).  208  Moreover,  financial  and  time  constraints  made  it  difficult  to  encourage 
groups  to  take  on  managerial  posts. 
The  TACD  soon  emerged  as  the  most  institutional  i  sed  of  the  civil  society 
dialogues.  The  group  established  one  secretariat,  at  Consumer  International  (CI)  in 
London,  because  Cl  was  an  international  NGO  and  was  able  to  accept  grants  from  the 
US  government  and  the  Commission.  Individuals  at  Cl  are  credited  for  their  role  in 
managing  the  dialogue.  209  The  creation  of  a  Steering  Group  put  a  core  group  of  NGOs 
in  charge  of  leading  the  dialogue  (see  table  5.4).  Most  of  the  other  60  consumer 
organisations  participate  in  the  TACD  in  the  three  working  groups  on  food,  electronic 
commerce  and  trade  and  Issue  Managers  are  appointed  for  each  main  issue  in  the 
working  groups  (see  figure  5.2).  Each  working  group  is  co-chaired  by  EU  and  US 
managers  who  are  in  contact  before  annual  general  meetings  to  discuss  the  agenda,  to 
commission  reports,  or  identify  areas  for  action.  Within  the  groups,  joint  EU  and  US 
Issue  Managers  are  charged  with  monitoring  specific  policy  sectors.  In  general  the 
groups  interact  through  email  list-serves  and  are  working  towards  having  more  direct 
contact.  TACD  officials  describe  a  fairly  constant  stream  of  communication  between 
210  members  . 
The  TACD  leadership  has  worked  to  produce  effective  mechanisms  capable  of 
producing  concrete  policy  recommendations.  It  holds  annual  summit  meetings  similar 
to  those  of  TABD  where  working  group  and  high  level  discussions  are  held  with  EU 
208  Interview,  European  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (32). 
Interviews,  USTR  and  US  State  Department,  Washington  DC,  October  200  (42,47). 
Email  correspondence.  TACD  Secretariat,  June  2001,  (6  1),  Interview,  US  NGO,  Washington, 
October  2000  (50). 
148 211 
and  US  official  S.  The  Steering  Group  publishes  a  report  of  summit  findings  and 
presents  them  to  the  appropriate  government  officials  before  the  biannual  EU-US 
Summit.  The  December  1999  Summit  in  Washington  D.  C.  was  the  first  to  which  the 
TACD  was  invited. 
The  TAED  established  similar  structures  to  the  TACD.  It  has  five  working 
groups  (see  figure  5.33)  who  meet  in  conjunction  with  the  annual  general  meeting  and 
carry  out  infon-nal  contact  through  Issue  Managers.  Certain  working  groups  have 
designated  issue  co-ordinators  for  policy  areas  that  overlap  working  groups.  The 
Steering  Group  guides  the  dialogue  and  has  decision  making  authority  over  funding, 
budget  activities  and  the  output  of  TAED  documentation.  It  meets  at  an  annual.  general 
meeting,  and  holds  additional  strategy  meetings  throughout  the  year.  Unlike  the 
TABD  and  TACD,  the  TAED  does  not  have  a  secretariat.  Rather  it  has  a  system  of  co- 
ordinators  who  perform  the  administrative  functions  of  dialogue.  212  In  the  past  TAED 
grant  holders  (the  EEB  and  the  NWF)  acted  as  co-ordinators.  In  2000,  however,  the 
US  TAED  members  failed  to  produce  a  co-ordinator  or  a  number  of  working  group 
chairs. 
Despite  early  objections  to  the  participation  of  government  officials,  EU  and 
US  officials  have  been  well  represented  at  TAED  meetings,  where  both  high  level  and 
2.13 
expert  level  contact  (between  the  working  groups  and  officials)  takes  place  . 
Like 
the  TABD  and  TACD  the  annual  TAED  meeting  produces  recommendatiom,  which 
2''  Government  representatives  at  TACD  meetings  have  included  the  US  Secretary  for  Agriculture,  the 
EU  Commissioner  for  Health  and  Protection,  US  Congressmen,  the  Deputy  USTR,  Deputy  Head  of  the 
Commission  Delegation  and  NTA  Task  force  level  representatives. 
2'2  Discussion  papers,  articles  and  updates  are  provided  on  the  0 groups'  web  site,  which  is  co-sponsored 
bý  the  Transatlantic  Information  Exchange  Service  Network  (see  xvw%A,.  tiesweb.  or,,  ). 
Past  participants  include  the  EU  Trade  Commissioner,  the  EU  Environmental  DG,  the  Assistant  and 
Deputý  Assistant  Secretary  for  the  Environment  in  US  State  Department  and  EU  Council  Presidency 
representatives.  Some  TAED  members  have  complained  about  the  absence  of  the  USTR.  A  Steering 
Group  Member  argued  that  the  USTR  had  been  asked  to  attend,  given  the  attendance  of  Trade 
Commissioner  Pascal  Lamy,  but  refused  on  the  basis  that  the  USTR  was  not  the  level  as  the  EU  Trade 
Commissioner.  Interview,  TAED,  Brussels,  May  2000  (27). 
149 representatives  had  the  opportunity  to  present  to  EU-US  Summit  leaders  in 
Washington  (1999)  and  Lisbon  (2000)  (see  table  5.2). 
What  Impact? 
The  failure  to  fill  vacancies  in  TAED  posts  demonstrates  the  lost  momentum  among 
US  NGOs  caused,  in  part,  by  TAED  funding  problems.  In  January  2000  the  objection 
of  Senator  Jesse  Helms,  in  the  Senate  Finance  Committee,  to  funding  for  the  TAED 
blocked  the  approval  of  funds,  and  stopped  the  State  Department  from  issuing  the 
grant.  As  a  US  State  Department  official  argued,  'it  would  take  a  high  level  decision  to 
fund  grants  over  Helms'  olýjection.  We  hope  to  convince  him  to  release  the  funds.  If 
that  does  not  work,  we  will  not  fund  over  his  objections.  '  214  The  failure  of  the  US 
Administration  to  produce  funds  has  implications  for  the  EU  budget,  because 
Commission  funding  is  subject  to  the  US's  'matched'  funds.  The  lack  of  funds 
overshadowed  the  May  2000  TAED  meeting  in  Brussels,  where  co-ordinators 
acknowledged  that  they  had  been  without  funds  for  months.  215  In  November  2000,  the 
TAED  announced  a  suspension  of  activities.  John  Hontelez,  Secretary  General  of  the 
EEB  and  member  of  the  Steering  Committee  of  the  TAED  argued, 
We  have  to  stop  our  activities  because  the  US  government  has  not  been  able  to 
provide  its  part  of  the  necessary  finances  to  run  this  dialogue.  It  has  faced 
opposition  in  the  Senate,  and  apparently,  it  is  not  giving  it  enough  priority.  The 
US  government  has  always  pretended  the  TAED  is  of  great  importance  to 
them.  This  failure  however  does  not  confirm  this. 
The  TACD  and  TAED  were  encouraged  by  the  US  Administration  to  seek  private 
sources  of  funding  before  the  suspension  of  the  TAED.  State  Department  officials 
indicated  that  the  2000  TACD  grant,  which  managed  to  pass  Congressional 
114  Interview,  US  State  Department,  Washington  DC  2000  (45). 
215  Interviews,  TACD  Participants,  Brussels,  May  200  (27,28,30). 
150 Appropriations,  would  be  the  last.  Despite  earlier  claims  that  the  US  Administration 
and  European  Commission  should  work  to  fund  the  dialogue,  US  officials  argued  that 
public  funding  was  never  a  permanent  arrangement.  One  official  argued,  'It  is  not  US 
government  policy  to  fund  NGOs.  '  216  The  future  of  the  TACD  hinges  on  the  capacity 
of  the  group  to  find  private  funding,  which  EU  TACD  officials  have  argued  that  they 
are  aiming  to  do  in  order  to  continue  the  dialogue.  217  US  TACD  members  were  less 
optimistic  about  the  future,  and  argued  the  importance  of  first  assessing  the  impact  of 
the  dialogUe. 
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and  Energy  and  Forests 
Issue  Managers/Horizontal  Issues 
I 
Climate  Change  Agreements  Sustainable  Agriculture/  Chemicals,  Public  Procurement 
Consumption  and  Production  Multifunctional  Agriculture,  Endocrine  Disrupters,  WEEE, 
Air  Quality,  Energy  Transport,  Biotechnology  and  GMOs,  Industry  Policies,  .  Eco-labelling 
Aviation,  Aircraft  Noise  Food  Safety,  Plant  and  Animal  MRAs/Standardisation, 
Health/Welfare  Environmental  Tax  Reforms,  POPs 
Trade  and  Forests  Fishing, 
Freshwater,  Oceans  Tourism 
Wildlife 
WTO  Rounds/  MEAs,  TRIPS 
Investment,  Forests,  Agriculture, 
TBT,  SPS  Agreements,  PPMs, 
Transparency  and  Civil  Society 
Participation 
'16  Interviews,  US  State  Department.  Washington,  October  2000  (45,47). 
217  lntervieývv,  TACD  Secretariat,  London,  January  2000  (23). 
2"  lntervie\ý,  TACD  participant.  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (50). 
151 The  future  survival  and  success  of  these  groups  is  directly  linked  to  their  capacity  to 
add  value  to  wider  transnational  social  movements  (see  also  Buck  2000).  What,  if  any, 
gains  were  reaped  through  the  creation  of  the  dialogues?  In  accordance  with  their 
outlined  objectives,  the  success  of  the  TACD  and  TAED  rests  on  the  capacity  of  the 
groups  to  build  dialogue  between  EU  and  US  NGOs,  to  increase  NGO  access  to  EU 
and  US  officials  and  to  shape  policy  output.  The  perceived  access  and  impact  of  the 
consumer  and  environmental  dialogues  is  divided  into  two  responses:  1)  the  success  of 
the  TACD  and  TAED  and  2)  their  relative  success  vis-d-vis  the  business  dialogue. 
While  NGO  complaints  about  unequal  access  and  impact  are  outlined  here,  the 
competition  between  the  dialogues  is  dealt  with  more  thoroughly  in  section  4. 
A  major  achievement  of  the  TACD  and  TAED  has  been  the  build  up  of 
dialogues  between  European  and  American  NGOs,  which  served  as  important  sources 
of  information  sharing  and.  networking.  The  dialogues  have  been  described  by  F.  U  and 
US  officials  as  a  'learning  processý.  219  American  NGOs  are  learning  from  European 
NGOs  about  the  EU  and  about  European  policies,  and  both  sides  are  learning  how 
they  can  harmonise  strategies  and  simultaneously  exert  pressure  on  their  governments. 
US  NGOs  have  found  an  ally  in  European  consumer  groups  and  on  many  policies  in 
the  European  Commission. 
Table  5.1  Dialogue  'Summits' 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
TABD  X  x  x  x  x  x  x 
TAED  xx  x 
TACD  x  x  x  x 
TALD  x  x 
119  Interview,  Commission  Dele-, 
-,  ation  and  USTR,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (34,42). 
152 The  TACD,  in  particular,  has  been  praised  for  overcoming  differences  between  US 
NGOs.  220  As  one  official  argued,  'the  success  of  the  TACD  is  just  overcoming  the 
Consumer  Union-Public  Citizen  gap  and  getting  American  consumer  groups  on 
speaking  terms.  '  221  TAED  representatives  agree  that  the  environmental  dialogue  has 
also  jumpstarted  co-operation.  Another  source  suggested  that,  'People  are  coming 
together.  There  is  more  common  ground  and  no  clear  divide  between  European  and 
American  NGOs  on  trade.  '  222  Environmental  Protection  Agency  (EPA)  officials 
agreed  that  transatlantic  dialogue  between  the  groups  was  significant,  arguing  that, 
'first  they  must  get  comfortable  at  the  table  with  each  other  because  goverriments 
223 
respond  when  constituencies  are  united  and  focused' 
. 
In  one  respect  the  dialogues  have  successfully  fulfilled  the  objectives  of  the 
NTA:  they  have  'built  bridges'  across  the  Atlantic.  The  real  test  for  participants, 
however,  is  their  capacity  to  act  as  'policy  shapers'.  Here  the  results  are  less  visible. 
First,  members  of  the  TACD  and  TAED  have  complained  about  the  level  of  access 
vis-ý-vis  the  business  dialogue.  Second,  consumers  and  environmentalists  have  argued 
that  the  civil  society  dialogues  do  not  have  the  same  influence  in  the  decision  making 
process  to  that  exerted  by  the  TABD. 
Table  5.2  Dialogues'  Access  to  EU-US  Summits 
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
TABD  X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X- 
X 
X 
X  _  X 
X 
_  X 
TACD  -  X  -  X  - 
TAED  X  X 
TALD  X 
Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (34). 
Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (34). 
Interview,  US  NGO.  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (30). 
153 On  the  one  hand  TACD  and  TAED  members  have  gained  access  to  both  high  level 
and  working  level  officials  through  the  annual  general  meeting  (see  table  5.3).  The 
TACD  and  TAED  each  have  contact  persons  in  the  State  Department  and  the  US 
Mission  in  Brussels  at  a  working  level.  The  TACD  and  TAED  have  increased  the 
formal  level  of  access  that  consumers  and  environmentalists  have  to  policy  makers.  224 
Bignami  and  Charnovitz  (2001)  argue  that: 
Groups  like  Consumers  International  have,  for  years,  hammered  out  common 
positions  among  member  groups  and  taken  these  positions  to  the  Codex,  the 
United  Nations,  and  various  other  international  organizations.  They  have  had 
observer  status  in  the  United  Nations  and  the  Codex  (but  not  the  WTO).  They 
have  educated  the  public  and  campaigned  on  various  issues.  Never,  however, 
had  they  been  promised  direct,  formal  access  to  policyrnakers  in  the  course  of 
intergovernmental  negotiations. 
However,  the  access  that  consumer  and  environmental  groups  have  gained  is 
overshadowed  by  the  comparable  access  allotted  to,  the  TABD.  Controversy  arose 
before  the  1999  Bonn  Summit  over  TABD's  access  to  EU-US  Summits.  Despite  the 
fact  that  the  TAED  and  TACD  had  written  to  summit  leaders  to  request  access,  the 
Gennan  Presidency,  urged  on  by  the  US  Commerce  Department,  refused  invitations  to 
the  civil  society  dialogues.  225  The  TAED  and  TACD-  supported  largely  by  the 
Commission-  publicly  denounced  the  unequal  access  given  to  the  TABD.  In  response, 
the  Washington  1999  Summit  statement  included  an  annex  for  equal  handling'  of  the 
226  dialogues 
. 
In  general  the  change  in  summit  procedures  was  seen  as  a  symbolic  win  for  the 
non-business  dialogues,  as  EU-US  Summits  are  arguably  not  their  best  point  of 
'24 
Interviews.  Environmental  Protection  Agency 
, 
Washington  DC,  October  2000  (48,49). 
Interview,  USTR,  Washin-ton,  October  2000,  (42). 
22ý  NGO  groups  argued  that  the  Council  Presidency  was  persuaded  by  the  German  Chancellor 
Schroeder,  who  hails  from  a  largely  industrial  region.  Interview,  TACD  Secretariat,  January  London, 
2000(23). 
-6  It  was  agreed  that  EU  and  US  authorities  should  meet  formally  with  all  of  the  dialogues  at  least  once 
every  since  months,  that  workin-  level  contacts  should  facilitate  routine  interaction  and  that  a  rotating 
schedule  for  summit  attendance  should  be  put  in  place. 
154 access.  227  Commission  officials  argued  that  private  sector  input  would  be  more 
effectively  aimed  at  working  group  level  and  have  pushed  for  dialogue  access  to  SLG 
rather  than  summit  level  meetings.  One  official  argued,  'it  is  not  much  use  if  you 
haven't  got  your  point  across  before  then.  They  need  to  concentrate  on  early  stages  of 
policy  decision  making  where  recommendations  can  be  much  more  detailed.  You  have 
a  better  chance  of  influencing  the  expert  than  the  political  boss.  '  228 
However,  access  to  transgovernmental  actors  is  also  a  source  of  contention 
among  the  transatlantic  dialogues.  The  TABD  has  both  higher  and  more  frequent 
access  to  officials.  NGOs  note  that  the  TABD  gets  higher  level  officials  at  its 
meetings,  including  the  US  Vice  President  and  the  WTO  Director.  229  The  TABD  has  a 
designated  'agency'  that  acts  as  its  partner-  the  US  Commerce  Department-  while  the 
TAED  and  TACD  have  a  small  number  of  designated  people  within  the  State 
Department.  Unlike  the  Commerce  Department  a  State  Department  official  pointed 
out  that,  'we  cannot  only  take  consumer  or  environmental  consumers  on  board.  230  The 
TABD  also  has  crosscutting  support  from  the  US  interagency  committee  that  deals 
with  its  issues.  TABD  members  also  benefit  from  informal  contact  with  governmental 
officials.  One  NGO  official  argued  that,  'where  TABD  has  more  access  is  at  a  daily 
working  level-  lunches  and  receptions,  meetings  every  month.  It  is  a  huge  policy- 
lobbying  machine.  231 
III  Rather,  it  has  been  ai-,  -ued  that  the.  Surrunits  serve  as  photo  opportunities  Interview,  TAED  and 
TACD  participants,  London  (1999)  and  Washin-ton  (2000)  (23,30). 
"S  Interview,  Commission,  Brussels,  September  1999  (15). 
-9  While  government  presence  at  TACD  and  TAED  annual  meetings  has  increased,  NGOs  argqe  that 
they  do  not  have  the  same  level  of  representation.  One  US  NGO  contended,  'We  did  not  have  the  Vice 
President  at  our  annual  inecting.  We  are  luck)  to  get  one  US  Cabinet  member.  '  Interview,  (23,50). 
Interview.  US  State  Department,  Washington,  October  2000. 
TACD  Secretariat  (23-24).  Email  correspondence  (63). 
155 Table  5.3  Formal  Access  for  the  Transatlantic  Dialogues 
TABD  TACD  TAED 
Regular  Attendance  at  Limited  Access  to  EU-US  Limited  Access  to  EU-US 
EU-US  Summit  Summit  Summit 
High  level  contacts  at  High  level  contacts  at  High  level  contacts  at 
annual  CEO  meeting  annual  general  meeting  in  annual  general  meeting 
plenary  in  plenary 
Working  Group  Working  Group  contact  at  Working  Group  contact 
contact  at  annual  CEO  annual  general  meeting  at  annual  general  . 
meeting  prior  to  plenary  meeting  prior  to  plenary 
Mid  Year  Meeting  Steering  Group  Planning  Steering  Group  Planning 
Meeting  Meeting 
US  Interagency  Co-  TACD  Contact  Person  in  TAED  Contact  Person  in 
ordinators  State  Department  State  Department 
Regular  Issue  Manager 
-  Working  Level 
Contacts 
The  real  problem  with  the  NTA  dialogue  process  is  not  just  that  NGOs  do  not  feel  like 
they  have  access  to  officials,  because  formal  dialogue  has  increased  through  the 
TACD  and  TAED.  Rather,  the  real  gap  between  the  TABD  and  the  TACD  is  in  the 
number  of  policy  recommendations  that  have  influenced  transatlantic  decision 
setters.  232  NGOs  claimed  that  the  success  rates  of  the  TACD  and  TAED-  if  measured 
against  the  TABD's  50  per  cent  rate-  would  be  significantly  lower.  233  Some  argued 
that  none  of  their  proposals  had  been  adopted.  Others  noted  that  NGO  input  had 
helped  change  the  thinking  on  some  policies.  for  example  on  the  better  access  for 
2'  A  TACD  official  notes,  'It  is  not  that  the  structures  are  not  working  well,  but  that  they  are  working 
better  I-or  the  TABD.  '  lntervicýN,  TACD  Secretariat.  January.  London  (2000)  (23-24). 
156 medications  in  developing  countries  and  greater  contact  over  GMOs  and  product 
labelling.  Overall  however,  the  dialogues  have  not  produced  the  same  concrete  gains 
that  the  TABD  has.  The  TAED  Scorecard  argued  that  government  responses  to 
recommendations  (in  grades  from  A-F)  were  significantly  below  average.  234  The 
TAED  slammed  the  US  government  for  its  'total  failure  to  act  or  failure  to  act 
appropriately'  on  a  wide  variety  of  issues.  235  Sixty-five  consumer  groups  echoed  the 
same  sentiment,  that  the  EU  and  the  US  had  largely  ignored  consumer  trade  policy 
recommendations,  in  an  annual  report  (2000).  236  The  message  is  that  'the  overall 
impact  of  the  TACD  has  not  been  enough,  but  we  are  encouraged  by  the  achievements 
of  the  first  few  years  and  believe  we  can  further  establish  the  dialogue  as  an  important 
part  of  transatlantic  trade  policy-making.  '  237 
To  summarise,  the  TACD  and  TAED  have  increased  formal  access  for 
consumer  and  environmental  NGOs,  but  the  quality  of  access  has  been  called  into 
question.  As  one  NGO  observes,  'they  are  telling  us  what  they  are  doing,  rather  than 
taking  our  advice.  We  have  access  but  we  don't  learn  specifics.  TAED  participants 
argue  that  US  officials  seem  to  be  just  going  through  the  motions.  '  238  The  low  key 
government  response  to  TACD  and  TAED  proposals  fuelled  claims  that  the 
governments  were  not  taking  the  groups  seriously  -  or  as  seriously  as  they  take  the 
TABD.  Government  officials  stressed  the  importance  of  the  TACD  and  TAED  as 
dialogue  structures.  A  State  Department  official  argued,  'Whether  or  not  their  policies 
Interviews  with  European  and  American  NGOs  London,  Brussels  and  Washington,  January,  May 
and  October  2000  (23,24.27-30,50). 
Fhe  Commission's  response  to  GMOs  received  the  high  est  mark  (a  C+).  Interview  (6). 
TAED-TACD  Press  Release  "I  ransatlantic  Consumer  Dialogues  Release  Annual  Reports,  Slarn 
Government  for  Lack  ot'Responsiveness.  '6  June  2000. 
116  TACD  press  release,  'US  &  EU  Consumer  Groups  Call  for  Swift  Action  to  Balance  Trade  Dialogue 
March  30  2000. 
2117  Email  correspondence  with  TACD  Secretariat,  June  2000,  (63). 
2,18  Interview,  American  NGO.  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (24). 
157 are  adopted,  they  are  widely  understood  and  seriously  considered.  239  To  participants, 
however,  faced  with  funding  problems  it  is  important  that  the  TACD  and  TAED  serve 
as  more  than  'talk  shops.  '  The  consensus  is  that  'talking  shops'  are  useful,  but  that  the 
TACD  can  only  gain  support  to  continue  as  an  efficient  lobbying  organisation.  A 
TACD  official  argued,  'Consumers  and  environmentalists  are  not  downplaying 
dialogue,  but  they  expect  more  concrete  results,  in  part  because  TABD  gets  them.  1240 
Table  5.4  Active  Dialogue  Members 
TABD  TACD  TAED 
Price  Waterhouse  Coopers  Consumers  *  European  Environmental 
Electrolux  International  Bureau 
Xerox  Danish  Consumer  0  Community  Nutrition 
United  Technologies  Council  Institute 
Corporation  Consumer  Federation  of  0  World  Wildlife  Federation 
Lafarge  America  0  German  League  for 
Suez-Lyonnaise  US  Consumers  Union  Nature  and  the 
Daimler  Chrysler  US  Public  Interest  Environment 
Philips  Electronics  Research  Group  0  National  Wildlife 
Warner-Lambert  EuroCoop  Federation 
Tenneco  Kepka  0  Edmonds  Institute 
Ford  Italian  Consumer  0  Center  for  International 
Council  Environmental  Law 
Consumer  Federation  of  Biodiversity  Action 
America  Network 
Public  Citizen  0  Public  Citizen 
2  ',  9  Interview.  US  State  Department,  Washington  DC,  October  (2000). 
Interview.  TACD  Secretariat.  London,  January  2000  (23). 
158 Table  5.5  Policy  Positions  of  the  Transatlantic  Dialogues 
TABD  Position  TACD  Position  TAED  Position 
Biotechnology  Supports  Supports  Supports 
establishment  of  a  establishment  of  establishment  of 
science-based  proof  science-based  proof  science-based  proof 
Li  Safety  that  GMOs  are  that  GMOS  are  not  that  GMOS  are  not 
harmful  harmful  harmful 
Lj  Labelling  Against  Supports  mandatory  Supports 
GMO  Labelling  labelling  Mandatory  labelling, 
E-Commerce  Supported  Safe  Opposed  Safe 
Harbour  Agreement  Harbour/Supports 
vacy 
Precautionary  Argues  the  PP  should  Favours  use  of  PP  in  Favours  use  of  PP  in 
Principles'  only  be  based  only  consumer,  health,  consumer,  health, 
on  sound  science  safety,  safety, 
Environment  Environment 
regulations  regulations 
TRIPS  Supports  full  Against  using  TRIPS 
implementation  of  to  block  production 
TRIPS  of  medicine  in 
developin  countries 
Climate  Change  Argues  Kyoto  Supports 
emissions  standards  implementation  of 
are  non-tariff  barriers  Kyoto  Treaty 
The  European  Identified  as  an  Early  Supports  WEEE  and 
Waste  Electrical  Warning  candidate  industry 
Equipment  responsibility  for 
Directive  (WEEE)  safe  waste  disposal. 
Participation  Supports  Supports  Supports 
And  Regulatory  Transparency  and  the  Transparency  and  the  Transparency  and  the 
Guidelines  Regulatory  Regulatory  Regulatory 
Guidelines  Guidelines  Guidelines 
3)  The  Transatlantic  Labour  Dialogue 
The  goal  of  promoting  co-operation  on  labour  issues  is  found  in  the  NTA  and  TER 
The  economic  chapter  of  the  NTA  makes  broad  reference  to  internationally  recognised 
labour  standards  and  employment  issues.  In  May  1997  the  AFL-CIO  and  ETUC 
agreed  to  initiate  the  dialogue  under  government  sponsorship  at  the  Bridging  the 
Atlantic  'people  to  people'  conference  in  Washington.  A  year  later  the  TEP  Action 
Plan  outlined  a  number  of  commitments  to  increased  dialogue  on  labour  between 
159 workers,  employers  and  NGOs  and  business  and  labour  advisory  groups  (see.  also 
Knauss  and  Trubek  2001). 
241 
The  Transatlantic  Labour  Dialogue  is  the  least  developed  formal  NTA 
dialogue.  The  first  meeting  of  the  TALD,  held  a  month  before  the  TEP,  coincided  with 
an  international  labour  summit.  Its  formal  launch  came  with  the  submission  of  a  joint 
statement  to  the  EU-US  Washington  Summit  in  1998.  However,  its  second  meeting 
was  postponed  until  June  1999.  Even  then,  the  meeting  took  place  at  an  international 
(G-8)  meeting,  and  no  official  statement  was  ever  released.  The  American  Federation 
of  Labour  and  the  Congress  of  Industrial  Organisations  did  issue  a  letter  to  President 
Clinton  and  Chancellor  Schroeder  before  the  Bonn  Summit  (June  1999).  They  agreed 
to  support  human  rights  clauses  in  international  agreements  and  to  broaden  the  labour 
agenda  for  the  WTO.  In  December  2000,  it  issued  its  first  real  recommendations  to 
EU-US  leaders.  Six  months  later,  however,  the  TALD  again  appeared  to  be  static.  242 
Hope  for  the  recovery  of  the  TALD  was  bleak,  because  its  structure  was 
flawed  from  the  beginning.  Knuass  and  Trubek  (2001)  argue  that  the  TALD  lacked 
substantive  expectations;  was  set  up  only  as  a  small  and  quasi-private  dialogue;  was 
neither  bilateral  nor  transatlantic  and  was  a  low  priority  for  labour  leaders. 
First,  although  the  TALD  produced  more  substantive  results  in  2000,  there 
was  no  sign  of  establishing  an  organisational  structure,  a  secretariat  or  formal 
objectives.  At  the  London  meeting  in  1999,  labour  leaders  agreed  to  hold  periodic 
reviews  of  the  trade  union  dialogue,  co-ordinate  their  positions  on  the  planned  Euro- 
American  social  and  employment  initiatives  and  initiate  a  Euro-American  working 
group.  None  ofthese  tasks  was  completed  and  there  was  no  subsequent  commitment 
2"  It  also  included  a  commitment  to  end  child  labour. 
'4'  The  2001  Eli-US  Summit  Statement  from  Gotenbur-  stated,  'We  support  the  Transatlantic 
Environment  Dialogue  and  the  Transatlantic  Labor  Dialogue  in  their  efforts  to  rejuvenate  their 
activities.  ' 
160 on  behalf  of  the  labour  dialogue  to  pursue  a  transatlantic  policy  agenda.  The  TALD  is 
basically  a  dialogue  between  the  AFL-CIO  and  the  EUTC.  Its  meetings  have  included 
only  a  handful  of  people  and  have  not  even  been  held  as  separate  events.  Knauss  and 
Trubek  (2000)  note  that,  'merely  trying  to  find  out  what  transpires  at  its  meeting  can 
be  an  exercise  in  frustration.  In  sum,  there  is  little  to  indicate  that  either  labor 
organisation  has  given  the  forum  any  serious  attention.  ' 
Those  involved  with  the  TALD  agree  that  it  is  not  a  forum  for  policy  shaping, 
and  is  only  marginally  a  forum  for  dialogue.  It  is  argued  that  the  TALD  is  not 
transatlantic  because  the  structure  of  international  trade  unions  dialogue  pre-dates  the 
NTA.  The  international  orientation  of  global  labour  movements  creates  diplomatic 
problems  for  EUTC  and  AFL-CIO,  and  it  was  feared  that  a  transatlantic  based 
dialogue  stood  the  risk  of  getting  'their  (affiliates)  noses  out  of  joint'.  The 
international  structure  of  the  labour  movement  also  explains  the  TALD's  focus  on 
multilateral  rather  than  transatlantic  issues.  Most  of  the  December  2000  statement 
focused  on  multilateral  trade  liberalisation,  the  MAI,  sustainable  development,  the  UN 
Rio  +10  meeting  and  Aids  Drugs  to  Africa  (see  figure  5.4).  243  There  appears.  to  be  a 
lack  of  interest  in  the  transatlantic  level,  because  the  TEP  is  not  viewed  as  a  substantial 
policy  forum.  A  TALD  representative  argued,  'Trade  unions  are  exerting  an  inside 
track  at  the  WTO  level.  If  the  bilateral  level  becomes  more  important,  then  the  TALD 
will  follow.  '  244 
Consequently,  the  TALD  is  little  more  than  a  modest  exchange  between  a 
European  and  an  American  labour  federation.  Given  its  lack  of  commitment  and  clear 
lack  of  influence.  the  laboLir  dialogues-  even  more  so  than  the  consumer  and 
environmental  dialogues-  cannot  survive  without  government  support.  The  labour 
4  ",  AlthOLIý1111  it  should  be  noted  that  TALD  did  broach  the  subject  of  EU-US  approaches  to  Burma. 
14  Intervievv,  TALD  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (13). 
161 movement  is  not  willing  to  commit  the  resources  to  fund  a  transatlantic  dialogue.  One 
European  labour  representative  argued  that,  'You  are  not  going  to  reinvent  the  trade 
union  organisation  for  a  one-fifth  the  cost  of  a  plane  ticket.  If  they  want  us  involved, 
they  have  to  put  their  money  where  their  mouth  is.  '  245 
The  labour  movements'  resistance  to  be  drawn  into  the  NTA  process  means 
that  the  TALD  has  had  no  impact  on  the  transatlantic  policy  shaping.  246  One  official 
even  bluntly  stated,  'There  is  no  labour  dialogue.  '  247 
Figure  5.4 
T  he  Transatlantic  Labour  Dialogue 
Co-ordinators:  AFL-CIO-  EUTC 
Meetings:  London  1998  and  Bonn  1999 
Statements:  May  1998,  December  1998,  December  2000  Summits 
Interests.  The  MAI,  GATS  and  public  services,  TRIPS  and  AlDs 
drugs  in  Africa,  Sustainable  Development 
4)  Transnational  Decision  Shaping 
The  creation  of  the  NTA  dialogues  has  ensured  that  private  actors  have  more  access  to 
transatlantic  decision  takers  at  both  a  high  political  level  and  a  working  level.  While 
business,  consumer,  environmental  and  labour  dialogues  have  all  gained  a  formal  role 
hi  the  process,  only  the  TABD  has  emerged  as  a  true  policy  'shaper'.  A  combination 
21ý  lntervicýN.  TALD,  Brussels.  September  1999  (13). 
'46  Interviews  Commission.  Brussels  (1999)  and  US  State  Department,  Washington  DC  (2000)  (9,44). 
'47  Interview,  US  State  Department,  Washington,  October  2000  (58). 
162 of  factors  contributes  both  to  the  effectiveness  of  the  dialogues  and  the  wide-range  of 
government  responses  to  the  recommendations. 
Organisation,  Focus  and  Funding 
EU  and  US  officials  have,  in  the  past,  blamed  a  lack  of  cohesion,  organisation  and 
interest  in  the  NTA  process  for  the  inequalities  in  actor  access  and  policy  adoption. 
The  civil  society  dialogues,  when  compared  to  the  business  dialogue,  have  been 
characterised  as  weak,  unorganised  and  plagued  by  internal  bickering.  There  were 
claims  that  the  TACD  and  TAED  were  less  influential  because  they  were  new  to  the 
process.  They  have  even  been  described  elsewhere  as  'toddlers  in  the  policy 
playpen'. 
248 
The  ability  of  the  private  dialogues  to  orgamse  themselves  is  directly  linked  to 
their  capacity  to  produce  cohesive  proposals.  Consensus  among  domestic  groups  and 
between  EU  and  US  actors  is  considered  a  major  strength  of  the  dialogues.  The  TABD 
is  undisputedly  the  most  developed  transatlantic  dialogue.  It  is  highly  organised  and  its 
proposals  carry  weight  because  they  bear  the  approval  of  200  CEOs.  249  In  'Short,  the 
TABD  is  arguably  a'well  oiled  machine.  '  250 
In  contrast,  however,  it  has  been  argued  that  since  the  launch  of  the  other 
dialogues,  that  the  strong  management  of  the  social  dialogues  was  needed  in  order  to 
overcome  differences  between  groups.  251  One  US  official  argued  that,  'the  TABD 
plays  a  different  role  than  the  other  dialogues,  which  is  to  come  to  a  common  position 
and  give  recommendations.  This  is  not  what  the  (TACD,  TAED,  TALD)  have  done- 
'48 
Quoted  in  Peterson  200  1. 
'41)  Interview  Council  Presidency  and  European  Commission,  Brussels,  September  1999  (5,15). 
,  so  Argued  by  TABD  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (14). 
251  Interviews,  Commission.  Brussels,  September  1999  (15,6). 
163 they  don't  agree.  '  252  Reaching  consensus  between  NGO  groups  is  more  complicated 
because  they  are  constituency  based  and  have  funding  commitments  to  other 
organisations.  253  The  civil  society  dialogues  also  had  more  trouble  getting  off  the 
ground  because  of  internal  policy  differences.  Initially,  US  consumers  groups  were 
unable  to  agree  on  whether  to  start  a  dialogue,  let  alone  agree  on  policy  proposals. 
To  some  extent  the  criticisms  levelled  at  the  civil  society  dialogues  were 
warranted  in  the  early  days  of  their  implementation,  but  the  groups-  not  including  the 
TALD-  recognised  the  need  to  organise  themselves.  The  TACD,  which  was  arguably 
the  most  incoherent  after  its  first  meeting,  subsequently  emerged  as  the  most.  coherent 
civil  society  dialogue.  Officials  argued  that  the  initial  dispute  between  Public  Citizen 
and  Consumer  Union  was  (mostly)  set  aside  and  that  Consumer  International  and  the 
Steering  Group  had  worked  hard  to  ensure  that  the  consumer  movement  had  a 
common  face.  The  TACD  -  three  meetings  on-  was  described  as  very  organised  and 
very  disciplined.  254  A  dialogue  that  was  earlier  described  as  'rude'  and 
'confrontational'  was  argued  to  be  proficient.  A  US  official  observed  that, 
If  they  are  tearing  their  hair  out  they  are  not  showing  the  governments.  By  the 
time  they  sit  across  from  us,  they  are  very,  very  professional.  They  do  not  wash 
their  dirty  laundry  in  public.  The  Steering  Committee  presents  a  united  front. 
255  They  spend  a  lot  of  time  co-ordinating  and  they  are  coherent  . 
Before  its  suspension,  the  TAED  co-ordinators  had  also  argued  that  the'dialogue 
needed  a  more  focused  agenda,  clear  strategy  and  better  organisation.  A  draft 
assessment  of  the  TAED-presented  at  the  2000  meeting-  emphasised  the  need  to  make 
the  working  groups  more  effective  and  criticised  in  particular  the  Trade  Working 
IntervickN,  US  Mission,  Brussels,  September  1999  (4) 
See  also  Aaron  et  al  (200  1)  who  argues  that,  'when  NGOS  are  brought  together  to  discuss  common 
issues  but  discover  that  they  differ  significantly  in  their  political  agendas  and  operating  style,  it  can  be  a 
complicating  factor 
I  254  Interview,  USTR,  Washin-ton  DC,  October  2000  (42). 
Interview.  US  State  Department.  October  2000  (47). 
164 group  for  failing  to  overcome  internal  differences.  In  response  to  vacant  US  posts,  the 
report  noted  that,  'there  are  bottlenecks  with  regards  to  willingness  to  and/or  ability  of 
lead  groups  to  invest  sufficient  time  in  co-ordination.  '  256 
The  orientation  of  the  TAED  and  TACD's  proposals  has  also  distinguished 
them  from  the  TABD.  A  credit  to  the  TABD  is  its  focus  on  policy  details  that  are 
specific  to  the  NTA  institutions  and  the  goal  of  the  NTM.  Although  the  TABD  has  a 
priority  group  that  deals  with  the  WTO,  it  has  used  global  forums  like  the  GBDe,  to 
address  multilateral  issues.  257  The  TACD  and  TAED,  on  the  other  hand,  have  debated 
the  need  to  allow  non-transat  I  antic  NGOs  into  the  dialogues.  Like  the  TALD,  there  has 
been  a  tendency  for  these  dialogues  to  focus  on  multilateral  or  domestic  rather  than 
transatlantic  issues.  They  have  been  accused  of  presenting  broad  proposals  and  of  less 
effectively  providing  ready-made  solutions.  This  is  in  part  because  they  concentrate  on 
issue  areas  where  the  EU  and  US  disagree,  for  example  over  GMOs,  BVT  and  beef.  A 
TACD  representative  argued  that,  'TABD  is  doing  the  governments'  job  for  them. 
Civil  society  is  not  as  focused  on  technicalities.  It  is  about  following  reactions  of 
process.  ' 
258 
In  reality,  however,  the  TACD-  more  than  the  TAED-  has  successfully  shifted 
the  focus  of  the  dialogue  to  address  a  number  of  transatlantic  'policies.  For  example  it 
has  continuously  emphasised  the  EU-US  Safe  Harbour  Agreement  and  employed 
research  staff  to  follow  the  transatlantic  MRAs.  On  the  TAED  it  was  claimed  that, 
*Broad  proposals  are  still  a  problem.  Contrary  to  business,  many  groups  have  less 
experience  co-operating  with  each  other.  Each  has  its  own  agenda,  and  some 
'%  - FAED  Asscssment  of  the  Dialogue  2000. 
257  At  a  global  level,  the  Global  Business  Dialogue  on  Electronic  Commerce  (GBDe)  was  launched  in 
1998  to  develop  a  global  consensus  on  the  industry  principles  for  the  policy  debates  on  electronic  I 
commerce. 
., 
overlapping  The  GBDe  share  interests  membership  and  secretariat  staff.  Interview,  TABD, 
April  2001  (53)  See  also  Cowles  forthcoming. 
'59  Interviekv,  TACD  official,  by  telephone,  ýune  2000  (24). 
165 recommendations  reflect  that.  '  259  It  was  also  argued  that  proposals-  such  as  the 
demand  to  the  end  multilateral  disputes  dealing  with  environmental  legislation-  wuld 
not  be  seriously  addressed  in  the  NTA.  Rather,  'to  bring  it  to  a  stage  where  these 
dialogues  can  be  used,  we  need  to  get  to  next  stage  to-have  more  concrete,  operational 
proposa  s.  '  260 
Officials  acknowledge.  that  the  quality  of  organisation  and  proposals  is 
hindered  by  the  funding  problem  encountered  by  the  civil  society  dialogues.  This 
obstacle  is  demonstrated  by  the  suspension  of  TAED  activities.  A  TACD  official 
explained  that  NGOs  cannot  afford  to  hire  researchers  and  lawyers  to  come  up  with 
policy  setting  details.  261  The  lack  of  resources  makes  it  harder  for  these  groups  to 
establish  their  own  networks  and  to  Penetrate  the  established  networks  of  'working 
lunches'  and  drinks  receptions  in  Brussels  and  Washington.  The  funding  problem  is 
also  most  acute  because  the  future  of  the  dialogues-particularly  the  TAED  and  the 
TALD-  depend  on  it.  Still,  funding  will  be  a  permanent  source  of  inequality.  One  MEP 
argued  that,  'They  will  never  have  the  same  influence  (as  TABD).  They  don't  have  the 
same  money  or  clout.  ' 
262 
Outsiders  and  Insiders  in  th  e  Policy  Process 
In  many  respects,  consumers,  environmentalists  and  industry  are  competi  ing  to 
influence  transatlantic  decision  making  because  they  hold  different-  sometimes 
directly  opposing-  stakes  in  the  process.  The  TACD  and  TAED  share  many  of  the 
same  goals,  which  is  reflected  in  a  number  of  joint  statements  they  have  issued  about 
the  TEP  and  participation  in  the  NTA  process  more  generally.  Furthermore,  all  of  the 
'ý')  Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (32). 
160  Interview,  Commission  Delegation,  Washington  DC,  October  200  (32). 
16'  Interview.  TACD  Secretariat,  London,  January  2000  (23-24). 
2 
62 
'  Interview.  European  Parliament,  Brussels.  September  1999  (17). 
166 groups  have  supported  the  implementation  of  the  transatlantic  regulatory  gpidelines, 
which  highlight  the  need  for  transparency-  and  thus  increased  access-  for  the 
dialogues.  However,  table  5.5  outlines  a  number  of  policy  areas  where  the  TABD 
holds  different  interests  to  the  TACD  and  TAED.  For  example  the  TABD  and  TAED 
disagree  over  the  implementation  of  the  Kyoto  Treaty,  because  the  TABD  argued  that 
emissions  standards  would  adversely  affect  the  competitiveness  of  industries.  The 
TABD  and  the  TACD  disagree  over  the  Safe  Harbour  Agreement  because  the  TACD 
believes  that  the  agreement  does  not  adequately  protect  privacy.  The  TABD  has 
identified  a  number  of  European  environment  directives-  including  the  WEEE  as 
possible  Early  Warning  System  candidates  (TABD  2000). 
Competition  between  the  groups  is  fuelled  by  different  policy  interests.  It  is 
demonstrated  by  the  aim  of  the  NGO  and  business  aims  to  counter  the  influence  one 
another.  Public  Citizen  helped  organise  protests  of  the  TABD  CEO  meeting  in 
Cincinnati  2000.  Lori  Wallach,  Director  of  Public  Citizens'  Global  Trade  Watch, 
argued  in  a  guest  article  in  the  Cincinnati  Observer  that,  'TABD  does  not  stand  for 
Truly  Appalling  Backroom  Deals,  but  it  should.  ,  263  Both  the  TACD  and  TAED  have 
emphasised  the  importance  of  monitoring  the  TABD.  The  sentiment  is  returned  by  the 
business  community.  Cowles  (2001:  263)  argues  that, 
Indeed,  the  US-EU  business  community  tends  to  view  the  creation  of  'other 
dialogues'  in  the  US-EU  relationship-  the  Transatlantic  Labor  Dialogue,  the 
Transatlantic  Consumers  Dialogue,  the  Transatlantic  Legislators  Dialogue-  not 
merely  as  an  attempt  to  introduce  civil  society  into  US-EU  relations,  but  also  to 
counteract  the  growing  influence  of  the  TABD. 
One  ofthe  biggest  obstacles  faced  by  consumers,  environmentalists  and  labour  is  not 
only  that  the  groups  are  competing  xvith  the  TABD.  but  that  many  of  the  their  interests 
Quoted  in  'Closed-Door  process  needs  chan,,  e  Guest  Column  in  Cincinnati  Enquirer  19  November 
2000. 
167 conflict  with  the  agenda  of  the  New  Transatlantic  Marketplace.  264  The  TAED  in 
particular  consists  of  many  groups  that  oppose  trade  liberalisation.  Although.  there  are 
many  pro-liberalisation  groups  within  the  consumer  dialogue,  it  has  been  noted  that 
breaking  down  regulatory  barriers-  a  goal  of  the  NTA  and  the  TABD-  has  the  potential 
to  undermine  health  and  safety  standards  (see  also  chapter  7).  One  of  the  first  actions 
of  the  TACD  and  TAED  was  to  oppose  implementation  of  the  TEP  Action  Plan 
because  of  its  inadequate  commitment  to  sustainable  development  and  transparency. 
As  one  official  pointed  out,  'the  TABD  says  things  the  governments  want  to  hear.  Its 
interests  are  seen  as  more  compatible  with  the  goals  of  the  TEP  and  the  NTA.  ' 
Adding,  on  the  other  hand  that,  'TAED  argues  against  the  WTO.  No  one  wants  to  hear 
this. 
265 
The  TACD  and  TAED  have  also  become  'outsiders'  in  the  policy  process 
partly  because  they  challenge  the  legitimacy  of  the  NTA.  While  all  of  the  dialogues 
have  argued  the  need  for  increased  transparency  in  the  transatlantic  decision  making, 
only  NGOs  have  spoke  out  against  the  de-politicisation  of  issues,  specifically  under 
the  TEP.  It  is  argued  that  decisions  related  to  TEP  should  be  taken  by  democratically 
elected  bodies  in  a  transparent,  participatory  and  accountable  way  in  order  to  protect 
social  standards.  Opposition  to  the  process  as  well  as  the  policies  means  that,  as  one 
TACD  official  argued.  'they  created  monsters  that  do  not  now  want  to  play  by  the 
rules.  ' 
266 
264  One  US  official  SLI-gested  for  example  that,  'the  governments  have  accepted  that  consumer  views 
are  valid,  but  NGOs  have  not  accepted  that  liberalisation  is  good.  'Interview,  USTR,  Washington  DC 
October  2000  (42).  See  also  Aaron  et  a]  (200  1  ). 
26ý  Interview,  F  uropean  Comm  ission,  Brussels,  September  1999  (6), 
168 Increasing  Transparency,  Finding  Consensus 
The  EU  and  the  US  have  attempted  to  make  the  NTA  process  legitimate  by  bringing  in 
different  groups,  laying  out  guidelines  for  equal  access  for  groups  and  encouraging 
public  participation  and  transparency  under  the  Joint  Regulatory  Guidelines.  In 
addition,  NTA  and  TEP  policies  must  follow  domestic  channels  of  decision  making.  In 
the  US,  public  notices  of  agreements  are  posted  in  the  Federal  Register.  The 
Commission  uses  formal  channels  of  communication  under  the  Commission's  Social 
Forum  to  gage  the  wider  public  views  on  policies. 
Competition  between  actors  has  complicated  transatlantic  decision  making. 
The  threshold  for  consensus  between  groups  is  high  because  so  many  interest  groups- 
with  very  different  interests  have  been  given  a  formal  role  in  transatlantic  decision 
making  process.  Some  officials  have  argued  that  inviting  participation  from  the  civil 
society  dialogues  has  weakened  the  process  because  it  undermines  ýefficient'  d  ecision 
taking.  267  In  response  to  this  problem,  transatlantic  actors  have  sought  ways  to 
encourage  the  dialogues  to  reach  consensus  amongst  themselves. 
First,  they  supported  the  idea  of  'multi  -dialogue'  meetings  between  business 
and  civil  society.  268  In  2000,  the  first  multi-dialogue  meeting  was  co-organised  by 
European  Partner  for  the  Environment  and  the  Luso  Foundation  with  funding  from  the 
266  Interview,  TACD  Secretariat,  London,  January  2000  (23-24). 
267  Interview,  Comm  ission  Secretariat,  September  1999  (16). 
168  The  principles  for  government  relations  with  the  Transatlantic  Dialogues  calls  for  dialogue  between 
the  dialogues.  Despite  the  goverriment's  encouragement,  there  was  very  little  outreach  between  the 
dialogues  bef-ore  2000.  The  Luso  American  Development  Foundation  (the  secretariat  of  the  Donors 
Dialogue)  tried  to  organise  a  meeting  in  1999  but  failed  to  gain  enough  support  from  the  dialogues  or 
frorn  the  governments.  The  TACD  argued  that  it  needed  to  first  get  itself  organised.  Commission 
officials  worried  that  the  dialogue  was  exclusive.  A  TABD  official  argued  that  it  clearly  had  different 
interests  than  the  other  dialogues.  One  participant  (20)  noted  that,  'this  would  mean  compromise-  that  is 
the  governments'  job  not  businesses.  '  TAED  and  TACD  members  reiterated  their  suspicion  of  the 
TABD  and  the  need  for  governments  to  strike  a  balance  between  interest  groups.  (Interviews  with  the 
Commission,  Brussels,  1999,  US  State  Department  and  US  Commerce  Department,  Washington,  2000 
(9,42,52). 
169 Commission.  269  The  multi-dialoguc  meeting  was  launched  to  increase  awareness  of 
each  other's  activities  and  to  explore  mechanisms  for  understanding.  All  of  the 
dialogues,  barring  the  TALD,  attended.  270  The  meeting's  concentration  on  one  policy 
sector-  Sustainable  Development-  helped  focus  the  dialogue.  Groups  were  also  pulled 
into  the  dialogue  by  assurances  that  the  meeting  would  not  be  used  to  negotiate  any 
common  positions  but  rather  to  allow  groups  to  exchange  views.  Participants  in  the 
meeting  were  cynical  about  gaining  any  concrete  results  from  the  first  meeting,  but  the 
second  meeting  held  in  January  2001  is  a  testament  to  the  multi  -dialogue's  continued 
support. 
Second,  EU  and  US  officials  worked  with  different  dialogues  to  establish  cross 
interest  policy  networks  or  'issue-orientated'  task  forces.  The  need  to  focus  on  cross 
cutting  interest  groups  and  specific  policy  problems  was  also  addressed  by  the 
governments  in  the  TEP.  To  date  the  most  successful  task  force  was  the  Biotechnology 
Consultative  Forum  which  managed  to  produce  agreed  results  from  the  science, 
business,  academic  and  NGO  communities.  TACD  members  originally  argued  the 
Forum  could  not  be  used  as  a  justification  of  consumer  support.  271  However,  the 
participation  of  an  EU  Steering  Member  helped  balance  the  representation. 
Finally,  officials  argue  that  the  Legislators  Dialogue  could  be  a  potential 
instrument  for  closer  dialogue  between  the  dialogues.  272  As  discussed  in  chapter  4, 
however,  the  TLD  contact  with  the  NTA  process  is  under-dev  eloped.  To  date,  the 
TLD  has  had  good  relations  only  with  the  TABD  and  little  to  no  contact  with  the 
2"'  The  European  Commission  (DG  External  Relations)  provided  support  for  the  project.  Additional 
contributions  to  help  cover  the  costs  of  the  two  LIS  resource  persons  were  provided  by  the  US  State 
Department  and  the  Heinrich  B611  Foundation.  In  addition,  each  of  the  dialogues  covered  the  travel 
costs  of  their  respective  representatives. 
The  role  of  Ron  Kingham-  the  former  co-ordinator  of  the  TAED-  was  influential  in  gaining  TACD  and 
TAED  support  for  the  meeting.  Telephone  correspondence,  March  2000  (23-24). 
271TI  1e  US  had  chosen  a  consumer  representative  who  was  opposed  by  US  consumer  groups  for  having 
n  Zý 
previously  been  employed  by  the  GMO  giant  Monsanto  Corporation.  Interview,  TACD  Secretqriat,  via 
telephone,  March  2000  (24). 
170 TACD  and  TAED.  Its  capacity  to  balance  the  dialogues  is  also  undermined  by  the  fact 
that  the  TABD  is  perceived  to  have  more  direct  access  to  the  bureaucratic  process  than 
it  actually  does. 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  sought  to  establish  if  and  how  the  private  NTA  dialogues  have  played  a 
role  in  shaping  transatlantic  decisions.  It  discussed  the  interaction  between  private 
actors  in  ýnew  transnational  networks  and  between  private  and  public  actors  at  a 
number  of  levels-  both  transgovernmental  and  intergovernmental.  Finally,  it 
questioned  the  impact  of  private  decision  shaping  forums  on  the  overall  process  of 
transatlantic  decision  making. 
A  number  of  themes  arose  in  this  examination  of  the  transatlantic  dialogues. 
The  motivations  for  inviting  participation  from  the  TABD  and  TACD,  TAED  and 
TALD  varied.  The  TABD  was  brought  into  the  process  to  help  the  EU  and  US 
facilitate  the  goals  of  trade  liberalisation  laid  out  in  the  New  Transatlantic 
Marketplace.  It  has  been  largely  encouraged  by  the  US  government  whose  officials 
believe  it  to  have  been  a  good  lobbying  partner.  The  TALD  dialogue  was  brought  in  to 
advise  the  EU  and  US  on  aspects  of  the  marketplace  relating  to  labour  issues.  The 
consumer  and  environmental  dialogues  were  pushed  by  the  Commission  to  balance  the 
interests  of  the  process.  The  Commission  found  an  ally  in  the  TACD  and  TAED  on 
policies  where  it  was  in  dispute,  or  about  to  enter  a  dispute  with  the  US,  for  example 
over  GMOs,  the  WEEEs.  and  data  protection.  Encouraging  civil  society  participation 
,,  vas  also  seen  as  a  wav  to  increase  transparency  in  the  Transatlantic  Economic 
'-2 
,  Interviex.  Luropean  Parliainent.  Septeinber  1999  (  10). 
171 Partnership  after  the  US  government  came  under  fire  from  domestic  NGO'groups 
worried  about  the  de-politicisation  of  social  and  envirom-nental  regulations. 
Increasing  the  participation  of  domestic  groups  at  the  transatlantic  level  has  not 
necessarily  made  the  process  more  balanced.  Above  all,  there  are  wide  ranges  of 
interests  covered  by  policy  network.  There  is  also  a  gross  imbalance  of  power  and 
resources  between  big  business  and  civil  society.  While  the  TABD  has  been  deemed 
largely  successful  in  shaping  policy  and  the  TACD  claims  to  have  had  some  impact  in 
shaping  decisions,  the  TAED  and  TALD  have  been  less  effective.  While  the  TABD 
has  very  much  found  itself  an  'insider'  in  the  process,  civil  society  has  remained 
somewhat  on  the  'outside'.  The  argument,  thus,  is  that  the  TABD  is  the  only  formal 
dialogue,  of  the  four,  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  there  has  been  a  clecentralisation  of 
decision  shaping  powers  to  private  actors. 
172 Chapter  6 
The  Transatlantic  Challenge  to  Transuational  Trafficking  in  Women 
Globalisation  and  political  instability  in  newly  democratised  states  have  given  rise  to 
global  challenges  that  cross  borders  and  elude  national  efforts  to  curb  trafficking  in 
drugs,  nuclear  material  and  migrants.  The  end  of  the  Cold  War  ushered  in  a  period  of 
economic  instability  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (CEE),  Russia  and  the  -Newly 
Independent  States  (NIS),  creating  social  circumstances  which  gave  rise  to  organised 
criminal  networks.  Weak  democracies  are  unable  to  contain  these  networks,  and 
Western  democracies  are  increasingly  unable  to  police  their  borders.  The  rise  of 
transnational  crime  is  problematic  not  only  because  it  crosses  borders,  but  because  it 
crosses  the  borders  of  developed  countries  (Ruggerio  1 2000:  189).  Trafficking  does  not 
stem  from  Eastern  Europe  alone,  but  the  rise  of  criminal  trade  from  Eastern  to  Western 
Europe  means  that  criminal  activity  originating  in  CEE  creates  new  challenges  for  the 
EU,  the  US,  who  as  developed  countries  are  the  main  recipients  of  trafficked  women 
(I  see  figure  6.1  ). 
The  increased  mobility  of  capital  and  people  means  that  individual  states,  both 
developed  and  developing,  are  unable  to  adequately  target  the  problems  of 
international  crime  and  international  terrorism  alone.  The  idea  that  cross  border  crime 
must  be  managed  through  national,  regional  and  international  co-operation  became 
accepted  wisdom  throughout  the  1990s.  The  US  government  set  up  FBI  training 
centres  in  Budapest  and  Bangkok  to  train  local  authorities  to  fight  transnational  crime 
and  terrorism.  The  FU  set  Lip  Council  working  groups  to  deal  with  terrorism.  police  C,  Zý 
co-operation  and  organised  crime  under  the  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Pillar.  At  the 
international  level  189  states  sioned  the  UN  Convention  on  Transnational  Organised  L- 
173 Crime  in  December  2000.  A  transatlantic  framework  for  increased  law  enforcement 
co-operation  was  created  under  the  global  challenges'  chapter  of  the  NTA. 
This  chapter  examines  EU-US  co-operation  in  combating  trafficking  in  women 
as  a  case  study  of  joint  co-operation  in  law  enforcement,  fighting  global  challenges 
and  transatlantic  policy-making.  In  1997,  and  again  in  1999,  the  EU  and  the  US  co- 
hosted  two  information  campaigns.  The  first  was  in  Ukraine  and  Poland  and  the 
second,  in  Bulgaria  and  Hungary.  A  third,  Russian  campaign  is  under  negotiation.  EU- 
US  co-operation  in  trafficking  in  women  is  discussed  in  the  context  of  this  thesis 
because  it  is  an  important  indicator  of  the  factors  that  instigate  and  impede  co- 
operation  in  the  area  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs.  Trafficking  in  women  is  not  only  an 
issue  of  transnational  crime,  but  also  of  human  rights,  migration,  and  labour. 
Transatlantic  co-operation  in  the  area  of  trafficking  in  women  is  distinct,  first 
because  it  is  rather  low  key  in  terms  of  visibility  when  compared  with  economic  co- 
operation  under  the  NTA.  EU-US  policy  on  trafficking  in  women  is  much  less 
integrated  than  it  is  for  example  in  the  case  of  the  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements. 
Second,  the  implementation  of  joint  projects  in  this  area  affects  the  EU  and  the  US 
only  indirectly,  because  the  transatlantic  anti  -trafficking  information  campaigns  are 
run  in  third  countries.  Thus,  in  contrast  to  the  MRA  case,  the  interest  of  outside  states 
that  are  affected  by  the  transatlantic  information  campaigns  directly  impacts  how  the 
EU  and  the  US  can  co-operate. 
This  chapter  seeks  to  explain  the  decision  making  process  that  led  the  EU  and 
the  US  to  I  , 
join  forces  in  fighting  trafficking  in  women.  First,  it  questions  why  the  EU 
and  the  US  chose  to  co-operatc  in  this  area:  What  informed  the  intergovernmental 
'political  decision'  to  co-operate  on  trafficking  in  women?  This  question  is  addressed 
in  section  1.  -, AIicrc  the  national  and  international  political  climate  on  trafficking  in 
174 women  is  discussed  in  relation  to  the  decision  to  establish  a  transatlantic  policy  on 
trafficking  in  women.  Here  it  is  argued  that  the  EU  and  the  US  were  able  to  co-operate 
on  trafficking  because  it  was  framed  as  a  human  rights  issue  as  well  as  a  law 
enforcement  policy. 
Once  it  is  established  why  a  joint  policy  on  trafficking  in  women  was  pursued, 
the  focus  of  the  chapter  turns  to  how  transatlantic  officials  chose  to  co-operate.  Here 
the  two  hypotheses  introduced  in  chapter  I  are  again  tested.  The  chapter  examines 
first,  whether  there  is  evidence  of  a  decentralisation  of  decision  making  to 
transgovernmental  actors.  In  other  words,  section  2  questions  how  prominent 
transgovernmental  actors  are  in  the  setting  and  shaping  the  policy  on  trafficking  in 
women.  Second,  this  chapter  asks  if  there  has  been  a  shift  of  decision  'shaping' 
powers  to  transnational  actors.  Section  3  examines  the  role  NGOs  played  in  shaping 
the  decision  making  process.  Section  4  questions  the  significance  of  transatlantic  co- 
operation  on  trafficking  in  women,  both  in  the  context  of  the  international  movement 
against  trafficking  and  the  global  challenges  pillar  of  the  NTA.  What  does  this  case 
study  tell  us  about  the  larger  NTA  political  agenda and  the  scope  for  co-operation  in 
the  field  of  Justice  and  Home  Affairs? 
1)  The  Political  Decision  to  Target  Trafficking  in  Women 
At  the  May  1997  EU-US  Summit  in  the  Hague,  US  President  Clinton,  Commission 
President  Santer  and  the  Dutch  Council  Presidency  agreed  to  co-operate  on  trafficking 
in  NAomen  and  issued  a  statement  committing  both  sides  to  work  together  to  combat 
the  problem.  The  details  of  the  project  were  finalised  six  months  later  and  announced 
at  the  following  summit.  Two  years  later  the  EU  and  the  US  endorsed  a  second 
prQlect.  and  in  2001  negotiations  for  a  trafficking  information  campaign  in  Russia 
175 were  underway.  This  section  seeks  to  explain  the  political  or  'intergovernmental' 
decision  to  pursue  co-operation  in  this  area.  The  concern  is  not  with  the  details  of  the 
transatlantic  projects  that  were  decided  in  between  the  May  and  December  1997  EU- 
US  Summits,  but  rather  with  why  transatlantic  leaders  chose  to  co-operate  in  the  first 
place. 
Nor  does  the  chapter  give  an  in  depth  analysis  of  the  nature  of  the  problem  of 
trafficking  in  women.  Rather,  it  concentrates  on  the  intergovernmental  response  to  the 
problem.  More  extensive  coverage  of  illegal  trafficking  in  migrants  and  women  is 
found  mostly  in  the  sociological  literature.  273  For  our  purposes  it  should  be  noted  that 
trafficking  in  women  is  a  problem,  which  is  both  global  and  extensive.  It  is  a 
governance  problem  that  has  been  tackled  at  the  national,  EU,  transatlantic  and 
international  level.  The  International  Organisation  of  Migration  (IOM)(1998a) 
believes  that  millions  of  women  are  trafficked  each  year,  and  it  is  estimated  that 
trafficking  in  women  and  children  is  a  business  that  generates  $7-12  billion  dollars 
annually  (OSCE  1999).  274  The  Congressional  Research  Service  notes  that  trafficking 
in  women  and  children  is  considered  the  largest  source  of  profits  for  organised  crime 
after  drugs  and  guns  (Miko  2000). 
In  order  to  determine  why  the  EU  and  the  US  have  effectively  addressed  the 
problem  of  trafficking  in  women,  we  must  first  identify  the  problem.  Defining 
trafficking  in  women  is  difficult,  as  many  different  interpretations  exist.  For  some  it  is 
important  to  make  a  distinction  between  trafficking  and  smuggling,  because 
trafficking  involves  a  lack  of  consent.  Martin  and  Miller  (2000:  969-970)  argue. 
Trafficking  in  persons  means  the  recruitment,  transportation,  transfer  harboring 
or  receipt  of  persons,  either  by  the  threat  or  use  of  abduction,  force,  fraud, 
27"  See  rather  Hu-hes  2000:  Ruggerio  1997:  Taylor  and  Jamieson  1999. 
274  1  luplies  (2000:  627)  ar-ues  that  it  is  diff-icult'to  know  exactly  how  many  women  have  been  trafficked 
because  the  trade  is  secretive,  women  are  silenced,  the  traffickers  are  dangerous  and  not  many  a(lencies 
are  COLintinu 
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deception  or  coercion  or  by  the  giving  or  receiving  of  unlawful  payments  or  benefits  to  achieve  the  consent  of  a  person  having  control  over  another  person. 
Figure  6.1 
Global  1  da  womm  am  cküä-m« 
, Niaickr  Souv-ce  Regl,  »m  alid  (t) 
Source:  US  State  Department,  Bureau  on  Population,  Migration  and  Refugees. 
177 A  broader  definition  is  given  by  Hughes  (2000:  627-628)  who  acknowledges  that 
many  women  initially  consent  voluntarily  to  work  abroad  in  the  sex  industry,  but 
without  the  knowledge  that  they  face  physical  abuse,  exploitation  and  enslavement. 
Her  definition  includes  trafficking,  which  'may  be  the  result  of  force,  coercion, 
manipulation,  deception,  abuse  of  authority,  initial  consent,  family  pressure,  past  and 
present  community  violence,  economic  deprivation  or  other  condition  of  inequality  for 
women. 
Varying  definitions  of  trafficking  highlight  different  aspects  of  the  problem. 
The  rise  of  voluntary  illegal  migration  to  the  EU  and  the  US  creates  problems  of 
border  control  more  generally.  The  desire  of  persons  to  migrate  illegally  due  to 
economic  conditions  means  a  criminal  market  has  emerged  for  smuggling  migrants. 
The  line  between  smuggling  and  trafficking  is  blurred  in  the  trade  in.  women. 
Trafficking  is  an  immigration  problem  because  many  women  seeking  work  (both  legal 
and  illegal)  in  the  West  agree  to  be  voluntarily  smuggled  across  borders,  only  to  find 
themselves  trapped  into  trafficking  schemes.  NGOs,  the  IOM  and  academics  question 
the  voluntary  nature  of  involvement  in  trafficking  networks,  because  as  Hughes 
(2000:  636)  argues  'Even  women  who  voluntarily  travel  to  engage  in  prostitution  do 
not  anticipate  the  level  of  manipulation,  deception,  and  coercion  to  which  they  will  be 
subjected.  '  The  international  definition  of  trafficking  put  forward  by  the  UN  Protocol 
on  Trafficking  acknowledges  that  trafficking  in  persons  occurs  even  when  payments 
are  given  or  received  to  achieve  the  consent  of  a  person  having  control  over  another 
person.  27ý  -  I-Jius.  fraud  and  deception  as  well  as  coercion  and  abduction  constitute 
trafficking, 
The  full  definition  of-trafficking  used  by  the  UN  Protocol  on  Trafficking  (2000)  includes,  'the 
recruitment,  transportation,  transfer,  harbOUring-  or  receipt  of  persons,  by  means  of  the  threat  or  use  of 
178 The  point  is  that  trafficking  is  a  multifaceted  problem  for  states.  First,  it  is 
linked  to  smuggling  which  means  that  it  is  a  border  control  problem,  particularly  for 
the  EU  where  the  numbers  of  women  trafficked  from  Eastern  Europe  to  Western 
Europe  are  estimated  to  be  around  500,000.276  The  involuntary  movement  of  persons 
aggregates  the  problem  for  states  because  trafficking  is  a  violation  of  international  law 
and  international  norms  banning  slavery.  Trafficking  in  women  is  both  a  transnational 
crime  and  a  human  rights  violation.  In  short,  EU  and  US  interest  in  combating 
trafficking  in  women  is  linked  to  all  three  dimensions  of  the  problem:  It  is  an 
immigration/migration  issue,  a  law  enforcement  violation  and  an  infringement  of 
human  rights.  Still,  to  understand  what  drove  the  EU  and  the  US  to  co-operate  in 
combating  trafficking  in  women,  we  have  to  first  get  to  the  root  of  the  problem  and 
examine  the  factors  that  drive  the  trade  in  women. 
A  Criminal  Market  Built  on  Human  Rights  Violations 
One  way  to  approach  the  problem  of  trafficking  in  women  is  to  analyse  it  as  a 
transnational  crime,  which  is  driven  by  the  demand  for  an  illegal  market  in  women 
(Talyor  and  Jamieson  1999,  Hughes  2000,  Schoelenhardt  1999).  In  market  terms,  the 
trade  is  driven  by  a  demand  for  women  sex  workers  in  the  West  and  a  supply  of 
impoverished  women  and  criminal  networks  in  the  East.  The  direct  impact  of  the 
crime  is  not  just  that  it  crosses  borders  but  that  it  crosses  EU  and  US  borders.  The 
demand  for  trafficked  women  exists  mainly  in  countries  with  thriving  sex  industries, 
force  or  other  forms  of  coercion.  of  abduction.  of  fraud,  of  deception,  of  the  abuse  of  power  or  of  a 
POSitiOn  Of  VUlnerabilit)  or  the  giving  or  receiving  of  payments  or  benefits  to  achieve  the  consent  of  a 
person  ha,,  ing  control  over  another  person,  for  the  purpose  of  exploitation.  ' 
Yhe  number  of  women  trafficked  to  the  US  from  CEE  countries  is  significantly  lower.  A  CIA  (see 
O*Neill  1999:  13)  report  estimates  that  4,000  women  are  trafficked  from  Europe  to  the  US  each  year. 
HokNeNer.  the  report  notes  that  trafficking  is  a  bigger  problem  froin  certain  states,  claiming,  -Sorne 
Florida  law  enforcement  officials,  for  example,  claim  that  the  state  is  being  inundated  with  trafficked 
\\;  omen  fi-orn  Russia,  Ukraine  and  Central  Europe.  ' 
179 including  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  US.  277  A  criminal  market  exists  for  the 
involuntary  trade  in  women  because  sociologists  note  that  there  is  a  demand  for 
prostitutes  that  could  never  be  supplied  voluntarily  (Hughes  2000). 
Three  factors  facilitate  the  criminal  market  for  the  trafficking  trade.  First, 
globalisation  and  political  instability  drive  the  supply  side  of  the  market.  Globalisation 
increases  the  mobility  of  persons,  which  facilitates  trade,  and  free  capital  allows 
criminal  money  to  be  moved  easily  throughout  the  world.  In  short,  'Privatisation  and 
liberalisation  of  markets  have  created  wider  and  more  open  marketplaces  throughout 
the  world'  (Hughes  2000  630-631).  New  technology,  specifically  the  internet,  has 
increased  communication  and  resulted  in  rapid  and  unregulated  movement  of  human 
capital  (Stoecker  1998,1999). 
The  globalisation  of  capital  has  made  it  difficult  for  individual  states  to  combat 
the  problem  of  trafficking,  but  illegal  markets  have  emerged  within  countries  in  part 
because  there  are  not  appropriate  laws  in  place  to  prevent  it  (Schloehardt  1999). 
Newly  developing  democracies  lack  appropriate  laws  to  protect  trafficking  victims  and 
prosecute  traffickers  and  demand  countries  have  only  a  recent  history  of  criminalising 
278 
the  traffickers  rather  than  the  trafficked  . 
The  free  movement  of  capital  and  people  and  increased  communication 
through  advanced  technology  facilitates  the  movement  of  people  and  funds,  which  in 
turn  propels  the  trade  in  trafficking  in  women.  Trafficking  is  an  attractive  business 
because  the  profits  from  trafficking  in  human  beings  rivals  that  of  drug  trafficking  but 
177  Hughes  (2000:  646)  notes  that  Germany  and  the  Netherlands  are  the  most  popular  destinations  for 
trafficked  women  in  Europe  because  prostitution  is  le-al.  O'Neill  (  1999:  13)  reports  that  the  sex  industry  I 
is  among  the  primary  sources  of  trafficked  women  in  the  US. 
'78  An  OSC  E(  1999)  report  states,  'In  the  vast  ina 
, 
jority  of  destination  countries,  trafficking  is 
approached  primarily  as  an  illegal  migration  or  prostitution  problem.  Consequently,  most  law 
enforcement  strategies  target  the  people  who  are  trafficked,  not  the  criminal  networks  that  traffic  them. 
Assuming  the  State  intervenes  at  all,  it  is  the  victims  who  are  arrested  and  deported  while  the  traffickers 
continue  to  operate  with  near-impuniq.  Few  victims  -  in  the  destination  country  or  upon  return  to  their 
country  of  origin  -  receive  an\  assistance.  protection,  or  le-al  remedy  against  their  traffickers.  ' 
180 the  penalties  are  minimal.  For  example  while  the  sentence  for  drug  trafficking  in  the 
UK  is  up  to  20  years  imprisonment,  the  sentence  for  trafficking  in  humans  usually 
carries  a  two  to  three  year  sentence.  279  In  the  US  the  statutory  maximum  for 
involuntary  servitude  is  10  years,  as  opposed  to  a  life  sentence  for  trafficking  10  grams 
of  LSD  (O'Neill  1999:  43).  The  traders  in  this  illegal  market  consist  of  amateur 
traffickers,  small  groups  of  criminals  as  well  as  international  trafficking  networks  (see 
Scholenhardt  1999).  However,  it  is  widely  acknowledged  that  organised  crime  largely 
fulfils  the  role  of  supplier  (Taylor  and  Jamieson  1999). 
Organised  criminal  networks  are  able  to  exploit  the  trade  in  trafficked  women 
because  countries  with  developing  economies  and  emerging  democracies  fill  the 
supply  side  of  the  market.  Traditionally  Asian  countries  were  the  lead  suppliers  in  the 
trafficking  trade,  but  the  post  Cold  War  transitions  to  democracy  and  private  market 
economies  in  CEE,  the  NIS  and  Russia  created  new  markets  for  transnational  crime  in 
general  and  illegal  trafficking  in  women  specifically.  Difficult  economic 
circumstances  fuelled  illegal  activity  and  forced  people  to  seek  work  abroad.  The 
illegal  trade  in  women  increased  note  Martin  and  Miller  (2000),  because  women  bore 
the  brunt  of  economic  restructuring.  In  Ukraine,  for  example,  IOM  notes  that  women 
280  represent  up  to  90%  of  the  newly  unemployed  . 
Trafficking  in  women  is  a  law  enforcement  problem,  because  it  involves  the 
illegal  transport  of  people  across  borders  as  well  as  kidnapping,  forced  labour  and 
281  slavery  like  practices  . 
However,  it  is  a  difficult  problem  to  confront  on  a  criminal 
level,  because  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  is  superficial  and 
-')  It  Should  be  noted  that  there  is  no  offence  of  traffickin-g  under  UK  law.  Rather,  most 
traffickers  get  prosecuted  under  prostitution  laws  (livin,  '  off  the  earnin-s 
of  a  prostitute)  and  the  average  sentence  in  3ý  ears  (max.  possible  is  7)  (Email  Interview  with  UK  NGO 
61).  See  also  'C  apt  ive  Market'  Kate  fIo  It,  The  Sunda%  Times  11aga--ine  18  February  2001. 
180  IOM  (2000)  Ukraine  Project  Report. 
IS1  See  Miko  (2000) 
181 international  human  rights  laws  are  rarely  enforceable  (see  below).  Little  to  no  action 
was  taken  against  traffickers  prior  to  the  1990s  despite  the  United  Nations'  (UN)  1948 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  which  claims  'No  one  shall  be  held  in  slavery 
or  servitude.  It  is  the  classification  of  trafficking  in  women  as  a  human  rights 
violation,  however,  which  helped  gain  momentum  for  international  anti-trafficking 
movements.  The  international,  national  and  indeed  transatlantic  responses  to 
trafficking  prior  to  2000  addressed  the  problem  through  education  and  aid  rather  than 
criminal  prosecution.  It  was  the  combined  interest  in  trafficking  in  women  on  a 
migration,  human  rights  and  law  enforcement  platform  that  made  bilateral,  plurilateral 
and  multilateral  action  possible. 
National  and  International  Responses  to  the  Problem  of  Trafficking 
International  interest  in  targeting  trafficking  in  women  is  demonstrated  by  its 
prominence  on  the  agenda  of  the  (UN)  and  the  Organisation  for  Security  and  Co- 
operation  in  Europe  (OSCE).  282  Trafficking  is  addressed  in  the  Stability  Pact  for  South 
Eastern  Europe  (1999).  The  2000  UN  Convention  Against  Organised  Transnational 
Crime  includes  a  Protocol  on  Trafficking  in  Women,  which  is  designed  to  help 
governments  share  information  about  organised  crime  and  increase  their  ability  to 
prosecute  traffickers.  283  International  organisations  have  encouraged  national 
governments  actively  to  target  trafficking  in  women  through  human  rights  legislation, 
but  the  LTN  Protocol  represents  the  first  international  step  towards  criminalising 
trafficking  in  women. 
2'2  The  OSCE's  commitment  to  cornbat  traffickino  is  seen  in  the  Moscow  Declaration  (1991  ),  the 
Stockholm  Declaration  (  1997),  the  Human  Dimensions  Serninars  (  1997-1999),  the  2000  Action  Plan 
and  the  creation  of  an  Advisor  on  Trafficking  in  the  Office  ot'Democratic  Institutions  and  Human 
Rights  (ODIHR). 
191,  The  stated  purpose  ofthe  UN  Protocol  on  -1  rafficking  in  Women  is  to  i)  prevent  and  combat 
trafficking  in  persons,  paying  particular  attention  to  women  and  children  ii  to  protect  and  assist  victims 
182 A  number  of  factors  prompted  US  domestic  action  on  trafficking  in  women. 
McBride  Stetson  (2000)  believes  that  trafficking  in  women  came  onto  the  US  public 
agenda  from  the  top  down.  She  argues  that  the  international  human  rights,  angle  on 
trafficking  in  women  prompted  the  Executive  Branch's  involvement,  which  eventually 
lead  to  Congressional  action.  Specifically,  the  characterisation  of  trafficking  as  a 
women's  rights  issue  as  well  as  a  human  rights  issue  helped  push  it  onto  the  US  policy 
agenda.  Both  Secretary  of  State  Madeline  Albright  and  First  Lady  Hilary  Clinton 
repeatedly  stressed  their  commitments  to  women's  issues.  The  precedence  for  US 
involvement  on  trafficking  in  women  was  the  creation,  of  an  Interagency  Council  on 
Women  in  1995  by  President  Clinton.  The  Interagency  Council  worked  with  the  State 
284  Department  in  creating  an  anti-trafficking  'czarina' 
,  and  in  establishing  trafficking 
in  women  representatives  in  the  Justice  Department,  Health  and  Human  Services  and 
the  US  Agency  for  International  Development.  McBride  Stetson  (2000:  18)  argues  that 
285  the  Interagency  Council,  'which  is  staffed  primarily  with  femmocrats 
, 
is  the  linkage 
between  the  UN's  Commission  on  the  Status  of  Women 
...  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
federal  policy  makers  in  Congress  on  the  other.  ' 
Interest  in  targeting  trafficking  in  women  also  came  from  the  bottom  up 
through  US  NGOs.  Women's  groups  and  human  rights'  groups  actively  encouraged 
the  US  Administration  and  the  US  Congress  to  act  on  trafficking.  The  US 
Administration  held  briefings  with  members  of  the  NGO  community  to  discuss 
trafficking  and  many  NGOs  worked  with  Republican  Representative  Chris  Smith,  who 
sponsored  the  US  Trafficking  Victims  Protection  Act  2000,  which  passed  the  Senate 
ni  November  2000.  Finally.  NGOs  leaked  information  to  the  media  in  order  to  draw 
of  such  trafficking,  with  full  respect  for  their  human  rights  iii)  to  promote  co-operation  among  State 
Parties  in  order  to  meet  these  objectives. 
184  1  Me  formal  title  for  the  position  is  the  Deputy  Director  and  Senior  Advisor  on  Trafficking  in  the  US 
State  Department. 
183 public  attention  to  the  problem.  The  New  York  Times  ran  an  article  in  January  1998 
based  on  a  report  by  the  Israeli  Women's  Network  and  a  video  documentation  of 
trafficking  complied  by  the  Global  Survival  NetWork.  286 
The  Clinton  Administration's  commitment  to  trafficking  in  women  was 
secured  in  March  1998  when  the  President  issued  the  policy  document  'Steps  to 
Combat  Violence  Against  Women  and  Trafficking  in  Women  and  Girls'..  The 
document  identified  trafficking  as  a  'fundamental  human  rights  violation'  and  outlined 
a  three-tiered  approach  to  combat  trafficking  in  women  and  children.  The  Clinton 
Administration  pledged  to  work  towards  preventing  trafficking  through  the  education 
of  women  and  local  authorities  and  job  skills  training,  protecting  victims  through 
funding  regional  assistance  of  victims  and  finally  prosecuting  the  traffickers.  The  US 
Administration  worked  abroad  with  source,  transit  and  destination  countries  to.  prevent 
trafficking  and  protect  victims.  At  home  Congress's  Trafficking  Against  Women  Act 
of  2000  incorporated  the  three  p's  into  domestic  legislation,  with  additional  provisions 
for  strengthening  the  punishment  for  traffickers  and  sanctions  against  foreign 
governments  failing  to  meeting  minimum  standards  in  combating  trafficking. 
Two  less  normative  factors  dictated  an  EU  level  response  to  the  problem  of 
trafficking  in  women.  First,  the  new  supply  source  of  trafficked  women  affected  the 
EU  much  more  directly  than  the  US.  While  the  US  was  dealing  with  roughly  45,000- 
50,000  trafficked  women  a  year,  the  EU  had  to  contend  with  an  estimated  500,000. 
The  geographical  location  of  this  new  supply  meant  the  problem  was  right  at  the 
doorstep  of  the  EU  and  compounded  the  challenge  of  maintaining  external  borders. 
One  US  oft-icial  argues,  'For  the  EU  trafficking  is  definitely  an  immigration  issue 
McBride  uses  the  ý,  Nord  -fernmocrats'  to  highlight  the  strong  presence  of  women's  rights  supporters. 
Telephone  Interview,  US  NGO.  March  2001(56). 
184 you  cannot  separate  it  from  the  political  debate  on  asylum  and  harmonisation.  '  287  The 
influx  of  trafficked  women  added  to  the  increased  supply  of  illegal  immigrants  which 
were  being  smuggled  into  the  EU.  288 
Table  6.1  A  Chronology  of  the  Trafficking  in  Women  Policy 
Joint  Action  Plan  1995  committed  the  EU  and  the  US  to  co-operate  in  the 
fight  against  trafficking  in  women  and  illegal  immigrants. 
Ministerial  Meeting  April  1997  in  the  Hague  Ministers  agreed  to  begin  work 
on  trafficking  in  women  information  campaigns  and  put  trafficking  on  the  EU- 
US  Summit  agenda. 
EU-US  Summit  May  1997  EU  and  US  Summit  leaders  agreed  to  pursue  joint 
co-operation  on  traffICking  in  women. 
November  1997  The  transatlantic  information  campaigns  are  launched  in 
Poland  and  the  Ukraine. 
EU-US  Summit  December  1997  The  SLG  report  announced  that  the 
information  campaigns  had  been  launched  in  Poland  and  the  Ukraine,  and  a 
trafficking  in  women  statement  is  released  as  a  summit  deliverable. 
.  April-  June  1998  The  first  information  campaigns  were  implemented. 
The  SLG  Report  May  1998  stated  that  US  law  enforcement  officials  and  the 
EU  Multidisciplinary  Group  on  Organised  Crime  should  evaluate  whether  to 
expand  the  initiative  to  discourage  trafficking. 
EU-US  Summit  December  1998  EU  and  US  leaders  formally  agreed  to  extend 
information  campaigns  to  Bulgaria  and  Hungary. 
Transatlantic  Conference  on  Trafficking  in  Women  July  1998  A 
transatlantic  conference  is  held  in  Lviv,  Ukraine  was  held  to  evaluate  the 
success  of  the  Polish  and  Hungarian  information  campaigns. 
SLG  June  1999  reported  that  law  enforcement  co-operation  continued  to 
combat  trafficking  in  women  and  children  despite  delays  in  planning  the 
Bulgarian  and  Hungarian  campaigns. 
October  1999  planning  stage  of  Bulgarian  and  Hungarian  campaigns  began. 
January-June  2000  implementation  of  Bulgarian  and  Hungarian  campaigns 
began. 
November  2000  US  Trafficking  in  Women  Act  was  passed. 
December  2000  The  UN  Protocol  on  Trafficking  in  Women  was  signed  in 
Palmero. 
Felephone  lritcrvicýN.  US  State  Department  Official.  February  200  1  (54). 
Den  Boer  and  Wallace  (2000:  5  17)  note  that  'people  si-nugpling'  became  a  major  preoccupation  of 
EU  law  enforcement  agencies  in  the  late  I  990s.  They  argue,  'Deepening  resistance  to  further 
innni-ration  from  within  the  EU,  and  the  consequence  tightening  of  border  controls  and  of  conditions 
for  entry,  created  an  illegal  market  to  supply  this  pent-up  demand,  smug-ling  desperate  people  across 
the  FU's  eastern  borders.  ' 
185 The  precedence  for  EU  immigration  policy  in  general  and  trafficking  in 
women  policy  specifically  was  set  by  the  creation  of  the  Justice  and  Home  Affairs 
(JHA)  pillar  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty.  The  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  introduced  a  new 
institutional  framework  for  dealing  with  organised  crime  at  the  EU  level  and  moved 
migration  policy  for  the  first  time  into  the  Commission's  competency.  Although  the 
Commission  had  issued  communications  on  trafficking  to  the  Council  and  hosted  a 
conference  on  trafficking  in  Vienna  in  1996,  increased  competence  on  JHA  allowed 
the  Commission  to  take  more  direct  action.  Two  vehicles  were  used.  The  DAPHNE 
project  supports  non-  governmental  and  voluntary  organisations  active  in  the  fight 
289 
against  violence  towards  women  and  children  The  STOP  program  (1996-2000)  co- 
ordinates  initiatives  to  fight  against  trafficking  in  human  beings 
. 
290  European  level 
policy  in  this  area  has  been  directly  targeted  at  the  applicant  states,  which  are  the 
source  of  trafficked  women.  291  Finally,  the  Council  was  due  to  sign  a  Directive  on 
Trafficking  in  2001,  which  would  harmonise  Member  States  laws  on  trafficking. 
The  Intergovernmental  Decision  to  Target  Trafficking 
We  have  established  that  trafficking  is  of  interest  to  states  because  it  is  linked  to 
migration,  human  rights  and  law  enforcement  policies  and  that  the  EU  and  the  US 
289  The  programme  sets  up  and  reinforces  European  networks  and  the  implementation  of  pilot  projects, 
the  results  of  which  can  be  disseminated  and  shared  throughout  the  EU.  Activities  focus  on  two 
principal  areas:  exchange  of  information  and  co-operation  networks  on  an  EU  level  and  the  raising  of 
public  awareness  and  exchange  for  best  practices  (DG  JHA,  Fight  Against  Organised  Crime,  available 
at  http:  //www.  europa). 
190  1  I"he  STOP  programme  supports  training  and  information  measures,  studies  and  exchanges  for  those  tý  -1 
responsible  for  the  fight  against  Such  fornis  ofexploitation,  including  judges,  public  prosecutors,  police, 
civil  servants  or  the  public  services  responsible  for  prevention.  victim  support  or  fighting  these 
phenomena. 
291  DG  Justice  and  lJorne  Affairs  web  page  states,  'in  the  future,  the  Commission  would  like  to  see 
candidate  Countries  take  a  more  pro-active  attitude  towards  prostitution.  givin  worrien  victims  sonle 
support  and  helping  to  establish  non-governmental  or-anisations  which  can  help  these  women' 
T 
,,  ýIatemenl  on  organiscd  crinic  (Indprostiffition. 
186 have  demonstrated  their  interest  in  fighting  trafficking  at  a  regional,  national  and 
international  level.  The  US  has  also  pursued  bilateral  co-operation  on  trafficking  in 
women  with  individual  Member  States  including  Italy  and  Finland.  EU-US  co- 
operation  was  secured  at  the  transatlantic  level  through  the  NTA  framework.  The  NTA 
Joint  Action  Plan  identifies  trafficking  in  women  as  a  specific  global  challenge  in  the 
context  of  immigration  and  asylum  in  1995.  In  1997,  post  Amsterdam,  EU  and  US 
ministers  met  in  April  and  decided  that  trafficking  in  women  was  an  area  where  the 
EU  and  the  US  could  co-ordinate  efforts.  Both  partners  were  already  pursuing 
individual  anti  -traffi  eking  programmes  and  did  not  differ  ideologically  on  the  issue  of 
trafficking.  Thus,  it  was  identified  as  an  area  where  resources  could  be  pooled  and 
efforts  organised  to  combat  the  problem.  The  political  decision  to  go  ahead  with  a 
joint  trafficking  project  came  from  the  intergovernmental  level,  as  was  evidenced  by 
its  prominence  on  the  agenda  of  the  EU-US  Summit  in  May  1997  in  the  Hague.  It  was 
there  that  transatlantic  leaders  'made'  the  decision  to  establish  a  transatlantic  policy  on 
trafficking  in  women. 
2)  Setting  and  Shaping  Transatlantic  Policy  on  Trafficking  in  Women 
The  intergovernmental  decision  to  establish  a  transatlantic  policy  response  to 
trafficking  in  women  was  addressed  in  the  previous  section  in  order  to  determine  why 
the  EU  and  the  US  decided  to  co-operate  in  this  case.  Transgovernmental  level 
decisions  are  examined  here  in  order  to  determine  how  the  EU  and  the  US  decided  to 
co-operate.  The  focus  is  on  the  administrative  decisions  that  'set'  the  transatlantic  anti- 
trafficking  policy.  Although  the  political  decision  to  co-operate  on  trafficking  in 
women  was  taken  at  the  interoovernmental  level.  transo  ox-ernmental  actors  establ  s  hed 
187 the  details  of  the  transatlantic  projects.  Thus,  it  is  argued  here  that  the  EU-US  policy 
resPonse  to  trafficking  in  women  demonstrates  the  larger  decentralisation  of  decision 
making  at  the  transatlantic  level. 
While  the  political  decision  to  co-operate  on  trafficking  came  from  the  top,  the 
details  that  established  the  infon-nation  campaigns  were  derived  from  the  bottom.  The 
issue  of  trafficking  in  women  rose  the  ranks  of  the  dialogue  structure,  from  the  NTA 
institutions,  to  the  ministerial  meetings  and  finally  the  EU-US  Summit.  Co-ordination 
of  EU  and  US  efforts  to  co-operate  were  handled  through  NTA  institutions  such  as  the 
NTA  Task  Force  and  the  Senior  Level  Group.  The  majority  of  contact,  however,  was 
made  on  an  ad  hoe  and  infon-nal  basis.  In  reality,  it  was  a  small  group  of  people*  who 
co-facilitated  EU-US  co-operation  in  this  area.  292  Key  contact  persons  in  the  US 
Mission,  DG  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  and  DG  External  Relations  established  and 
maintained  the  dialogue  on  trafficking.  The  concept  of  an  information  campaign  and 
the  details  of  the  transatlantic  project  were  derived  at  the  working  group  level. 
Subsequent  decisions  to  pursue  trafficking  in  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Russia  were 
taken  at  sub-summit  level  and  were  the  result  of  the  transgoverrimental  dialogue.  For 
example,  the  SLG  report  states  that  close  co-operation  between  US  law  enforcement 
and  the  EU  Multidisciplinary  Group  on  Organised  Crime  preceded  the  decision  to 
expand  the  transatlantic  anti-trafficking  initiative  (SLG  1998a). 
EU  and  US  foreign  ministers  effectively  'set'  the  policy  on  trafficking  in 
women,  but  their  decisions  was  directly  based  on  the  input  of  lower  level 
transgovernmental  actors  who  were  charged  with  finding  a  way  that  the  EU  and  the 
US  could  work  together.  NTA  institutions  were  key  in  providing  a  focus  for 
transatlantic  etTorts  to  combat  trafficking  in  NN-omcn.  The  SLG  tracked  the  progress  of 
192 
1  Interview  with  US  State  Department  officials  (54,33)  and  EU  Comillission  officials  (3  1,26j. 
188 the  information  campaigns  and  was  thus  able  first,  to  keep  momentum  going  for  the 
process  by  highlighting  ongoing  work  in  Task  Force  and  SLG  meetings  and  second,  to 
serve  as  a  problem  solving  forum.  One  US  official  notes  that  when  obstacles  arose,  the 
NTA  Task  Force  and  the  SLG  'kicked  in',  and  that  the  NTA  process  helped  accelerate 
decisions  on  for  example  funding  problems  293 
. 
One  EU  official  notes  that  it  was  the 
NTA  Task  Force  that  provided  political  guidance  to  the  co-ordinators  of  the 
process  . 
294  Policy  'shaping'  decisions  were  affected  by  domestic  structures, 
bureaucratic  processes  and  the  political  will  of  both  the  EU  and  the  US  as  major 
'demand'  states  along  with  the  co-operation  of  the  supply  states  where  the  information 
campaigns  were  run.  The  project  thus  required  that  officials  accurately  gauge  the 
capacity  for  co-operation  between  the  EU  and  the  US  on  trafficking  in  women. 
Three  key  trans  governmental  decisions  are  addressed  here;  first  the  decision  on 
where  to  target  transatlantic  efforts,  second,  the  details  of  the  transatlantic  policies  and 
third,  who  would  implement  the  transatlantic  campaign. 
Where  to  co-operate? 
The  first  trans  governmental  policy  decision  was  the  choice  concerning  where  to  co- 
operate.  Why  were  Ukraine,  Poland,  Hungary,  Bulgaria  and  Russia  chosen  as 
candidates  for  transatlantic  information  campaigns?  The  transatlantic  information 
campaigns  were  run  not  only  where  they  were  needed  but  also  where  they  were  most 
likely  to  work.  The  criteria  for  the  transatlantic  campaigns  included  countries  where  an 
organisation  was  established  to  implement  the  campaigns  and  where  local  government 
officials  were  willing  to  co-operate  with  the  project.  29  -5  First,  the  co-operation  of  local 
Telephone  with  US  Mission  official  Brussels,  February  2001  (54). 
'94  Interview  \N  ith  EU  Commission  Official,  DG  External  Relations,  May  2000  (26). 
2ý)ý  Interview,  IOM  official  Budapest,  April  2000  (25). 
Telephone  interview  with  US  Mission  Official  Brussels.  February  200  1  (54). 
189 government  is  needed  because  in  addition  to  educating  women  on  the  risks  of 
trafficking  networks,  the  EU-US  project  is  designed  to  train  local  authorities  to  spot 
the  dangers  of  trafficking.  Second,  a  non-govemmental  body  is  required  to  run  the 
projects,  because  it  is  not  feasible  to  have  EU  or  US  authorities  implement  the 
campaigns  within  the  supply  states.  Each  country  chosen  for  the  transatlantic 
campaigns  was  either  a  source  or  transit  country  for  trafficking  networks,  a  country 
where  local  government  authorities  showed  commitment  to  address  the  problem  and 
where  non-govern  mental  infrastructure  existed  to  implement  the  campaigns. 
The  campaigns  target  major  supply  or  transit  states  responsible  for  the 
movement  of  women  from  Eastern  to  Western  Europe.  Ukraine  was  a  candidate 
country  for  the  information  campaigns  because  of  its  role  as  both  a  transit  and  a  source 
country.  Similarly  Russia  was  targeted  because  Russia,  along  with  Ukraine  are  two  of 
the  poorest  countries  in  Europe  and  the  largest  suppliers  of  the  'Natasha  trade'.  296 
Trafficking  networks  to  move  women  west,  from  Russia  use  Ukraine,  and  Russian  and 
Ukrainian  women  are  reported  as  the  'most  popular  and  valuable  women'  in  the  sex 
trade  (Hughes  2000).  Bulgaria  is  another  source  country,  where  an  estimated  10,000  a 
year  are  trafficked  to  Northern  and  Southern  Europe.  297  Poland  is  both  a  demand  and 
a  transit  country.  The  US  Embassy  reports  that  70  percent  of  Ukrainian  women 
working  in  the  sex  industry  in  Poland  are  there  under  duress  and  are  controlled  by  the 
Agencija  Tovazhyshka  prostitution  ring  (Hughes  2000).  Women  from  the  NIS  are  also 
moved  through  Poland  and  Hungary  into  the  EU. 
As  noted  above,  government  co-operation  is  essential  in  this  type  of  EU-US 
project  because  implementation  takes  places  within  the  territory  of  sovereign  states. 
296  Hughes  (2000)  notes  that  trafficking  of  Ukrainian  and  Russian  women  is  so  widespread  that  these 
women  have  been  labelled  as  'Natashas'. 
190 In  short,  government  co-operation  is  necessary  because  host  states  can  be  sensitive 
298 
about  law  enforcement  co-operation  and  foreign  government  funding.  One  US 
official  notes  that  before  the  campaigns  were  run  host  states  were  sensitive  to  outside 
queries  about  the  problem  of  trafficking.  299  Once  EU  and  US  intervention  in  host 
states  was  established,  there  were  also  concerns  among  some  CEE  and  Russian 
officials  that  trafficking  was  taking  up  more  time  and  attention  than  other  areas  of  law 
enforcement.  3  00  Finally,  there  were  concerns  that  the  burden  of  targeting  trafficking 
was  misplaced.  Source  and  transit  countries  have  pointed  the  finger  of  blame  back  at 
the  West  and  argued  first,  'You  deal  with  the  demand  !  301 
The  countries  chosen  for  the  first  campaign  were  both  states  that  expressed 
interest  in  addressing  the  problem  of  trafficking.  IOM  (1998)  noted  that  the  Ukrainian 
and  Polish  governments  had  shown  a  commitment  to  confronting  migration  problems 
and  working  co-operatively  to  protect  potential  victims.  The  Polish  and  Hungarian 
government's  willingness  to  co-operate  with  the  EU  and  the  US  on  trafficking  can  be 
explained  by  their  positions  in  the  first  wave  of  EU  accession.  Both  governments  had 
incentive  to  show  the  EU  that  it  could  address  issues,  which  would  compound  the 
debate  on  border  movement.  The  EU  showed  preference  for  working  with  countries, 
which  were  in  the  fast  track  for  EU  accession.  The  US  chose  to  work  with  Bulgaria, 
which  had  a  less  established  working  relationship  with  the  Co  mmission  than 
297  IOM  press  release  notes  that  the  trafficking  routes  from  Bulgaria  are  established.  Women  are  brought 
through  the  former  Yugoslavia,  Romania.  the  Czech  Republic,  Poland,  and  Hungary  to  Austria,  Zý  --  Germarrv  and  the  Netherlands. 
2"'  Point  argued  by  Commission  official,  DG  External  Relations,  May  2000  (26). 
199  - Fhe  inteFViC\Vee  argued  that  until  recently  you  could  not  mention  the  't'  (trafficking)  word  in  some 
of  these  countries.  Telephone.  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels,  February  2001  (54). 
'00  ,  Felephone  Interview,  US  Mission  official.  Feblliarý  2001  (54).  Commission  official,  DG  External 
Relations,  Brussels,  May  2000  (26). 
101  IntervielA.  US  Mission  Official.  Februarý  2001  (54). 
191 Hungary.  302  The  EU  instigated  co-operation  with  Russia,  under  the  EU-Russia 
303  Partnership 
,  proved  to  be  more  difficult.  The  low  level  of  commitment  to  the 
problem,  sensitivity  to  outside  involvement  and  the  bureaucratic  structure  of  the 
Russian  government  held  up  the  negotiations.  EU  membership  is  less  of  a  'carrot'  to 
lure  Russian  co-operation.  However,  its  willingness  to  accept  the  information 
campaign  may  be  tied  to  new  US  legislation  that  warrants  sanctions  against  countries 
not  adequately  addressing  the  trafficking  problem.  304 
Finally,  the  existence  of  civil  society,  particularly  a  strong  NGO  presence  or 
field  level  support  for  international  organisations,  was  a  prerequisite  for  running  the 
anti-trafficking  information  campaigns.  Each  country  where  the  EU  and  the  US  have 
co-operated  had  a  non-  governmental  infrastructure  capable  of  implementing  the 
campaign  at  a  local  level  and  the  support  of  the  IOM.  The  IOM  was  able  to  draw  on 
NGO  subcontractors  in  Ukraine  where  more  research  and  advocacy  has  been  done  on 
trafficking  in  women  and  advocacy  by  non-governmental  organisations  than  in  any 
other  source  country  (Hughes  2000).  The  existence  of  the  well-establ  i  shed  anti- 
trafficking  NGO  La  Strada  was  a  factor  in  the  EU  decision  to  use  Poland  as  a  host 
state.  Policy  proposals  submitted  by  IOM  field  offices  in  Bulgaria  and  Hungary 
shaped  the  transatlantic  decisions  to  co-operate  in  those  countries.  Finally,  although 
Russia  has  a  less  established  civil  society  than  other  host  states,  Russian  based 
advocacy  groups  such  as  the  Mira  Med  Institute  and  the  Moscow  Center  for 
International  Defence  have  expressed  an  interest  in  working  with  local  authorities  to 
combat  the  problem  of  trafficking. 
US  officials  p0inted  Out  that  the  EU  had  expressed  an  interest  in  dealing  directly  with  countries  in 
the  first  wave  of  enlarement.  Intervie%k  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels,  January  2001  (26):  US  State 
Department  Official,  Washington  D.  C,  August,  2000  (29). 
It  should  be  noted  that  while  the  RJ's  Partnership  with  Russia  is  designed  to  cross  over  into  more 
concrete  joint  action,  the  US  iný  okenient,  at  least  on  a  transatlantic  level,  is  restricted  to  the 
information  campaign. 
192 Table  6.2 
Parallel  Transatlantic 
Information  Cam  aigns 
Campaign  I  Implementation 
Partner 
Campaign  11  Implementation 
I  Partner 
EU  s  onsored  Poland  La  Strada  Hungary  10M 
UIIQ  _-_  ,,,  I  S  Sponsored 
I  JL,,  ýiný  Ukraine  10M  Bulgaria  10M 
How  to  co-ordinate  co-operation? 
Transgovernmental  actors  played  a  crucial  rule  in  gauging  what  type.  of  co-operation 
was  possible  and  how  the  EU  and  US  could  jointly  address  the  problem  of  trafficking. 
First,  EU-US  co-operation  on  trafficking  in  women  materialised  in  the  form  of  an 
information  campaign.  The  idea  was  to  target  trafficking  in  women  on  the  supply  side 
by  raising  avvarenessl  of  potential  victimns  and'  Ilocal  authorities.  The  awn  of  the 
information  campaign  was  to  train  authorities  and  to  build  on  the  NGO  structure  in 
order  to  gain  information  about  trafficking  trends,  recruitment  methods  and  potential 
deterrents  to  the  trafficking  trap.  305  The  concept  behind  the  trafficking  campaigns  was 
prevention  rather  than  law  enforcement  co-operation,  the  emphasis  being  on  research 
and  strategy  definition  in  the  first  phase  and  information  dissemination  in  the  second. 
The  second  decision  to  consider  is  how  the  EU  and  the  US  chose  to  co-operate 
through  the  information  campaigns.  To  claim  that  the  EU  and  the  US  successfully 
pursued  'joint  action'  on  trafficking  in  women  is  somewhat  deceptive.  It  is  more 
realistic  to  describe  the  campaigns  as  'separate  but  parallel'  projects.  EU  and  US 
officials  acted  together  to  co-ordinate  efforts,  but  the  administration  of  each  campaign 
was  carried  out  separately.  According  to  EU  and  US  officials,  different  bureaucratic 
structures  and  funding  arrangements  dictated  the  way  the  EU  and  the  US  could  jointly 
manage  the  problem.  Logistically,  it  was  easier  to  support  different  projects,  but  joint 
Paragraphs  based  on  lntcrvic\ýs  ý,  Nith  FU  Commission  Official,  External  Relations.  Brussels.  May 
2000,  (26)  and  US  Mission  Official.  Brussels,  February  2001,  (54). 
3  ()  ý  Interview,  FU  Commission  Official,  Brussels,  May  2000  (26) 
193 co-ordination  was  desirable  to  avoid  overlap.  Parallel  campaigns  were  chosen  so  that 
the  comparisons  could  be  made  between  the  two.  306 
Joint  co-operation  in  the  transatlantic  anti  -trafficking  campaigns  did  take  the 
form  of  co-funding.  The  EU  and  US  agreed  to  match  funds  (approximately),  co- 
ordinate  timing  and  effectively  employ  implementation  partners.  The  US  State 
Department's  Bureau  of  Population  and  Migration  put  forward  $382,000  in  Ukraine 
and  $400,000  for  the  Bulgarian  campaign.  The  Commission  matched  the  funds  with 
250,000  euros  for  the  Polish  project  and  268,000  euros  for  Hungary.  307  .  The 
differences  in  internal  funding  mechanisms  made  co-ordinating  payments  difficult. 
Both  EU  and  US  officials  agree  that  generally  it  is  much  easier  for  the  US  to  deliver 
funds  than  it  is  for  the  EU.  On  the  US  side,  the  State  Department  was  able  to  allocate 
funding  for  this  project  out  of  the  Bureau  of  Population  Refugees  and  Migration's 
budget.  On  the  EU  side,  the  Commission  ran  into  problems  with  the  original  funding 
for  Poland.  They  tried  to  fund  the  campaign  using  PHARE  money  set  aside  for  human 
rights,  but  were  subject  to  a  number  of  conditions  set  out  by  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
One  Commission  officials  notes,  'There  were  all  types  of  requirements  by  Member 
States  which  delayed  the  project  for  half  a  year'.  'O'  While  US  officials  were  keen  in 
the  first  case  to  distribute  the  money  before  the  end  of  the  fiscal  year,  the  Commission 
was  unable  to  match  the  funds  in  time  and  implementation  of  the  project  was  delayed. 
To  avoid  later  delays  the  subsequent  project  was  funded  through  a  Commission 
ý06  Paragraph  based  on  interviews  with  a  high-ranking  DG  External  Relations  Official,  Brusselsý 
September  1999  (9)-1  EU  External  Relations  Official,  Brussels,  May  2000  (26);  US  State  Department 
Officialý  Washington  D.  C.  ý  August  2000  (29)ý  EU  Commission  official,  Washington  D.  C  October  2000 
(3  1);  US  State  Department  Official,  Washington  D.  C  October  2000  (33)ý  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels  t,  1999  (7)ý  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels.  February  2001  (54). 
7  FiIII-Ires  are  approximate.  Taken  from  interviews,  US  Population  Refugees  and  Migration  website 
and  EU  JHA  website. 
'108  Interview,  Commission  official.  Brussels.  May  2000  (26). 
194 budget,  a  line  that  is  approved  by  the  European  Parliament  rather  than  the  Council,  and 
thus  subject  to  fewer  restrictions.  309 
Who  to  co-operate  with? 
Funding  issues  also  dictated  why  the  EU  and  the  US  decided  to  use  different 
implementation  partners  in  the  first  information  campaigns.  The  EU  chose  to  work 
with  the  non-governmental  organisation  La  Strada  in  Poland  because  the  Commission 
had  a  history  and  practice  of  working  with  NGOs,  and  because  the  EU  funding 
structure  made  it  easier  to  fund  NGO  projeCtS3  10.  The  US  chose  to  work  with  the  IOM 
in  the  Ukraine  because,  as  we  saw  with  the  case  of  the  TAED,  US  goverment  policy 
typically  does  not  involve  funding  NGOs  directly.  The  International  Organisation  on 
Migration  was  originally  chosen  because  it  had  experience  in  Ukraine  and  a  good 
working  relationship  with  local  officials  and  NGOs.  The  second  campaigns  ran  with 
the  same  implementation  partner,  because  it  was  decided  after  the  first  campaign  that 
IOM,  with  its  larger  size  and  support  structure,  had  done  a  more  comprehensive  job. 
IOM  also  had  a  better  working  relationship  with  the  government,  particularly  in 
Bulgaria  where  La  Strada  has  not  had  a  habit  of  working  with  government  officials. 
Finally,  it  was  agreed  that  the  projects  would  be  more  comparable  if  the  same  partner 
311  implemented  them  . 
In  summary,  the  EU-US  information  campaigns  against  trafficking  in  women 
are  an  example  of  policies  which  were  officially  'set'  by  high  level  transgovernmental 
actors  (ministers)  but  heavily  shaped  by  lower  level  trans  governmental  officials  (US 
"  ()  9  Intervie"s  with  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels,  February  2001  (54);  US  State  Department  Officialý 
August  2000,  Washington  DC,  (29).  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels,  May  2000  (26). 
10  NGOs  must  go  through  a  formal  application  process  and  compete  for  funding  at  the  EU  level,  but  La 
Strada  %%as  alread\  beim,  funded  b%  the  Commission 
n- 
Interview,  US  Mission  Offlicial,  Brussels  February  2001  (54).  Interview.  US  NGO,  Washington  D,  C 
March  2001  (56). 
195 Mission,  State  Department  and  Commission  officials)  transatlantic  level.  It  was  these 
transgovernmental  actors  who  made  crucial  decisions  on  where,  how  and  with  whom 
the  EU  and  the  US  would  co-operate.  The  small  number  of  staff  dealing  with 
trafficking,  however,  meant  that  government  officials  relied  heavily  on  information 
from  non-govemmental  sources.  Thus,  it  is  important  also  to  examine  the  role  of  non- 
governmental  organisations  and  international  organisations  in  'shaping'  policy  on 
transatlantic  trafficking  in  women. 
3)  Shaping  Transatlantic  Policy  on  Trafficking  in  Women 
This  section  focuses  on  the  role  of  transnational  actors  in  shaping  transatlantic  policy 
on  trafficking  in  women.  It  tests  this  case  study  against  the  hypothesis  that  a 
decentralisation  of  decision  making-  in  the  form  of  decision  shaping-  has  taken  place 
in  the  transatlantic  policy  process.  Is  there  evidence  that  transnational  actors  played  a 
shaping  role  in  the  transatlantic  decision  making  forum  on  trafficking  in  women?  It  is 
argued  that  while  private  actors  clearly  have  a  role  in  shaping  the  global  governance 
response  to  trafficking,  there  is  no  formal  role  for  transnational  actors  in  transatlantic 
governance.  This  is  the  case  because  the  role  of  private  actors  is  not  institutional  i  sed 
under  the  global  challenges  chapter  of  the  NTA. 
Transnational  Shaping 
So  far  the  decision  making  process  for  trafficking  in  women  policy  draws  many 
parallels  with  the  MUtual  Recognition  Agreements  (MRAs).  In  both  cases  the  political 
decision  to  pursue  the  policy  carne  from  the  intergovernmental  level.,  and  different 
levels  of  transgovernmental  actors  were  active  in  setting  and  shaping  the  'mutual 
recognition  agreements  and  the  anti-trafficking  information  campaigns.  However,  the 
196 case  of  trafficking  in  women,  set  against  the  MRAs,  highlights  a  divide  in  economic 
and  political  policy  making  over  the  use  of  transnational  institutions. 
First,  NGOs  clearly  participate  in  decision  shaping  at  the  national  and 
international  levels.  On  the  US  side,  there  is  an  active  dialogue  between  government 
and  human  rights,  women's  rights  and  religious  NGOs  on  trafficking  in  women.  In 
particular  the  Global  Survival  Network,  Human  Rights  Watch,  the  International 
League  for  Human  Rights  and  the  Coalition  Against  Trafficking  in  women  have 
worked  closely  with  both  the  US  Administration  and  the  US  Congress.  312  Feminist  and 
human  rights  NGOs  worked  with  Republican  Chris  Smith  of  New  Jersey,  who 
sponsored  the  anti-trafficking  bill  in  Congress,  and  the  US  Administration  held 
briefings  with  members  of  the  NGO  community  to  discuss  trafficking.  313  The  Under- 
Secretary  of  State  for  Global  Affairs,  Frank  Loy  recognised  the  important  role  played 
by  NGOs  in  a  testimony  to  Congress  in  1998.  His  department's  web  page  provides 
links  to  roughly  10  NGOs,  including  Anti-Slavery  International,  the  Traditional 
Values  Coalition  and  the  International  Human  Rights  Law  Group.  314 
The  Commission's  original  communication  on  trafficking  in  1996  also  noted 
that  combating  trafficking  would  require  the  involvement  of  NGO's.  That  same  year 
the  Commission  invited  EU  and  US  based  NGOs  to  the  anti-trafficking  conference  it 
hosted  in  Vienna.  Many  European  NGOs  including  La  Strada  (in  Poland,  the  Czech 
Republic,  Bulgaria  and  Ukraine),  Phoenix  in  Germany,  the  Foundation  Against 
Trafficking  (STV)  in  the  Netherlands  and  Payoke  in  Belgium  have  established  a  habit 
'12The  Coalition  Against  Trafficking  in  Women  formed  including  a  number  of  women's  rights  groups 
including  Equalitý  Now,  Planned  Parenthood.  International  Women's  Health  Coalition,  National 
Organization  foi-  Woirieiiý  Women's  Environment  and  Development  Organisation;  Catholics  for  a  free 
Z, 
Choice,  Sisterhood  is  Global  Institute.  National  Black  Women's  Health  Projject,  Feminist  Majorityý 
Center  for  Women  Policy  Studies  See  McBride  Stetson  (2000:  6). 
In  a  ineetin-  held  oil 
ýebruary  22  1999,  the  President's  Interagency  Council  on  Women  held  a 
briefing  with  over  120  representatives  fi-orri  the  NGO  community  to  discuss  among  other  things  the 
Council's  initiatives  to  combat  trafficking  in  women  and  girls.  See  US  State  Department,  Highlights 
from  NGO  Public  Briefing  Meeting.  Februar\  22,1999. 
197 of  co-operation  with  the  Commission.  Under  the  Daphne  project  the  Commission 
funded  49  different  NGOs  prQjects.  315 
At  the  international  level,  transnational  networks  work  in  both  OSCE  and  UN 
forums.  NGOs  actively  participated  in  the  OSCE  Human  Dimensions  Seminars  and 
the  Vital  Voice  Conference  in  1997.  The  Human  Rights  Caucus  was  created  of 
roughly  10  European,  American  and  Asian  NGOs  to  shape  the  negotiations  of  the  UN 
Protocol  on  Trafficking.  NGOs  also  keep  each  other  informed  on  individual  projects. 
One  US  NGO  representative  notes  that  email  contact  across  the  Atlantic  is  constant.  316 
In  contrast  to  the  TABD,  TACD  and  TAED,  which  operate  as  private 
'institutions'  in  the  economic  chapter  of  the  NTA,  there  is  no  formal  role  for  human 
rights,  women's,  or  religious  NGOs  at  the  transatlantic  level.  While  NGOs  may 
broadly  shape  the  international  and  domestic  decision  on  trafficking,  there  is  no 
evidence  of  an  institutional  i  sation  of  political  non-governmental  actors  within  the 
NTA.  In  short  there  is  no  Transatlantic  Trafficking  Dialogue.  Despite  the  lack  of  a 
transatlantic  specific  NGO  network,  there  is  evidence  that  non-governmental  actors 
shape  the  transatlantic  anti-traffi  eking  campaign  both  from  the  top  down  and  the 
bottom  up.  Networks  of  NGOs  did  participate  in  EU,  US  and  international  decision 
making  forums,  and  the  two  implementation  partners  were  directly  responsible  for 
shaping  the  transatlantic  decisions.  The  main  non-EU  US  policy  'shaper'  however  was 
not  an  NGO,  but  an  international  organisation. 
The  IOM  influenced  the  transatlantic  decisions  from  the  top  down.  It  helped 
influence  both  where  and  with  whom  the  EU  and  the  US  would  co-operate.  The  IOM 
shaped  the  decision  on  "ho  to  co-operate  with  by  submitting  proposals  for  potential 
14  See  ýN\v\\.  usinFo.  state.  Lo\  topical  -lobal/traffic 
It  should  be  noted  that  there  "as  a  large  response  to  the  Daphne  project,  428  proposals  were 
received. 
,  16  Interview,  US  NGO,  Washington  DC,  March  2001  (56). 
198 information  campaigns  across  CEE  and  the  NIS.  The  location  of  field  offices  capable 
of  implementing  the  campaign  helped  shape  the  decision  on  where  to  co-operate.  The 
IOM  feedback  on  the  first  campaign  also  influenced  the  transatlantic  decision  to  use 
IOM  in  both  Bulgaria  and  Hungary.  In  the  case  of  Poland,  shaping  came  from  the 
bottom  up.  It  was  the  NGO  La  Strada  whose  proposal  was  accepted  by  the 
Commission.  Other  non-governmental  organisations  were  also  important  because  the 
IOM  subcontracted  work  out  to  private  actors  in  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  Ukraine.  For 
example  IOM  relied  on  Winrock  International  to  facilitate  interaction  among  women's 
NGOs  and  worked  with  La  Strada  in  Ukraine.  While  this  case  study  supports  the 
argument  that  private  actors  have  played  a  role  in  shaping  the  decision  making  process 
on  trafficking  in  women,  it  is  less  supportive  of  claims  that  a  privatisation  of  decision- 
making  has  occurred.  The  strong  role  of  the  IOM,  rather  than  NGOs,  as  a  'manager' 
of  the  information  campaigns  and  the  limited  ad  hoe  or  sub-contracted  use  of  private 
resources  at  the  transatlantic  level  is  indicative  of  the  fact  that  transnational  networks 
play  a  less  formal  role  in  shaping  decisions  under  the  political  chapters  of  the  NTA. 
A  Transatlantic  Trafficking  Dialogue? 
Co-operation  with  NGOs  at  the  transatlantic  level  is  ad  hoc  and  indirect  through  the 
IOM,  but  is  there  justification  for  a  more  institutionalised  role  for  NGOs?  Would  the 
transatlantic  global  challenges  framework  benefit  from  a  Transatlantic  Trafficking 
Dialogue,  similar  to  the  TACD  or  TAED?  What,  if  any,  would  the  benefits  of  a  formal 
transnational  dialogue  be  in  this  sectoi-9 
The  role  of  NGOs  in  preventing  trafficking  and  protecting  trafficking  victims 
is  undoubted.  In  addition  to  providin-  governments  with  information  and  raising  ::!,  C- 
axNareness.  NGOs  caii  fulfil  crucial  services  such  as  victim  assistance.  Gramegna 
199 (1996)  argues  that  NGOs  have  a  'leading  role'  to  play  in  offering  counselling,  care  and 
assistance  to  trafficked  women.  The  OSCE  notes  that  what  limited  assistance  there  is 
for  victims  of  trafficking  is  provided  almost  exclusively  by  NGOs.  One  OSCE  (1999: 
14)  report  states  that,  'In  countries  where  legislation  and  institutions  are  weak,  or 
where  police  and  other  authorities  are  complicit  to  trafficking,  NGOs  may  be  the  only 
institution  taking  effective  steps  to  prevent  trafficking  or  to  protect  victims.  ' 
The  role  of  NGOs  is  especially  important  because  private  actors  are  able  to 
fulfil  functions  that  governments  and  the  IOM  cannot  always  provide.  In  particular 
NGOs  are  needed  to  establish  a  direct  link  between  victims  and  local  authorities. 
Johnson  (1999)  argues  that  EU  Member  State  governments  should  recognise  the  fact 
that  private  NGO's  are  sometimes  more  able  to  provide  necessary  services  because 
they  serve  as  a  buffer  between  governments  and  victims.  The  OSCE  (1999:  2  1)  report 
notes  that  victims  who  receive  support  from  NGOs  are  more  likely  to  co-operate  with 
law  enforcement  and  serve  as  potential  witnesses.  In  addition  NGOs  provide  a  crucial 
service  to  governments  and  the  IOM  by  providing  them  with  valuable  information 
about  traffickers  and  the  trafficked.  For  example,  a  video  produced  by  the  Global 
Survival  Network  first  shed  light  on  the  extent  of  the  trafficking  problem  in  1998.  In 
short,  one  European  NGO  argues, 
NGOs  play  a  crucial  role  in  the  information  campaigns  because  they  are  the 
source  of  first  hand  information,  they  have  the  direct  access  to  victims  of 
trafficking,  but  also  have  a  broad  based  knowledge  of  local  conditions- 
political,  economic  and  social-  needed  to  implement  the  campaigns'.  317 
The  importance  of  maintaining  a  link  between  the  public  and  private  sector  is  an 
underlying  theme  iii  the  NTA.  Maiiy  NGOs  have  expressed  the  need  to  forge  a  formal 
dialogue  bet,,  Neen  non-governmental  and  governmental  actors  similar  to  that  which  ZD 
',  1  Interview.  European  NGO,  (via  email)  2001  (60). 
200 exists  in  the  economic  chapter  of  the  NTA.  Steve  Warnath  (1998)  of  the  President's 
Council  on  women  notes  that, 
in  discussions  with  NGOs,  various  government  officials  and  others  we  have 
heard  that  it  would  be  helpful  to  convene  a  series  of  meetings  in  different 
regions  of  the  world  to  facilitate  government,  NGOs  and  private  sector  co- 
operation  in  developing  of  regional  strategies  of  prevention,  protection  and 
enforcement. 
Speaking  at  the  launch  of  the  Hungarian  information  campaign,  the  EU  Commissioner 
for  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Vitorino  stated  the  campaigns  should,  'stimulate  the 
building  up  of  important  networks  and  partnerships  between  police,  judicial  and  social 
authorities  as  well  as  with  NGOs  and  other  actors  of  civil  society.  '  NGO 
representatives  have  argued  that  groups  like  La  Strada  have  to  be  integrated  into  the 
decision  making  process  because  they  know  the  most.  Although  there  is  some  NGO 
involvement  in  implementing  transatlantic  policy  thTough  the  IOM,  some  argue  that 
there  needs  to  be  a  formal  role  in  decision  making  because  there  is  distrust  between 
NGOs  and  the  IOM.  318 
Three  barriers  stand  in  the  way  of  institutionalising  a  transatlantic  trafficking 
dialogue.  First  some  NGOs,  particularly  at  the  local  level,  are  unwilling  to  work 
directly  with  governments  or  with  the  IOM.  319  There  is  some  scepticism  in  the  NGO 
community  about  the  use  of  the  IOM,  given  its  mandate  as  a  migration'organisation.  In 
addition  some  organisations  are  sceptical  of  local  authorities  and  feel  they  alone  are 
better  able  to  provide  protection  to  victims  for  fear  that  victims,  rather  than  traffickers, 
will  be  criminalised  under  domestic  legal  systems  (OSCE  1999:  21).  Second,  funding 
a  transnational  dialogue  could  prove  difficult,  particularly  on  the  US  side  where  NGOs 
cannot  receive  over  $25,000  "ithout  undergoing  a  government  audit.  Here,  it  is  worth 
I'his  distrust  stems  from  the  fact  that  the  IOM  is  a  government  sponsored  body  dedicated  to 
or-anised  rni,  ýration.  IntervieNN,  US  NGO,  Washin-ton  D.  C,  March  2001(56). 
Interview,  US  NGO,  Washington  D.  C.,  March  2001  (56). 
201 remembering  the  funding  problems  faced  by  the  TAED  in  the  US  Senate.  Finally, 
again  as  in  both  the  TAED  and  TACD,  there  is  an  ideological  split  amongst  NGOs, 
particularly  in  the  US  where  feminist  groups  quibble  over  the  language  used  in  the  UN 
Protocol  on  Trafficking.  Some  feminist  groups  disagreed  with  the  words  outlawing 
'forced  prostitution',  and  accused  the  Clinton  Administration  of  signing  a  Treaty 
which  not  only  gives  traffickers  a  safety  net,  through  consent,  but  which  advocates 
prostitution.  320  Despite  these  barriers  to  institutionalisation,  however,  building  a 
stronger  link  with  civil  society  on  the  political  dialogue  could  reap  the  same  benefits 
that  the  economic  dialogue  has  from  the  TABD,  the  TAED  and  TACD. 
Institutionali  sing  the  political  dialogue  further  through,  for  example,  a  Transatlantic 
Trafficking  Dialogue  would  elevate  the  NTA's  policy  of  'building  bridges'  in  political 
sectors. 
4)  Implications  of  the  Transatlantic  Information  Campaigns 
After  questioning  why  the  EU  and  the  US  chose  to  co-operate  on  trafficking  in  women 
under  the  NTA,  and  examining  how  the  policy  was  set  and  shaped,  this  section  turns 
to  an  evaluation  of  the  implications  of  the  campaigns  both  in  a  transatlantic  and  an 
international  context.  It  has  two  aims.  First  it  seeks  to  explain  the  shortcomings  of  both 
the  transatlantic  and  international  response  to  trafficking  in  women,  highlighting 
factors  such  as  the  sensitivity  of  international  law  enforcement  co-operation  and  the 
weak  JHA  pillar  in  the  EU.  Second,  despite  these  shortcomings,  this  section  confirms 
the  significance  of  the  transatlantic  information  campaigns  in  light  of  efforts  to  fight 
global  cliallen-es  at  an  international  and  transatlantic  level.  Z-- 
,  N)  Ten  leading  ferninist  organisations  argued,  'The  position  taken  by  the  administration  suggests  you  do 
not  consider  prostitution  to  be  a  form  ofsexual  exploitation.  '  See  Wall  Street  Journal,  'The  Clintons' 
Shrug  at  Sex  Trafficking'  10  January  2000.  Response  to  'The  Clintons  Shrug  at  Sex  Trafficking,  12 
Januarý  2000  (http:  wý\  Interview  with  US  NGO,  Washington  DC  March  2001  (56). 
202 Low-key  co-operation 
The  information  campaigns  run  in  parallel  by  the  EU  and  the  US  are  an  example  of 
fairly  low  key  co-operation  between  states.  Transatlantic  co-operation  against 
trafficking  in  women  was  limited  in  this  case  to  dialogue  and  co-funding.  Transatlantic 
efforts  to  combat  trafficking  were  concentrated  on  education,  or  prevention,  rather 
than  protection  of  victims  and  prosecution  of  traffickers.  EU,  US,  IOM  and  NGO 
officials  agree  that  information  campaigns  cannot  eliminate  the  problem  of  trafficking 
on  their  own,  so  why  has  such  a  limited  approach  been  taken?  The  shortcomings  of  the 
project  are  rooted  not  only  in  the  funding  limitations  discussed  in  section  2,  rather 
there  are  larger  political  issues  which  limit  the  practical  co-operation  on  trafficking  in 
women. 
The  three  p-  prevention,  protection  and  prosecution-  approach  to  combating 
trafficking  outlined  by  the  Clinton  Administration  has  been  described  as  an  optimal 
strategy  for  dealing  with  the  problem  of  trafficking.  However,  EU-US  co-operation  is 
limited  to  prevention.  How  do  the  other  two  p's  figure  into  the  EU  and  US  efforts  to 
combat  trafficking  in  CEE?  As  noted  above,  NGOs  have  been  the  most  effective 
providers  of  protection  to  victims  of  trafficking,  and  the  EU  and  the  US  have  both 
funded  NGOs  in  the  region  for  victim  assistance.  Individually  the  EU  and  the  US  have 
also  introduced  policies  to  prosecute  traffickers  through  the  US  Trafficking  Victims 
Protection  Act  and  the  Council  Directive  on  Trafficking  in  Women.  Together,  the  EU 
and  the  US  have  yet  to  co-ordinate  transatlantic  co-operation  on  protection  for  victims. 
In  principle,  this  is  a  task,  which  might  be  addressed  by  a  Transatlantic  Trafficking 
Dialogue. 
203 Trafficking  in  women  is  considered  a  law  enforcement  issue  by  the  NTA,  yet 
transatlantic  co-operation  does  not  include  provisions  for  addressing  the  prosecution  of 
traffickers.  Co-operation  between  the  EU  and  the  US  is  lacking  in  this  area  in  part 
because  the  institutional  provisions  for  prosecuting  traffickers  at  the  national,  EU,  and 
international  level  are  also  weak.  Transatlantic  co-operation  on  trafficking  began 
before  the  EU,  the  US  or  the  UN  had  adequate  legislative  authority  to  prosecute 
traffickers.  The  OSCE  (1999)  reports  that  'limited  law  enforcement  capacity,  lack  of 
expertise  at  the  judicial  level,  limited  resources,  and  insufficient  collaboration  between 
law  enforcement  and  other  agencies  results  in  inadequate  or  inefficient  investigation. 
and  adjudication  of  trafficking  cases'.  When  the  EU  and  the  US  pursued  co-operation 
in  the  first  and  second  information  campaigns,  institutional  provisions  for  prosecution 
were  not  in  place  at  the  national,  EU,  international  and  transatlantic  level.  However, 
new  law  enforcement  provisions  have  since  been  introduced.  US  legislation  and  the 
UN  Protocol  on  Trafficking  were  only  passed  in  2000,  and  the  EU  was  expected  to 
pass  the  Council  Directive  on  Trafficking  in  2001.  While,  these  new  measures  in  no 
way  guarantee  a  shift  towards  more  in-depth  law  enforcement  at  the  transatlantic  level, 
they  could  well  broaden  the  scope  of  EU-US  collaboration  on  trafficking  in  women. 
Prevention  campaigns  will  not  curb  the  number  of  trafficked  women  from  CEE 
and  the  NIS  unless  the  root  causes  of  trafficking  are  addressed.  One  NGO  official 
argues,  '  you  can  tell  1,000  women  that  they  will  be  trapped  in  prostitution  but  it  is 
counter-productive.  Many  knew  they  would  be  working  in  sex  work,  but  they  need  the 
money  to  send  back  home.  '  321  Even  prosecution  will  not  deal  with  voluntary  migration 
pursued  out  of'  desperation.  Trafficking  in  women  is  a  problem  that  is  directly  linked 
to  the  poor  economic  and  social  circumstances  that  accompany  the  transitions  to 
Interview.  US  NGO,  Washington  DC.  February  2001  (59). 
204 democracy  and  a  private  market  economy.  These  are  problems  that  the  EU  and  the  US 
are  dealing  with  both  individually  and  together  under  the  NTA  chapter  on  promoting 
human  rights  and  democracy  and  through  the  Stability  Pact  for  South  Eastern  Europe. 
Given  the  fact  that  co-operation  between  the  EU  and  the  US  on  trafficking  was 
limited  to  prevention  rather  than  protection  or  prosecution,  the  question  remains,  how 
significant  was  the  campaign?  The  interviewee  response  to  this  question  was  m  ixed. 
The  information  campaigns  were  criticised  for  not  getting  to  the  root  of  the  problem 
by  failing  to  address  poor  economic  conditions  and  the  lack  of  legal  economic 
migration,  322  and  for  not  providing  witness  protection  and  extended  stays  for 
trafficking  victims.  323  One  US  official  characterised  the  information  campaigns  as 
dominated  by  rhetoric  rather  than  action.  324  Another  added  that  the  EU  and  the  US 
would  always  be  capable  of  doing  more  individually  then  together  because  funding 
restrictions  on  each  side  meant  that  independent  revenue  would  be  needed 
eventually. 
32-5 
Despite  the  limited  nature  of  joint  co-operation  however,  it  is  worth  examining 
the  EU-US  campaigns  in  the  context  of  the  larger  anti  -trafficking  movement.  Policy 
makers  argued  that  the  decision  to  pursue  a  second  and  third  round  of  the  information 
campaigns  is  evidence  that  the  projects  have  had  worthwhile  effects  on  the  ground. 
One  of  the  most  significant  aspects  of  the  transatlantic  information  campaigns  is  that 
they  increased  awareness  of  the  problem  both  externally  and  internally.  First,  the  joint 
campaigns  reiterated  EU  and  US  commitment  to  addressing  the  problem  of 
trafficking.  326  An  IOM  official  in  Hungary  noted  that  EU-US  backing  for  the  IOM 
information  campaign  in  Hungarý  raised  the  profile  of  the  project.  Another  official 
Interview,  US  NGO.  Washington  DC,  February  2001  (59). 
Interview,  t  JS  State  Department  Official,  Washington  DC.  October  2000  (33). 
Interview,  Hi-h  ranking  US  State  Department  Official,  Washington  DC.  October  2000  (44). 
Interview,  t  JS  State  Department  Official.  Washington  DC,  October  2000,  (33) 
205 noted  that  the  considerable  coverage  of  the  Ukrainian  project  had  'helped  create  a 
sense  of  urgency'  about  the  problem  of  trafficking  (Escaler  1998).  The  EU-US 
sponsored  information  campaigns  also  paved  the  way  for  further  action  on  trafficking 
in  women  in  the  countries  where  they  were  run.  The  Commissioner  for  Justice  and 
Home  Affairs  Antonio  Vitorino  (1999)  argued  at  the  launch  of  the  Hungarian 
campaign,  that  'previous  campaigns  have  proved  to  have  had  considerable  spin-off 
effects  such  as  setting  up  of  permanent  co-ordination  structures  to  work  with  the 
problem  on  a  permanent  basis.  '  327  One  US  official  added  that  these  campaigns  helped 
ensure  that  the  host  countries  acknowledged  the  problem  of  trafficking  and  lead  to 
more  'open  will'  between  the  host  states  and  the  EU  and  US.  328  Finally,  the 
transatlantic  trafficking  campaigns  fulfilled  greater  NTA  commitments,  by  helping  to 
forge  contacts  between  EU  and  US  officials  dealing  with  trafficking  and  with  the  IOM 
and  local  NGOs.  The  information  campaigns  have  allowed  officials  to  gain 
experience  working  with  NGOs  and  governments  and  build  further  bridges  in  this 
area.  The  joint  EU-US  initiative  is  seen  in  the  international  community  as  part  of  a 
necessary  step  to  strengthen  co-operation  and  co-ordination  efforts  among  relevant 
governmental,  intergovernmental  and  non  -governmental  institutions  (IOM  1998b). 
Trafficking  and  the  NTA 
The  trafficking  in  women  case  sheds  some  light  on  the  nature  of  EU-US  co-operation 
in  the  area  of  global  challenges  under  the  NTA.  To  recap,  the  Joint  Action.  Plan 
contains  transatlantic  commitments  to  combating  global  challenges  such  as  organised 
crime.  terrorism.  and  illegal  immigration.  These  are  policy  areas  where  the  EU  and  the 
US  have  a  shared  interest  iii  protecting  national  security.  The  transnational  nature  of 
'26  Interview,  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels,  February  200  1  (54). 
Speaking  notes.  laurich  of  Hungarian  int"orniation  campaign  November  1999. 
206 these  threats  means  that  state  responses  are  co-ordinated  at  different  levels  of 
governance.  Co-operation  on  trafficking  in  women  is  a  step  towards  fulfilling  NTA 
aims  to  improve  law  enforcement  capacities  through  joint  action  and  the  pooling  of 
resources  at  a  transatlantic  level.  The  nature  of  law  enforcement  co-operation  in  the 
trafficking  in  women  case,  like  co-operation  on  global  challenges  more  generally,  has 
been  limited.  This  section  seeks  to  explain  what  the  trafficking  case  can  tell  us  about 
global  challenges  co-operation  and  what  the  global  challenges  chapter  can  tell  us  about 
the  trafficking  in  women  case. 
As  noted  in  chapter  3 3,  co-operation  under  the  global  challenges  chapter  has 
been  less  integrated  then  under  the  other  chapters  of  the  NTA.  Funkt  (unpublished:  35) 
identifies  two  factors  which  limit  the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  the  US  to  co-operate  in 
fighting  global  challenges.  First,  he  argues  the  preservation  of  state  sovereignty  and 
the  poorly  defined  institutional  role  of  EU  actors  in  the  area  of  Justice  and  Home 
Affairs  has  obstructed  international  law  enforcement  co-operation.  The  trafficking 
case  is  a  prime  example.  By  focusing  on  prevention  the  EU  and  the  US  chose  to 
pursue  a  policy  that  only  affected  the  sovereignty  of  the  host  country.  Co-operation 
between  the  EU  and  the  US  is  kept  non-controversial  as  to  avoid  member-state  or 
Congress  intervention. 
Second,  the  weakness  of  the  EU's  third  pillar  is  blamed  more  generally  for  a 
lack  of  US  co-operation  on  political  issues.  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  Policy  was  only 
established  with  the  Maastricht  Treaty  and  migration  issues  moved  in  community 
competence  through  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam.  329  On  a  technical  level,  funding  co- 
ordination  in  the  trafficking  case  was  difficult  due  to  multi-level  decision  making  in 
the  EU.  Co-operatioii  oii  protectioii  and  prosecution  was  blocked  by  the  lack  of  a 
,  28  Interview.  US  Mission  Official.  Brussels,  January  2001  (59). 
207 common  policy  on  trafficking  in  women  in  the  EU  before  2001.330  However,  it  should 
be  noted  that  the  US  also  lacked  effective  legislation  for  criminalising  trafficking  until 
2000. 
Despite  the  limitations  of  the  NTA's  global  challenges  chapter,  the  trafficking 
case  is  significant  in  the  context  of  the  development  of  the  NTA  more  generally.  First, 
the  information  campaigns  are  the  only  co-funded  policy  project  under  the  global 
challenges  chapter  of  the  NTA.  Co-funding  represents  a  deeper  level  of  integration, 
and  a  more  concrete  deliverable  than  for  example  joint  statements.  Second,  the  anti- 
trafficking  campaigns  represent  the  first  operational  activity  within  the  migration 
dialogue  established  by  the  NTA.  Despite  the  limited  nature  of  the  co-operation  on 
trafficking  in  women,  the  original  campaigns  have  served  as  a  stepping-stone  to 
additional  projects  across  CEE,  and  Russia.  The  inforination  campaigns  demonstrate 
how  dialogue  between  Justice  &  Home  Affairs  officials  in  the  US  Administration  and 
the  EU  institutions  can  produce  concrete  results.  One  US  official  argued,  'I  would 
like  to  think  the  success  of  these  efforts  will  help  pave  the  way  for  other  global 
challenges'.  That  said,  it  was  added  that,  'it  will  be  hard  to  replicate  the  kind  of  focus 
we  achieved  on  such  a  specific  area.  Part  of  this  has  to  do  with  the  complex 
relationships  on  other  global  Issues  and  the  difficulty  in  matching  specific  goals.  1331 
The  trafficking  in  women  case  is  an  example  of  how  the  EU  and  the  US  can  pool 
resources  and  orgamse  efforts  to  combat  global  challenges,  even  if  only  on  a  small 
scale.  The  co-operation  on  combating  HIV/AIDS  in  Africa  (discussed  in  chapter  3)  is 
For  a  more  comprehensive  overview  of  the  development  of  JHA  policy  see  Den  Boer  and  Wallace 
(2000). 
"('One  US  official  argued,  'Because  JHA  co-operation  on  the  FU  level  isjust  being  developed,  the  US 
still  relies  extensl\,  ely  oil  bilateral  relations  with  member  states,  making  co-operation,  particularly  in 
law  enforcement,  very  complex.  '  Interview,  US  Mission  Official,  Brussels,  February  2001  (54). 
Interview.  US  Mission  official,  via  telephone,  February  2001  (54). 
208 a  more  recent  example  of  how  the  EU  and  US  officials  have  learned  to  share 
knowledge  and  co-ordinate  resources  to  maximise  their  use. 
Conclusion 
In  conclusion,  the  case  of  EU-US  co-operation  on  trafficking  in  women  draws  many 
parallels  with  the  other  case  studies  discussed  in  this  thesis.  First,  like  policy  making 
on  mutual  recognition  agreements  and  banana  subsidies,  the  trafficking  case  shows 
that  the  potential  for  co-operation  is  greater  where  bureaucratic  control  is  exercised 
and  Congress  and  member  state  involvement  is  minimal.  The  case  analysed  in  this 
chapter  is  one  in  which  the  Commission  and  the  US  Administration  have  pursued  a 
joint  project  that  is  both  non-controversial  and  in  the  joint  interest  of  Western  states. 
By  dealing  with  the  supply  side  of  trafficking  through  prevention  campaigns  in  CEE, 
the  EU-US  information  campaigns  do  not  impinge  on  the  sovereignty  of  either  US 
domestic  legislators  or  the  nationalgovemments  in  the  Member  States. 
If  one  looks  at  the  decision  making  process  of  the  transatlantic  policy  on 
trafficking  in  women,  it  is  also  clear  that  this  case  study  shares  characteristics  with  the 
mutual  recognition  agreements.  Both  policies  are  the  result  of  a  complex,  multi-level 
decision  making  process.  Intergovernmental  actors  under  the  NTA  framework  'made' 
the  political  decision  to  pursue  both  policies  at  EU-US  Summits.  In  both  cases 
transgovernmental  actors  carried  out  the  details  of  policy  'setting'  and  policy  Z7, 
'shaping'.  Thus  both  cases  support  the  hypothesis  that  transatlantic  policies  are  the 
result  of  decentralised  decision  making.  A  major  difference  between  the  mutual 
recognition  agreements  and  the  transatlantic  trafficking  in  women  information 
campaigns,  however.  is  the  level  at  which  private  actors  were  involved  in  the  decision  Z:, 
making  processes.  In  the  case  of  the  MRAs.  the  role  of  private  actors  was 
209 institutionalised  through  the  TABD  (and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  TACD  and  TAED), 
however  there  is  no  formal  role  for  transnational  networks  in  decision  shaping  on  the 
political  side  of  the  NTA  dialogue.  Nonetheless,  private  actors  have  exercised  some 
functions  of  privatised  governance,  in  particular  by  implementing  the  trafficking 
campaigns. 
This  chapter  also  established  that  domestic  institutions  and  the  newness  of 
Justice  and  Home  Affairs  policy  in  both  the  EU  and  the  NTA  limit  how  deeply  the  EU 
and  the  US  can  co-operate  on  political  issues.  The  EU-US  information  campaigns  are 
criticised  for  addressing  only  one  of  the  three  p's.  However,  it  has  been  argued  here 
that  these  campaigns  are  an  important  stepping  stone  both  for  the  anti  -trafficking 
movement  and  for  the  migration  and  law  enforcement  dialogue  under  the  global 
challenges  chapter  of  the  NTA.  New  national,  EU  and  international  laws  could 
increase  the  scope  for  co-operation  on  protecting  victims  and  prosecuting  traffickers 
on  a  transatlantic  scale.  The  dialogue  already  established  between  Justice  and  Home 
Affairs  officials  in  Europe  and  the  US  means  that  transatlantic  policy  on  trafficking 
has  room  to  grow  under  the  NTA. 
210 Chapter  7 
Regulating  the  Transatlantic  Marketplace: 
The  EU-US  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements 
Ultimately  the  goal  of  the  New  Transatlantic  Marketplace  is  to  create  a  barrier  free 
marketplace  through  further  liberalisation  of  trade  in  goods,  services  and  investment. 
A  major  part  of  that  market  opening  strategy  is  to  implement  agreements  that 
eliminate  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade.  The  Customs  and  Co-operation  Agreement 
(1996);  the  positive  Comity  Agreement  (1998);  the  Veterinary  Equivalency 
Agreement  (1999);  the  Science  and  Technology  Agreement  (1997)  and  the  Mutual 
Recognition  Agreement  (1997)  are  examples  of  agreements  that  aim  to  reduce  barriers 
to  trade  in  the  form  of  regulatory,  customs  and  competition  standards. 
This  chapter  examines  the  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  (MRAs),  signed  in 
six  sectors  in  1997  and  under  negoýiation  in  six  additional  sectors,  in  the  larger  context 
of  the  transatlantic  partnership.  The  MRAs  are  of  economic  significance  because  they 
eliminate  redundant  testing  and  certification  costs  affecting  $60  billion  in  trade.  332 
Politically,  the  MRAs  represent  a  spillover  of  integration  from  the  European  single 
market.  The  MRAs  have  the  potential  to  spark  further  integration  within  the 
transatlantic  process  because  they  symbolize  confidence  building  between  trade 
officials  and  regulatory  authorities.  These  agreements  arc  important  for  understanding 
the  nature  of  the  interaction  between  the  partners,  because  joint  decision  making  in  the 
MRA  process  carries  wider  implications  for  transatlantic  governance. 
Decision  making  in  the  MRAs  is  examined  here  as  a  case  study  of  economic 
policy  making  Linder  the  NTA  fi-ame"'ork.  The  MRA  negotiations  are  comparable  to 
[S60,000  mi  II  ion]  A  framework  agreement  in  services  is  expected  to  affect  a  further  $130  bi  II  ion. 
Source:  US  Mission  Website:  http:  ',!  %ý,  "ýw.  useu.  be/'isstiesý/mra0  I  16.  html 
211 the  trafficking  in  women  dialogue  because  both  policies  were  established  through 
intergovernmental  and  transgovernmental  decision  making.  The  MRAs  were  pursued 
under  the  NTA  framework  and  monitored  by  transatlantic  institutions.  They  represent 
a  policy  sector  where  transgovemmental  networks  of  trade  officials  exercised 
considerable  control  over  the  development  of  the  policy  and  where  new  networks  of 
regulatory  officials  formed  to  shape  policy  details.  The  MRAs  are  also  a  test  case  for 
the  policy  shaping  capacity  of  private,  transnational  networks,  including  the  TABD, 
the  TACD  and  the  TAED  in  the  transatlantic  policy  process. 
The  mutual  recognition  agreements  also  highlight  the  importance  of  decision 
making  in  a  system  of  multi-level  governance.  The  MRAs,  unlike  the  information 
campaigns,  were  controversial  among  domestic  actors  because  they  affect  the 
enforcement  of  domestic  health  and  safety  standards.  Transatlantic  institutions,  which 
are  comprised  mainly  of  political  and  trade  officials,  had  to  compete  with  regulatory 
authorities  in  the  MRA  process,  particularly  in  the  US,  where  actors  were  less  familiar 
with  mutual  recognition.  In  this  case,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  US  rather  than  the  EU 
suffered  from  a  capabilities-expectations  gap. 
This  chapter  questions  how  the  MRA  process  is  managed  and  how  the  interest 
of  actors  is  accommodated.  It  is  argued  that  transatlantic  institutions  were  key  in 
facilitating  decisions  which  made,  set  and  shaped  MRA  policy.  However,  these 
different  sets  of  actors  were  charged  with  finding  a  policy  that  could  accommodate  not 
only  their  transatlantic  counterparts  but  domestic  agents  as  well.  In  this  respect  the 
MRA  case  also  bears  resemblance  to  the  banana  dispute  discussed  in  chapter  8. 
This  chapter  is  approached  in  the  following  way.  Section  I  examines  the 
political  decisiori  to  pursue  the  MRAs  at  a  transatlantic  level.  Section  2  discusses  how 
domestic  actors  and  traiispovemmerital  actors  set  and  shape  policy  and  section  ') 
212 examines  the  role  of  private  networks  in  the  process,  examining  NGO  claims  that  the 
process  lacks  transparency  and  accountability.  Section  4  looks  at  the  significance  of 
the  MRA  negotiations  in  the  larger  context  of  the  NTA. 
I)-  The  Political  Decision  to  Pursue  Mutual  Recognition 
This  section  seeks  to  explain  how  and  why  intergovernmental  actors  made  the  decision 
to  Pursue  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  as  part  of  the  larger  transatlantic  market 
opening  strategy.  The  New  Transatlantic  Marketplace  is  based  on  facilitating  trade 
between  the  EU  and  the  US.  Regulatory  co-operation  is  crucial  to  improving  'market 
access  as  standards  and  certification  procedures  often  form  non-tariff  barriers  to  trade. 
The  purpose  of  mutual  recognition  agreements  is  to  remove  the  barriers  that  result 
from  additional  or  different  regulatory  requirements  on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic.  The 
concept  of  mutual  recognition  denotes  the  acceptance  of  US  product  or  service  tests  in 
the  EU  without  duplicate  testing,  and  vice  versa.  In  theory  this  means  products  can  be 
ý333  'approved  once,  accepted  everywhere  in  the  transatlantic  marketplace  . 
In  practice 
this  means  that  both  EU  and  US  regulatory  agents  must  accept  the  standards  of  their 
counterparts.  NicolaYdis  (19974:  1)  argues,  'The  recognition'  involved  here  is  of  the 
'equivalence',  compatibility'  or  at  least  'acceptability'  of  the  counterpart's  regulatory 
system,  the  'mutual'  part  indicates  that  the  reallocation  of  authority  is  reciprocal  and 
simultaneousý. 
An  Intergovernmental  Decision 
'rhe  political  impetus  for  mutual  recognition  agreements  came  from  the  top. 
Intergovernmental  actors  laid  out  the  intention  to  pursue  an  agreement  on  mutual 
This  phrase  was  adopted  by  the  TABD  as  a  slo-an  for  the  MRAs.  See  http:  //www.  tabd.  com 
213 recognition  certification  and  testing  procedures  in  the  New  Transatlantic  Agenda 
(1995)  and  the  Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership  (1998).  The  NTA  included  the 
aim  'to  conclude  an  agreement  on  mutual  recognition  of  conformity  assessment 
(which  includes  certification  and  testing  procedures)  for  certain  sectors  as  well  as  the 
intention  to  identify  other  sectors  for  further  negotiation.  The  first  set  of  MRAs 
(signed  in  1997)  included  telecommunications,  medical  devices,  electromagnetic 
compatibility,  electrical  safety,  recreational  craft  and  pharmaceuticals  and 
concentrated  on  'conformity  assessment'  meaning  that  testing,  inspection  and 
certification  of  goods  for  either  the  EU  or  the  US  market  can  be  conducted  once, 
locally  (see  table  7.2).  Transatlantic  leaders  announced  their  intention  to  expand 
mutual  recognition  to  the  testing  and  approval  of  services-  architecture,  insurance, 
engineering-  as  well  as  new  goods-  road  safety,  cosmetics  and  marine  safety-  in  the 
Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership.  The  TEP  outlined  plans  to  extend  mutual 
recognition  to  professional  certification  and  in  the  case  of  marine  safety  to  pursue  a 
'full  equivalence'  agreement  or  MRA  +,  meaning  that  the  EU  must  accept  marine 
safety  equipment  that  has  become  certified  under  US  rather  than  EU  requirements  and 
vice  versa. 
214 Table  7.1 
IA  Chronolo2v  of  the  MRA  Neaotiations  I 
(1995)  NTA  and  NTA  Action  Plan  outline  the  intention  to  pursue  MRAs 
(1996)  The  Senior  Level  Group  identifies  eight  sectors  for  possible  MRAs 
(1997)  The  MRA  Agreement  is  signed  including  7  annexes. 
(1998)  TEP  and  TEP  Action  Plan  announce  the  spread  of  MRAs  to  new  goods  sectors  and 
services 
(1999)  The  TEP  Steering  Group  announces  a  draft  framework  agreement  for  services  MRAs 
in  architecture  engineering  and  insurance  as  well  as  the  intention  to  begin  negotiations  in 
marine  safety. 
(2000)  The  first  MRAs-  in  Recreational  Craft,  EMC  and  Telecoms-  move  into  the  operational 
phase  while  sectors  such  as  pharmaceuticals  and  medical  devices  miss  deadlines  for 
implementation. 
Table  7.2  The  MRA  Annexes 
MRA  Set  I-  NTA 
(umbrella  agreement  signed  1997) 
MRA'Set  11-  TEP 
(under  negotiation  in  2001) 
Goods  Goods 
Telecommunications,  9  Road  Safety 
Medical  devices  *  Cosmetics 
Electromagnetic  compatibility  *  Marine  Safety  (MRA  +) 
Electrical  safety  Services 
Recreational  craft  Architecture 
Pharmaceuticals.  Engineering 
Insurance 
Ae  Motivation  for  Mutual  Recognition 
Mutual  recognition  is  a  method  of  trade  liberalization  that  is  both  an  alternate  and 
complimentary  approach  to  other  methods  of  regulatory  co-operation,  but  how  did 
mutual  recognition  come  onto  the  transatlantic  policy  agenda  and  why  was  it  chosen 
over  other  market  opening  strategies.  especially  harmonization?  Intergovernmental 
actors  had  a  number  ofmotivations  for  pursuing  mutual  recognition  in  addition  to  and 
215 as  an  alternate  for  a  strict  harmonization  strategy.  Put  plainly,  the  MRAs  are  a  means 
of  achieving  increased  market  access  at  the  lowest  political  cost. 
The  transatlantic  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  are  expected  to  affect  an 
estimated  $170  billion  of  trade  in  goods  and  services.  334  The  logic  behind  the  MPAs  is 
that  eliminating  redundant  testing  reduces  the  cost  of  exporting  for  manufacturers. 
Ambassador  Ralph  Ives  of  the  Unites  States  Trade  Representative  (USTR)  argued, 
'MRAs  can  also  save  regulatory  agencies  resources  by  enhancing  regulators' 
confidence  in  products  from  MRA  partners  and  reducing  the  need  to  test  and  inspect 
those  foreign  products'  (Ives  1997:  32).  A  1996  US  government  briefing  reported  that 
mutual  recognition  could  save  the  Federal  Drugs  Administration  $1.5  million  in  the 
pharmaceutical  sector  alone  335 
. 
Nicola:  fdis  (I  997a:  I  is  3)  argues  that  mutual  recognition  i 
more  beneficial  than  harmonization  in  this  respect  because  the  latter  does  not  always 
eliminate  the  cost  of  redundant  testing  procedures  as  governments  often  continue  to 
require  their  own  agencies  to  certify  products. 
Politically  the  costs  of  MRAs  are  also  lower  than  the  harmonization  of 
domestic  standards.  First,  mutual  recognition  fits  into  the  new  transatlantic 
framework  because  it  is  a  contractual  norm  rather  than  a  legal  proceeding,  thus  it  is  the 
result  of  negotiations  between  bureaucrats  rather  than  legislative  authorities 
(NicolaYdis  1997a:  1).  Like  the  TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TEP,  the  Mutual  Recognition 
Agreements  bypass  US  domestic  legislation,  thus  making  them  easier  to  negotiate. 
Second,  harmonization  is  very  difficult  to  achieve,  because  regulatory  officials, 
particularly  in  the  US.  fiercely  guard  sovereignty  336  (see  also  below).  Mutual 
33  -'  The  rough  figures  quoted  from  the  US  Mission  and  TABD  are  $50-60  billion  in  trade  under  the  first 
n 
framework  aareernent  and  $130  billion  in  a  services  framework  agreement. 
5  Based  on  the  assumption  that  each  Good  Manufacturing  Practices  (GMP)  pharmaceutical  plant 
inspection  the  FDA  performs  costs  the  agency  $100,000  and  150  such  inspections  are  performed  in  the 
FU  each  year  (see  White  House  1996b). 
-6  Interview  UK  Foreign  Office  official,  London  January  2000  (21).  See  also  Cowles  1997. 
216 recognition  results  in  only  a  limited  transfer  of  authority  because  it  does  not  require 
regulatory  agents  to  change  their  domestic  rules.  Specifically,  MRAs  do  not  require 
the  transfer  of  authority  to  a  supranational  body  (NicolaYdis  1997a:  4).  Thus,  they  are 
less  likely  to  attract  negative  attention  from  the  US  Congress  or  the  EU  Member 
States.  Third,  mutual  recognition  fits  well  into  the  practical  transatlantic  building 
block  strategy  because  they  are  less  time  consuming  that  harmonization,  which 
requires  constant  updating  and  amending  of  national  regulatory  systems  (Nicol  aYdis 
1997b:  3). 
Finally,  support  for  mutual  recognition  stems  from  its  external  spillover  from 
the  European  Single  Market  (Nicokffdis  1997a,  1997b;  Egan  2001a,  2001b).  Although 
MRAs  are  embedded  in  international  law  in  both  the  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade 
Agreement  and  the  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services,  they  are  not  the  result  of 
a  WTO  'top  down'  strategy  of  liberalisation,  but  rather  an  extension  of  the  EU's  new 
'Global  Approach'  to  the  internal-  market  (see  also  Egan  200  1  a;  2001  b).  NicolaYdis 
(1997a;  1997b)  argues  that  EU-US  mutual  recognition  negotiations  are  an  example  of 
both  normative  and  strategic  spillover.  In  negotiating  MRAs  with  countries  outside 
the  Union,  the  EU  has  made  mutual  recognition  a  symbol  of  European  integration. 
Strategically,  the  EU  was  able  to  shape  the  envirom-nent  of  transatlantic  negotiations 
because  mutual  recognition  is  an  area  where  EU  institutions  have  competency.  Thus, 
it  can  be  argued  that  the  US  was  able  to  draw  on  the  EU  experience  and  'ride  the 
wave'  of  the  internal  market  (NicolaYdis  1997a:  7). 
Not  only  has  mutual  recognition  spread  from  a  regional  to  a  plurilateral 
setting,  the  onset  Of  Mutual  recognition  within  the  new  transatlantic  marketplace  has 
sparked  a  further  breakdown  of  regulatory  barriers  to  trade.  For  example,  the  US 
National  Institute  of'  Standards  and  Technology  and  the  EU  National  Measures  Z-- 
217 Institute  signed  an  agreement  extending  mutual  recognition  to  test  reports,  calibration 
and  measurement  certificates  provided  for  regulatory  compliance.  The  Veterinary 
Equivalency  Agreement  extends  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition  to  animal 
standards.  Furthermore,  the  conclusion  of  the  first  phase  of  the  MRAs  enabled 
intergovernmental  leaders  to  set  the  precedent  for  the  negotiations  in  three  new  goods 
and  three  new  service  sectors. 
Political  obstacles  to  the  MRAs 
Mutual  recognition  in  the  transatlantic  marketplace  is  not  used  with  the  same  depth  or 
scope  found  in  the  European  single  market.  In  the  EU  mutual  recognition  applies  to 
the  full  equivalence  of  standards  rather  than  conformity  assessment  certification.  In 
other  words  within  the  EU  each  national  government  must  accept  the  regulations  of 
the  Member  States.  337  On  the  other  hand  the  transatlantic  MRAs,  barring  the  MRA  + 
in  marine  safety,  require  standards  agencies  to  test  products  using  both  EU  and  US 
standards  tests.  A  number  of  factors  blocked  further  and  faster  integration. 
First,  transatlantic  institutions  lack  the  depth  to  oversee  and  enforce  the  MRAs. 
European  mutual  recognition  has  been  established  legally  in  the  EU  through  the  Cassis 
de  Dijon  case,  and  is  legitimately  enforced  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  but  no 
overarching  institution  has  the  capacity  to  enforce  mutual  recognition. 
Second,  distinct  political  and  cultural  systems  different  negotiating  styles  in  the 
EU  and  the  US.  Drawing  on  the  logic  of  the  single  market,  the  EU  pushed  for  an 
agreement  that  would  cover  full  mutual  recognition  of  equivalence.  Contrary,  the  EU- 
US  MPAs  refer  only  to  testing  and  certitication  competence  (see  Pelkmans  1998; 
Nicola*fdis  1997b.  Egan  2001b)  because  US  officials  argued  that  in  some  sectors  full 
See  Nicoldfdis  I  997aý  1997bý  E-an  200  1  a:  200  1b 
218 MRAs  would  not  be  compatible  with  domestic  legal  systems  (Ives  1997:  28;  Vogel 
1998).  Instead  US  negotiators  took  the  position  that  a  less  ambitious,  but  more 
pragmatic  strategy  should  be  pursued,  assuming  the  basic  requirement  of  limiting  the 
duplication  of  testing  standards  was  fulfilled. 
Third,  in  a  situation  that  mimics  the  Seattle  WTO  negotiations,  disagreement 
surfaced  over  where  to  apply  mutual  recognition.  The  US  negotiators  argued  in  favour 
of  sector  by  sector  negotiations  on  the  basis  that  involving  too  many  sectors  would 
mean  involving  more  regulatory  agencies  and  thus  increase  the  possibility  of  a  higher, 
unreachable  threshold  for  agreement.  The  EU  favored  a  framework  approach  which 
trade  officials  hoped  would  encourage  the  spillover  of  mutual  recognition  to.  further 
sectors  (Ives  1997;  NicolaYdis  1997a;  1997b;  Egan  2001a;  2001b).  The  Commission, 
however,  did  insist  on  a  'balanced  package'.  Horton  (1998:  648)  argues,  'it  would  not 
agree  to  MRAs  on  telecommunications  and  recreational  craft  -  viewed  as 
advantageous  to  the  United  States-  unless  there  also  was  MR-A  coverage  of 
pharmaceuticals-  viewed  as  advantageous  to  the  EU.  ' 
Another  barrier  to  MRA  negotiations  stems  from  the  EU  and  US  regulatory 
processes,  which  are  defined  by  different  institutional  structures  and  legal 
requirements.  For  example,  differences  exist  in  the  right  of  access  for  private  actors  in 
either  system  (see  below).  In  terms  of  implementation  the  US  federal  structure  has 
been  blamed  for  blocking  more  comprehensive  agreements  and  blocking 
implementation,  because  the  national  level  is  bound  legally  to  respect  the  rights  of 
individual  states,  particularly  in  services  sectors.  338  Faced  with  this  EU  Commission 
officials  have  accused  the  US  regulatory  bodies  of  'not  being  able  to  deliver.  339 
Interview,  UK  Forci-n  Office,  January,  London  2000  (21). 
Interview.  European  Commission,  DG  Trade,  Brussels  (  15). 
219 As  a  result  of  two  distinct  and  equally  complex  procedures,  many  actors-  both 
private  and  public-  play  a  role  in  setting  and  shaping  regulatory  policy.  Although  the 
impetus  for  agreements  came  from  intergovernmental  actors  under  the  NTA  and  TEP 
340  frameworks 
,  the  policy  details  of  the  MRA's  were  derived  from  negotiations  among 
and  between  transgovernmental  and  transnational  actors  with  consideration  to  the 
political  concerns  addressed  in  this  section.  Sections  2  and  3  elaborate  on  the  role 
played  by  these  actors.  Each  points  to  competing  forces  at  work  in  the  MRA  process. 
One  consists  of  transgovernmental  actors  fighting  over  their  sovereign  right  to  control 
the  regulatory  process,  the  other  is  made  up  of  transnational  actors  struggling  to  obtain 
information  and  subsequently  exert  influence  over  international  standards.  341 
2)  Transgovernmental  Trade  and  Domestic  Regulatory  Authorities 
While  the  political  decision  to  pursue  MRAs  came  from  the  top,  the  policy  was  set  and 
shaped  by  a  number  of  transgovernmental  and  domestic  actors.  The  MRA  process 
demonstrates  the  important  role  played  by  these  actors,  particularly  in  the  negotiation 
of  policy  details  and  the  process  of  confidence  building  in  the  transition  phase  of  the 
MRAs. 
34" 
The  USTR  Charlene  Barshefsky  and  former  European  Commissioner  Leon 
Brittan  signed  the  first  EU-US  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  in  1997,  thus 
effectively  setting  the  policy  for  MR-As.  34  -"  The  MRA  is  an  umbrella  agreement  that 
340  One  FDA  official  argued  it  was  a  'political  decision  to  have  internal  MRAs,  there  was  no  option  on 
the  part  of  technical  agencies'  (3  6). 
341  This  point  was  made  by  a  US  Mission  official  in  an  interview  conducted  September  1999,  Brussels. 
,  42  The  MRAs  undergo  two  phases  before  the  agreements  are  operational  in  individual  sectors.  First,  the 
negotiations  follows  the  political  decision  to  pursue  MRAs  but  predates  the  signing  of  the  agreement. 
The  transition  phase  is  a  confidence  building  process,  which  follows  the  si  ning  of  the  agreement  but  9 
precedes  full  implementation.  The  operational  phase  of  the  MRAs  marks  the  point  when  the  agreements 
are  in  working  order.  The  negotiation  and  transitional  phases  are  the  primary  focus  of  this  discussion  as  n 
onk,  three  MRAs  ,  ýere  fulk  operational  at  the  time  of  \ýriting, 
,  03  EU  decision  inakino  procedures  require  Council  ratification  which  was  given  on  22  June  1998.  The 
negotiation  of  the  second  set  of  MRAs  has  yet  to  be  concluded. 
220 allows  mutual  recognition  to  be  implemented  in  seven  annexes  (see  table  7.2).  The 
Office  of  USTR  and  DG  I  (now  DG  Trade)  aided  by  the  US  Commerce  Department 
and  DG  III  (now  DG  Industry)  played  a  large  role  in  setting  and  shaping  the 
overarching  agreement.  However,  the  complexity  of  both  EU  and  US  regulatory 
systems  dictated  that  many  transgovernmental  actors  had  a  role  in  policy  shaping  in 
the  individual  annexes.  The  NTA  and  the  TEP  delegated  the  task  of  facilitating 
mutual  recognition  to  trade  officials  within  transatlantic  institutions,  but  the 
technocratic  nature  of  mutual  recognition  and  the  need  for  confidence  building  also  led 
to  the  entrenchment  of  transatlantic  regulatory  networks.  Examination  of 
transgovernmental  and  domestic  actors  is  interesting  in  the  context  of  this  discussion 
because  it  displays  the  interplay  of  interests  between  not  only  EU  and  the  US 
negotiators  but  between  domestic  regulatory  and  trade  officials,  particularly  in  the  US. 
Regulatory  Autonomy  in  a  Trade  Driven  Process 
Both  EU  and  US  regulatory  systems  involve  a  complex  interplay  between  many 
different  department  agencies,  standards  setting  bodies  and  legislative  bodies. 
Negotiation  and  confidence  building  in  the  MRA  process  was  complicated  by  the 
clashing  interests  of  regulatory  and  trade  officials  and  by  the  institutional  'mismatch' 
of  the  EU  and  US  regulatory  systems.  Two  main  differences  surfaced  in  the  MRA 
negotiations:  contrasting  systems  of  regulatory  accountability  and  cultures  of  tl 
regulatory  autonomy  (NicolaYdis  1997a).  Institutional  asymmetries  were  a  source  of 
conflict  in  the  MRA  process,  because,  notes  Stuart  Eizenstat,  'We  found  that  we  have 
entirely  different  regLilator,,  reoirnes"  (quoted  in  Cowles  2001:  225).  The  fierce 
protection  over  autonorny  exercised  by  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA),  in 
the  medical  devices  and  pharmaceuticals  annexes,  and  to  a  lesser  extent.  the 
221 Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Administration  (OSHA),  in  the  electrical  safety 
annex,  led  to  claims  that  US  regulatory  agents  were,  'obsessed  with  giving  up 
344 
sovereignty' 
The  accountability  of  EU  standards  was  brought  into  question  because  EU 
regulatory  authorities  rely  more  on  private  conformity  assessment  bodies  (CABs)  for 
product  testing  standards  than  their  US  counterparts.  US  regulatory  agents, 
particularly  the  FDA,  were  opposed  to  the  EU  system  of  private  CABs.  The  medical 
device  negotiations  were  prolonged  because  the  FDA  was  initially  unable  and 
unwilling  to  transfer  regulatory  authority  to  third  parties.  While  the  EU  argued  that 
private  third  party  assessment  bodies  should  be  able  to  certify  in  accordance  with  FDA 
standards,  FDA  officials  claimed  they  could  not  delegate  the  ultimate  authority  to 
approve  the  private  third  party  reports  or  manufacturing  facilities  inspections  (Ives 
1997:  30).  FDA  opposition  was  only  curbed  when  the  FDA  Modernization  Act  (1.997) 
altered  the  scope  of  FDA  control  and  allowed  delegation  of  authority  to  third  party 
assessment  bodies  (Egan  2001  b:  15). 
NicolaYdis  (1997b:  19)  argues  that  contrary  to  US  fears,  there  is  a  very 
symbiotic  relationship  in  the  EU  between  the  private  and  public  sector  and  that 
accountability  is  high  because  the  European  Organization  for  Testing  and 
Certification-  a  government  agency-  oversees  CABs.  Two  main  organizations,  Comit6 
Europ6en  de  Normalisation  (CEN)  and  the  ComA6  Europ6en  de  Normalisation 
Electrotechnique  (CENELEC),  coordinate  various  national  standards  bodies  and  over 
40  regulatory  organizations  (see  also  Egan  2001:  8-9).  Z-- 
Zý 
On  the  other  hand,  it  can  be  argued  that  accountability  is  not  as  visible  in  the 
US  system  where  there  is  no  authoritative  body  in  charge  of  regulatory  agents.  US 
Quoted  froni  interview  with  UK  Foreign  Office  Official,  January  2000  (2  1).  n 
222 regulatory  policy  is  both  highly  fragmented  (see  Egan  2001b)  and  decentralised.  (see 
Cowles  1997).  The  US  system  relies  heavily  on  voluntary  conformity  from  over  four- 
hundred  federal  and  state,  trade  and  industry  associations,  scientific  and  technical 
societies.  The  American  National  Standards  Institute  (ANSI)  does  serve  as  an 
'administrator'  and  'coordinator'  of  the  private  sector  voluntary  standardization 
system,  however  Egan  (2001b:  24)  notes  that  the  ANSI  does  not  set  standards  itself 
and  that  not  all  standards  bodies  are  members.  345  Thus,  EU  officials  worried  about 
capacity  of  the  US  to  guarantee  regulatory  quality  given  the  lack  of  accountability  (see 
also  Nicola:  fdis  1997b;  Egan  2001  b:  14).  To  compensate  for  this  problem  the  National 
Institute  on  Standards  -  an  agent  of  the  Commerce  Department-  created  the  National 
Voluntary  Conformity  Assessment  Program  to  accredit  conformity  assessment  in  the 
us. 
EU  officials  believed  US  accountability  was  further  threatened  by  the 
autonomous  role  of  many  US  regulatory  agencies.  The  Federal  Drug  Administration, 
the  Federal  Communications  Commission,  the  Federal  Aviation  Agency,  the  Defense 
Department  and  the  National  Institute  on  Standards  and  Technology  (NIST)  all 
operate  separately  and  are  governed  by  individual  statutes  from  Congress.  The  high 
degree  of  autonomy  experienced  by  US  regulatory  agencies  means  that  sovereignty  is 
guarded  very  closely.  According  to  Cowles  (1997:  3  5)  'the  statutory  independence  of 
the  agencies  meant  that  regulatory  officials  had  their  own  independent  mindset  and 
turf  to  defend  as  well.  ' 
Generally  rivalry  between  trade  and  regulatory  agencies  stems  not  only  from 
competition  over  regulatory  authority,  but  because  the  trade  and  regulatory  officials  z:  I  I 
inherently  perform  different  functions  and  have  different  goals.  Ives  (1997:  29)  adds 
Including  Prominent  or,,  anisation  such  as  the  American  Society  for  Testing  Material  and  the 
International  Institute  of  EmOneers  (IIE)  (Egan  2001  b). 
223 that  negotiations  were  difficult  because  'A  successful  negotiation  requires  regulatory 
authorities  to  cooperate  with  trade  officials  ... 
But  the  agencies  almost  speak  different 
languages-  the  regulators  in  scientific  terms,  the  trade  agencies  in  economic  terms.  ' 
One  US  NGO  simplified  the  divide  by  arguing,  'One  builds  things,  the  other  knocks 
things  down.  ' 
346 
Conflict  between  trade  and  regulatory  officials  was  particularly  cumbersome  in 
the  US.  A  delicate  balance  between  the  European  Commission  (both  DGI  and  DGIII), 
national  regulatory  bodies  and  the  private  sector  had  already  been  met  within  the 
single  market  requirement.  US  regulatory  agents,  on  the  other  hand  did  not  have  the 
same  experience  with  MRAs  and  some  were  'less  comfortable'  with  the  notion  of 
mutual  recognition.  347  Clashes  between  trade  and  regulatory  officials  are  most  evident 
in  the  medical  devices  and  pharmaceutical  annexes  of  the  MRA,  where  the  FDA  has 
US  domestic  authority,  and  in  the  electrical  safety  annex,  which  is  under  the 
jurisdiction  of  OSHA.  While  the  FDA  was  not  opposed  directly  to  mutual  recognition, 
it  did  express  concern  about  the  transfer  of  authority  to  private  actors,  EU  regulatory 
agents  and  US  trade  officials.  FDA  officials  were  keen  to  demonstrate  that  the,  'legal 
authority  to  regulate  is  placed  with  FDA,  not  Commerce,  not  USTR.  '  348  The  FDA 
argued  that  the  statutory  authority  of  the  agency  could  not  be  delegated  to  other 
bodies.  Within  the  NTA  process,  State  Department  and  USTR  officials  sought  to 
convince  the  FDA  that  MR-As  did  not  affect  their  statutory  mission.  The 
Modernization  Act  of  the  Federal  Food,  Drug  and  Cosmetic  Act  (1997)  outlined 
Congress's  expectations  for  the  MR-As.  FDA  was  directed  in  consultation  with  the 
Secretary  of  Commerce  to  support  the  Trade  Representative  in  reaching  agreement 
316  Interview  v,,  ith  TAED  official,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (30). 
347  Interview  with  USTR  official,  Washington  DC.  October  2000  (43), 
,  48  Interview  with  FDA  official,  Maryland,  October  2000  (38). 
224 with  the  EU  on  all  products  under  the  FDA's  jurisdiction  given  that  there  is  no 
reduction  in  standards  levels  (Merrill  1998:  742). 
Regulatory  officials  were  initially  opposed  to  setting  up  a  joint  EU-US 
committee  to  oversee  conformity  assessment  because  of  the  potential  opportunity  for 
trade  agencies  to  dominate  (see  Ives  1997)  and  opposed  the  negotiation  of  an 
overarching  umbrella  agreement  or  TU  packaging'  of  the  annexes  driven  by  USTR. 
Sharon  Holston,  Deputy  Commissioner  for  External  Affairs  for  the  FDA  testified  in 
front  of  the  House  Committee  on  Commerce,  Subcommittee  on  Oversight  and 
Investigations  that,  'There  were  clearly  times  during  the  negotiations  when  DG-I 
negotiators  operated  under  the  assumption  that  trade  issues  were  paramount  in  the 
negotiation.  It  was  made  clear  to  them,  however,  that  for  legal  and  policy  reasons 
health  and  safety  issues  would  govern.  '  349  FDA  also  requested  a  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  (MOU)  with  USTR  to  secure  clear  authority  for  the  FDA  in  the 
sectoral  annexes  and  a  reserved  'observer'  role  for  USTR  in  Joint  Committee  meetings 
where  FDA  annexes  were  discussed  (see  below) 
.3 
50  A  FDA  official  argued,  'on 
anything  that  affected  FDA,  we  were  in  charge.  '  351 
The  MRAs  are  thus  seen  not  a  transfer  of  authority  to  from  the  FDA  to  EU 
regulatory  bodies  but  as  a  'contract  for  service'.  352  In  such  an  agreement  the  role  of  a 
trading  partner  is  not  that  of  law  maker  but  rather  that  of  information  source  or  service 
provider  (Merrill  1998).  Under  the  Modernization  Act  FDA  is  still  responsible  to 
Congress  for  the  standards,  thus  interest  in  assuring  that  mutual  recognition  partners 
1119  Statement  by  Sharon  Smith  I  lolston,  Deputy  Commissioner  for  External  Affairs  Food  and  Drug 
Administration  Department  of  Health  and  Human  Services,  Before  the  Subcommittee  on  Oversight  and 
In  vest  ityations  Committee  on  Commerce.  US  [louse  of  Representatives,  2  October  1998.  1 
FDA  official  argued  on  the  Joint  Committee,  that  we  wanted  to  make  certain  that  we  are 
spokesperson. 
Interview  with  FDA  official,  Maryland.  October  2000  (38). 
225 maintain  the  same  level  of  equivalence.  MRA  negotiation  and  implementation  was 
delayed,  however,  because  the  period  of  confidence  building  failed  to  convince  FDA 
of  the  equivalence  of  all  Member  States  standards.  Some  argue  that  the  existence  of 
regulatory  culture  in  the  FDA  prevents  the  FDA  from  co-operating  because  the  FDA 
believes  in  the  high  level  of  its  standards.  353  One  FDA  official  argued  that,  'FDA  has  a 
proud  history.  (Initially)  we  felt  no  need  to  play  in  this-  we  are  used  to  being 
authoritative.  '  354  Further,  the  FDA  had  problems  accepting  the  equality  and 
equivalency  of  standards  across  the  15  Member  States.  One  FDA  official  commented, 
'FDA  knew  Europe  was  not  'whole'.  '  A  US  trade  official  affirmed  the  American 
perception  that,  'Portuguese  standards  are  not  the  same  as  those  in  the  UK.  '  As  a 
result  of  a  lack  of  confidence  between  the  FDA  and  member  state  regulatory  officials, 
FDA  was  only  able  to  approve  testing  certification  in  one  member  state,  the  UK,  by 
2001  December  deadline  for  implementation.  355 
Ultimately  the  MR-As  seek  to  reduce  the  cost  of  exporting  to  producers  and  the 
cost  of  duplicate  testing  for  domestic  regulators,  however,  making  domestic  systems 
MRA  'ready'  is  also  costly.  FDA  officials  argue  that  the  agency  has  spent  'significant' 
in  promoting  MRAs  out  of  'nominal  budgets.  356  Misunderstanding  over  the  cost  of 
processing  applications  for  conformity  assessment  under  the  MRA  led  to  'differences 
in  interpretation'  between  OSHA  and  the  Commission  and  delayed  the  approval  of 
European  CABs  capable  of  implernenting  OSHA  assessments.  OSHA  claimed  that  it 
was  able  to  charge  fees  for  'processing'  applications  for  conformity  assessment  under 
,  52  The  United  States  enters  into  an  agreement  with  a  trading  partner  under  the  expectation  that  the 
trading  partner  will  take  steps  to  help  FDA  perform  its  primary  function  of  applying  domestic  legal 
standards  to  products  imported  into  the  United  States.  ' 
See  Millen  1998, 
,  i4  Interview  FDA,  Maryland,  October  2000  (38). 
,  55  Alden  2001,  Financial  Times 
Interviews  with  FDA  officials,  Maryland,  October  2000  (36-38). 
226 the  MRA,  but  the  Commission  argued  that  OSHA  ran  the  risk  of  duplicating  fee 
assessment  (OSHA  2000). 
Further  conflict  in  the  MRA  negotiations  resulted  from  the  domestic 
orientation  of  US  regulatory  agencies  and  their  lack  of  experience  with  the  EU  single 
market  system.  Conflict  arose  over  the  FDA's  refusal  to  accept  European  certification 
of  testing  reports  in  lieu  of  the  full  reports.  357  FDA  officials  argued  their  statutory 
authority  required  FDA  officials  to  review  the  full  reports,  which  caused  'enormous 
difficulties'  with  EU  officials  in  the  MRA  negotiations.  A  FDA  official  argued,  'there 
was  a  lot  of  pressure  not  to  hold  to  this  position-  they  thought  we  were  being 
arbitrary'.  The  problem  was  defused  by  language  whereby  the  FDA  accepted  that  it 
would  'normally'  be  able  to  accept  certification  and  by  new  efforts  to  secure  a 
common  inspector  report  format.  358  One  FDA  official  blamed  delayed 
implementation  of  the  FDA  annexes  on  the  fact  that  much  documentation  on  the 
Member  States  legal  and  regulatory  systems  was  provided  in  native  languages. 
Language  differences  also  arose  in  the  electrical  safety  MRA.  Although  three 
European  companies  had  applied  for  OSHA  approval  to  certify  products,  two  were  not 
considered  because  the  applications  were  made  in  French  and  Spanish.  One  OSHA 
official  argued,  'We're  a  domestic  health  and  safety  agency,  we  don't  do  translations' 
(Alden  2001). 
Balancing  the  Trade  and  Regulatory  Camps 
The  conceptual  i  sation  of  an  EU-IJS  MRA  did  not  originate  within  the  NTA  process,  359 
however  the  intergovernmental  decision  to  pursue  the  agreements  brought  mutual 
3ý7  Interview  with  FDA  officials,  Maryland,  October  2000,  (36,37,38)  EU  Commission  delegation 
official.  Washington  DC.  October  2000  (35) 
FDA  interviews,  (36,37) 
"9  FDA  began  discussions  with  the  Commission  as  carly  as  1992. 
227 recognition  into  the  NTA  decision  making  process  and  put  transatlantic  actors  at  the 
'steering  wheel'  of  the  negotiations.  Transatlantic  institutions  played  a  key  role  in 
pushing  negotiations  ahead  and  striking  a  balance  between  trade  and  regulatory 
authorities.  First,  transatlantic  institutions  under  the  New  Transatlantic  Agenda  drove 
the  MRA  process  forward.  The  MRA's  were  the  result  of  endless  negotiations  of 
experts  through  the  transatlantic  institutions  before  the  EU-US  Summit  where  the 
MRA  framework  agreement  was  announced  . 
360  The  Senior  Level  Group  and  the  TEP 
Steering  Group,  which  bring  together  trade  officials,  were  charged  with  monitoring  the 
process,  identifying  achievable  goals  on  a  sector  by  sector  basis  and  setting  a  number 
of  deadlines  for  practical  tasks.  The  TEP  Steering  Group  also  takes  recommendations 
from  the  transatlantic  dialogues,  and  initiates  information  exchanges  between  EU  and 
US  experts,  for  example  by  holding  meetings  between  architects  and  engineers  (TEP 
Steering  Group  2000).  Under  the  NTA  process  regulatory  agents  in  the  annexes  were 
tied  into  the  umbrella  time  frame  and  trade  authorities  maintained  control  over  the 
overarching  process.  One  USTR  official  argued  that  the  NTA,  'essentially  put  USTR 
in  charge  of  what  they  should  be,  management  of  the  issues.  361  The  NTA  process 
pushed  domestic  regulators  to  meet  deadlines,  and  one  FDA  official  notes,  '  we've 
been  able  to  accomplish  much  more  than  we  thought.  '  362 
In  addition,  the  MRA  umbrella  agreement  created  new  transatlantic 
ýinstitutionsý  to  facilitate  the  existing  MRAs.  First,  it  established  a  new  transatlantic 
process  for  designation  of  procedures  for  mutual  conformity  assessment.  European 
and  American  domestic  actors  were  joined  in  Designating  Authorities  which  were 
assigned  to  each  sector  iii  the  MRA  agreement.  For  example,  in  the  medical  devices 
sector  the  FDA  and  member  state  regulatory  bodies  were  charged  with  approving  and 
,  60  Interview  Council  Presidency  official,  Brussels,  September  1999  (5). 
Interview  USTR  official,  Washington  DC.  October  2000  (42). 
228 then  monitoring  private  conformity  assessment  bodies  in  the  EU  and  the  US  and  to 
exchange  information  on  the  acceptability  of  private  conformity  assessment  bodies. 
Second,  despite  initial  objections  from  US  regulatory  agencies  (see  above)  and 
NGOs  (see  below)  a  Joint  Committee  was  created  of  EU  and  US  officials.  This 
committee  is  responsible  for  making  sure  the  agreement  functions.  It  thus  serves  an 
administrative  role  and  as  an  extra  'check'  for  conformity  assessment  bodies.  The 
Joint  Committee  provides  a  forum  for  discussion  and  helps  coordinate  the  negotiation 
of  extra  sectors.  Finally,  on  a  working  level  six  Joint  Sectoral  Committees  were  also 
established  to  assist  the  Joint  Committee  and  oversee  technical  implementation. 
Each  of  these  played  an  important  part  in  the  confidence  building  process.  It 
was  the  motivation  of  market  access  that  drove  the  process  forward  and  helped 
overcome  the  staunch  protectionist  positions  of  many  domestic  regulators.  These  new 
institutions  are  a  forum  for  information  sharing  and  problem  solving.  In  short,  they 
establish  a  pattern  of  co-operation  between  EU  and  US  officials  and  trade  and 
regulatory  agents. 
Table  7.3.  MRA  Institutions 
Institution  Role 
Designating  Authorities  Approve  and  monitor  CABs 
Joint  Committee  Co-ordinate  the  negotiation,  transition  of 
annexes  between  trade  and  regulatory  agents 
Joint  Sectoral  Committee  Oversee  technical  implementation 
Conformity  Assessment  Bodies  (CABs)  Conduct  certification  testing 
The  argument  being  made  here  is  this:  trade  officials  and  regulatory  agencies  clashed 
in  the  MRA  negotiations  because  each  had  a  different  stake  in  the  process.  Regulators 
,  62  Interview.  FDA  official,  Maryland.  October  2000  (38). 
229 sought  to  protect  the  level  of  domestic  standards  and  the  authority  to  establish  these 
standards.  Trade  officials  fought  to  reduce  different  testing  procedures  as  a  barrier  to 
trade  and  to  keep  the  MRA  process  moving.  Despite  these  centrifugal  forces,  the  new 
level  of  transgovernmental  institutionalization  provided  a  forum  for  managing  the 
process.  363  A  working  relationship  was  established  whereby  trade  officials  maintained 
control  over  the  umbrella  agreement  and  regulatory  agents  retained  authority  in  the 
individual  annexes. 
3)  Transnational  Input:  The  Role  of  the  Transatlantic  Civil  Society 
The  MRAs  are  a  case  that  also  demonstrates  the  capacity  of  private  and  non- 
governmental  actors  to  shape  transatlantic  policy.  The  TABD,  the  TACD  and  the 
TAED  endeavoured  to  shape  MRA  decisions.  Given  their  conflicting  goals,  the 
business  and  social  based  dialogues  formed  separate  alignments  with  the  regulatory 
and  trade  camps.  The  TABD  agenda  naturally  aligns  with  trade  authorities  ambitions 
to  eliminate  redundant  testing  procedures.  On  the  other,  consumers  and 
environmentalists  have  reiterated  regulatory  agents'  fears  about  a  reduction  in  the 
level  of  health,  safety  and  environmental  standards. 
The  Role  of  TABD 
The  TABD  has  been  a  staunch  supporter  of  the  MRAs  and  has  been  actively  involved 
364 
with  the  agreements  since  its  creation  in  1995 
. 
MR-As  benefit  industry  because  they 
seek  to  reduce  duplicate  testing  procedures.  The  bottom  line  is  that  these  tests  are 
costly.  and  the  MRAs  are  a  means  to  reducing  the  cost  of  exporting.  This  reduction 
benefits  the  exporters  directly.  as  a  TABD  advisor  argues  that  a  typical  US 
Argued  by  TABD  official,  interview,  Brussels,  September  1999  (14). 
230 manufacturer  may  spend  $50,000-100,000  annually  complying  with  foreign  regulatory 
requirements  (Stern  1997). 
The  TABD  took  an  active  interest  in  MRA  negotiations  on  a  political  and 
technical  level.  First,  it  created  the  Transatlantic  Advisory  Committee  on  Standards 
(TACS)  made  up  of  industry  experts  from  the  working  group  on  regulatory  co- 
operation  Ao  investigates  ways  that  regulatory  standards  could  be  harmonised  on  a 
sector  by  sector  basis.  Within  four  months  of  its  creation  the  TACS  was  able  to 
provide  EU  and  US  officials  with  a  clear  outline  of  where  EU  and  US  industry  felt 
MRAs  were  feasible.  365  Thus,  on  a  technical  level,  the  TACD  was  able  to  provide  the 
EU  and  US  governments  with  specific  information  that  could  facilitate  mutual 
recognition  in  a  number  of  sectors. 
On  a  political  level,  the  TABD  exerted  constant  pressure  on  the  EU  and  the  US 
to  meet  these  proposals.  366  At  the  TABD  conference  in  Chicago  EU  and  US  officials 
agreed  to  a  deadline  for  agreement  on  MPAs  in  the  original  sectors  by  January  31 
1997.  When  this  deadline  slipped,  TABD  publicly  criticised  the  US  Administration 
and  the  Commission  for  failing  to  conclude  the  agreement.  The  TABD  chairs  sent 
letters  to  Clinton  and  Santer  and  stepped  up  their  campaign  through  frequent  meetings 
with  officials,  exerting  pressure  on  the  Administration  through  the  US  Commerce 
department.  The  TABD  became  deeply  embedded  in  the  MRA  decision  making 
process  (see  also  Cowles  2001a;  2001b),  and  had  representatives  present  when  the 
agreements  were  finally  signed  in  June  1997  (TABD  1998).  The  Financial  Times 
While  some  officials  (interviews  38,39,41)  have  argued  that  MRA  neaotiations  existed  before  the 
TABD  was  created.  arguably  the  most  progress  was  made  after  the  creation  of  the  TABD. 
'6'  In  May  1996  it  released  a  progress  report  listing  priority  areas  for  regulatory  co-operation  (see 
wxNkv.  tabd.  gov). 
366  Interview,  USTR  official,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (41);  US  Commerce  official,  Washington 
DC.  October  (52). 
231 reported  'The  key  to  final  approval  of  the  MRA  was  the  Transatlantic  Business 
Dialogue'  (June  19  1997). 
The  TABD  has  continued  to  monitor  the  progress  of  the  annexes  in  the 
transitional  phase  of  the  MRAs.  The  TABD  Scorecard  (issued  mid  year  since  1998) 
identifies  government  successes  and  failures  in  the  individual  MRA  sectors.  The 
TABD  (1999,2000)  has  publicly  criticised  the  delayed  implementation  of  the  medical 
devices  and  electrical  safety  annexes,  and  warned  that  failure  to  implement  all  of  the 
annexes  on  time  would  undermine  credibility  of  the  entire  process. 
Trade  officials  have  continually  praised  the  TABD  for  its  role  in  the  MRA 
process.  Numerous  high-ranking  officials  have  highlighted  the  role  of  TABD,  and 
even  the  TEP  agreement  notes  its  contribution.  Commissioner  Brittan  (1997),  "  noted 
the  vital  input  of  TABD'.  US  Commerce  Secretary  Daley  argued,  'TABD  said  it  was 
important,  we  heard  them  and  we  acted.  '  President  Clinton  (1996)  thanked  the  TABD, 
'for  their  leadership  in  achieving  these  agreements'  and  USTR  Barshefsky  (1997) 
claimed,  'We  could  not  have  achieved  this  (MRA)  package  without  the  Transatlantic 
Business  Dialogue.  EU  Trade  Commissioner  Lamy  (1999)  told  TABD  members,  'It  is 
quite  clear  that  I  have  much  less  influence  over  the  process  now  than  when  I 
participated  in  it  as  a  member.  '  367 
TABD's  influence  in  the  MRA  process  was  most  recognised  among  trade 
officials  at  a  political  rather  than  a  technical  level.  Commerce  and  USTR  officials 
argued  that  TABD  played  'a  huge  role'  in  the  MRA  process.  368  On  the  other  hand, 
FDA  officials  have  downplayed  the  role  of'  TABD  in  the  negotiations,  referring  to 
FDA  and  TABD  interaction  as  'briefings'  rather  than  dialogue.  369  The  TABD  has  an 
,  67  For  a  list  of  more  supportive  comments  for  TABD  see.  'What  They've  Said  About  TABU  available 
ýN'wxN'.  tabd.  coiii/resoLii-ces/content,  /qLiotes.  htiiiI 
,  68  Quoted  frorn  FU  Delegation  Official.  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (35). 
,  69  FDA  interviews  (38,39). 
232 ally  in  USTR  and  Commerce,  because  its  goals  are  trade,  not  regulatory  in  nature.  The 
divide  is  a  natural  phenomenon  because  trade  officials,  businesspeople,  regulators  and 
the  civil  society  dialogues  do  not  have  parallel  interests  in  the  MRA  process.  370  For 
example,  TABD  pushed  for  the  decentralisation  of  regulatory  co-operation  between 
the  EU  and  the  US,  a  policy  directly  opposed  by  the  FDA  and  the  NGOs.  371  A  TABD 
advisor  argued  that  US  regulatory  agencies  and  civil  society  networks,  who  oppose  the 
transfer  of  authority  to  business,  were  obstacles  to  the  international  liberalisation  of 
regulatory  standards  (Stern  1996). 
The  role  of  TACD  and  TAED 
The  EU-US  MRAs  have  been  controversial  among  the  NGO  community  in  the  US. 
Whereas  European  NGOs  have  had  experience  with  mutual  recognition  in  the  single 
market,  one  US  Trade  officials  notes,  'American  NGOs  do  not  understand  the  MRAs.  ' 
372  An  EU  official  argued  that  American  NGOs  are  learning  from  European  through 
373 
the  TACD  and  the  TAED 
, 
but  many  US  members  have  opposed  the  MRAs  on  a 
political  and  technical  level.  On  a  political  level,  these  groups  have  teamed  up  with 
FDA  in  opposing  'delegated  governance',  trade  control  over  the  regulatory  process, 
and  the  influence  of  TABD.  374  On  a  technical  level  the  TACD  and  TAED  has 
expressed  concerns  about  a  downward  spiral  of  health  and  safety  standards  and  the 
cost  to  consumers  and  government  agencies. 
370  Interview,  US  Commerce  official,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (52). 
37  '  TABD  supported  FDA  reforms,  in  order  to  make  the  agency  more  compliant  with  the  EU  regulatory 
system  of  private  conformity  assessment  (Stern  1997). 
372  One  EU  official  argued  that  on  the  'European  side  everyone  knows  about  MRAs  because  of  the' 
single  market,  but  US  NGOs  believed  the  US  Administration  was  telling  lies.  '  Interview,  European 
Commission  Delegation,  Washington,  2000  (34). 
373  Interview,  EU  Commission  Delegation,  Washington,  2000  (34). 
374  one  TACD  member  argued,  'we  have  better  communication  with  FDA'.  Interview,  US  NGO, 
Washington  DC,  October  2000,  (50). 
233 Despite  attempts  by  the  trade  official-TABD  coalition  to  convince  NGOs  of 
the  safety  of  MRAs  375 
,  many  groups  hold  'deep  reservations'  about  the  agreements 
(see  CEO  1998b).  In  short  they  argue  that  MRAs  could  lead  to  a  downward  spiral  or 
lowest  common  denominator  of  health,  safety  and  environmental  standards  (de  -Brie 
1999,  TACD  1998:  3).  Environmentalists  and  consumers  have  continually  argued  that 
international  standards  must  not  be  harmonised  down,  but  rather  improved  (TACD 
1998:  3).  Not  all  consumer  groups  are  against  MRAs  completely,  376  but  the  TACD  has 
specifically  asked  the  government  to  distinguish  between  standards  which  effect  health 
and  safety  and  those  that  do  not.  A  TACD  (2000)  briefing  paper  states,  'Equivalence- 
377  based  mutual  recognition  is  inappropriate  for  use  with  substantive  standards.  ' 
. 
A  second  opposition  to  the  MRAs  is  the  cost  of  negotiation  and 
implementation.  It  is  estimated  that  just  one  sector  (pharmaceuticals)  cost  the  FDA 
$10  million  to  comply  with  the  MRA  agreement  . 
378  NGOs  argue  that  the  benefits  of 
MRAs  are  direct  to  producers,  thus  cost  should  be  shifted  to  the  private,  rather  than 
public  sector.  One  TAED  (2000)  paper  maintains  that,  'Given  such  a  hefty  price  tag 
for  this  annex  and  the  MRA  as  a  whole,  a  case  must  be  made  directly  to  consumers  on 
both  continents  who  must  be  assured  that  there  will  be  an  improvement  in  their  public 
health  and  safety  protection  to  justify  this  cost.  ' 
Government  officials  have  actively  tried  to  portray  the  MRAs  as  environmental,  consumer  and 
labour  friendly.  When  the  MRAs  were  signed  Barshevsky  argued,  'The  real  winners  today  are 
manufacturers,  workers,  and  consumers,  both  in  American  and  in  Europe  who  will  see  reduced  costs, 
increasedjobs,  and  a  better  standard  of  living'  (1997).  At  the  TACD's  second  meeting  in  February 
2000,  the  EU  head  of  Unit  for  DG  Trade  argued  that  by  facilitating  trade  MRAs  would  benefit 
consumers  by  creating  lower  prices  and  greater  choice  (Petriccione  2000). 
376  Interview,  TACD  official,  January  2000,  London  (24). 
377  EU  and  US  officials  have  argued  that  MRAs  do  not  undermine  health  and  safety  because  they  do  not 
change  existing  domestic  standards.  However,  a  TAED  (2000)  draft  paper  states  that  'mutual 
recognition  allows  for  imprecise,  subjective  comparison  of  what  may  be  vastly  different  democratically 
achieved  regulatory  standards.  '  In  addition,  it  is  argued  that  there  are  no  adequate  provisions  for 
amendments,  termination,  dispute  resolution,  public  participation  or  congressional  oversight. 
378  TACD  (2000). 
234 The  TACD  has  also  vocalised  opposition  to  the  transfer  of  authority  away  from 
regulatory  agencies  and  the  domestic  system.  NGOs  fiercely  opposed.  incorporating  a 
voluntary  conformity  assessment  system  where  the  transfer  of  regulatory  authority 
would  shift  from  agencies  like  the  FDA  to  private  conformity  assessment  bodies  in 
third  countries  (CEO  1998a;  1998b  TAED  2000).  It  is  argued  that,  'The  delegation  of 
tasks  under  the  MRA  to  conformity  assessment  bodies  in  another  jurisdiction  runs  the 
risk  of  defacto  privatization  of  government  responsibilities'  (TACD  2000). 
Consumers  and  environmentalists  have  teamed  with  US  regulatory  agents  in 
supporting  strong  national  regulatory  bodies.  Furthermore,  TACD  and  TAED 
members  sided  with  US  regulatory  agencies  against  the  creation  of  the  Joint 
Committee.  Like  the  FDA  and  the  FCC,  consumer  and  envirom-nentalists  were  hesitant 
to  create  an  influential  body  that  had  the  potential  to  be  dominated  by  trade  concerns 
rather  than  social  standards  (TACD  2000).  A  TAED  official  argued  that  at  the  core  of 
their  concerns  was  the  fact  that  'suddenly  trade  negotiators  are  in  charge  of  regulatory 
policy.  '  379 
A  TACD  briefing  paper  also  raised  concerns  about  the  transfer  of  MRAs  from 
the  domestic  regulatory  policy  to  the  sphere  of  international  trade  policy.  It  is'argued 
that  moving  MRAs  into  the  scope  of  foreign  trade  puts  a  cloak  of  secrecy  over  the 
negotiations  (TACD  2000)  and  leads  to  a  lack  of  Congressional  oversight  because  the 
MRAs  are  an  executive  agreement  and  are  thus  not  subject  to  ratification  in  the  US. 
The  MRAs  were  negotiated  outside  the  scope  of  the  EU  or  US  legislative  process  and 
Congress  and  the  European  Parliament  had  only  marginal  involvement  in  the 
negotiations.  380 
379  Interview,  US  NGO,  Washington  DC,  October  2000  (30). 
380  The  European  Parliament  has  supported  the  MRAs,  but  continually  fought  for  more  input  and 
consultation  with  the  European  negotiating  team  (European  Parliament  1998).  A  Senate  staff  member 
235 Non-govermnental  organisations  have  also  directly  opposed  the  privileged 
access  that  TABD  had  to  the  MRA  negotiations.  The  special  relationship  between  the 
TABD  and  the  Commerce  Department  in  MRA  negotiations  was  a  particular  fixation 
of  US  regulatory  officials  and  NGOs.  Supported  by  the  Environmental  Protection 
Agency,  they  argued  that  the  role  of  the  TABD  in  the  MRAs  bordered  on  violating  the 
US  Administration  Procedures  Act  and  the  Federal  Advisory  Committee  Act  (TACD 
2000;  1998;  TAED  2000).  One  TACD  member  argued,  'Our  biggest  fear  is  that  the 
MRAs  are  TABD.  381 
Contrary  to  the  TABD,  the  perceived  input  of  TACD  and  TAED  in  the  MRA 
negotiations  is  limited.  Not  one  interviewee  argued  that  either  dialogue  played  a 
significant  role  in  the  output  of  policy.  These  groups  became  involved  in  the  MRA 
discourse  late  in  the  game  because  they  were  created  only  after  the  first  set  of  MRAs 
had  been  agreed.  The  TACD  did  not  produce  a  briefing  paper  on  MRAs  until  late 
2000.  A  TAED  statement  was  drafted  for  the  May  2000  annual  meeting,  but  MRAs 
were  not  picked  up  as  a  major  'issue  area'  by  the  Trade  Working  Group.  382  The 
resource  gap  discussed  in  chapter  5  highlights  differences  between  business  and  civil 
society.  Whereas  the  TABD  has  a  specific  committee  with  extensive  industry 
resources  that  concentrates  on  regulatory  co-operation,  TACD  relies  on  a  small 
number  of  recently  hired  full  time  research  staff  and  TAED  on  two  'issue  managers'. 
argued  that  the  MRAs  are  not  an  issue  that  have  been  focused  on,  Interview,  Washington  DC,  October 
2000(51). 
381  Interview,  US  NGO,  Washington,  October  2000  (50). 
392  Although  a  earlier  Commission  response  to  the  TAED's  1999  recommendations  about  the 
MRAs  received  a  response  from  the  Commission  stating,  'Due  to  then  vary  natur 
,e 
of  the 
MRAs  (they  avoid  the  duplication  of  testing  and  certification),  they  do,  per  se,  affect  the 
environment.  ' 
236 Transparency  and  Accessfor  Civil  Society 
The  TABD,  TACD  and  TAED  agree  on  two  aspects  of  the  MRA  negotiation  and 
implementation  process,  albeit  for  completely  different  motives.  First,  both  consumer 
and  business  groups  favour  the  US  position  of  sector  by  sector  negotiations. 
Consumers  feared  a  framework  approach  would  result  in  the  spillover  of  MRAs  to 
additional  sectors  whereas  the  TABD  worried  that  the  difficulty  of  negotiating  an 
overarching  strategy  would  prevent  agreement  in  all  or  additional  sectors.  393  Second, 
both  pushed  for  more  transparency  in  the  rule  making  process  in  order  to  -gain 
increased  access  to  government  negotiations.  The  TABD  wants  access  to  joint  sectoral 
meetings  and  to  be  included  in  the  process  to  set  up  monitoring  mechanisms  (TABD 
1999).  The  2000  mid  year  report  suggested  that  the  rule  making  process  should  be 
more  open  to  industry  and  that  TABD  should  be  able  to  comment  on  government 
guidelines  before  they  are  implemented  (TABD  2000-midyear).  It  was  also  argued  that 
TABD  should  play  a  formal  role  in  the  formation  of  a  monitoring  body  for  compliance 
with  the  agreements  (TABD  1999).  TACD  and  TAED  members  complained  about  the 
lack  of  adequate  time  for  response  for  public  comment.  A  TACD  (2000)  paper  states, 
'MRAs  remove  important  regulatory  processes  and  issues  from  the  public  realm  and 
place  them  behind  the  opaque screen  of  foreign  affairs.  ' 
Government  officials  recognise  the  need  to  promote  transparency,  but  deny 
conducting  closed  negotiations.  Rather  they  stress  that  TACD  and  TAED  have  been 
briefed  on  MRAs.  that  Federal  Register  Notices  have  been  published,  that  general 
public  meetings  have  been  held  by  USTR  on  the  TEP  and  on  auto  safety  and  that  the 
TEP  Steering  Committee  (2000-report)  calls  for  proposals  from  all  dialogues.  Cowles 
(1997:  13-14)  notes  the  problem  is  not  with  either  domestic  system.  Any  person  can 
237 comment  on  ongoing  regulatory  procedures  due  to  the  US  Administrative  Procedures 
384  Act  by  Congress  because  notices  have  been  published  the  Federal  Register. 
,  and 
different  parties  are  invited  to  provide  input  to  Commission  officials,  for  example 
through  the  Social  Policy  Forum  in  the  EU.  Rather  she  argues  the  problem  is  with  the 
transatlantic  regulatory  process,  because  there  are  no  rules  governing  access.  To  gain 
credibility  Egan  (2000b:  32)  argues  MRAs  must  be  put  into  a  legal  framework  which 
is  approved  by  the  European  Parliament  and  the  US  Congress. 
4)  The  MRAs  in  the  context  of  the  NTA 
The  MRAs  have  been  hailed  the  most  concrete  deliverable  produced  by  the  NTA 
process.  Economically  and  politically  the  MRAs  represent  a  step  towards  integrating 
regulatory  systems  in  order  to'produce  an  open  transatlantic  marketplace.  Conflict  in 
negotiating  and  implementing  the  MRAs,  however,  demonstrates  the  obstacles  faced 
by  MRA  negotiators. 
First,  the  limited  scope  of  the  MRAs,  especially  when  compared  to  mutual 
recognition  within  the  EU,  highlights  fundamental  differences  in  the  EU  and  US 
regulatory  systems.  Delays  in  the  transition  and  implementation  periods  of  the  MRA 
annexes  can  be  attributed  to  a  'mismatch  of  systems'  and  the  struggle  for  autonomy 
not  only  between  EU  and  US  regulators,  but  between  regulatory  bodies  and  trade 
officials,  particularly  in  the  US.  A  number  of  officials  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic 
expressed  concern  with  delayed  implementation  of  the  agreements,  particularly  in  the 
medical  devices  and  pharmaceutical  annexes.  In  both  of  these  sectors  the  FDA  was 
responsible  for  holding  up  negotiation  and  implementation  of  the  MRAs  'due  to 
383  Egan  (2001  a)  notes  this  is  already  the  case  with  the  umbrella  agreement,  where  problems  with 
sectors  such  as  medical  devices  and  pharmaceuticals  hold  up  negotiation  and  implementation  of  other 
sectors. 
238 conflict  over  certification  reports  and  levels  of  equivalency.  385  In  the  services  sector 
negotiations  of  a  framework  agreement  have  been  delayed  because  the  US  federal 
government  did  not  have  the  authority  to  override  state  certification  standards.  One 
Commission  official  explains,  'it  is  frustrating  for  Europeans  who  say  you  (the  US) 
agreed  to  do  it  and  now  you  cannot  deliver.  '  In  this  respect,  it  can  be  argued  that  the 
US,  not  the  EU  suffers  from  the  capability-expectations  gap,  which  is  usually 
attributed  to  the  EU. 
Still,  the  MRA  process  is  an  important  case  study  that  provides  insight  into  the 
capacity  of  NTA  institutions  to  produce  policies  or  concrete  deliverables.  One  EU 
trade  official  argued  that  the  NTA  structure  was  crucial  to  the  MRA  negotiations 
because  the  process  needed  political  oversight.  EU  and  US  political  officials  argued 
that  the  NTA  process  was  a  way  of  'getting  technical  people  to  do  technical  things.  ' 
NTA  institutions  are  a  way  of  managing  the  dialogue  between  regulators  and  trade 
officials  and  accommodating  the  international  interests  of  trade  and  political  officials 
as  well  as  the  interests  of  domestic  actors. 
Another  benefit  of  the  MRAs  is  the  bridges  the  process  builds  between  EU  and 
US  regulators  and  trade  officials  as  well  as  the  business  and  NGO  communities.  The 
confidence  building  process  between  EU  and  US  officials  is  arguably  an  important 
part  of  the  process.  An  EU  official  argued,  'Slowly,  slowly  we  build  dialogue.  To  get 
MRA  convergence  we  build  trust  between  regulators  on  equivalency  assessment.  '  The 
MRAs  are  also  an  example  of  a  learning  process  where  US  regulators,  businesses  and 
NGOs  learn  from  EU  regulators,  business  and  NGOs  who  already  have  experience  of 
,  94  Federal  re(,,  istcr  notices  posted  by  the  FDA  and  USTR  are  available  on  their  websitesý 
http:  //xvwxv.  ustr.  (Tov 
To  surnmarise,  the  problem  steins  from  the  fact  that  the  FDA  does  not  recognise  the  certification  and 
regulatory  requirements  of  the  internal  market  as  a  single  system.  Whereas  US  officials  criticised  the 
EU  for  it  lack  of  a  single  European  FDA.  EU  trade  official  argued  that  the  FDA  was  too  stringent  in 
239 working  with  Mutual  Recognition  Agreements  in  the  single  market.  Building 
confidence  between  regulators,  trade  officials  and  civil  society  is  a  step  in  securing 
and  expanding  the  mutual  recognition  and  harmonisation  of  standards  that  affect  trade. 
The  agreements  themselves  are  a  step  in  building  the  new  transatlantic  marketplace. 
Phase  two  or  the  'next  generation  of  MRAs'  builds  on  confidence  established  between 
the  EU  and  the  US  and  goes  further  than  the  first  phase  by  implementing  full 
equivalency  in  marine  safety  and  the  MRA  in  services.  A  Commerce  department 
official  argues,  'The  MRAs  are  the  first  step  in  broader  liberalisation  of  trade  through 
mutual  recognition  and  harmonisation  of  health  and  safety,  environmental 
standards'. 
386 
The  MRA  process  is  of  interest  in  this  discussion  on  the  transatlantic  dialogue 
because  the  interaction  of  actors  under  the  framework  of  transatlantic  institutions  and 
through  transgovern  mental  and  transnational  networks  upholds  the  hypotheses  made 
in  chapter  I  of  this  thesis.  Like  the  trafficking  in  women  information  campaign,  the 
MRAs  demonstrate  a  delegation  of  decision  setting  and  shaping  to  a  range  of 
transgovernmental  actors  thus  supporting  the  argument  that  the  NTA  has  led  to 
decentralisation  in  the  decision  making  process.  The  role  of  transnational  actors  or  a 
privatisation  of  decision  shaping  is  also  apparent  in  the  MRAs  because  of  the  role 
played  by  the  TABD  the  TACD  and  the  TAED.  Unlike  the  trafficking  in  women  case, 
the  MRAs  also  represent  a  more  controversial  policy,  which  is  characterised  by 
competition  between  domestic  actors  and  international  negotiators.  In  this  respect  the 
MRAs  also  share  characteristics  with  the  banana  dispute  (see  chapter  8). 
requesting  specific  language  rather  than  general  principles.  Interview,  US  Trade  official  who  supported  ZI 
a  policy  of  'assurne  it  is  equivalent  until  I  know  it  is  not'. 
240 Conclusion 
This  chapter  discussed  the  institutional  1  sation  of  new  dialogues,  the  decentralisation 
of  decision  setting  and  shaping  and  the  increased  influence  of  private  actors  in  MRA 
negotiations  and  transitions.  Regulatory  policy  is  a  tricky  sector  because  it  deals  with 
two  politically  sensitive  subjects:  the  autonomy  of  regulatory  authorities  and  the 
sovereignty  of  states  to  control  domestic  standards. 
The  role  of  domestic,  transgovernmental  and  transnational  actors  in  MRA 
negotiations  were  outlined  above.  What  emerged  during  MRA  negotiations  were  two 
coalitions:  one  made  up  of  US  regulatory  agents  and  the  TACD  and  TAED,  the  other 
of  trade  officials  and  the  TABD.  The  first  fought  against  decentralisation  and 
privatisation  of  standards  for  fear  that  agencies  like  the  FDA  and  the  OSHA  would 
lose  authority  to  foreign  private  companies,  thus  leading  to  reduced  levels  of  social 
protection.  The  TABD  and  trade  officials  supported  the  reduction  of  costs  in  order  to 
facilitate  trade  and  fulfil  the  goals  of  the  New  Transatlantic  Marketplace. 
In  the  end  the  influence  of  the  latter  is  more  visible.  The  FDA  was  forced  to 
modernise,  and  thus  accept  the  authority  of  EU  private  conformity  assessment  bodies 
and  MRAs  were  negotiated  in  areas  addressing  health  and  safety  issues  despite  NGO 
objections.  TABD  was  deemed  a  success  story  and  the  USTR  and  Commerce  had  a 
big  deliverable  to  report  to  the  EU-US  Summit. 
Conflict  between  and  among  trade  and  regulatory  officials  highlights  the 
importance  of  the  NTA  process.  Although  MRAs  had  been  discussed  before  1995,  the 
creation  of  NTA  institutions  and  the  political  commitment  to  MRAs  outlined  in  the 
agreement  inýjected  focus  into  the  negotiations.  NTA  institutions  such  as  the  Senior 
Level  Group  and  the  TEP  Steering  Committee  provided  political  oversight  for  the 
186  Interview,  US  Commerce  Department  official,  Washin-gton  DC,  October  2000  (52). 
241 negotiation  and  transition  phases  of  the  MRAs.  However,  while  trade  officials  drove 
the  process  forward  and  were  responsible  for  setting  the  overarching  umbrella 
agreement,  agencies  such  as  the  FDA  and  OSHA  retained  control  over  policy  details 
in  annexes  where  they  had  regulatory  authority.  The  MRAs  did  not  transfer  authority 
from  regulatory  to  trade  officials,  but  rather  gave  USTR  and  NTA  officials  the  job  of 
delegating  tasks  to  the  appropriate  domestic  actors. 
242 Chapter  8 
The  EU-US  Banana  Dispute 
The  main  focus  of  this  thesis  has  been  on  the  new  co-operation  between  the  EU  and 
the  US.  Although  the  NTA  has  been  established  as  an  administrator  and  facilitator  of 
transatlantic  agreement,  it  has  not  eliminated  conflict  between  the  partners, 
particularly  on  the  economic  front.  Trade  disputes  cover  less  than  2  per  cent  of  total 
transatlantic  trade  387 
, 
but  media  coverage  of  dispute,  -,  is  far  more  extensive  than.  ; it  is  for 
EU-US  Summits  or  transatlantic  agreements.  388  Hush  kits,  bananas,  beef,  genetically 
modified  crops  and  foreign  sales  corporations  have  overshadowed  the  TEP,  the  MRAs 
and  indeed  the  larger  transatlantic  partnership.  Despite  increased  transatlantic 
dialogue  between  EU  and  US  actors,  these  disputes  have  prompted  warning  reports  of 
looming  trade  wars  throughout  the  1990s.  389 
The  transatlantic  banana  dispute  has  attracted  world-wide  media  attention.  390 
Generally  the  case  is  of  interest  because  it  has  erupted  over  a  product  which  is  not 
grown  in  significant  quantities  in  either  the  EU  or  the  US.  It  is  a  case  that  appears,  at 
least  on  the  surface,  to  pit  big  American  corporations  against  small  Caribbean  farmers. 
Ultimately  the  dispute  is  of  both  economic  and  political  consequence.  On  an  economic 
level,  the  dispute  represents  a  struggle  for  market  access.  On  a  political  level  this 
,  87  EU  and  US  officials  regularly  quote  this  figure.  A  US  Commission  official  (9)  argued  that  disputes 
Zý 
in  terms  of  the  total  economic  relationship  amounted  to  1peanuts'.  Another  (15)  noted  that  disputes 
covered  I-21,  o  of  trade  but  95%  of  media  coverage. 
For  example,  a  search  in  the  Financial  Times  Archive  cite  for  'EU  banana'  between  1996  and  2001 
retrieves  750  mostly  'ver\  strong'  matches.  A  search  usina  the  same  dates  and  the  term  'MRA'  retrieves 
onlý  2  relevant  articles  (see  http:  -www.  ft.  com). 
191)  See  for  example  Guardian  13,16  April  1999;  The  Independent  8  April  1999;  Financial  Times  8  April 
1999'  Irish  Times  6  April  2001  ý  BBC  News  Online  5,  December  1997ý  17  December  1998-,  January  1 
1999ý  4,5  March  19K  23  March  1999ý  24  April  19K  30  September  2000. 
""'A  search  for  'EU  banana'  on  the  Financial  Times  '-Iobal  archive'  which  includes  world-wide  news 
sources  returns  2993  h  its  between  1996  and  200  1. 
243 dispute  is  about  the  rules  governing  the  internal  trading  system,  and  thus  concerns  the 
legitimacy  and  capacity  of  the  institutions  that  manage  it.  The  dispute  is  of  interest  to  a 
broader  analysis  of  EU-US  relations,  because  it  tests  the  capacity  of  both  transatlantic 
and  multilateral  institutions  to  diffuse  conflict. 
Again,  the  interest  lies  with  the  institutionalisation  of  the  dialogue  in  general 
and  of  transatlantic  decision  making  specifically.  The  banana  negotiations  differ  from 
the  MRAs  and  anti-trafficking  information  campaigns  because  there  appears  to  be  a 
lack  of  decentralised  decision  'shaping'  by  transgovernmental  actors.  Further,  private 
actor  input  is  limited  to  traditional  lobbying  through  domestic  institutions.  NNW.  ]  - 
multinational  corporations  and  transnational  networks  of,  for  example  Caribbean 
farmers  and  EU  banana  operators,  have  shaped  decisions,  private,  transatlantic 
dialogue  structures  have  not. 
The  constraints  of  existing  bilateral  and  multilateral  trading  arrangements  and 
the  avid  interest  of  domestic  actors  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  are  key  to 
understanding  why  the  EU  and  US  entered  a  trade  dispute  over  bananas  and  why  the 
dispute  spiralled  out  of  control  for  almost  a  decade.  Section  I  maps  the  development 
of  the  dispute  through  five  EU  banana  regimes.  Section  2  focuses  on  domestic  input 
into  the  US  negotiations,  while  section  3  considers  the  Commission's  negotiating 
mandate  in  light  of  commitments  to  ACP  countries,  the  Member  States  and  domestic 
banana  operators.  Section  4  considers  the  wider  implications  of  the  dispute  by 
questioning  what  impact  the  banana  dispute  had  on  the  larger  transatlantic  partnership 
and  the  WTO. 
1-he  balance  between  'fair  trade*  or  'free  trade',  as  championed  by  the  two 
partners.  is  a  highlighted  theme  throughout  the  chapter.  Two  popular  views  of  the  EU- 
US  dispute  are  examined:  one  depicts  the  US  as  a  *bilateral  bully',  the  other  portrays 
244 the  EU  as  a  multilateral  'rule  breaker'  (see  table  8.1  ).  The  chapter  seeks  to  test  which, 
if  either,  scenario  accurately  illustrates  the  role  each  side  played  in  the  dispute. 
Table  8.1  Depictions  of  EU  and  US  roles  in  the  Banana  Dispute 
Scenario  I-  Bilateral  Bully  versus  Third  World  Protector 
EU  officials  have  described  the  EU  banana  regimes  as  development  policy,  not  trade  policy. 
Throughout  the  banana  dispute  it  was  argued  that  the  banana  regime  protected  the  economies  of  small, 
third  world  banana  producing  states.  Among  its  supporters  the  EU  was  regarded  as  a  'third  world 
protector',  an  image  which  becomes  more  vivid  when  one  considers  that  the  villain  is  the  United  States 
and  US  banana  producing  multinationals  in  Latin  America.  According  to  this  logic  the  US  has  been 
deemed  a  'bilateral  bully'  for  pushing  around  not  just  the  EU,  but  small  Caribbean  States  and  even  its 
'partners  in  crime',  the  Latin  American  banana  producers.  The  US  decision  to  impose  'unilateral' 
sanctions  before  the  WTO  ruled  on  the  revised  banana  regime  and  to  introduce  Carousel  Retaliation 
met  harsh  reaction  in  the  public  arena.  The  media,  particularly  in  countries  that  strongly  supported  the 
regime,  such  as  the  UK,  generally  supported  the  governments'  decision  to  support  'poor  Caribbean 
farmers'  and  supermarkets  reacted  to  public  opinion  by  introducing  voluntary  labelling  of  free  trade 
bananas 
. 
39  '  The  EU  banana  regime  also  gained  general  support  from  non-governmental  organisations 
mobilising  against  globalisation  and  brought  the  implications  of  the  banana  dispute  into  the  larger 
debate  on  the  cost  of  free  trade. 
Scenario  11-  Multilateral  Trade  Enforcer  versus  Rule  Breaker 
US  officials  rejected  the  idea  that  the  EU  was  acting  as  a  third  world  protector92  and  instead  portrayed 
it  as  the  enemy  of  multilateral  rules.  It  was  argued  that  that  the  EU  was  not  protecting  the  Caribbean, 
but  rather  EU  banana  operators  who  benefit  from  the  EU  licensing  scheme.  The  USTR  Barshefsky 
argued,  'This  is  absolutely  a  trade  issue.  This  is  nothing  morý  than  the  taking  a  number  of  import 
licenses  from  US  distributors  of  Latin  bananas  and  handing  them  over  to  European  companies  in  a 
discriminatory  manner"9'.  Under  this  scenario  the  EU  image  of  a  third  work  protector  is  replaced  with 
that  of  a  'multilateral  rule  breaker'.  The  EU  was  chastised  for  failing  to  produce  a  WTO  compatible 
regime  despite  three  multilateral  rulings.  US  officials  claimed  that  the  EU  side-stepped,  stalled  and  at 
worst  defied  the  WTO.  US  President  Clinton  argued,  'We  cannot  maintain  an  open  trading  system, 
which  I  am  convinced  is  essential  for  global  prosperity,  unless  we  also  have  rules  that  are  abided  by'.  394 
The  Dallas  Morning  News  agreed,  'It  is  fundamentally  about  whether  countries  will  respect  the  rules 
governing  international  trade-  or  slice  them  as  they  see  fit  and  thereby  encourage  a  return  to  the  law  of 
the  jungle  where  no  rules  apply.  395 
1)  An  Overview  of  the  Banana  Dispute 
The  banana  dispute  stems  from  the  European  Community  regulation  on  banana 
imports  initiated  by  the  Lome  Convention  in  1975,  which  established  preferred  access 
to  the  European  market  for  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  (ACP)  bananas. 
See  also  BBC  News,  UK  Gets  *Fair  Trade'  Bananas,  17  January  2000 
'92  Interviews  conducted  in  USTR,  Washington  2000  (57)  and  the  House  Subcommittee  on  Trade, 
Washington,  2000  (39). 
39  11  Quoted  in  European  Union  Magazine  (not  dated). 
Quoted  in  BBC  News  (  1999)  Clinton:  It's  about  Rules  not  Bananas,  6  March 
245 Subsequent  re-negotiation  of  Lome  and  several  EU  Banana  Protocols  ensured  that 
ACP  states  maintained  their  traditional  access  to  the  European  market.  Five  separate 
banana  regimes  were  renegotiated  during  the  dispute  (see  table  8.3).  Each  regime  used 
tariff  quotas  and  licensing  schemes  to  alter  market  access  for  Latin  American  and 
Caribbean  banana  producers  and  transformed  the  practices  of  banana  operators  within 
the  EU  (see  table  8.4). 
Banana  i:  Member  State  Regimes 
Although  Lome  established  access  for  ACP  exporters,  the  lack  of  an  EC  'Policy'  on 
bananas  prior  to  1993,  meant  that  the  level  of  access  was  determined  separately  by  the 
Member  States.  396  Three  tariff  regimes  were  created  in  accordance  with  different 
Member  State  preferences  (see  banana  i).  397  First,  Germany  had  duty  free  imports, 
which  did  not  discriminate  between  ACP  and  Latin  American  producers.  Second, 
Benelux  countries,  Ireland  and  Denmark  imposed  a  20%  duty  on  all  imported  bananas. 
Finally,  it  was  the  duty  free  imports  for  ACP  states  in  France,  Italy,  Spain,  Greece, 
Portugal  and  the  UK  that  enabled  Caribbean  and  African  banana  producers  to  stake 
out  a  share  of  the  European  market. 
In  1993  Latin  American  banana  producing  countries  requested  a  GATT  panel 
to  challenge  the  legality  of  the  ECs  banana  regimes.  The  main  source  of  contention 
was  the  third  regime.  The  system  gave  preference  not  only  to  ACP  states,  but  to 
domestic  producers  and  operators.  399  Sutton  (1997:  7)  notes  that  in  the  UK,  for 
ý9'  Quoted  in  the  Guardian  (  1999)  Bananas:  the  view  from  America,  9  March. 
,  06  Bananas  \N  ere  not  covered  b)  EC  Common  Agricultural  Policy,  nor  by  the  Commercial  policy  (see 
Stevens  1  9W  2000:  327). 
See  also  Stevens  20W  Sutton  1997. 
Latin  American  banana  producers  controlled  virtually  100%  of  the  market  in  Germany,  Denmark 
and  Belgium  and  90%  of  the  Irish  and  Dutch  markets  under  the  other  two  regimes  (Sutton  1997:  7) 
246 example,  domestic  companies  Geest  and  Fyffes  controlled  65%  and  25%  of  the  market 
share  while  Spain  imported  all  of  its  bananas  from  the  Canary  Islands. 
The  first  banana  regime  was  found  inconsistent  with  GATT  rules  in  May  1993. 
However,  the  decision  was  of  little  consequence  because  the  EC  was  able,  under 
GATT  rules,  to  block  the  panel  decision  from  being  adopted  and  because  the  Member 
States  were  already  undergoing  reform  to  create  a  single  European  policy  on  banana 
imports.  The  search  was  for  a  regime  that  could  comply  with  the  internal  requirements 
of  the  Single  European  Market  and  the  external  requirements  of  the  4  th  Lome 
Convention.  399 
Banana  ii:  The  Restrictive  Tariff  Rate  Quota 
In  July  1993  the  EC  began  implementing  a  single  market  in  bananas  under  Council 
Regulation  404-93  (banana  ii).  It  set  up  a  three  tiered  banana  regime  with  duty  free 
quotas  for  ACP  banana  producers  and  a  two  tiered  tariff  structure  for  Latin  American, 
or  'dollar  bananas'  (see  table  8.4).  The  single  European  policy  on  banana  imports 
sought  to  retain  the  traditional  divide  in  the  market.  Latin  American  producers  were 
encouraged  to  keep  but  deterred  from  trying  to  increase  their  share.  ACP  countries  had 
a  substantial  tariff  advantage,  but  faced  new  competition  from  Latin  American 
producers  (see  also  Steven  2000:  342-43). 
Latin  American  producers  opposed  the  regime  on  the  basis  that  quotas  reserved 
for  ACP  states  restricted  their  level  of  access  to  the  European  market.  400  Five  Latin 
American  countries.  this  tirne  supported  by  the  US,  took  the  new  banana  regime  to  the 
Under  the  Lonie  Convention  the  EC  a-reed  that  'no  ACP  state  shall  be  placed,  as  regards  access  to 
its  traditional  markets  and  its  advantages  in  those  markets,  in  a  less  favourable  position  than  in  the  past 
or  at  present'. 
""'  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  history  of  the  banana  dispute  see  Stevens  1996;  2000  who 
ar-ues  that  Latin  American  producers  were  angry  first,  that  the  single  market  for  banana  restricted 
247 GATT  in  late  1993.  In  reality  it  was  the  licensing  system,  not  the  tariff  rate  quotas, 
401 
that  were  directly  opposed  . 
US  multinationals,  particularly  United  Fruit 
Corporation,  and  some  Latin  American  states  opposed  the  'B'  quota  system,  which 
allocated  part  of  the  free  market  to  EU  producers.  The  restricted  access  of  certain 
producers  to  the  market  was  heightened  by  the  allocation  of  category  'A'  licenses,  of 
which  nearly  ninety  percent  were  given  to  Latin  American  countries  (including  Costa 
Rica,  Columbia,  Nicaragua  and  Venezuela)  who  had  cut  a  deal  with  the  EU  to  settle 
their  dispute  through  the  Framework  Agreement  on  bananas.  The  result,  however,  was 
that  the  licensing  scheme  further  restricted  market  access  for  the  remaining  Latin 
American  banana  producing  countries,  including  Honduras,  Guatemala,  Mexico  and 
402  Ecuador 
. 
The  allocation  of  import  licenses  also  created  a  monopoly  for  European 
firms,  and  further  restricted  the  quantities  that  US  companies  operating  in  Latin 
America  could  distribute  in  Europe. 
In  January  1994  the  GATT  panel  ruled  that  Regulation  404-93  was 
inconsistent  with  international  trading  rules,  but  again  the  EC  blocked  the  panel  report. 
The  completion  of  the  Uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade  talks  and  the  creation  of 
the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  in  1995  marked  a  major  turning  point  in  the 
transatlantic  banana  dispute.  New  rules  prevented  the  EC  from  blocking  panel  findings 
and  provided  new  procedures  for  dispute  resolution,  which  included  approving  the 
challengers  use  of  retaliatory  sanctions. 
Thus,  the  challenge  to  the  EU  banana  regime  made  by  the  US,  Mexico, 
Guatemala.  Honduras  (and  later  Ecuador)  in  April  1996  carried  more  weight  then 
access  to  Geririaný  which  had  previously  been  duty  free  and  second  that  access  was  restricted  because 
the  tariff  quota  for  Latin  American  bananas  was  too  low. 
401  This  argument  ýN  as  made  bý  a  USTR  official,  interview,  Washington  DC,  2000  (57).  The  US  argued 
that  import  licenses  took  avay  US  business  because  of  their  allocation  to  French  and  British  companies 
and  EU  ripening  Firms.  USTR  Press  Release  (  1997). 
248 previous  complaints  made  to  the  GATT.  In  May  1997  the  WTO  found  many  aspects 
403 
of  the  EC  banana  regime  violated  WTO  rules  ,  and  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body 
(DSB)  gave  the  EC  until  January  1,1999  to  comply  with  its  ruling.  Faced  with  the 
threat  of  US  sanctions,  the  Commission  was  again  charged  with  finding  a  regime  that 
could  fulfil  internal  commitments  to  the  SEM  and  external  commitments  to  both  ACP 
states  and  the  multilateral  trading  regime. 
Banana  iii:  The  Non-  Restrictive  (or  Less  Restrictive)  Tariff  Quota 
After  internal  negotiations  the  European  regime  was  revised  in  July  1998.  On  January 
1,1999  the  EU  began  implementing  the  revised  tariff  quota  regime  (Regulation 
1637/98  and  2362/98)404 
. 
The  regime  would  continue  to  operate  on  tariff  quota  system, 
but  the  allocation  of  licenses  was  less  restrictive.  Moreover,  the  Latin  American  quota 
increased  vis  a  vis  the  ACP  quota.  The  re-allocation  of  licences  on  a  global  rather  than 
individual  basis  was  introduced  to  increase  competition  amongst  ACP  producers. 
Although  the  licensing  scheme  did  not  distinguish  between  ACP  and  Latin  American 
producers  per  se,  license  distribution  was  still  restrictive,  because  allocation  was  based 
on  a  historical  reference  period  (1994-1996)  when  ACP  imports  were  guaranteed  by 
the  EU  regime. 
The  new  regime  again  met  with  opposition.  Caribbean  states  felt  the  global 
allocation  of  licenses  would  not  guarantee  individual  states'  traditional  export  levels 
and  that  the  less  restrictive  licensing  scheme  would  offer  no  incentive  to  import  ACP 
bananas 
. 
405  The  Americans  believed  that  the  licensing  scheme  discriminated  against 
third  country  operators.  US  officials  argued  that  the  changes  to  the  regime  were 
402  Essentiallv,  the  Framework  All 
greement  on  bananas  mana--ed  to  divide  the  previously  united  front 
from  Latin  American  banana  producing  states  (Sutton  1997:  22). 
The  EC  did  exercise  its  right  to  appeal,  but  the  decision  was  upheld  in  September  1997.  1 
249 cosmetic  and  accused  the  Commission  of  making  only  a  token  gesture  to  bring  the 
regime  in  line  with  international  trade  laws.  406  Believing  it  was  still  not  WTO 
compliant,  the  US  proceeded  first,  to  publish  a  list  of  intended  sanctions  in  the  Federal 
Register  and  second,  to  file  another  request  for  a  WTO  panel  in  November  1998,  two 
months  before  the  new  EU  regime  was  implemented.  Following  its  implementation, 
the  US  sought  WTO  authorisation  to  impose  over  $500  million  in  retaliatory  tariffs. 
In  March  the  WTO  DSB  announced  it  needed  more  time  before  ruling  on  the 
compatibility  of  the  new  EU  regime  (see  section  4).  The  US  proceeded  with  plans  to 
imPose  100%  tariffs  on  a  range  of  items,  but  agreed  not  to  collect  the  tariffs  until  after 
the  panel  ruled.  However,  the  Commission  argued  that  the  tariffs,  which  would  be 
backdated,  would  effectively  prohibit  (particularly  small)  companies  from  exporting. 
USTR  Charlene  Barshefsky,  however,  was  so  confident  of  the  illegality  of  the  EU 
regime  that  she  argued:  'If  you  believe  the  regime  is  WTO  consistent-  then  ship'.  407 
In  April  the  WTO  ruled  that  the  EU  banana  regime  was  still  inconsistent  with 
multilateral  rules  and  authorised  $191  million  in  sanctions.  408  In  addition  to  reducing 
the  level  of  retaliatory  tariffs,  the  Dispute  Settlement  Panel  ruled  that  the  US  had  acted 
too  early  in  imposing  sanctions.  Decrying  the  use  of  'unilateral  sanctions',  the  EU 
filed  a  WTO  dispute  challenging  US  domestic  trade  legislation,  Section  3.01  (see 
below).  409  A  panel  was  convened  on  2  March  1999,  but  later  ruled  in  favour  of  the 
us.  410 
404  See  'The  US/EU  Banana  Dispute:  Modifications  to  the  EC  Banana  Regime',  DGI,  External 
Relations  10  November  1998,  www.  europa.  or- 
40ý  See  the  Caribbean  Banana  Exporters  Association  website  at  http:,,,  'I/www.  cbea.  org 
406  See  US  Administration  Press  Release  (1998) 
407  Quoted  in  Guardian  9  March  2000. 
108  This  was  a  significantly  lower  figure  than  that  requested  by  the  US. 
409  See  Commission  Press  Release,  EC  Request  for  establishment  of  a  panel  on  Section  301  of  the  US 
Trade  Act  1974.  Available  httlL  (e 
-ýuro)a. 
eu.  int.  downloaded  29  November  2000. 
250 Banana  iv.  -  First  Come  First  Serve  Licensing 
The  Commission  came  under  further  pressure  to  find  a  compatible  regime  when  in 
May  2000  the  US  Congress  passed  legislation  designed  to  maximise  the  impact  of  US 
sanctions  on  the  EU  in  both  the  banana  and  the  beef  disputes.  The  Carousel  Retaliation 
Act  (2000)  requires  the  USTR  to  rotate  items  on  the  sanction  list,  thus  imposing 
constant  fear  on  EU  exporters  (see  section  2). 
In  December  2000,  in  the  aftermath  of  the  EU-US  Summit  and  after  a  year  of 
extensive 
I 
internal  negotiation,  EC  Agriculture  ministers  agreed  to  a  radical  overhaul  of 
the  banana  regime.  The  fourth.  regime  would  mark  the  end  of  the  tariff  quota  svstem 
which  had  more  or  less  been  in  place  since  1992,  but  would  first  allow  for  a 
transitional  period  governed  by  three  tariff  quotas  and  a  'first  come  first  serve' 
allocation  of  licenses  (see  tables  8.2;  8.4). 
Table  8.2  The  Transitional  First  Come,  First  Serve  Licensing 
U  Licenses  allocated  to  the  first  boats  to  reach  EU  shores. 
LI  Shippers  would  have  to  commit  bananas  to  the  vessel  before  submitting 
'  declaration  of  intent  to  import  and  to  lodge  a  high  security  deposit  to  deter 
speculation.  411 
0  After  declaring  their  intention  to  import  specified  quantities,  pre-allocatiOn  would 
be  determined  when  vessels  were  within  sailing  distance  from  Europe  to  avoid 
discrimination  against  countries  that  were  further  away. 
The  fourth  banana  regime  was  both  highly  controversial  and  short-lived.  The 
Commission  argued  that  eliminating  the  quota  system  would  make  the  EU  regime 
WTO  compliant,  but  internally,  it  was  the  subject  of  difficult  internal  and  external 
negotiations. 
410  The  WTO  See  Agence  Press  (1999)  Controversial  US  Le-islation  Does  Not  Violate  WTO  Rules,  22 
December. 
41  '  This  provision  was  introduced  as  a  means  of  trying  to  maintain  stable  prices  of  the  banana  market, 
thus  ensuring  the  protection  of  European  consumers  and  domestic  producers. 
251 Banana  v:  Historical  Reference  Licensing 
The  first  come  first  serve  licensing  scheme  was  replaced  in  April  2001  Oust  three 
months  before  it  was  due  to  be  implemented)  with  a  historical  reference  licensing 
system,  similar  to  that  used  in  third  banana  regime.  The  new  regime  (banana  v) 
marked  the  end  of  the  banana dispute  between  the  EU  and  the  US.  European  Trade 
Commissioner  Lamy  and  USTR  Zoellick  brokered  the  deal  on  April  18,2001,  which 
included  provisions  for  the  end  to  first  come  first  serve  licensing  and  US  retaliatory 
sanctions  by  I  July  200  1. 
Under  the  deal,  the  plan  to  move  to  a  tariff  only  system  by  2006  remained,  but 
the  first  come  first  serve  licensing  scheme  was  scratched.  The  EU-US  agreement 
established  two  phases  of  three-tiered  tariff  rate  quotas  for  the  transitional  period  (see 
table  8.4).  It  was  decided  that  a  historical  reference  period  (1994-1996)  would 
deten-nine  interim  banana  licenses.  The  EU-US  deal  offered  'something  for  everyone' 
(see  table  8.5  )412  Non-traditional  operators,  such  as  Chiquita,  gained  access  to  tariff 
rate  quotas,  while  traditional  operators  maintained  the  majority  of  Category  A  and  B 
licenses.  ACP  producers  were  protected  by  tariff  rate-quotas  in  the  transitional  phase, 
while  Latin  American  producers  were  guaranteed  the  move  to  a  tariff  only  regime,  and 
the  possibility  of  higher  access  to  the  EU  market  during  the  transition. 
'11'  Two  strong  supporters  of  the  first  come  first  serve  regime-  Ecuador  and  Dole  Foods  Corporation- 
were  the  only  losers  in  a  compromised  designed  to  make  multiple  winners.  See  Financial  Times,  EU 
Calls  on  Ecuador  to  Support  Banana  Deal,  18  April  200  1. 
252 Table  8.3  Chronology  of  the  Banana  Dispute 
1993 
May  GATT  panel  finds  against  EC  Member  States  (banana  i).  EC  blocks  panel  report 
from  being  adopted  by  the  GATT  Council 
July  The  single  market  in  bananas  is  launched  with  EC  Regulation  404/93 
1994 
January  o  The  GATT  panel  finds  against  Regulation  404/93  (banana  ii) 
February  *  The  EC  blocks  the  GATT  panel  report  on  Regulation  404/93  from  being  adopted 
1995 
January  The  new  WTO  dispute  settlement  provision  prevents  one  member  from  blocking 
panel  findings 
1996 
September  The  US,  Ecuador,  Guatemala,  Honduras  and  Mexico  challenge  banana  ii  under  the 
WTO  dispute-settlement  mechanism. 
1997 
May  The  WTO  panel  rules  against  the  EC  regime. 
July  The  EC  appeals  19  findings  in  the  WTO  panel  report. 
September  The  WTO  Appellate  Body  upholds  panel  findings  of  EC  GATT/GATS  violations. 
1998 
January  WTO  arbitrator  gives  EC  until  January  1,1999  to  comply  with  WTO  rulings. 
June  *  European  Agriculture  Council  adopts  modifications  to  banana  regime. 
o  The  EU  adopts  a  revised  banana  import  regime  (banana  iii)  to  be  implemented 
July  January  1999. 
*  The  US  argues  that  the  new  EC  regime  is  not  compatible.  USTR  publishes 
November  its  retaliatory  sanction  list  in  the  Federal  Register  and  seeks  a  WTO  panel  on  the 
EU  Banana  Regime 
1999 
January  Banana  iii  is  implemented  on  I  January  1999  and  the  United  States  seeks 
WTO  authorisation  to  impose  $500  million  in  retaliatory  tariffs  on  the  EU  under  Article 
22  of  the  DSU.  The  EU  requests  a  WTO  panel  to  rule  on  the  compliance  of  banana  iii 
under  Article  21  of  the  DSU. 
March  o  The  WTO  panel  announces  it  needs  more  time  to  rule  on  the  EU  banana 
regime.  The  US  imposes  sanctions  and  announces  that  customs  duties  will  not  be 
collected  until  the  panel  rules. 
April  *  The  WTO  panel  rules  that  the  EU  banana  regime  is  still  inconsistent,  and  authorises 
US  retaliatory  tariffs  amounting  to  $191.4  million  a  year. 
May 
o  The  Commission  requests  a  Dispute  Settlement  Panel  on  US  Section  301. 
2000 
May  o  Carousel  Retaliation  is  passed  by  the  Senate  as  part  of  the  Afro-Caribbean  trade  bill 
December  9  The  WTO  rejects  the  EU  request  for  a  panel  on  Section  30  1.  EU  agriculture  ininisters 
agree  to  a  new  banana  regime  (banana  iv). 
2001 
April  Banana  deal  struck  between  the  EU  and  the  US  (banana  v).  EU  agrees  to  drop  first 
come  first  serve  licensing  and  implement  historical  references  system  by  July  1,2001. 
US  agrees  to  drop  retaliatory  sanctions  on  same  day. 
253 Table  8.4  The  EU  Banana  ReLyimes 
Non-preferential  duty  free  imports  in  Germany 
20%  duty  on  imported  bananas  in  Benelux  countries,  Ireland 
Banana  I  Member  State  and  Denmark. 
Regimes  Duty  ffee  imports  in  France,  Italy,  Portugal,  Spain  and  the  UK 
maintained  duty  free  imports  for  ACP  states 
Two-  Tiered  Tariffs 
ACP  states:  857,000  tonnes  of  duty  free  imports  from 
Restrictive 
traditional  ACP  countries 
BananaH  Tariff  Rate 
Latin  America:  2  million  tonne  quota  at  100  ecus  per  tonne, 
Quota  rising  to  850  ecus. 
Three-  Tiered  Licenses 
Category  A  licenses  (66.5  %)  of  the  2  million  tonne  quota 
allocated  to  traditional  operators. 
Category  B  licenses  (30%)  of  the  quota,  awarded  to  operators 
with  history  in  ACP  trade 
Category  C  licenses  created  for  new  producers. 
Two-Tiered  Tarfs 
ACP:  857,000  tonnes  of  duty  free  imports  (to  be  filled 
globally) 
Banana  Less  Restrictive  Latin  American:  75  ecu  for  the  first  2.553  million  tonnes.  A 
III  Tariff  Rate  new  provision,  however,  was  that  this  quota  would  be  filled 
Quota  globally  by  ACP  states. 
Licensing 
Three-tiered  system  remained 
No  distinction  between  ACP  and  Latin  American  producers  for 
the  allocation  of  import  licenses,  but  license  distribution  based 
on  historical  reference  (1994-1996)  for  1999  and  2000)  for  a 
period  when  levels  of  ACP  bananas  had  been  guaranteed  by 
the  EU  regime. 
Tariff  Only  System 
Transition  to  Move  to  tariff  only  system  by  2006  after  transitional  period  Banana  Tariff  Only 
IV  System/FCFS 
First  Come  First  Serve  Licensing  (Transitional  Period) 
Licensing 
Three  quotas  would  be  managed  fortnightly  or  weekly  to 
control  banana  prices 
All  categories  of  licenses  would  be  allocated  on  the  First  Come 
First  Serve  basis 
Tariff  Only  System 
Move  to  tariff  only  system  by  2006  after  transitional  period. 
Interim  Three-tiered  licensing  (two  phases) 
Phase  I  (I  July  2001) 
ý-  Category  A-  2.2  million  tonnes 
Banana  Transition  to  Category  B-  353,000  tonnes 
V  Tariff  Only  Category  C-  850,000  tonnes 
System/  Phase  11  (1  January  2002) 
Historical  Category  A-  2.2  million  tonnes 
Licensing  Category  B-  453,000  tonnes 
Category  C-  750,00  tonnes 
Historical  Reference  Licensing 
Historical  Reference  licensing  based  on  the  distributions 
between  1994  and  1996.83%  of  A  and  B  licenses  for 
traditional  operators  and  17%  for  non-traditional. 
254 2)  The  US  negotiating  position 
The  focus  in  this  section  turns  to  the  motives  driving  US  decisions  in  the  -banana 
dispute.  It  questions  whether  the  US  acted  in  the  interest  of  the  multilateral  trading 
regime  or  multinational  companies?  Four  US  decisions  in  the  banana  dispute  are 
considered  below  including  the  decision  to  file  the  GATT/WTO  cases;  to  impose 
sanctions  before  the  WTO  ruling  on  the  EU's  less  restrictive  tariff  quota;  to  target  EU 
Member  States  with  sanctions  using  Section  301  and  Carousel  Retaliation;  and  finally, 
to  accept  the  banana  deal. 
The  WTO  Challenge 
In  both  Europe  and  the  US  it  is  widely  thought  that  the  Clinton  Administration  was 
initially  hesitant  to  get  involved  in  the  WTO  dispute.  A  trade  war  with  Europe  over  a 
product  with  little  domestic  agricultural  significance  conflicted  with  Clinton's  plans  to 
strengthen  the  US  relationship  with  Europe.  Why  would  the  US  enter  the  banana 
dispute  when  it  is  not  a  large  exporter  of  bananas  to  the  EU?  Many  EU  officials  have 
argued  that  the  US  decision  to  enter  the  dispute  was  dictated  by  Chiquita  Corporation, 
the  American  based  multinational  banana  producer  operating  in  Latin  America.  US 
trade  officials  have  argued  that  the  decision  to  pursue  the  dispute  was  prompted  by  the 
need  to  accommodate  a  range  of  actors  including  the  US  Congress,  Latin  American 
banana  producers  and  Chiquita.  In  the  early  stages  of  the  dispute,  one  USTR 
representative  stated,  'We  did  not  consciously  enter  the  GATT  dispute.  In  part  we  did 
so  at  the  request  of  Latin  American  countries.  '  413  The  direct  US  link  to  Latin 
American  banana  producers.  however,  is  Chiquita.  Chiquita's  role  in  the  dispute  is 
crucial  to  understanding  the  US  decision  to  file  a  WTO  complaint  against  EU  banana 
subsidies. 
255 USTR  involvement  in  the  WTO  dispute  was  secured  when  Chiquita  applied 
for  a  Section  301  petition,  requiring  USTR  to  investigate  the  EU  banana  regime  under 
the  US  1974  Trade  Act.  It  was  the  Section  301  petition  that  subsequently  led  to  the  US 
decision  to  join  other  Latin  American  countries  in  requesting  the  Dispute  Settlement 
panel  in  1996.  Section  301  requires  USTR  to  act  if  a  trading  practice  is  in  violation  of 
bilateral  or  multilateral  trade  agreements.  Thus  a  USTR  official  argued  that,  'There 
was  little  flexibility  on  this,  USTR  had  to  take  the  301  Petition  because  GATT  had 
found  the  EC  in  violation  of  rules'.  414 
The  main  beneficiary  of  USTR's  investigation  into  the  EU  banana  regime  was 
Chiquita.  Chiquita  reported  over  a  billion  dollars  in  lost  revenue  since  the  second 
banana  regime  was  established  in  1993,  and  in  January  2001  it  sued  the  European 
Commission  for  $519  million  in  damages  incurred  as  a  result  of  the  EU  ba.  nana 
subsidies.  415  Despite  the  fact  that  American  multinationals  controlled  three-fourths  of 
the  EU  market,  Chiquita's  share'dropped  from  roughly  40  to  20  percent  after  the 
implementation  of  the  single  market  regime.  In  addition,  while  Chiquita's  market 
share  dropped  roughly  20%.  two  other  US  banana  multinationals,  Del  Monte  and 
Dole,  managed  to  increase  their  market  share  over  Chiquita.  416  Both  refused  to  enter 
the  dispute  despite  their  shared  interest  in  Latin  American  banana  plantations.  417 
413  Interview  USTR  official,  Washington  D.  C.  and  by  telephone  2000.2001  (57,58). 
414  Still,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  decision  was  unprecedented.  Prior  to  USTRs  decision  to  launch  the 
301  investigation,  one  USTR  official  argued  it  'would  break  new  ground,  as  this  would  be  the  first  time 
that  USTR  had  ever  used  Section  301  in  connection  with  a  product  that  was  not  exported  from  the 
US.  'Quoted  in  Barlett  and  Steel  (2000) 
it  15  Sutton  (1997)  reports  Chiquita's  pre-1993  market  share  at  43%  and  post  1993  at  18%.  See  also 
Alden  and  Bowen  (Financial  Times)  200  1. 
"6  Chiquita  claims  its  loses  are  a  direct  result  of  the  EU  banana  regime,  however,  it  has  also  been 
Zý 
argued  by  the  international  consulting  firm,  Arthur  D.  Little  International  that  Chiquita's  losses  are  due 
to  its  earlier  policy  of  oversupplyincy  (see  Sutton  1997:  25). 
417  It  appeared  that  Dole  and  Del  M  onte  wished  to  avoid  the  negative  press  attention  that  Chiquita 
received  for  battling  against  small  Caribbean  producers.  Both  companies  publicly  offered  their  support 
for  ACP  states  (despite  their  endorsement  of  first  come  first  serve  licensing,  deemed  detrimental  to  ACP 
states).  Dole  claimed  that,  'precipitous  change  in  current  trading  regime  arrangement  would  cause 
disproportionate  amount  of  harm  to  ACP  and  European  banana  producing  regimes'.  Del  Monte  reported 
that  it  activities  in  Cameroon,  'were  part  of  a  corporate  strategy  recognising  the  EU's  need  to  provide 
256 While  USTR  is  commissioned  to  protect  US  businesses,  its  avid  interest  in  the 
banana  dispute  at  the  beset  of  one  company  against  the  rest  of  the  industry  drew  heavy 
criticism.  It  was  widely  argued  that  Chiquita's  privileged  position  was  secured  by  its 
CEO,  Carl  Linder,  who  had  made  heavy  campaign  contributions  to  the  Clinton 
Administration  418 
. 
Time  Magazine  reported  that  Chiquita's  CEO  'got  Washington  to 
launch  trade  war  for  him'  (see  Barlett  and  Steel  2000).  Commissioner  Brittan  argued 
that  US  involvement  in  the  dispute  settlement  process  was  'driven  by  the  fact  that 
419  Chiquita  is  a  company  that  gives  money  to  political  parties' 
Chiquita  managed  to  lobby  support  not  only  from  the  Clinton  and  Bush 
Administrations  but  also  from  Congress.  Twelve  US  Senators  called  for  a  formal 
inquiry  into  the  EU  banana  regime,  and  USTR  came  under  heavy  pressure  from 
Congress  to  exert  maximum  pressure  on  the  EU  to  end  to  the  dispute.  Congressional 
interest  in  bringing  an  end  to  banana  subsidies  was  also  tied  to  the  larger  goal  of 
curbing  unfair  EU  trading  practices,  a  particular  irritant  of  both  politicians  and  lobbies 
linked  to  domestic  agriculture. 
some  form  of  protection  to  EU  growers  and  to  honour  the  commitments  made  under  Lome.  '  See 
Caribbean  Banana  Exporters  Association,  EU  Banana  Regime:  Position  of  Del  Monte  and  Dole 
Corporations:  available  at  httpL_'/cbea.  or-,  downloaded  22  November  2000.  Dole  corporation  refused  to 
comment,  claiming  their  position  was  well  documented  in  the  press.  In  reality,  both  companies  were 
less  affected  by  the  EU  banana  regime  because  they  had  taken  steps  to  diversify  their  markets.  Dole 
invested  in  ACP  producing  states  such  as  Jamaica,  Cameroon  and  the  Ivory  Coast,  and  bought  up 
European  importers  that  field  the  import  licences,  thus,  ensuring  that  Dole-Europe  benefits  from  EU 
quota-rents.  417  Del  Monte  expanded  European  distribution,  increasing  its  European  business  by  30  per 
cent,  with  half  of  its  $2  billion  in  revenues  coming  from  the  continent.  Chiquita,  who  had  sold  its 
interests  in  the  Irish  based  banana  operator  Fyffes,  suddenly  found  itself  in  direct  competition  with 
companies  who  held  European  licenses.  Interview  USTR  official,  Washington  DC  2000,  (58);  See  also 
Alden  and  Bowen  (Financial  Times)  February  16,2001. 
419  see  Laurance,  B(  1999)  The  Bi-,  Banana  In  Sunday  Guardian,  7  March 
419  Quoted  in  BBC  News  (1999)  Banana  War  exposes  old  trade  divisions,  5  March.  The  argument  over 
Chiquita's  campaign  contributions  gave  rise  to  speculation-  mostly  in  the  European  Voice-  that.  Doles' 
position  would  be  more  heavily  protected  Linder  the  Bush  Administration  because  it  had  given  more 
money  to  the  Republican  party  (see  European  Voice  2000).  However,  this  was  disproved  when  the  Bush 
Administration  supported  a  deal  opposed  by  Dole. 
257 Sanctioning  the  EU  regime 
The  decision  to  sanction  the  regime  prior  to  the  WTO  ruling  raised  the  stakes  in  the 
dispute  and  increased  tension  between  the  transatlantic  partners.  In  late  1998  USTR 
came  under  heavy  pressure  to  retaliate  against  the  EU  in  the  banana  dispute.  Members 
of  Congress  were  frustrated  with  the  EU's  failure  to  implement  a  WTO  consistent 
regime  despite  the  1997  ruling.  Congress  and  USTR  agreed  that  changes  to  the  EU 
banana  regime,  which  were  set  for  implementation  in  January  1999,  would  not  make 
the  EU  regime  WTO  compatible.  In  November  the  House  approved  Resolution  213 
calling  for  the  Administration  to  actively  pursue  EU  compliance  in  the  banana  and 
beef  disputes.  The  Resolution,  later  approved  by  the  Senate  states  that,  'the  President 
should  develop  a  trade  agenda  which  actively  addresses  agricultural  trade  barriers  in 
multilateral  and  bilateral  trade  negotiations  and  steadfastly  pursues  full  compliance 
with  the  dispute  settlement  decision  of  the  World  Trade  Organisation'  (US  Congress 
1998). 
The  decision  to  sanction  the  EU  gained  cross  party  support  from  influential 
Democrats  and  Republicans  in  Congress,  and  featured  lobbying  by  many  heavy 
weights  including  the  Speaker  of  the  House  Newt  Gingrich,  Senator  Trent  Lott  and 
Senator  Bob  Dole  as  well  as  Minority  Leader  Richard  Gephardt.  420  Congress  exerted 
pressure  on  the  Administration  who  in  turn  agreed  to  pursue  'all  necessary  action  to 
ensure  full  and  timely  EU  compliance  in  these  cases.  '  White  House  Chief  of  Staff 
Erskine  Bowles  (1998)  outlined  in  a  letter  to  several  Congress  Members  in  November 
1999  the  Administration's  commitment  to  utilising  (1)  domestic,  (2)  bilateral  and  (3) 
multilateral  channels  to  end  the  dispute.  '121  First,  bilateral  discussion  with  the 
410  These  politicians  favoured  the  'free  trade'  stance,  while  a  movement  of  less  influential  Democrats 
has  opposed  the  US  challen'.  e  to  subsidised  Caribbean  bananas  in  Favour  of  'fair  trade*  (see  also  below). 
421  The  letter  stated.  'The  Administration  shares  your  view  that  the  World  Trade  Organisation  cases 
involving  bananas  and  beef  hormones  are  important  tests  of  whether  the  European  Union  (EU)  intends 
258 Commission  would  continue  in  accordance  with  commitments  made  under  the  NTA. 
Second,  USTR  would  reserve  the  right  to  challenge  the  regime  in  the  WTO.  Finally,  in 
keeping  with  domestic  commitments,  retaliation  against  the  EU  would  be  instigated 
under  Section  330  1  of  the  1974  Trade  Act.  Bowles  also  announced  the  Administration's 
intent  to  publish  the  list  of  sanctions  in  the  public  register  for  comment  in  November 
1998  and  to  impose  sanctions  no  later  than  March  3,1999.  The  commitment  to 
Congress  locked  USTR  negotiators  into  a  time  frame  for  retaliation. 
US  decision-makers  appeared  fairly  united  in  their  decision  to  sanction  the 
EU.  422  However,  the  decision  to  pass  the  Carousel  Retaliation  Act,  ironically  as  part 
of  the  Afro-Caribbean  Trade  Bill,  highlighted  differences  between  Congress  and  the 
US  Administration.  It  also  illustrated  how  Congress  was  able  to  impact  US  trade 
policy  directly,  and  how  Chiquita,  as  a  strong  supporter  of  Carousel,  was  able  to  exert 
additional  pressure  on  USTR  indirectly.  Carousel  Retaliation  gained  popular  support 
in  Congress  because  it  was  designed  to  maximise  pressure  in  all  trade  disputes  with 
423 
the  EU 
. 
Two  factors  helped  maximise  the  lobbying  efforts  of  Chiquita  on  Carousel 
Retaliation.  Again,  the  hefty  campaign  contributions  made  by  Carl  Linder  (around  $5 
million)  to  both  parties  in  Congress  came  under  scrutiny.  Moreover  Chiquita's 
interests  coincided  with  many  in  Congress  who  were  interested  in  putting  an  end  to 
other  trade  disputes  where  agriculture  subsidies  and  tariff  rate  quotas  formed  non-tariff 
to  implement  WTO  rulinos  issued  against  it'.  The  widelý  publicised  letter  is  available  from 
jmpý,,  Jlill.  heefor-ft  \Ntos.  hun 
422  Although  it  should  be  noted  that  some  members  of  the  House  were  opposed  to  sanctions  and 
introduced  House  Resolution  1361  (sponsored  by  Democrat  Representative  Maxine  Waters)  to  'bar  the 
imposition  of  increased  tariffs  or  other  retaliatory  measures  against  the  products  of  the  European  Union 
in  response  to  the  banana  regime  in  the  European  Union.  '  The  resolution  stated  that  US  consumers  and 
Caribbean  farmers  should  not  pay  for  losses  to  one  US  company.  The  resolution  never  re-surfaced  from 
the  House  Subcommittee  on  Trade  after  it  was  logged  there  in  April  1999. 
42  33  Views  expressed  by  interviews  with  House  and  Senate  staff  members,  Washington  D.  C.  2000. 
259 barriers  to  trade.  424  Chiquita  gained  wider  political  support  by  teaming  up  with  the 
beef  lobby,  who  had  much  more  broad-based  constituency  support.  425  The  US  Beef 
Cattlemen  Association  and  Chiquita  Corporation  ran  an  ad  campaign  drawing 
attention  to  domestic  opposition  to  the  EU's  banana  and  beef  regimes  (see  figure  8.1). 
The  'Message  to  Congress'  was  that  US  companies  were  paying  the  price  for  EU  non- 
compliance  with  WTO  rules  426 
. 
The  idea  that  the  European  Commission  was  dodging  the  WTO  decision  was 
popular  in  Congress.  One  Senate  staff  member  noted  that  Senators  felt  that  despite 
three  WTO  rulings  the  Commission,  'was  doing  nothing!  427  That  viewpoint  was  also 
held  in  the  House,  where  one  staffer  noted  that,  'Once  the  banana  case  was  won, 
Congress  expected  the  Europeans  to  comply.  That  they  don't  is  an  affront.  ý428  US 
Congressman  John  Thune  argued  that, 
The  EU-US  beef  and  banana  disputes  were  important  tests  for  these  new 
(WTO)  procedures.  The  EU's  refusal  to  live  with  the  consequences  of  the 
decision  is  unacceptable.  It  defies  the  purpose  of  the  WTO  and  breeds  further 
scepticism  among  those  who  want  free  and  fair  trade.  429 
Carousel  Retaliation  was  seen  as  a  way  offiorcing  the  Commission  to  comply  with  the 
WTO  ruling,  thus  putting  an  end  to  the  dispute.  However,  it  was  highly  controversial 
both  in  transatlantic  relations,  where  it  was  unanimously  condemned  by  European 
institutions,  and  domestically  where  the  US  Administration  publicly  voiced  concerns 
over  the  new  legislation.  USTR  Barshefsky  testified  before  the  Senate  Finance  Trade 
-124  See  European  Union-  Germany-  France  Report,  June  1998,  US  Congress,  Committee  on  Aýgriculture, 
Agriculture  Trade  Expansion  Delegation. 
12ý  Tile  US  Beef  Cattlemen  Association  has  the  support  of  beef  farmers,  who  are  present  in  most  US 
states,  whereas  Chiquita  has  no  domestic  agricultural  base.  Rather,  its  only  direct  constituency  link  is  to 
its  headquarters  in  Cincinnati  Ohio. 
426  See  also  US  Beef  Cattlemen  1998. 
117  interview,  Washington  DC  2000  (5  1). 
1-1ý  interview,  Washington  DC  2000  (39). 
Available,  http:  house.  gov/thune.  wto.  htm 
260 Sub-Committee  that  she  opposed  Carousel  Retaliation 
. 
430  Another  USTR  official 
noted  that  USTR  already  had  the  power  to  change  the  sanction  list,  adding,  'if  we 
thought  changing  the  list  would  do  it,  we  would.  ' 
Carousel  Retaliation  highlights  institutional  rivalry  between  USTR  and 
Congress  on  foreign  trade  policy.  While  USTR  was  more  tuned  to  the  external, 
bilateral  and  multilateral  implications  of  using  sanctions,  Congress  was  acting  solely 
in  interest  of  domestic  businesses.  One  House  Staff  member  noted  with  irritation  that, 
'  Business  argued  that  USTR  should  look  at  the  products  on  the  list  to  have  full 
impact...  we  were  baffled  that  USTR  refused  to  look  at  it...  '  431  One  Senate  staff 
member  stated  the  view  that  officials  in  USTR  simply  'oppose  authority  for 
Congress.  '  432 
The  decision  to  sanction 
The  decision  concerning  which  products  to  sanction,  including  a  range  of  cheese, 
wine,  clothing,  appliances  and  beauty  products  increased  the  complexity  of  US  policy 
towards  the  EU  banana  regime.  Two  factors  were  crucial  to  determining  the  sanctions 
list.  First,  officials  asked  where  sanctions  would  most  likely  have  an  impact,  and 
second,  where  minimum  damage  would  be  caused  to  US  companies.  433  UltimatelY,  the 
decision  lay  with  USTR,  however  the  list  of  sanctions  was  available  for  public 
comment  in  the  Federal  Register.  A  comparison  of  the  original  and  final  lists  sheds 
some  light  on  which  other  influences  shaped  the  US  decision  on  'who'  to  sanction.  In 
addition  it  points  to  domestic  casualties  of  the  banana  war. 
4"M  See  US  Administration  Press  Release  (2000)  Carousel  Revised  Retaliation  List  in  EU  Disputes 
Delayed,  20  June. 
13  1  Interview,  Housc  Staff,  Subcon-unittce  on  Trade,  Washin,,  ýton  DC,  2000  (39). 
13  20 
Interview,  Senate  Staff,  Senate  Finance  Committee,  Washinz.,  ton  DC,  2000  (5  1). 
4  ',  3  lntervieýý,  USTR  official,  Washington  2000  (57). 
261 The  internal  economic  repercussions  of  US  sanctions  became  apparent  when 
US  manufacturers,  farmers  and  retailers  reported  lost  exports  and  lost  imports..  For 
example,  US  farmers  faced  lost  sales  of  raw  ingredients  to  EU  cookie  producers,  and 
434 
Whirlpool  halted  shipments  of  certain  coffeemakers  . 
US  department  stores  such  as 
Nieman  Marcus  435  were  forced  to  find  alternative  sources  of  cashmere  and  small 
retailers  of,  for  example.  bath  products  were  unable  to  import  products  for  distribution. 
The  damage  to  US  companies  had  internal  political  repercussions.  First,  the 
viewpoint  that  US  trade  policy  was  dictated  by  large  companies  was  reinforced  by  the 
fact  that  many  large  multinational  companies,  such  as  Gillette  and  Mattel,  were  able  to 
lobby  their  European-made  imports  off  the  sanction  list,  while  small  companies 
without  lobby  facilities,  which  were  often  unaware  of  the  dispute,  were  not.  436  Second, 
damage  to  US  companies  involved  in  foreign  trade  instigated  backlash  from 
companies  who  condemned  the  use  of  unilateral  sanctions.  A  spokesperson  for  the 
American  Association  of  Exporteks  and  Importers  in  New  York  argued  that,  'We 
would  like  to  see  rule  of  law  rather  than  [the  US]  acting  as  jury  and  judge.  '  437 
US  policy  decisions  in  the  banana  dispute  also  had  external  repercussions  for 
bilateral  US  relations  with  other  states.  The  decision  to  strategically  target  sanctions  at 
the  regimes  strongest  supporters  threatened  bilateral  relations  between  the  US  and 
certain  Member  States.  In  particular,  the  banana  dispute  soured  the  'special 
relationship'  between  the  US  and  the  UK.  While  the  UK  had  been  spared  from 
4  ',  4  See  Cox,  J (1999)  Punitive  Actions  by  US  Felt  World-wide'  In  US  Today,  March  11. 
131  ý  One  USTR  official  notes  that  Neiman  Marcus  tried  to  lobby  Scottish  cashmere  off  the  list  by  arguing 
that  Chinese  replacements  were  of  lower  quality  (57). 
1  ',  6  See  Barlett  and  Steele  2000.  Members  of  Congress  also  lobbied  to  get  some  industries  off  the  list. 
Zý 
For  example  Congressman  Bill  Delahunt,  a  strong  supporter  of  US  sanctions,  actively  lobbied  USTR  on 
behalf  of  NeýN  England  candle  makers  and  Greetin  Card  Makers  whose  imports  were  on  the  original 
sanction  list  (Press  Release  16  April  2001 
437  Quoted  in  CNN  (1998)  US-EU  Trade  War  Looms.  10  November. 
262 retaliation  in  the  beef  dispute,  its  strong  support  of  the  EU  regime  ensured  it  was  one 
438 
of  the  countries  hardest  hit  by  US  sanctions  . 
The  US  challenge  to  end  the  EU  banana  regime  also  threatened  the  US-Caribbean 
relationship.  In  March  (1999)  the  Caribbean  Community  and  Common  Market 
(Caricom)  suspended  the  Caribbean-US  'Partnership  for  Prosperity  and  Security  in  the 
Caribbean'  or  the  Bridgetown  Accord  (1997)  in  protest  of  US  sanctions.  A  Caricom 
spokesman  confirmed  that  the  suspension  of  the  Accord  was  a  means  of 
communicating  its  disgust  to  the  White  House.  439 
Finally,  the  banana  dispute  put  a  strain  on  US-Latin  American  relations.  In 
particularly,  the  relationship  with  Columbia  and  Costa  Rica  was  threatened  when  the 
two  states  signed  a  pact  with  the  EU  in  which  they  withdrew  their  complaint  against 
the  banana  regime.  The  deal  was  met  harshly  in  the  US  Congress,  where  Senator  Bob 
Dole  [unsuccessfully]  called  for  sanctions  against  these  countries  to  be  included  in  a 
budget  bill  (Greenwald  et  al  1996).  The  tension  between  the  US  and  Ecuador,  who 
chose  to  accept  the  EU's  first  come  first  proposal,  was  exemplified  by  the  comments 
of  Ecuador's  Ambassador  to  the  EU,  Alfredo  Pinoargote,  who  argued  that  'Ecuador 
and  the  EU  have  been  virtually  taken  hostage  by  the 
[US].,  440 
438  The  sanctions  placed  heavy  pressure  on  the  UK  government  because  they  threatened  to  shut  down 
the  Scottish  cashmere  industry.  US  industry  and  members  of  Congress  strongly  supported  targeting  Z'  Z'  Z" 
cashmere  because  threatening  an  already  fragile  textile  industry  would  maximise  pressure  and  hopefully 
convince  the  UK  government  to  use  its  influence  within  the  EU.  Instead,  the  UK  government  turned  and 
sharply  criticised  the  US.  In  protest,  the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  took  the  rare  opportunity 
twice  to  summon  the  US  Ambassador  to  the  UK. 
4  39  Wilkinson,  B  (1999)  Caricom  Suspends  Treaty  with  US  Over  Bananas,  One  World  News,  9  March, 
Available  at  http:.  wLN-W.  0ne,  ývorld.  on-, 
""  Quoted  in  BBC  News  (2000)  Ecuador  turns  on  US  in  trade  war.  6  October.  Ecuador's  decision  was 
said  to  be  dictated  by  its  dependence  on  EU  imports,  which  kept  it  from  imposing  WTO  approved 
sanctions. 
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264 Why  accept  this  deal? 
Three  months  into  Bush's  Presidency,  the  US  government  agreed  to  end  the  banana 
dispute  with  the  EU.  Why  did  the  US  govemment  choose  to  accept  this  deal?  From  the 
start,  the  US  had  favoured  the  use  of  historical  reference  licensing  over  first  come,  first 
serve  licensing,  but  a  sticking  point  in  previous  negotiations  had  been  the  reference 
period  used  to  determine  banana  licenses.  It  was  argued  that  a  post  1993  reference 
period  upheld  the  distortions  of  the  EU  banana  regime  because  it  issued  licensing  on 
the  basis  of  volume  distribution  at  a  time  when  tariff-rate  quotas  existed  fqr  ACP 
bananas.  The  pressing  questions  is  why  the  US  agreed  to  a  deal  that  included  a 
historical  reference  period  of  1994-1996  for  license  distribution,  the  same  period  used 
in  the  third  banana  regime  and  how  was  USTR  able  to  sell  the  deal  at  home?  It  is 
argued  that  the  compromise  was  struck  in  order  to  avoid  the  implementation  of  first 
come,  first  serve  licensing  and  the  subsequent  use  of  Carousel  Retaliation,  which 
USTR  had  avoided  using  thus  far. 
A  number  of  factors  helped  influence  USTR's  decision  to  accept  the  historical 
reference  licensing  scheme.  First  and  foremost  noted  one  official,  'We  wanted  to  end 
this  dispute.  '  The  close  pre-existing  relationship  between  Commissioner  Lamy  and 
USTR  Zoellick  arguably  incited  compromise.  441  Still,  despite  early  meetings  between 
the  two,  Zoellick  testified  in  front  of  Congress  in  March  2001  that  the  EU  would  face 
sanctions  unless  it  could  show  greater  flexibility  on  bananas.  It  was  widely  believed 
that  the  Bush  Administration-  like  the  Clinton  Administration-  was  under  pressure 
from  Congress  to  implement  Carousel  Retaliation,  which  the  Clinton  Administration 
111  lntervieývvee  (57)  argued  that  Commissioner  Brittan  and  USTR  Barshefsky  had  mismanaged  the 
dispute.  A  Financial  Times  Editorial  stated  that,  'Much  ofthe  deterioration  in  transatlantic  trade 
relations  since  the  mid-  I  990s  was  due  to  personal  frictions  between  their  predecessors,  Sir  Leon  Brittan 
and  Charlene  Barshcfsky.  Messrs  Larny  and  Zoellick  have  had  the  maturity  and  good  sense  to  rise 
above  petty  squabbling  in  the  interests  of  bigger  shared  goals.  That  bodes  well  for  the  handlin  of  future  9 
disputes.  ' 
265 had  shelved.  442  One  USTR  official  argued  that  the  perception  of  Congress  was'similar 
to  the  Administrations.  They  wanted  the  dispute  solved,  'they  were  sick  of 
bananas. 
443 
USTR's  mission  was  to  find  a  compromise  that  could  'best'  accommodate  the 
interests  of  Latin  America,  the  Caribbean  and  Chiquita.  444  Despite  earlier  objections 
from  the  Latin  American  producers  and  Chiquita,  the  historical  reference  system  met  a 
fundamental  requirement  of  all  three  parties:  it  replaced  the  first  come  first  serve 
system.  The  threat  of  first  come  first  serve  was  particularly  persuasive  in  convincing 
Chiquita  to  accept  the  historical  references  period  of  1994-1996.  Although  it  stood  to 
gain  a  few  licenses  (overall  the  tariff  quota  for  dollar  bananas  was  increased  by 
100,000)  under  the  banana  v  regime,  the  numbers  were  not  drastically  different  to 
those  upheld  by  previous  regimes.  However,  one  USTR  official  noted  that,  Thiquita 
actually  mortally  feared  [first  come  first  serve].  It  fought  until  it  became  abundantly 
clear  that  it  would  be  a  reality.  '  445'  In  addition,  Chiquita  was  guaranteed  a  definitive 
date  for  the  end  of  the  tariff  rate  quota  system. 
3)  EU  Decision  Making  in  the  Banana  Dispute 
While  US  involvement  in  the  banana  dispute  can  be  mainly  attributed  to  domestic 
interests,  at  first  glance  the  EU  position  seems  to  be  the  product  of  external  factors, 
most  obviously  its  relations  with  ACP  states.  US  officials  have  argued,  however,  that 
the  EU  front  as  third  world  protector  is  a  cover  for  its  real  interest  in  protecting  EU 
banana  operators.  This  section  considers  the  decision  to  maintain  the  tariff  rate  quota 
44'  A  Senate  Staff  Member  argued  in  October  2000,  that  'Congress  has  been  put  pressure  on  the  n  --  Administration  to  get  rid  of  these  disputes.  '  Washington  (5  1 
14  ',  lntervie%ý,  USTR  official.  Washington  2000  (58) 
4-14  Interview,  USTR  official,  Washington  2000  (57) 
1  ý5  Interview,  USTR  official.  Washington  2000  (58).  zn 
266 system,  to  change  the  regime,  and  finally  to  introduce  first  come  first  serve  licensing 
and  a  tariff  only  regime. 
Table  8.5 
Favoured  First  Come  First  Serve  Favoured  Historical  Reference 
Licensing  Licensing 
(Bananaiv)  (Banana  v) 
US  Multinationals  US  Multinationals 
e  Dole  Corporation  *Chiquita  Corporation 
ACP  States 
e  None 
ACP  States 
eAll 
Latin  American  Producers 
*  Ecuador 
EU  Banana  Operators 
e  None 
Latin  American  Producers 
*All  barring  Ecuador 
EU  Banana  Operators 
e  All 
Pressure  to  Maintain  the  Regime 
The  main  lobbies  that  fought  to  keep  the  EU  regime  were  Caribbean  farmers  and  EU 
banana  operators.  446  EU  operators  favoured  the  historical  reference  period  used  in  the 
regime's  licensing  scheme,  because  the  time  period  used  guaranteed  more  licenses  for 
447  EU  companies  who  were  already  trading  with  ACP  states  . 
The  tariff  quota 
441  Through,  for  example,  lobby  groups  such  as  the  Caribbean  Banana  Export  Association  and  the  EU 
Banana  Operators  Association. 
447  The  Financial  Times  (I  999a)  reported  that  the  regime  'largely  benefit[ed]  EU  banana  traders.  ' 
267 maintained  secure  access  for  Caribbean  and  African  bananas.  Both  lobby  groups  were 
able  to  maintain  the  support  of  Member  States,  particularly  those  with  colomal  ties, 
who  in  turn  fought  to  keep  the  tariff  rate  quota  regime.  448 
The  Reaction  to  US  Sanctions 
The  European  Commission,  the  Member  States  and  the  European  Parliament 
unanimously  condemned  US  sanctions.  Nonetheless  the  WTO  approval  of  sanctions 
acted  as  a  catalyst  of  change.  Carousel  Retaliation  increased  pressure  on  decision- 
makers  to  revise  the  regime.  Although  European  leaders  such  as  Blair  argued  that 
Carousel  was  totally  unproductive,  the  threat  of  increased  sanctions  had  the  intended 
affect.  First,  some  Commission  officials  admitted  that  Carousel  Retaliation  forced  the 
EU  to  reconsider  its  plans  for  change  more  quickly.  Second,  sanctions  not  only 
instigated  a  backlash  against  the  US,  but  also  against  the  EU  as  European  companies 
and  member  state  governments  became  stuck  in  the  crossfire  of  the  transatlantic  trade 
war. 
In  September  2000,16  months  after  the  WTO  ruled  that  the  EU  banana  regime 
was  inconsistent  with  WTO  rules,  a  number  of  European  companies  announced  that 
they  were  taking  legal  action  against  the  Commission.  Arran  Aromatics,  a  Scottish 
manufacturer  of  bath  products,  reported  that  it  was  seeking  legal  consultation  on 
reclaiming  damages  of  E2  million  in  lost  export  orders  to  the  US  (Eaglesham  2000). 
The  Italian  based  Fiamm  Spa,  producers  of  batteries,  announced  it  would  be  seeking 
L'15bn  compensation  (11  Sole  2000)  and  Scottish  cashmere  producers  threatened  to 
4-18  It  should  be  noted,  however  that  Germany  opposed  the  new  regime,  because  it  previously  had  duty 
free  imports  for  all  bananas,  be  they  Latin  American,  Caribbean  or  African.  Germany  challenged  the 
single  banana  re-ime  in  the  European  Court  of  Justice,  but  the  court  upheld  the  EU  wide  tariff  rate 
quota  system. 
268 sue  the  Commission  for  f5  million  (Chisholm  2000) 
. 
449  European  companies  argued 
they  should  not  have  to  pay  the  consequences  of  'the  European  principle  of  preference 
for  our  former  Caribbean  colonies.  450  The  companies  backed  the  US  argument  that 
the  Commission  had  failed  to  handle  the  dispute  in  a  'reasonable  time  span'. 
In  response  to  the  threatened  litigation,  European  Commission  trade 
spokesman  Anthony  Gooch  argued  that  these  companies  lacked  'a  legal  leg  to  stand 
on'.  451  It  was  argued  that  the  blame  was  misplaced  because  the  Commission  had  taken 
action  to  change  the  banana  regime  (including  three  major  communications  to  the 
Council).  Renegotiating  the  banana  regime  had  been  timely  because  of  the  interests  of 
the  Member  States.  While  the  UK  and  Germany  pushed  for  a  compromise,  the 
southern  Member  States,  including  France  and  Spain,  voted  against  the  Commission's 
proposal  for  compromise.  452 
Negotiating  First  Come,  First  Serve 
The  negotiations  on  the  fourth  banana  regime  were  held  up  by  internal  disagreement 
between  Member  States  and  the  European  Parliament  and  external  opposition  to  both 
phases  of  the  fourth  banana  regime.  First,  some  Member  States,  453  EU  banana 
operators,  ACP  and  some  Latin  American  states  opposed  the  move  to  a  tariff  only 
system.  The  Commission  (1999,2000),  the  Council  (1999)  and  the  European 
Parliament  (2000)  argued  against  ending  the  tariff  rate  quota  system.  However,  it  was 
449  This  claim  was  made  before  cashmere  was  temporally  removed  from  the  list. 
450  Quote  made  by  Ian  Russell,  managing  director  of  Arran  Aromatics,  in  Eaglesharn  (2000). 
4SI  Quote  found  in  Wall  Street  Journal  (2000)  European  Firins  Seek  EU  Damages,  for  Banana  War,  30 
August. 
1ý2  Germany  and  the  UK  Nvere  two  of-the  member  states  hardest  hit  by  US  sanctions.  While  Germany 
had  traditionally  opposed  the  banana  regime.  the  UK  had  been  an  avid  supporter.  Some  argue  the  UK 
sold  out  to  the  US  to  protect  the  cashmere  industry.  After  bilateral  lobbying  by  Tony  Blair  US  officials 
took  cashmere  off  the  list  arguing  that  the  UK  because  it  was  less  aggressive  in  its  support  for  EU 
banana  re-irric  ten  other  countries.  See  Mac  Farlane  (2000).  1  4  Particularly,  Spain,  France,  Portugal,  Ireland  and  Greece:  the  former  having  strong  colonial  ties  and 
the  latter  bcin(,  small  scale  banana  producers. 
269 decided  in  July  2000  that  the  move  was  the  only  way  to  satisfy  the  US  and  -end  the 
WTO  dispute.  The  Council  asked  the  Commission  to  pursue  more  definitive  plans  for 
the  transitional  licensing  scheme.  However,  internal  conflict  was  publicised  when 
agriculture  ministers  refused  to  grant  the  Commission  a  mandate  to  negotiate  a  direct 
move  to  the  tariff  only  system  should  the  transitional  system  fail  to  solve  the 
dispute 
454 
Most  parties  favoured  the  historical  preference  system,  but  there  was 
disagreement  over  which  reference  period  would  determine  the  licences.  The  US  and 
Latin  American  countries  preferred  pre  1993  levels,  but  Caribbean  producers  and  EU 
banana  operators  preferred  post  single  market  levels.  There  was  also  a  ques  tion  of 
whether  the  auctioning  system,  which  was  opposed  by  ACP  states  and  the  US,  would 
be  WTO  compatible. 
The  decision  to  move  ahead  with  first  come  first  serve  licensing  met  with 
backlash  from  EU  banana  operators,  ACP  states  and  some  Latin  American  Countries. 
Banana  operators  from  many  Member  States,  Caribbean  and  Latin  American  teamed 
up  in  an  advertising  campaign  protesting  against  the  first  come  first  serve  system  (see 
figure  8.2).  455  They  argued  that  this  system  would  lead  to  serious  disruption  in  the 
market.  Atlanta  (2000),  the  largest  German  fruit  wholesaler  and  leading  operator  and 
distributor,  told  the  European  Community  Banana  Trade  Association  that,  'first  come 
first  served  systems  would  force  the  operators  to  break  up  their  shipping  schedule 
which  now  are  in  line  with  the  ripening  cycles  and  the  general  requirements  of  the 
market'.  Furthermore,  it  was  argued  that  free  lance  traders  would  be  able  to  block 
454  See  Smith,  M  2000  (Financial  Times)  and  EU  Business  2000. 
455  Run  in  European  Voice,  23-29  November  2000,  those  countries  included  Austria,  Belgium, 
Columbia,  Denmark,  Ecuador,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Jamaica,  Netherlands, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  the  UK  and  the  Windward  Islands. 
270 Figure  8.2 
ADVERTISEMENT 
To  whom  it  may  concern 
Statement  on  the 
Future  EU  Import 
Regime  for  Bananas 
The  undersigned  companies  and  (sub-)  national  organisations, 
together  representing  the  vast  majority  of  banana  trading 
companies  in  the  European  market,  reaffirm  their  strong 
opposition  to  the  Commission's  proposal  to  introduce  a 
transitional  import  regime  based  on  a  "First  Come  -  First 
Served"-system. 
That  system  is  in  no  respect  suited  to  the  characteristics  and 
requirements  of  marketing  a  perishable  product  such  as 
bananas  and  would  lead  to  a  serious  disruption  in  the  market 
Austria 
ADEG  Osterreich  Handelsgesellschaft  -  Fruchtexpress 
Grabher  GmbH&  Co.  KG  -Johann  Ischia  &Co.  Im-  und 
Exportges.  m.  b.  H.  -  Josef  Ahorner  Geselischaft  m.  b.  H.  - 
Josef  Mathy  Ges.  m.  b.  H.  &  Co.  -  Obst  Huber  Fruchtimport 
Gesellschaft  m.  b.  H.  -  ZEILBERGER  fruit  service  AG 
Belgium 
Banacol  Marketing  Belgium  BVBA  -  BANANIC 
INTERNATIONAL  N.  V.  -  Geest  Europe 
Leon  Van  Parys  N.  V. 
Columbia 
Uniban 
Denmark 
Brdr.  Lembcke  AIS 
Ecuador 
COSTATRAOING  S.  A. 
Finland 
inex  Partners  Oy  Veikko  Lame  Oy 
France 
AGRUPRIM  S.  A.  COBANA  IMPORT  S.  A.  R.  L. 
Compagnie  des  Bananas  -  Pomona 
Moreover.  thatproposal  has  been  rejected  by  the  United  States, 
seven  Latin  American  supplying  countries  and  the  Caribbean. 
If  it  was  enacted,  this  longstanding  dispute  would  not  he 
resolved. 
The  undersigned  companies  therefore  join  the  call  by  the 
United  States,  seven  countries  of  Latin  America  and  the 
Caribbean  for  the  prompt  introduction  of  a  different  system,  for 
instance  based  an  historical  references  of  banana  trading 
companies. 
Germany 
Afrikanische  Frucht-Compagnie  GmbH  -  Atlanta  AG  - 
BANATRADING  GmbH  -  Cobana  GmbH  &  Co.  KG 
Edeka  Fruchtkontor  GmbH  -  Internationale 
Fruchtimport  Geselischaft  Weichert  &  Co  - 
T.  Port  GmbH  &  Co. 
Ireland 
Central  Banana  Importers  Ltd.  -  Keelings  Ltd. 
N.  Smyth  &  Co.  Ltd. 
Italy 
ABC  -  Bariba  -  Chiqufta  Italia  -  Co-Frutta  Dal  Bello 
Evergreen  Trade  -  Simba  SPA  -  SOCOBA  TICO 
Jamaica 
BECO 
Netherlands 
Bruigam  &  Visser  -  Chiqufta  -  Jan  van  den  Brink  b.  v. 
Velleman  &  Tas 
Portugal 
Frulegue-Agricultura,  Comercio  a  Industria,  LDA. 
Frutban-Agrotecnica,  Comercio  de  Frutas  a  Produtos 
Horticoles,  LDA.  -  Paniberica-Agricultura,  Comercio  a 
Inclustria,  LDA. 
Spain 
Angel  Rey  S.  A.  -  BARGOSA,  S.  A.  -  Cesar  Pis6n  a 
Hijos,  S.  A.  -  Hispafrut  S.  A.  -  Garvic,  S.  A.  - 
Hijos  de  Martin  Moreno,  S.  L.  -  MARTIMAR  Hijos 
de  Enrique  Martin,  S.  A.  -  Meneu  Distribuci6n,  S.  A.  - 
Marcadistribucion  S.  A.  -  Mundifruit  Import  Export 
S.  A.  -  Reybenpack,  S.  A.  - 
Everfresh  AB 
United  Kingdom 
Fyffes  -  Geest  Bananas  Ltd.  -  JAMCO  -  Mack  Multiples 
-  S.  H.  Pratt  &  Co.  (Bananasl  Ltd. 
Windward  Islands 
Wibdeco 
For  further  information  contact:  info@atlanta.  de 
European  Voice  30  November  -6  December  2000 regular  operators  and  that  consumers  would  be  hurt  by  the  quality  of  the  fruit,  because 
companies  would  be  unwilling  to  ship  expensive  high  quality  fruit  given  the  risk  of 
securing  a  license. 
Caribbean  banana  producing  countries  also  lobbied  against  first  come,  first 
serve  licensing,  which  they  believed  would  have  disastrous  effects  on  their  economies. 
It  was  feared  that  the  'ship  race'  for  licenses  would  disadvantage  small  operators  and 
rapidly  push  the  Caribbean  growers  out  of  the  market.  American  multinationals  also 
had  an  advantage  over  Caribbean  exports  because  their  established  markets  in  Eastern 
Europe  provided  the  option  of  shipping  on  to  other  countries,  should  their  bid  for  a 
license  be  rejected  near  EU  shores  (CBEA  2000a;  2000b). 
American  countries  also  opposed  the  first  come,  first  serve  system.  Wilson 
(2001)  reported  that,  'They  fear  Ecuador,  the  biggest  exporter,  will  further  increase  its 
market  share  at  its  neighbours'  expense  because  of  its  low  production  costs.  '  The  US 
was  not  on  board  either.  USTR  officials  argued  that  the  system  was  not  compatible 
with  WTO  rules.  456  In  short,  as  one  US  trade  negotiator  argued,  'First  come,  first 
serve  will  not  end  the  dispute.  Latin  Americans  oppose  it.  Caribbean  producers  oppose 
it.  The  Africans  don't  like  it.  Companies  except  for  Dole  don't  like  it.  '  Even  the 
Commission  admitted  that  'The  first  come  first  serve  system  has  very  limited  support 
and  constitutes  a  particular  heavy  administrative  burden  for  the  EC.  '  Morever,  'small 
time  smaller  operators  which  are  not  'primary  importers'  could  be  eliminated  from  the 
markets'  (European  Commission  1999b).  Why,  then,  was  the  banana fourth  licensing 
scheme  pursued? 
456  See  Financial  Times  (1999)  'US  rejects  Brussels'  proposal  on  bananas',  II  November;  Alden,  E 
(2000)  'US  and  EU  still  split  on  beef  and  bananas'  In  Financial  Times;  December  19;  The  Independent 
(1999)  'US  Rejects  Banana  Trade  Deal',  II  November. 
272 The  decision  to  implement  the  first  come  first  serve  licensing  scheme  can  only 
be  explained  as  a  compromise  made  in  the  face  of  internal  and  external  pressure. 
Consistent  WTO  rulings  and  the  threat  of  US  sanctions  meant  that  the  regime  needed 
to  change,  but  negotiators  had  their  hands  tied  at  a  political  level  by  the  Member  States 
and  the  lobbies  behind  them.  457  Commission  officials  argued  that  they  had  very  little 
option  in  revising  the  banana  regime;  they  believed  that  the  tariff  quota  regime  would 
458  have  to  be  eliminated  to  end  the  dispute 
EU  Member  States  insisted  on  a  transitional  system  tariff-rate  quota  system  to 
protect  ACP  states.  The  tariff  rate  quotas  required  a  licensing  scheme,  but  finding  a 
system  which  satisfied  EU  operators,  Caribbean  exporters  and  the  WTO  complainants 
was  an  impossible  task.  Member  states  were  forced  to  choose  the  'least  worst'  option 
when  the  Commission  announced  in  July  2000  that  without  an  agreement  on  a 
licensing  system,  a  transitional  shift  to  a  tariff  only  regime  would  not  be  practical. 
Many  were  opposed  to  the  first  come  first  serve  licensing,  but  many  had  stronger 
objections  to  scrapping  the  transitional  period  and  moving  directly  to  a  tariff  only 
system.  459  In  the  end  it  was  the  Member  States  preference  for  a  slow  transition  to 
protect  those  who  had  gained  from  previous  banana  regimes  which  placed'on  the 
agenda  a  licensing  scheme  so  avidly  opposed  by  the  same. 
Why  a  deal  now? 
The  Commission's  decision  to  abandon  the  first  come  first  serve  system  was  a 
compromise  aimed  at  balancing  multiple  interests.  By  implementing  the  controversial 
Jý-  Viewpoint  also  expressed  by  Finnish  Council  Presidency  officials,  Interview,  Brussels,  1999  (5). 
4ý8  Need  to  interview  a  couple  of  people  in  Brussels  to  see  why  the  Caribbean  Framework  proposals 
(which  had  gained  support  frorn  some  Latin  Americans  and  the  US)  was  used  other  than  the  fact  that  it 
lacked  concrete  details.  One  USTR  officials  argued  that  if  the  EU  was  concerned  with  the  Caribbean  it 
would  have  taken  its  proposal  on  board. 
1ý1)  See  Smith,  M  2000,  T-inancial  Times. 
273 license  system,  the  EU  stood  to  alienate  the  banana  operators  and  ACP  farmers  it  had 
originally  tried  to  protect.  Even  so  the  reaction  of  these  parties  to  first  come,  first  serve 
licensing  was  well  noted  before  the  Council  agreed  to  it.  So,  why,  in  the  end,  did  the 
Commission  revert  back  to  a  historical  reference  system? 
First,  there  were  questions  about  the  WTO  compatibility  of  the  first  come  first 
serve  system.  The  challengers  to  the  regime  indicated  that  they  would  continue  to 
challenge  the  EU  banana  regime  at  the  WTO.  The  US  threat  of  Carousel  Retaliation 
implementation  increased  the  risk  of  damaging  sanctions  on  EU  companies.  In 
addition  the  EU-US  banana  deal  secured  US  support  for  the  EU's  WTO  waivers  for 
Most  Favoured  Nation  (MFN)  status  under  Article  I  of  the  DSU,  which  the 
Commission  feared  it  would  not  be  able  to  secure.  460 
Second,  the  Commission  played  a  crucial  role  in  ending  the  dispute  because  it 
had  wide  discretion  on  the  type  of  licensing  system  to  be  used  during  the  transitional 
period.  The  threat  of  first  come,  first  serve  was  originally  designed  to  force  the 
Member  States  to  agree  to  a  historical  licensing  system.  The  Commission  only 
accepted  the  first  come,  first  serve  system  when  the  Member  States  could  not  agree  on 
461 
a  historical  reference  period  . 
Further,  Commissioner  Lamy  argued  that  first  come 
first  serve  was  used  to  pressure  the  US  to  make  a  deal.  462  Rumours  in  the  banana 
community  suggested  that  the  Commission  would  have  abandoned  the  controversial 
licensing  system  either  way.  However,  preliminary  work  on  the  system  suggested 
contrary. 
The  Commission's  final  decision  to  relinquish  the  first  come  first  serve  system 
also  stems  froin  the  problematic  implementation  of  the  system.  One  Commission 
Although  consensus  is  not  needed  to  secure  a  waiver,  if  a  number  of  countries  were  willing  to 
continue  fi-hting,  the  dispute  would  continue. 
161  See  Commission  Communication  on  FCFS,  4  October  2000.  COM  (2000)  621.  Interviews  with 
Commission  official  (via  einail)  2001(59):  and  USTR  official  (via  telephone)  2001  (58) 
274 official  noted  that,  'when  it  came  to  actually  putting  First  Come  First  Serve  into 
practice,  there  were  all  sorts  of  technical  problems  -  the  whole  system  had  to  be 
created  from  scratch.  There  were  serious  doubts  as  to  whether  the  system  would  be  up 
and  running  by  I  July  2001  (it  had  already  been  put  back  from  I  April).  '  463  Failure  to 
implement  the  regime,  noted  one  official,  'would  create  a  real  blot  on  the 
Commission's  record. 
ý464 
To  summarise,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  EU's  decision  to  revert  back  to  the 
historical  reference  license  system  was  a  means  of  'best'  accommodating  interested 
parties.  EU  banana  operators  and  ACP  farmers  accepted  that  they  were  losing  the 
privileges  of  the  previous  regime,  and  favoured  historical  referencing  for  the  interim 
period.  The  EU  abandoned  its  ally  in  Latin  America  (Ecuador)  in  favour  of  more 
broad  based  support  from  other  banana  producing  states  and  US  agreement  that  the 
WTO  challenge  would  not  continue.  Finally,  given  the  complications  of  first  come 
first  serve,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  banana  deal  was  a  means  of  maintaining  the  EU's 
credibility. 
465 
4)  The  Wider  Implications  of  the  Banana  Dispute 
The  transatlantic  banana  dispute  is  such  an  important  case  study,  because  it  highlights 
the  capacity  of  transatlantic  disputes  to  undermine  relations  with  third  states.  It 
demonstrates  how  conflict  in  the  transatlantic  relationship  distracts  from  co-operation 
under  the  NTA.  Finally,  these  combined  factors  illustrate  the  capacity  of  transatlantic 
disputes  to  threaten  the  stability  and  legitimacy  of  the  multilateral  trading  system. 
462  See  European  Voice,  April  13,2001 
16"  Interview  Commission  official  (via  email)  200  1  (59). 
464  Interview  USTR  official  (via  telephone)  2001  (58). 
46N  Aq,  ued  bN/  Commission  official  (via  email)  2000  (59) 
275 Relations  with  the  Caribbean  and  Latin  America 
In  the  end,  it  can  be  argued  that  both  the  EU  and  the  US  acted  like  'bullies'. 
Strategically  they  used  the  position  of  smaller  states  to  gain  support  throughout  the 
dispute,  and  domestic  decisions  taken  in  the  banana  war  carried  greater  implications 
for  the  smaller  banana  producing  states. 
First,  the  EU  defended  its  position  as  'third  world  champion'  by  arguing  that 
the  US  was  bullying  it  into  a  policy  that  would  undermine  Caribbean  economies. 
Ultimately  it  argued  that  the  US  challenge  undermined  efforts  to  prevent  illicit  activity 
in  the  region,  because  the  lost  market  access  for  Caribbean  bananas  would  result  in 
employment  loss,  drug  trafficking  and  high  levels  of  illegal  immigration  to  the  US.  466 
Thus,  EU  officials  argued  that  the  US  challenge  to  the  banana  regime  undermined  EU, 
US  and  transatlantic  efforts  to  curb  drug  production  in  the  Caribbean  through  for 
example,  the  Caribbean  Drugs  Initiative  (1997).  A  Council  Secretariat  official  argued 
that  the,  'The  EU  spent  a  lot  of  money  fighting  off  drugs  in  Caribbean.  The  US  is 
acting  to  destroy  farmers.  '  467 
Ironically,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  EU's  commitment  to  the  Caribbean  was 
temporarily  abandoned  when  it  agreed  to  implement  first  come,  first  serve  licensing.  468 
The  decision  also  threatened  to  undermine  efforts  to  curb  economic  instability  in  Latin 
America.  It  was  argued  that  lost  employment  in  the  banana  industry  could  increase 
social  tension,  which  in  turn  would  fuel  guerrilla  movements  and  harm  efforts  to  end 
466  To  highlight  the  scale  of  the  problem  Hallain  and  Preston  (  1997)  note  that  in  Dominica,  for  example, 
the  banana  industry  is  the  only  legal  crop  cultivated  year  round,  and  it  supports  30%  of  the  workforce 
directly  and  70%  indirectly  (Hal  I  ain  and  Preston  1997). 
4(,  7  This  viewpoint  was  also  expressed  bN  officials  in  the  European  Commission  (in  US)  and  in  the  UK 
Foreign  Office. 
168  See  also  Daih,  Telegraph  1999. 
276 civil  conflict.  Increased  violence  in  Columbia,  in  turn  would  undermine  EU  and  US 
efforts  to  end  conflict  through  the  hefty  financial  aid  that  has  poured  into  the  region.  469 
Indirectly,  both  the  EU  and  the  US  have  played  the  role  of  bully  as  the 
domestically  influenced  decisions  taken  by  each  has  had  a  negative  impact  on  smaller 
states  caught  in  the  crossfire.  The  implication  for  the  transatlantic  decision-makers  is 
clear:  disputes  between  the  two  largest  trading  partners  risk  damaging  their  external 
relations  with  other  states.  Furthermore,  the  banana  dispute  threatened  both 
transatlantic  and  multilateral  frameworks  for  international  co-operation. 
The  Effect  on  the  NTA  Relationship 
The  banana  dispute  had  the  capacity  to  undennine  the  NTA  process  in  two.  respects. 
The  interest  here  is  first,  in  how  the  banana  dispute  interfered  with  the  overall  process 
of  co-operation.  Did  the  banana  dispute  actually  block  co-operation  under  the  NTA 
process?  Second,  the  interest  is  in  the  'perceived'  damage  of  the  banana  dispute. 
Aaron  etal  (2001:  3)  argue  that  transatlantic  trade  disputes  have  'polluted  the 
atmosphere,  stifling  a  productive  discussion  about  the  larger  relationship'.  To  what 
extent  did  the  banana dispute  do  so?  Ultimately,  the  test  for  NTA  institutions  is  how 
effectively  they  managed  the  banana  dispute. 
Most  would  agree  the  banana  dispute  specifically  had  some  impact  on  the  NTA 
process.  Despite  the  existence  of  the  Early  Warning  System  and  institutions  such  as 
the  SLG  and  TEP  Steering  Group,  the  banana  dispute  raged  on  for  almost  a  decade.  It 
was  on  the  EU-US  Summit  agenda  for  over  three  years.  However,  while  EU  and  US 
officials  conceded  that  the  banana  case  had  a  negative  impact  on  the  relationship,  they 
469 
See  also  Wilson  200  1. 
277 also  argued  that  it  did  not  impede  the  overall  structure  of  transatlantic 
institutional  isation  or  the  facilitation  of  further  co-operation.  470 
In  general,  one  Commission  official  explained  that  disputes  'take  away  from 
meetings  where  other  issues  could  be  discussed' 
. 
47  1  The  banana  dispute  was  blamed 
for  overshadowing  EU-US  Summits.  However,  while  the  dispute  provided  a  diversion 
at  intergovernmental  and  transgovernmental  meetings,  it  did  block  the  NTA  process 
from  producing  a  number  of  deliverables,  most  notably  the  MRAs,  the  SouthýEastern 
Europe  Stability  Pact,  the  AIDS  initiatives  in  Africa  and  even  the  TER  While  the 
dispute  may  have  interfered  with  increased  co-operation,  the  whole  NTA  structure 
survived.  As  one  Commission  official  argued,  'conflict  in  one  field  does  not  break 
apart  in  other  areas.  '  472 
The  most  structural  damage  caused  by  the  banana  dispute  was  to  the 
Transatlantic  Economic  Partnership.  One  Commission  official  observed  that,  'TEP  ran 
parallel  to  bananas,  hormones,  an  d  Helms  Burton.  These  disputes  have  had  counter 
influence.  '  A  representative  from  the  American  Chamber  of  Commerce  in  Brussels 
agreed  that  these  disputes  damaged  the  TEP.  473  The  argument  follows  that  the  .  period 
in  which  the  TEP  stalled  (most  of  1999)  coincided  with  the  most  hostile  yea  r  in  the 
banana  dispute.  But,  the  banana  dispute  was  a  setback  rather  than  a  stopper.  In  2000, 
the  TEP  was  back  on  track,  while  the  banana  dispute  raged  on.  One  USTR  official 
argued  that,  'the  banana  dispute  did  not  prevent  any  positive  developments.  If  we.  both 
wanted  something  it  went  ahead  even  through  the  dispute.  474 
170  Interview  with  Commission.  Council  Presidency,  USTR  officials.  September  (1999),  October  (2000) 
(5,9.15,57-9). 
4"1  Interview,  Commission  official,  September  1999,  Brussels  (9). 
112  Interview,  Commission  official,  September  1999,  Brussels  (6), 
1733  Interview,  US  Chamber  of  Commerce  Brussels,  September  1999  (19). 
174  Interview,  USTR  official,  (via  telephone)  2000  (58). 
278 Disputes,  like  that  over  bananas,  interfere  with  transatlantic  co-operation, 
because  they  occupy  time  and  resources  of  the  negotiators  on  both  sides  of  the 
Atlantic,  but  the  actual  damage  in  terms  of  overall  trade  is  overshadowed  by  the  larger 
trading  relationship.  European  interviewees  often  argue  that  bananas  affect  less  than 
1%  of  trade  but  95%  of  media  attention  on  transatlantic  relations.  One  USTR  official 
agreed,  noting  that,  'Disputes  do  not  offset  everything  else.  There  is  $300  million 
involved  in  disputes  and  $300  billion  in  trade.  Journalists  focus  on  news,  that  news  is 
not  that  the  US  and  the  EU  are  trading  swimmingly  on  $300  billion  in  trade.  ' 
Thus,  despite  talk  of  a  transatlantic  trade  war,  the  EU  and  US  remain  partners 
within  the  NTA  structure.  A  major  shortcoming  of  this  structure,  however,  was  its 
failure  to  minimise  'surface'  or  superficial  damage  to  the  relationship  that  resulted 
from  mishandling  the  dispute.  The  structure  did  not  stop  EU  and  US  officials  from 
having  a  public  'war  of  words'  over  bananas.  Despite  the  established  dialogue 
structure,  EU  and  US  officials  took  to  what  Prodi  has  characterised  as  'megaphone' 
rather  than  'telephone'  diplomacy.  475 
Without  underestimating  the  real  damage  to  the  EU-US  partnership,  it  can  be 
argued  that  the  perception  of  damage  did  more  to  undermine  the  partnership.  The  EU's 
failure  to  design  a  WTO  compatible  regime  led  to  harsh  criticism  in  the  US  where  for 
example  USTR  Barshefsky  argued  that  the  EU  was  forcing  'a  major  confrontation  in 
transatlantic  trade'  (USTR  1998).  The  key  factor  was  the  US  decision  to  impose 
sanctions  in  March  1999.  Special  trade  negotiator  Peter  Scher  maintained  the  time  had 
come,  'for  the  EU  to  bear  some  of  the  consequences  for  its  GATT  and  WTO 
476  obligations'  ,  while  Conimissioner  Brittan  argued  that  the  USs  'politically  unwise' 
47ý  Prodi  commented  after  the  June  2000  EU-US  Summit,  'We  decided  that  megaphone  diplomacy 
would  be  replaced  by  telephone  diplomacy'.  Financial  Times  (2000)  New  Tactbut  EU-US  disputes 
rernain,  I  June. 
476  press  Release,  USIS  3  March  1999. 
279 decision  to  take  unilateral  sanctions  was  risking  damage  to  the  WTO  and  EU-US 
relations  over  a  minor  economic  issue'  477 
.A 
Council  Secretariat  official  accused  the 
US  of  'taking  hostages' 
. 
478  And,  the  UK  Minister  for  Trade  and  Industry  stated  that,  'I 
deplore  the  action  which  the  United  States  has  taken  ... 
it  is  completely  unauthorised  by 
any  WTO  procedures.  '  479 
The  hostility  of  the  banana  dispute  was  most  apparent  among  domestic  actors 
who  lacked  direct  access  to  transgovernmental  networks.  The  dispute  fuelled  anti- 
American  sentiment  in  certain  Member  States'  governments  and  negative  reactions  to 
the  EU  in  Congress  490 
. 
In  particular,  US  sanctions  alienated  one  of  its  greatest  allies 
within  the  EU,  leading  one  UK  official  to  accuse  the  US  of  being  'irrational'  and 
'unacceptable'.  481 
The  dispute  had  a  disproportionate  effect  in  Congress,  where  politicians  have 
482 
little  knowledge  and  even  less  interest  in  the  NTA  or  the  TEP 
. 
In  Congress,  the 
perceived  'stalling'  of  the  EU  in  the  WTO  process  generated  perceptions  that  the  EU 
was  not  'playing  fair'.  While  Congress  argued  it  had  taken  quick  action  to  change  US 
tax  laws  after  the  WTO's  ruling  in  the  Foreign  Sales  Corporation  Case,  the  EU  had  not 
made  significant  changes  to  its  banana  regime.  One  House  staff  member  argued  that 
'In  5  months  we  were  able  to  pass  a  major  change  to  tax  law,  (to)  respond  quickly  by 
law.  Yet,  the  EU  has  failed  to  comply  with  WTO  rulings  in  either  the  beef  or  the 
banana  case  in  almost  ten  years.  '  483 
477  Commission  Press  Release  (1998)  No.  96/98,10  November. 
478  Interview,  Council  Secretariat,  September  1999  Brussels  (3) 
-179  Quoted  by  Buerkle  (  1999)  in  the  International  Herald  Tribune. 
Barnabv  Mason  ar-ued  in  BBC  News.  for  example.  that  the  bitter  dispute  over  bananas  added  to 
tension  mounted  by  American  exports  of  genetically  modified  crops.  the  acquittal  of  the  American 
military  pilot  whose  plane  killed  20  people  in  Italy,  and  disagreement  over  Cuba,  Iran,  Iraq  and  Kosovo 
(1999)  Transatlantic  Tensions  Deepen,  5  March. 
"'  BBC  News,  3  May1999. 
482  Interview,  Staff  Member.  Committee  on  Trade,  Washington  DC  September  2000  (5  1). 
4931  Interview.  Staff  Member,  Comm  ittee  on  Trade,  Washington  DC  September  2000  (5  1). 
280 To  summarise,  the  banana  dispute  did  increase  tension  in  the  relationship  and 
contributed  to  the  general  negative  atmosphere  prompted  by  trade  disputes  in  EU-US 
relations.  Its  hard  to  determine  the  exact  impact  of  these  negative  perceptions,  but  a 
USTR  official  stated  that,  'When  you  are  throwing  insults  at  each  other-  it  is.  hard  to 
kiss  and  make  up.  '  Still,  the  dispute  was  not  as  detrimental  to  the  NTA  process  as  it 
was  perceived  to  be.  What  is  more  damaging  to  the  reputation  of  the  NTA,  is  that  it 
did  not  have  a  major  impact  on  the  banana  dispute.  The  banana  dispute  highlights  the 
inability  of  the  NTA  process  to  'manage'  diverging  interests  on  either  side  of  the 
Atlantic  (see  also  Aron  et  al_2001). 
The  Multilateral  Trading  System 
Arguably  the  most  important  consequence  of  the  banana  dispute  is  the  failure  of  the 
EU  and  the  US  to  resolve  the  conflict  through  the  WTO.  Both  sides  have  accused  the 
other  of  breaking  multilateral  trading  rules,  and  of  jeopardising  the  multilateral  trading 
system.  The  unilateral  nature  of  US  sanctions  and  the  EU  failure  to  bring  the  regime  in 
line  WTO  rulings  have  called  into  question  the  effectiveness  and  legitimacy  of 
international  rules. 
First,  unilateral  sanctions  and  the  introduction  of  Carousel  Retaliation  led  EU 
officials  to  question  the  compatibility  of  US  domestic  trade  legislation  with  the  WTO. 
European  institutions  united  around  the  view  that  the  timing  of  US  sanctions 
threatened  the  sanctity  of  the  WTO.  Sir  Leon  Brittan  warned  that:  'My  message  to  the 
United  States  is  a  simple  one:  use  the  WTO.  484  The  UK  Trade  Minister  Brian  Wilson 
argued,  'It  is  at  this  point  that  the  Americans  appear  to  have  pulled  the  plug  on  the 
4s  '4  Quoted  in  CNN  20  November  1998. 
281 (WTO)  procedures  and  acted  unilaterally'  . 
485  Corm-nissioner  Lamy  accused  the  US  of 
making  up  its  own  rules.  486 
Arguably  the  US  did  'break  the  rules'  because  the  DSB  concluded  that  it  had 
acted  too  early  in  imposing  sanctions.  Nonetheless,  it  approved  the  sanctions  and 
upheld  the  legality  of  Section  301  and  Carousel  Retaliation.  The  timing  of  the  US 
request  for  retaliation  exposed  a  'loop'  in  WTO  law.  The  US  argued  that  the  timing  of 
the  sanctions  was  dictated  by  Dispute  Settlement  Understanding  (DSU)  Article  22, 
which  states  that  the  complaining  party  must  retaliate  within  20  days  after  the 
ýreasonable  time'  deadline  for  implementation,  in  this  case  I  January  1999.  However, 
Article  22.6  requires  the  DSU  to  grant  authorisation  for  retaliation  within  30  days  of 
the  expiration  period.  This  left  a  small  window  of  opportunity  -  21  January  to  31 
January-  for  the  US  to  request  retaliation.  US  officials  argued  (under  Article  22.7)  that 
if  retaliation  was  not  made  within  that  time  period,  the  'negative  consensus'  rule 
would  lapse,  and  the  DSU  would  have  to  rule  under  'positive  consensus',  which  would 
allow  any  country,  including  the  EU,  to  block  retaliation.  487  The  US  requested.  a  panel 
th  for  DSB  authorisation  on  January  14  1999,  and  the  panel  was  scheduled  for  the  25 
, 
within  the  'window  of  opportunity'  (see  also  Komuro  2000;  Vallen  and  McGivern 
2000;  Ziedaliski  2000). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  EU  requested  the  re-establishment  of  the  DSB  panel, 
which  reconvened  on  12  January  1999,  under  Article  21.5.  The  EU  argued  that  th  e  US 
could  not  retaliate  until  the  Article  21.5  procedures  had  finished,  or  until  the  new  EC 
banana  regime  was  found  to  be  inconsistent  with  WTO  rules.  Commissioner  officials 
moved  to  suspend  the  US's  request  for  a  panel  decision  on  sanctions,  claiming  it  was 
Quoted  in  McSm  ith  and  Fraser  (1999). 
486  See  Giles,  W  (2000)  Carousel  Deepens  Row  over  Banana  Trade,  In  Financial  Times,  9  July. 
487  See  Surnmary  of  U.  S.  Legal  Position  on  Dispute  in  WTO  on  EC  Banana  Regime,  USTR  Press 
Release  12  January  1999,  available  on  US  Mission  website  (http:  //www.  useu.  be). 
282 invalid  until  a  Article  21.5  decision  was  made.  The  US  in  turn  accused  the  EC  of 
'blocking  tactics'.  USTR  Barshefsky  argued,  'The  EU  today  took  the  extraordinary 
step  of  shutting  down  the  work  of  the  WTO.  488 
The  dispute  over  Articles  21  and  22  highlighted  a  problem  with  the  legal 
framework  of  the  DSU.  Article  21  makes  no  reference  to  the  right  to  retaliation  in 
Article  22  and  Article  22  makes  no  reference  to  21.  The  EU  argued  that  Article  21 
took  precedence  over  Article  22.  The  US  argued  that  the  EU's  reading  of  the 
relationship  between  Article  21  and  Article  22  would  render  Article  22  inoperative 
because  the  30  day  deadline  for  negative  consensus  (under  Article  22)  would  expire 
before  the  90  day  deadline  for  a  DSB  ruling  (under  Article  21.5).  The  US  argued  that 
the  EU  actions  had  invoked  an  'endless  loop  of  litigation.  ' 
In  this  case,  the  timing  conflict  between  Article  21  and  22  procedureS489  was 
reconciled  by  the  DSB's  request  on  2  March  for  more  time  to  gather  information, 
which  merged  the  deadlines  for  both  Article  21  and  22  DSB  decisions.  The  conflict 
over  these  articles,  however,  drew  attention  to  deeper  problems  in  the  DSU 
framework.  The  'contradictory'  drafting  of  Articles  21  and  22  and  the  'ambiguous' 
language  of  the  DSU  has  subsequently  arisen  in  other  cases,  including  the  Canadian- 
Australian  salmon  dispute  (see  also  Vallen  and  McGivern  2000;  Komuro  2000:  32). 
Second,  the  EU  failure  to  comply  with  the  WTO  ruling  was  heavily  criticised, 
especially  in  Congress  where  the  EU  was  seen  to  be  undermining  the  credibility  of  the 
WTO.  One  USTR  representative  observed  that  the  pressure  coming  from  Congress 
was  renewed  after  dispute  settlement  proceedings.  He  argued,  'After  you  battle  and 
win,  well  you  played  the  multilateral  game  the  way  the  Europeans  said  you  should  and 
488  .  Ambassador  Barshevsky  Expresses  Dismay  at  European  Union  Blockinta,  Tactis  in  WTO'  USTR 
Press  Release  25  January  1999. 
181)  The  Article  22  procedures  required  the  DSB  decision  by  March  2,1999,  but  the  Article  21 
procedures  were  not  due  to  be  completed  until  12  April  1999. 
283 now  they  are  not  implementing!  "  He  added  that  'Europeans  are  thumbing  their,  nose  at 
(the  WTO)'.  For  USTR  this  was  a  tough  position  because  they  had  fought  hard  for 
Congressional  support  of  the  WTO  on  the  grounds  that  the  new  system  would  be  a 
serious  medium  for  dispute  resolution  . 
490  The  message  from  Congress  was  clear:  the 
EU  needed  to  comply  with  the  ruling.  A  Senate  Finance  Committee  spokesperson 
argued  thatl  'We  have  lost  many  cases  but  we  have  always  complied.  ' 
The  WTO  Dispute  Settlement  mechanism,  however,  does  not  require  the  EU  to 
change  its  banana  regime.  Rather,  it  authorises  sanctions  to  compensate  the  challenger. 
A  Trade  Committee  staff  member  noted  that,  '  Europeans  have  made  little  effort  to 
comply,  but  they  are  entitled  to  do  this.  '  Adding  ironically  that,  'Congress  made  sure 
that  Uruguay  would  allow  us  to  accept  retaliation  the  same!  '  Thus,  the  banana*  dispute 
exposed  another  loop  in  the  WTO  system.  Gleason  and  Walther  (2000:  16)  argue  that 
the  WTO  suffers  from  implementation  problems  including,  'inadequate  safety  checks, 
incentives,  and/or  sanctions  to  encourage  the  promptest-possible,  good  faith 
implementation.  ' 
For  many  who  supported  the  EU's  banana  subsidy  regime  the  WTO  ruling 
raised  questions  about  the  legitimacy  of  a  trade  policy  which  protects  untamed 
liberalisation.  The  banana  case  fuelled  the  mobilisation  against  globalisation  as 
NGOs,  including  TACD  representatives,  argued  that  the  WTO  should  promote  fair,  if 
not  always  free  trade.  491  The  WTO  was  further  questioned  by  Congresswoman 
Maxine  Waters  who  expressed  outrage  at  the  WTO  decision  to  sanction  the  European 
banana  regime  claiming.  'It  is  time  for  the  WTO  to  begin  listening  to  concerns  of 
490  A  USTR  official  argued,  'We  promised  them  that  the  WTO  would  not  be  a  General  Agreement  on 
'Falk  and  Talk.  '  Interview,  via  telephone,  June  2001  (58). 
;  91  It  should  be  noted  that  Ralph  Ives  has  argued  that.  'The  WTO  does  not  require  free  trade',  because  'a 
WTO  consistent  regime  doesn't  inean  no  preferences.  '  (USIS  Press  Release,  'US  Officials  Stress 
Interest  in  Resolvin-  EU  Banana  Dispute'  12  September  1998. 
284 small  farmers,  labour  union  members,  environmentalists,  consumer  advocates  and 
human  rights  activists'. 
The  banana  dispute  was  an  important  case  because  it  was  one  of  the  first  cases 
tested  by  WTO.  While  the  banana  case  is  a  classic  dispute,  many  more  up  and  coming 
disputes  will  be  more  difficult  to  manage  given  their  predisposition  to  scientific  (beef), 
cultural  (gmos)  and  legal  (FSCs)  differences  between  the  EU  and  the  US.  What  links 
these  disputes  is  the  fact  that  that  strong  domestic  political  lobbies  and  internal 
pressure  will  continue  to  ensure  that  EU  and  US  interests  clash,  and  that  trade 
negotiators  will  find  themselves  in  direct  conflict  between  domestic  and  WTO 
interests. 
Conclusion 
To  summarise,  this  chapter  sought  to  explain  which  factors  could  explain  EU.  and  US 
decision  making  in  the  banana  dispute.  It  was  argued  that  domestic  and  external 
factors  influenced  both  EU  and  US  decisions  in  the  dispute,  and  the  banana  deal,  can 
only  be  characterised  as  a  balance  of  interests  or  the  'least  worst  option'. 
What  was  also  notable  in  the  banana  dispute  is  the  way  in  which  the  dispute 
was  handled.  While  many  civil  servants  and  private  actors  were  involved  in  the 
dispute,  transgovernmental  and  transnational  networks  were  not  prevalent.  Rather  the 
banana  case  was  negotiated  in  traditional  diplomatic  style  by  high  ranking,  often 
intergovernmental,  officials.  Unlike  the  MRA  or  trafficking  in  women  cases, 
transatlantic  institutions  were  not  instrumental  in  reaching  an  agreement  on  EU  banana 
subsidies.  Although  the  NTA  institutions  cushioned  the  impact  of  the  dispute  and  kept 
officials  talking,  the  dispute  was  not  'managed'  through  the  NTA  process,  EU-US 
Summits  or  the  early  warning  systern.  Institutionalisation  did  not,  and  some  argue 
285 could  not,  prevent  the  banana  dispute  because  the  case  demonstrated  the  classic  clash 
of  EU  and  US  economic  and  political  interests.  In  this  respect  the  banana  case  study 
differs  dramatically  from  both  the  trafficking  information  campaigns  and  the  MRAs 
where  transatlantic  institutions  facilitated  co-operation  on  a  technical  level. 
The  case  also  highlighted  the  dilemma  posed  by  conflicting  international  and 
domestic  interests.  Because  these  will  always  exist,  the  real  test  for  transatlantic 
relations  is  in  the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  the  US  to  manage  disputes  in  a  way  which 
minimises  the  damage  to  bilateral  and  multilateral  institutions.  The  negative 
atmosphere  created  by  the  banana dispute  highlights  the  need  to  strengthen  dialogue 
structures  that  can  deal  with  conflict  as  well  as  co-operation.  The  way  in  which  the 
dispute  was  handled  also  risked  undermining  the  legitimacy  of  the  WTO.  In  short  the 
banana  dispute  exposed  weaknesses  of  both  the  bilateral  structure  of  the  NTA  and  the 
multilateral  trading  system. 
286 Chapter  9 
Conclusions 
This  thesis  raised  a  number  of  questions  about  the  roles  of  institutions,  actors, 
dialogue,  and  policy  co-ordination  in  the  process  of  EU-US  relations.  First,  and 
foremost  it  asked:  do  institutions  matter  and  if  so  why  do  they  matter?  It  considered 
the  capacity  of  the  EU  and  the  US  not  only  to  manage  the  relationship  but  also  to 
exercise  governance  through  transatlantic  institutions.  Second,  this  thesis  focused  not 
only  on  inStIlt  I  .y  on  i  ons,  bUt  also  on  the  actors  who  participate  in  them.  it  sought  to  gauge 
[Utl 
the  extent  to  which  the  process  of  transatlantic  institutional]  sation  allowed  different 
categories  of  actors  to  engage  in  different  types  of  decision  making.  In  short,  it  asked: 
who  governs  in  the  process  and  how? 
The  'process'  of  transatlantic  relations  was  dissected  by  specifying  and 
analysing  multiple  types  of  decisions  in  EU-US  policy-making  and  the  role  of  multiple 
types  of  actors.  Three  hypotheses  were  set  out  in  chapter  one  to  help  us  analyse  how 
the  process  works.  First,  it  was  argued  that  the  TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TEP  have 
created  transatlantic  institutions  and  that  transatlantic  actors  perform  functions  of 
governance  through  these  institutions.  Second,  it  was  hypothesised  that  under  that 
institutional  framework,  a  decentralisation  of  decision-making  powers  had  been 
allocated  to  transgovernmental  actors  who  perform  both  'setting'  and  'shaping' 
functions  in  the  policy  process.  Finally,  this  thesis  explored  the  role  of  trarisnational 
actors  in  transatlantic  policy  making.  It  tested  the  hypothesis  that  there  has  been  a 
decentralisation  of  decision  shaping  to  not  only  state.  but  also  to  non-state  actors. 
Specifically,  it  explored  the  capacity  of  the  TABD,  the  TACD  and  the  TAED  to 
influence  transatlantic  policies. 
287 This  chapter  summarises  the  evidence  presented  throughout  this  thesis  in 
relation  to  the  three  hypotheses.  More  generally,  it  asks  what  we  have  learned  about 
EU  and  US  relations  from  studying  the  relationship  in  the  1990s.  The  underlying 
argument  is  that  the  new  transatlantic  institutions  do  matter.  Section  I  examines  the 
extent  to  which  the  relationship  has  been  institutional  i  sed  under  the  TAD,  the  NTA 
and  the  TER  It  argues  that  the  agreements  have  established  a  structure  for  transatlantic 
governance  by  creating  a  framework  for  policy  making  and  building  institutions, 
which  serve  as  decision-making  structures. 
The  thesis  also  examined  how  these  governance  structures  have  altered  the 
scope  for  actor  input  into  decision  making.  Section  2  addresses  the  evidence  presented 
for  the  purpose  of  testing  the  second  hypothesis.  It  argues  not  only  that 
transgovernmental  networks  have  been  institutional  i  sed,  but  that  their  policy  setting 
and  policy  shaping  capacity  points  to  a  decentralisation  of  policy  making  by  state 
actors. 
Section  3  summarises  the  role  of  non-state  actors  in  the  transatlantic  policy 
process.  It  specifies  the  varied  'shaping'  capacity  of  the  formal  transatlantic  dialogues 
and  well  as  the  wider  impact  that  corporations,  interests  groups  and  other  non-state 
actors  have  in  shaping  transatlantic  decisions  at  both  a  trarisnational  and  a  national 
level.  Each  of  these  sections  outlines  evidence  presented  in  the  case  studies,  both  in 
support  of  and  at  odds  with  the  three  hypotheses. 
Finally,  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  was  not  only  to  categorise  the  role  of 
institutions  and  actors  in  transatlantic  policy  making,  but  also  to  question  the 
implications  of  the  iiistitutionalisation.  decentralisation  and  privatisation  of 
transatlantic  decision  making.  What  do  these  recent  developments  tell  us  about  EU- 
US  relations  and  international  relations  more  broadly?  Section  4  recaps  a  number  of 
288 themes  that  have  been  addressed  throughout  the  thesis,  particularly  the  dilemma  facing 
policy  makers  seeking  to  strike  a  balance  between  effective  governance  and  legitimate 
governance.  It  suggests  the  need  for  future  research  on  the  long-term  affects  of 
transatlantic  institutional  i  sation  and  the  implications  of  the  de-politicisation  of 
transatlantic  foreign  policy  making. 
1)  The  Institutionalisation  of  Transatlantic  Relations 
This  thesis  took  on  three  main  analytical  tasks: 
*  It  sought  to  establish  whether  and  how  the  relationship  has  been  institutionalised. 
9  In  the  context  of  theoretical  debates  about  the  EU-US  relationship  and  international 
relations  in  general,  it  questioned  why  the  EU  and  US  chose  to  institutionalise  the 
relationship. 
&  It  asked  whether  and  why  the  institutional  i  sati  on  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue 
matters? 
The  thesis  presented  evidence  to  support  the  hypothesis  that  the  relationship  had  been 
institutional  i  sed  into  a  structure  of  transatlantic  governance.  Chapter  3  explo'red  the 
creation,  through  the  transatlantic  agreements,  of  formal  structures  for  decision 
making  and  a  policy  framework  for  governance.  The  TAD  and,  particularly,  the  NTA 
and  the  TEP  outlined  policy  areas  where  European  and  US  leaders  committed 
themselves  to  co-operation.  The  NTA  Action  Plan  and  TEP  Action  Plan  specified  the 
scope  for  policy  co-ordination  under  the  new  transatlantic  dialogue.  The  TAD 
institutional  i  sed  contact  between  heads  of  states  via  the  biannual  EU-US  summit 
meeting.  It  also  established  a  ministerial  level  dialogue  as  well  as  a  political  dialogue. 
289 The  density  of  different  transatlantic  institutions  and  dialogues  is  striking. 
EU-US  decision-making  structures  developed  through  the  NTA  and  the  TEP  with  the 
creation  of  institutions  such  as  the  SLG,  the  NTA  Task  Force,  the  TEP  Steering  Group 
and  the  TEP  Working  Groups.  The  NTA  and  the  TEP  also  encouraged  the  creation  of 
the  TABD,  the  TACD  and  the  TAED.  We  are  left,  in  this  chapter,  to  try  to  come  to  a 
final  judgement  about  whether  these  agreements  and  the  dense  layers  of  formal 
dialogue  they  created  at  many  different  levels,  have  complicated  or  simplified  the 
process  of  EU-US  co-operation,  generally,  and  policy  co-ordination,  specifically.  Is 
co-operation  easier  to  achieve  when  more  voices  are  heard  in  the  policy  process?  Or 
does  allowing  new  'toddlers  into  the  policy  playpen'  amount  to  expanding  the  number 
of  actors  wielding  vetoes  over  co-operative  agreements? 
The  TAD,  the  NTA  and  the  TEP  are  products  of  intergovernmental  'history 
making  decisions.  '  The  motivation  for  these  high  level  political  decisions  can  be 
explained  by  rationalist  rationale.  in  other  words  it  is  argued  throughout  the  thesis  that 
the  EU  and  the  US  chose  to  'institutionalise'  their  relationship  because  it  was  in  their 
interest  to  do  so.  As  the  Cold  War  period  began  to  fade  in  1989,  both  sides  recognised 
that  common  ideas,  values,  culture  and  multilateral  institutions  could  not  hold  the 
transatlantic  partnership  together  as  the  common  security  threat  of  the  Soviet  Union 
had  throughout  the  Cold  War.  However,  the  EU  and  the  US  identified  mutual  interest 
in  maintaining  the  partnership,  particularly  in  response  to  new  soft  security.  threats, 
such  as  the  economically  and  politically  unstable  CEE  and  the  Middle  East,  and  in 
light  of  bilateral  economic  disputes  over.  for  example  bananas,  beef  and  milk 
hormones.  The  EU  was  keen  to  demonstrate  its  capabilities  as  a  foreign  policy  actor, 
and  the  US  welcomed  the  prospects  of  burden  sharing  in  light  of  its  growing  need  to 
be  a  -superpoxver  on  the  cheap'. 
290 The  NTA  arose  out  of  fears  that  the  TAD  structure  was  not  doing  enough  to 
narrow  the  gap  between  the  partners.  It  sought  more  effective  co-operation  on  policy 
areas  where  the  EU  had  growing  competence  under  the  Maastricht  Trepty.  For 
example,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  issues,  such  as  migration  and  international  crime, 
made  it  onto  the  transatlantic  agenda  under  the  global  challenges  chapter  of  the  NTA. 
The  TEP  also  demonstrated  mutual  interest  in  getting  more  concrete  economic  results 
from  the  transatlantic  partnership,  including  further  market  opening  agreements  and 
the  containment  of  trade  disputes. 
Institutional]  sation  has  had  two  broad  implications  for  transatlantic  relations. 
First,  the  creation  of  so  many  new  and  varied  decision-making  forums  means  that  the 
decision  making  process  now  has  multiple  tiers  and  multiple  stages.  The  different 
institutions  created  by  the  transatlantic  agreements  point  to  the  institutional  ised  -role  of 
intergovernmental  actors  (through  the  EU-US  Summit),  transgovernmental  actors 
(through,  for  example  the  SLG,  TEP  Steering  Group)  and  transnational  actors  (through 
the  TABD,  TACD,  TAED).  Throughout  the  thesis,  we  have  seen  the  capacity  of 
intergovernmental  actors  to  'make'  the  high  level  political  decisions  which  establish 
institutional  change  and  policy  expansion,  but  also  of  transgovernmental  and 
transnational  actors  to  'set  ,  and  'shape'  policy. 
Second,  the  institutionalisation  of  the  dialogue  exposes  the  different  purposes 
served  by  the  different  transatlantic  institutions.  Intergovernmental  decisions  highlight 
the  commitment  of  the  EU  and  the  US  to  fostering  dialogue,  and  where  possible  policy 
co-ordination  and  conflict  management.  49"  Specifically  it  can  be  noted  that  the 
intergoveriu-nental  decisions  to  include  trafficking  in  women  in  the  NTA  global 
challenges  chapter  and  the  MRAs  in  the  economic  chapter  (and  later  in  TEP)  are  the 
492  The  overall  impact  of  the  institutions  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  section  4. 
291 decisions  that  established  the  scope  for  these  transatlantic  policies.  Both  decisions 
represented  a  broad  commitment  to  policy  co-ordination.  Their  inclusion  in  the 
transatlantic  policy  framework  put  trans  governmental  actors  in  charge  of  producing 
substantive  results.  The  agreements  also  committed  the  EU  and  the  US  to  manage 
disputes  through  continued  dialogue.  In  the  case  of  the  banana  dispute,  it  can  be 
argued  that  the  institutional  structure  cushioned  the  impact  of  conflict  between  the 
partners.  The  institutions,  at  least,  kept  people  talking. 
The  point  is  that  the  institutionalisation  of  the  transatlantic  relationship 
changed  the  way  that  actors  operated  within  the  system.  While  it  is  difficult  to  gauge 
just  how  the  behaviour  of  social  actors  is  shaped  or  altered  by  transatlantic  institutions, 
institutions  at  least  created  the  opportunity  for  actors  with  different  interests  to 
formally  participate  in  the  policy  making  process.  Sections  2  and  3  discuss,  in  more 
detail,  how  these  actors  operate  with  these  decision-making  structures. 
2)  The  Decentralisation  of  Decision  Setting  and  Shaping 
The  first  hypothesis  posited  that  the  institutional  i  sati  on  of  the  dialogue  resulted  in  the 
creation  of  not  only  intergovernmental  but  also  transgovernmental  and  transnational, 
institutions.  Chapter  4  explored  the  dense  level  of  contacts  that  were  forged  between 
high  and  low  level  civil  servants  under  the  three  transatlantic  agreements.  It 
questioned  the  extent  to  which  intergovernmental  actors  had  created  room  for 
transgovernmental  actors  to  influence  the  process  through  the  creation  of  economic, 
political  and  NTA  institutions.  and  a  specified  early  warning  process.  To  test  the 
second  hypothesis  -  that  power  to  make  joint  policies  had  been  effectively 
clecentralised  from  the  intergovernmental  level  'downwards'  --  the  thesis  sought  to 
make  clear  the  functions  of  transgovernmental  institutions  in  the  process  of 
292 transatlantic  decision  making.  The  thesis  sought  to  uncover  evidence  that 
transgovernmental  actors  had  both  'set'  and  'shaped'  transatlantic  policy. 
The  underlying  question,  for  many  scholars.,  is  whether  transgovernmental 
actors  act  independently  of  their  political  bosses  or  if  they  simply  follow 
predetermined  paths  in  transatlantic  policy  making.  In  other  words,  does  dialogue 
between  transgovernmental  actors  result  in  preference  convergence?  It  was  argued 
throughout  the  thesis  that  intergovernmental  actors  maintain  control  of  the'policy 
process  by  'making'  the  decisions,  which  establish  the  scope  for  policy  co-ordination. 
To  an  extent  transatlantic  agreements,  particularly  the  NTA  and  the  TEP,  created  a 
mandate  for  transgovernmental  actors  to  work  within. 
However,  there  is  also  evidence  to  suggest  that  transgovernmental  actors 
exercise  some  control  over  the  process,  albeit  within  certain  boundaries.  For  example, 
chapter  4  established  that  a  range  of  transgoverni-nental  actors,  at  the  ministerial  level 
and  at  the  agency  level,  had  effectively  acted  as  policy  'setters'  by  signing  agreements, 
producing  declarations  or  co-ordinating  policies.  Gauging  the  capacity  of  actors  to 
'shape'  policy  is  more  difficult.  Unlike  'setting'  decisions,  written  records  of  'shaping' 
decisions  often  do  not  exist.  Furthermore,  a  wide  variety  of  actors  have  the  capacity  to 
act  as  transatlantic  policy  shapers  through,  for  example,  the  SLG,  TEP  Steering  Group, 
NTA  Task  Force,  TEP  and  Troika  working  group  meetings.  That  interviewees  went  to 
great  lengths  to  discuss  the  roles  of  these  institutions  suggests  that  they  play  a  role  in 
the  process,  but  what  role  exactly?  It  was  argued  that  these  actors  effectively  helped 
decide  not  that  the  EU  and  the  US  would  co-operate,  but  how  they  could  co-operate. 
Trans  govern  in  ental  actors  fulfilled  a  number  of  important  shaping  functions. 
First,  transgovernmental  actors  helped  shape  the  initial  policy  agendas  of  the  NTA  and 
the  TEP  bý  identifynig,  areas  NNhere  co-operation  might  be  feasible.  Once 
293 intergovernmental  actors  decide  that  co-operation  should  be  pursued, 
transgovernmental  actors  continue  to  shgýpe  the  policy  agenda  by  outlining  specific 
issue  areas,  within  policy  sectors,  where  the  EU  and  the  US  could  reach  consensus.  In 
short  they  identify  'policy  options'. 
Trans  governmental  actors  also  establish  'policy  details'  once  the 
intergovernmental  actors  'make'  the  decision  to  pursue  a  policy,  in  a  variety  of  ways. 
Institutions  like  the  SLG  provide  political  oversight  and  establish  time  frames  for  co- 
operation  in  the  early  stages  of  policy  formation.  They  also  establish  potential 
language  for  'setting'  decisions.  In  the  case  of  trafficking  in  women  for  example,  the 
concept  of  an  information  campaign  and  the  details  of  the  transatlantic  project  were 
derived  at  the  working  group  level.  Effectively  the  dialogue  was  set  by  foreign 
ministers  at  a  ministerial  level  dialogue,  where  ultimately  the  decision  to  co-ordinate 
that  policy  rested.  However,  a  dialogue  between  US  Mission,  US  State  Department, 
DG  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  and  DG  External  Relations  officials  determined  key 
details  of  the  transatlantic  anti-trafficking  policy  including: 
0  where  to  target  transatlantic  efforts, 
9  how  to  technically  co-ordinate  the  anti-traffic  king  plans  and 
*  who  should  implement  the  transatlantic  campaigns. 
The  transatlantic  anti-traffi  eking  campaigns  were  also  shaped  by  the  NTA  Task  Force 
and  the  Senior  Level  Group  who  were  charged  with  overseeing  the  policy 
development,  keeping  it  on  the  NTA  agenda  and  acting  as  a  problem  solving  forum, 
for  example  over  funding  problems. 
The  role  of  trans  governmental  actors  in  the  MRA  case  was  somewhat  easier  to 
document  and  more  significant  given  the  higher  profile  and  domestic  implications  of 
the  agreements.  The  USTR  and  Cornmissioner  for  Trade  publicly  *set'  the  transatlantic 
294 regulatory  policy  by  signing  the  MRA  agreement.  Many  more  actors  played  a  role  in 
shaping  the  policies.  While  trade  officials  exercised  control  over  the  overarching 
framework  agreement,  domestic  regulators  shaped  the  policy  details  in  each  of  the 
individual  annexes.  Transatlantic  institutions  played  a  key  role  in  pushing 
negotiations  ahead  and  striking  a  balance  between  trade  and  regulatory  authorities. 
The  Joint  Committee  and  Joint  Sectoral  Committee  tried  to  strike  a  bargain  between 
regulators  and  trade  officials.  The  SLG  and  the  TEP  Steering  Group  monitored  the 
process,  helped  identify  achievable  goals  on  a  sector  by  sector  basis  and  kept  the 
negotiations  to  a  time  schedule  by  establishing  and  monitoring  deadlines. 
In  some  ways,  at  least,  the  wide  range  of  policy  shapers  in  the  process  of 
transatlantic  decision  making  complicates  the  policy  process  because  it  makes  . the  task 
of  consensus  reaching  laborious.  The  NTA  institutions  seek  to  reach  a  consensus 
among  policy  shapers  before  decisions  can  be  set.  At  the  same  time  the  MRA  case,  in 
particular,  demonstrates  the  capacity  of  the  NTA  institutions  to  facilitate  co-operation 
by  forging  compromise  among  a  wide  range  of  actors  with  different  interests  and  with 
different  levels  of  access  to  the  policy  process.  In  particular  transatlantic  institutions 
were  credited  with  managing,  but  not  overcoming,  the  differences  between  the  trade 
camp  and  the  regulatory  camps.  The  banana dispute  also  highlighted  the  capacity  for 
domestic  actors  to  shape  transatlantic  policy  decisions.  In  that  case,  however,  the  NTA 
institutions  did  not  serve  as  decision-making  forums.  Rather,  actors  sought  to  shape 
policy  by  lobbying  domestic  institutions. 
In  both  the  trafficking  in  women  and  MRA  case  studies,  intergovernmental 
actors  indicated  an  interest  in  joint  co-operation.  Overall,  the  *shaping'  capacity  of 
transgovernmental  actors  demonstrates  that  decentralised  transatlantic  institutions  also 
serve  as  policy  making  mechanisms,  in  addition  to  acting  as  forums  for  the  exchange 
295 of  dialogue,  information  and  ideas.  The  capacity  of  transgovernmental  actors  to  act  as 
policy  shapers  sheds  some  light  on  the  rationalist-constructivist  debate  outlined  in 
chapter  two.  Although  ultimately  the  scope  for  policy  co-ordination  is  determined  by 
self-interest,  the  policy  details  are  derived  from  the  transgovernmental  dialogue. 
Arguably  the  institutions  are  more  than  just  talking  shops. 
However,  there  is  less  evidence  to  suggest  that  these  institutions  are  effective 
where  the  EU  and  US  political  leaders'  interests  do  not  coincide.  As  one  Council 
Presidency  official  argued,  'where  there  are  disputes,  our  hands  are  usually  tied  at  a 
political  level.  493  This  argument  is  consistent  with  Slaughter's  argument  on 
transgovernmentalism:  mainly  that  transgovernmental  networks  can  gradually  achieve 
politicial  convergence,  but  they  are  less  likely  to  contain  serious  political  or  economic 
conflict  (Slaughter  1997:  196).  In  the  banana  case,  for  example,  the  NTA  process  kept 
up  dialogue  between  the  leaders  and  sheltered  the  rest  of  the  policy  agenda  from  the 
dispute,  but  transgovernmental  inst  itutions  did  little  to  manage  or  resolve  the  dispute. 
The  broader  argument  is  that  decision-making  powers  are  less  decentrallsed 
where  high  political  interest  is  involved.  Nonetheless,  decentralised  dialogue  has  been 
deemed  an  important  part  of  the  conflict  management  process.  The  creation  of  the 
Early  Warning  System  and  the  Biotechnology  Forum  demonstrates  an  interest  in 
fostering  dialogue  at  lower  levels  to  prevent  conflict,  where  possible.  The  idea  that 
disputes  can  be  managed  from  the  bottom  up  is  illustrated  by  one  Commission 
official's  comment  that,  'closer  contact  and  more  consultation  slowly  breeds  more 
broad  understanding.  '  494  While  the  potential  for  transgovernmental  conflict 
management  exists.  the  institutions  are  still  at  an  early  stage  of  developing  the  capacity 
to  manage  diSPLItCS. 
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296 3)  Policy  Shaping  by  Non-state  Actors 
The  institutional  i  sation  of  the  transatlantic  relationship  extends  to  the  private,  as  well 
as  the  public  sector.  The  development  of  transnational  dialogues  such  as  the  TABD, 
the  TAED,  the  TACD  and  the  TALD,  was  another  focus  of  this  thesis.  It  questioned 
why  these  dialogues  were  created  by  the  EU  and  US  governments  under  the  NTA, 
how  they  became  institutionalised,  and  the  extent  to  which  they  have  fostered 
communication  across  the  Atlantic.  Subsequently,  we  looked  for  evidence  to  support 
the  hypothesis  that  decision  shaping  powers  had  been  delegated  to  non-state  actors 
under  the  NTA.  The  emphasis,  thus,  was  not  only  on  the  existence  of  transnational 
networks  or  of  transnational  dialogue,  but  also  on  the  capacity  of  these  dialogues  to 
'shape'  transatlantic  decisions. 
Chapter  5  outlined  evidence  to  support  the  idea  that  an  institutional  isation  of 
the  TABD,  the  TACD,  the  TAED  (before  its  suspension)  had  occurred.  Each  of  these 
dialogues  established  some  type  of  organisational  structures  to  facilitate  consensus 
between  European  and  American  counterparts.  Dialogue  between  these  groups  has 
resulted  in  a  process  of  policy  learning  as  American  and  European  businesses  and 
NGOs  exchange  information,  share  strategies  and  seek  consensus.  In  particular 
American  consumer  and  environmental  NGOs  have  learned  from  European  groups, 
who  have  more  experience  operating  in  policy  networks  and  influencing  the  European 
Commission.  The  TALD  was  the  only  case  examined  that  cannot  be  considered  to  be  a 
serious  dialogue  structure.  As  such,  the  failure  of  the  TALD  means  that  labour  actors 
have  no  institutionalised  right  to  shape  transatlantic  policy. 
The  other  dialogues  established  regular  high  level  and  working  level  dialogues 
,,  vith  the  US  Administration  and  the  Commission.  It  is  clear  that  groups  involved  in 
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officials.  But  how  effectively  do  they  shape  transatlantic  policy? 
The  business,  consumer,  environmental  (and  even  labour)  dialogues  were 
encouraged  by  EU  and  US  officials  to  develop  into  policy  shapers.  The  US 
administration  was  convinced  that  the  TABD  would  support  the  US  negotiating 
position.  Generally,  the  EU  and  the  US  both  had  an  interest  in  encouraging  civil 
society  participation  to  balance  the  power  of  the  TABD.  The  Commission  also 
believed  that  the  TACD  and  TAED  would  become  an  ally  in  negotiations  with  the  US 
over  food  safety  and  privacy.  The  TEP  congratulated  the  TABD  for  its  role  in 
securing  transatlantic  agreements  and  encouraged  consumers  and  envirom-nentalists  to 
make  a  constructive  contribution  to  policy  making.  The  dialogues'  members,  business 
and  NGOs  alike,  have  argued  that  the  dialogues  could  not  continue  without  concrete 
policy  results. 
It  was  noted  throughout  the  thesis,  however.  that  the  transatlantic  dialogues 
have  had  a  varied  shaping  capacity.  The  TABD  is  the  only  dialogue  to  have  had  a 
visible  impact  on  the  policy  process.  It  is  widely  praised  by  EU  and  US  officials  for 
helping  find  consensus  on  a  range  of  policies.  A  high  percentage  of  TABD 
recommendations  have  been  addressed.  It  is  credited  with  helping  to  facilitate  the 
MRAs.  On  the  other  hand  the  social  dialogues  have  not  achieved  similar  results. 
Neither  the  TACD  nor  TAED  claims  to  have  had  any  impact  on  the  process  and  the 
future  of  all  of  the  civil  society  dialogues  depends  on  their  willingness  and  capacity  to 
secure  private  funding.  One  NGO  observed  that,  'they  are  telling  us  what  they  are 
doing.  rather  than  taking  our  advice.  We  have  access  but  we  don't  learn  specifics. 
298 TAED  participants  argue  that  US  officials  seem  to  be  just  going  through  the  motions.  ' 
495 
The  argument  made  in  chapter  5  was  that  while  the  TABD  case  strongly 
supports  the  hypothesis  that  a  decentralisation  of  decision  shaping  has  been  delegated 
to  private  actors,  the  TACD,  TAED  and  TALD  do  not.  The  TACD,  as  the  most 
organised  dialogue,  has  the  potential  to  be  a  future  policy  shaper.  However,  time  will 
tell  if  the  Commission's  sponsorship  of  the  society  dialogues  will  prove  useful  in 
future  debates  on  food  safety,  data  protection  and  waste  management. 
Chapter  7  also  demonstrated  the  shaping  capacity  of  the  TABD,  but-not  the 
TACD  or  TAED,  in  the  MRA  negotiations.  Many  officials  argued  that  both  TABD 
recommendations  and  the  lobbying  action  of  TABD  members  had  a  major  influence 
on  the  process.  A  major  advantage  of  the  TABD  is  that  it  has  managed  to  concentrate 
on  a  number  of  policy  sectors  where  common  goals  are  held  by  the  EU  and  US,  most 
notably  the  facilitation  of  trade  liberalisation  as  a  major  component  of  the  New 
Transatlantic  Marketplace.  On  the  other  hand  the  TACD  and  TAED  have  an  interest  in 
and  have  focused  on  areas  where  the  EU  and  US  disagree. 
The  banana  case  also  demonstrated  the  capacity  of  private  actors  to  shape 
transatlantic  policy.  However,  the  influence  of  private  actors  centred  around  national 
rather  than  'transatlantic'  policy  makers.  Chiquita  corporation  invoked  US  domestic 
legislation  and  lobbied  Congress  to  influence  US  policy.  Transnational  consumer  and 
development  groups  and  banana  operators  were  able  to  influence  the  EU's  policy  on 
bananas.  Unlike  the  MRA  case,  however,  the  existence  of  transatlantic  business 
consensus  was  blocked  by  the  lack  of  common  economic  interest.  The  power  of 
ýJqs  Interview.  American  NGO,  Washinaton  DC,  October  2000  (24). 
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case.  However,  it  was  WTO,  rather  than  transatlantic  rules  that  created-the  bias. 
In  areas  where  EU  and  US  business  consensus  exists,  the  TABD  has  started  to 
play  a  role  in  transatlantic  conflict  management.  By  identifying  early  warning  system 
issues,  the  transnational  business  group  has  tried  to  resolve  and  prevent  transatlantic 
disputes  that  would  have  negative  effects  for  industry.  For  example,  the  Corm-nission 
demurred  from  creating  a  new  trade  dispute  on  metric  labelling  on  the 
recommendation  of  the  TABD. 
Chapter  6  also  examined  the  role  that  non-state  actors  play  in  political  sectors 
examined  by  the  NTA.  First,  the  rise  of  transnational  criminals  created  the  need  for 
transatlantic  co-operation  on  trafficking  in  women.  It  was  noted  that  a  wide  range  of 
NGOs  have  worked  with  governments  at  the  international  and  national  levels  to 
combat  the  problem  of  trafficking  in  women.  This  case  demonstrates  the  capacity  of 
the  private  sector  to  perform  functions  of  governance  because  NGOs  have  the  capacity 
to  provide  administrators  with  practical  policy  solutions,  particularly  at  the  local  level. 
Yet,  the  trend  in  the  anti-trafficking  policy  sector  is  one  of  moving  away  from  directly 
utilising  NGOs  for  the  information  campaigns,  and  instead  working  with  an 
international  organisation.  That  said,  NGOs  play  an  important  role  as  they  are 
subcontracted  out  by  the  International  Organisation  on  Migration.  It  was  also  argued 
that  further  decentralisation  of  the  trafficking  dialogue  and  better  private-public  co- 
operation,  through  something  like  a  transatlantic  anti  -trafficking  dialogue,  could.  be  a 
way  to  achieve  effect,  'privatised'  governance  in  this  sector,  of  a  sort  which  resembles 
that  which  exists  in  other  sectors  examined  by  this  thesis. 
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The  transatlantic  institutions  that  have  been  the  focus  of  this  thesis  could  plausibly  be 
viewed  as  fulfilling  their  basic  purpose:  to  inject  new  focus  into  transatlantic  relations 
and  keep  both  sides  committed  to  the  pursuit  of  a  true  partnership.  As  one 
Commission  argued,  'the  NTA  became  the  new  "glue"  in  transatlantic  relations  ,-  496 
However,  the  thesis  was  concerned  more  specifically  with  the  impact  that  the 
transatlantic  agreements  had  not  only  on  transatlantic  relations  but  on  the  process  of 
transatlantic  governance,  It  was  argued  that  the  institutionalisation  of  the  new 
transatlantic  dialogue  created  a  formal  structure  for  collective  transatlantic 
governance. 
The  institutionalisation  of  different  levels  of  transatlantic  dialogue  arguably 
facilitated  co-operation  and  increased  the  capacity  for  consensus  reaching  among 
transatlantic  actors.  The  institutions  created  by  the  transatlantic  agreements  have 
increased  the  opportunity  for  dialogue,  deliverables,  and  debate.  The  decentralisation 
of  the  trans  governmental  dialogue  has  fostered  a  more  sustainable  habit.  of  co- 
operation  between  the  EU  and  the  US.  For  example,  the  anti  -trafficking  infon-nation 
campaigns,  while  certainly  rather  modest  policy  actions,  are  the  first  step  in  forging 
co-operation  on  migration  issues  and  other  global  challenges.  The  MRAs  have  helped 
build  confidence  between  regulators  that  will  effect  EU-US  regulatory  co-operation 
more  broadly.  497  Transatlantic  mechanisms  may  also  prove  useful  in  both  the 
prevention  and  management  of  conflict.  If  the  early  warning  system  works,  in  practice, 
it  could  prevent  some  future  trade  disputes.  While  transatlantic  mechanisms  have  been 
less  successful  at  'n-ianaging'  system  friction  in  highly  political  disputes,  such  as  the 
496  Interview.  Commission  Official,  DG  External  Relations,  Brussels  1999  (6). 
497,  It  is  perhaps  revealing  that  after  the  dramatic  blocking  of  the  merger  between  General  Electric  and 
H  one  ywe  II  (both  US  -headquartered  firrils)  by  the  EIJ  Commissi  on  in  2001.  after  the  merger  had  been 
301 banana  case,  the  decentralisation  of  transatlantic  policy  co-ordination  has,  nonetheless, 
ensured  that  co-operation  in  other  areas  continues. 
Most  notably,  the  dense  levels  of  contact  established  by  the  transatlantic 
agreements  have  been  utilised  to  facilitate  'governance'  between  two  systems  where 
decision-making  competency  is  shared  between  many  different  actors.  The 
mechanisms  created  by  the  transatlantic  agreements  endeavour  to  compensate  for  the 
institutional  rivalry  among  domestic  actors,  which  is  ever-present  in  multi-level 
systems  of  governance.  This  thesis  has  portrayed  both  the  EU  and  the  US  as  multi- 
level  systems  and  argued  that  one  effect  of  the  sharing  of  power  across  multiple  levels 
of  governance  is  to  place  stark  limits  on  EU-US  cooperation.  Witness,  for  example, 
the  recent  proposal  of  Gordon  Brown,  the  UK  Chancellor,  for  the  EU-US  equivalent 
of  the  study  that  preceded  the  launch  of  the  EU's  single  market  programme  in  the 
1980s.  On  the  US  side,  the  administration  of  George  W  Bush  gave  no  official 
response,  as  it  struggled  to  win  trade  negotiating  authority  from  Congress  for  a  new 
WTO  round.  Both  the  White  House  and  Congress  were  lobbied  by  US  manufacturers 
of  products  with  high  duties,  such  as  textiles,  clothing  and  footwear,  to  reject  Brown's 
proposal.  Meanwhile,  Brown's  proposal  received  a  cool  reception  at  the  WTO  in 
Geneva,  particularly  among  developing  country  delegates  who  naturally  feared  that  z:  l 
the  transatlantic  partners  were  looking  for  alternatives  to  a  new  trade  round.  And,  in 
Brussels,  a  senior  Commission  official  dismissed  Brown's  idea  as  'one  of  a  number  of 
balloons'  being  floated,  and  stressed  that  it  could  only  proceed  if  backed  by  the 
Commission  and  other  EU  Member  States.  498 
Thus,  barriers  to  entry  into  new  realms  of  EU-US  cooperation  are  high. 
I 
However,  transatlantic  institutions  created  in  the  1990s  act  to  protect  existing  realms 
cleared  by  US  anti-trust  authorities.  both  the  Commission  and  the  George  W  Bush  administration 
agreed  to  explore  an  upgrade  in  cooperation  on  competition  matters  to  avoid  such  outcomes  in  future. 
302 of  cooperation  from  atrophy  or  backsliding.  The  sub-summit  decision-making 
procedures  essentially  put  lower  level  civil  servants  in  charge  of  'managing'  the 
dialogue  and  increasing  the  international  awareness  of  domestic  actors.  As  Frellesen 
(200  1)  argues,  the  process  gives  experts  a  dose  of  'transatlanticism.  ' 
The  institutionalisation  of  transgovernmental  as  well  as  intergovermental 
contacts  is  one  way  to  compensate  for  the  capabilities-expectations  gaps  incurred  in 
both  the  EU  and  US  systems,  because  transgovernmental  actors  have  a  joint  mission  to 
establish  precisely  how  co-operation  can  be  pursued.  For  example,  transgovernmental 
contact  between  JHA,  DG  I  and  US  officials  enabled  actors  to  establish  how  the  EU 
and  US  could  co-operate  in  a  policy  sector  where  the  EU  is  widely  perceived  to  be 
incapable  of  strategic  action.  In  the  MRA  case,  transatlantic  institutions  helped 
overcome  the  capabilities-expectations  gap  which  arises  from  the  sharing  of 
competency  between  US  trade  officials  and  domestic  regulators.  Thus,  -  the 
transatlantic  dialogue  is  designed  not  only  to  facilitate  consensus  between  the  EU  and 
US,  but  among  domestic  actors  as  well. 
Above  all,  the  transatlantic  governance  process  is  pragmatic.  It  is  designed  to 
facilitate  policy  'deliverables'  Where  the  EU  and  the  US  have  common  interests.  The 
transatlantic  system  of  governance  is  'efficient'  not  only  because  it  brings  possibly 
contentious  actors  into  the  dialogue  process,  but  because  it  avoids  them  where 
possible.  As  bureaucratic  agreements,  not  treatiesl  the  NTA  and  the  TEP  de-politicise 
the  process  of  governance.  The  decentralisation  of  decision-making  to  the  expert,  or 
working  level,  is  a  way  to  take  many  issues  out  of  the  political  debate  and  into  the 
technocratic  arena.  The  privatisation  of  decision  shaping,  in  the  case  of  the  TABD,  is 
""  Quoted  in  Financial  Times,  26  July  200  1  (available  from  www.  ft,  com). 
303 also  a  way  for  the  government  and  the  business  community  to  reach  consensus  on  a 
range  of  liberalisation  policies. 
Yet,  it  is  impossible  to  avoid  wondering  whether  this  effective  mode  of 
transatlantic  governance  comes  at  a  price.  Again,  the  question  of  how  transatlantic 
decision-making  fares  in  the  debate  on  technocratic  governance  needs  to  be  addressed. 
The  debate  is  significant  given  the  role  of  the  EU-US  decision  making  process  as  a 
case  study  for  transnational  governance  more  generally. 
While  the  de-politicisation  of  policy  making  increases  the  threshold  for  co- 
operation,  it  also  raises  questions  about  the  legitimacy  of  transatlantic  governance.  A 
number  of  concerns  were  raised  throughout  the  thesis  about  governance  through 
bureaucratic  networks.  First,  the  bureaucratic  control  over  the  NTA  process  has  been 
criticised,  by  for  example  civil  society  groups,  who  argue  that  legislators  should  -have 
a  more  important  role  in  the  process.  The  weak  nature  of  the  TLD  compounds  the 
problem,  and  it  was  argued  in  chapters  4  and  5  that  more  parliamentary  dialogue  could 
increase  domestic  acceptance  of  the  NTA  process. 
Second,  the  decentralised  and  de-politicised  policy-making  process  may 
undermine  the  transparency  of  transatlantic  governance.  NGOs,  in  particular,  have 
argued  against  the  incorporation  of  regulatory  policy  in  the  TEP  generally  and.  against 
the  MRAs  specifically.  The  transatlantic  partners,  led  in  particular  by  the  US 
administration,  have  continually  argued  the  need  for  more  open  decision  making 
proceedings  and  have  attempted  to  make  the  process  more  transparent  by  introducing 
Joint  Guidelines  for  Regulatory  Co-operation.  They  have  also  invited  wider  public 
participation  through  the  cj%Til  socicty  dialogues.  The  TACD  and  TAED  were  brought 
into  the  NTA  process  to  legitimise  the  TER  Furthermore,  the  guidelines  on  dialogue 
participation  were  established  to  ensure  equal  access  for  the  dialogues.  However,  the 
304 unequal  capacity  of  private  and  NGO  actors  to  engage  in  effective  decision  shaping 
highlights  another  problem  with  transatlantic  decision  making. 
However,  the  relative  shaping  capacity  of  business  groups  over  other'civil 
society  groups  is  not  specifically  a  transatlantic  problem.  The  statement  made  by  one 
MEP,  that:  'they  (consumer  and  environmental  groups)  will  never  have  the  same 
499  influence.  They  do  not  have  the  same  money  or  clout'  ,  could  just  as  easily  describe 
domestic  and  EU  politics.  The  problem  for  transatlantic  policy  makers  however,  is 
that  the  impact  of  the  TABD  has  become  a  focus  of  anti  -global  isati  on  groups  who  are 
part  of  larger  international  social  movements  aimed  at  controlling  the  transfer  of 
'governance'  away  from  the  nation  state.  As  the  civil  society  dialogue,  particularly  the 
TACD,  continues  to  develop  policy  makers  face  the  task  of  practically  balancing  the 
interests  of  different  actors.  Decision-makers  will  have  to  weigh  the  effectiveness  and 
legitimacy  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue  in  the  context  of  wider  debates  about  the 
access  and  impact  of  environmental,  consumer  and  labour  movements  at  the  WTO,  the 
G-8,  and  the  EU. 
In  conclusion,  the  NTA  process  has  been  criticised  for  being  only  a  limited 
process  of  governance  that  fails  really  to  deliver  in  terms  of  policy  output.  The 
limitations  of  the  new  transatlantic  dialogue  were  highlighted  throughout  the  thesis. 
However,  it  was  argued  that  many  deliverables  have  been  first  rather  than  final  steps, 
and  that  the  transatlantic  institutions  fulfil  necessary  functions  in  the  process  of 
governance.  If  Leon  Brittan  (1998:  2)  is  to  be  believed,  *the  results  may  sometimes  be 
relatively  unglamorous,  but  they  are  certainly  not  insignificant.  '  In  particular  it  is 
argued  that,  'the  NTA  has  fostered  a  habit  of  contact  and  dialogue  across  broad  areas 
499  Interview.  ELlropean  Parliament,  BrUssels.  September  1999  (17). 
305 of  our  administration,  which  might  otherwise  not  have  been  brought  to  talk  to  each 
other.  ' 
Interviewees  agreed  that  the  NTA  managed  the  daily  relationship  and  got 
bureaucrats  talking  about  ways  to  co-operate  in  a  range  of  areas  where  EU  and  US 
civil  servants  would  not  necessarily  have  had  contact.  That  dialogue  is,  arguably,  the 
most  important  deliverable  of  the  process.  As  one  Commission  official  argued,  'the 
logic  of  the  NTA  is  similar  to  the  thinking  behind  the  EU.  If  we  are  constantly  talking, 
it  is  less  likely  that  we  will  be  fighting.  '  500 
While  the  'staying'  power  of  transatlantic  institutions  is  not  guaranteed,  the 
commitment  of  both  sides  to  the  process  of  institutionalisation  in  the  1990s  was  not 
merely  symbolic.  We  have  seen  that  institutions-  intergovernmental, 
transgovernmental  and  transnational  -  were  continually  developed  in  the  years  after 
the  Transatlantic  Declaration  was  unveiled  in  1990  and  that  current  discussions  are 
underway  to  make  transatlantic  institutions  more  effective.  The  potential  for  further 
decentralisation  over  decision  making  to  institutions  such  as  the  SLG  and  the  NTA 
Task  Force,  is  being  discussed  by  the  Commission  (2001).  US  and  European 
governments  have  also  encouraged  future  participation  from  non-state  actors  including 
the  TABD,  the  TACD,  the  TAED  and  the  TALD  as  well  as,  for  example,  anti- 
trafficking  NGOs  (see  EU-US  Summit  2001;  Warnath  1998).  In  the  end,  the 
institutionalisation  of  the  transatlantic  dialogue  is  best  viewed  as  an  ongoing  process. 
Further  research  will  be  needed  to  assess  the  long  term  development  of  transatlantic 
institutions  and  the  process  of  transatlantic  governance  more  widely. 
306 Research  Notes 
This  research  was  primarily  interview  driven.  In  total  sixty-four  elite  interviews  were 
conducted  (between  July  1998  and  June  2001)  with  a  wide  range  of  members  of  the 
following  institutions  in  Brussels,  Washington  D.  C.,  London,  and  Budapest:  the  US 
Mission,  the  Commission,  the  Council  Secretariat,  the  European  Parliament  and 
Parliament  Secretariat,  the  US  State  Department,  USTR,  US  Commerce  Department, 
US  Federal  Drug  Administration,  Congressional  staff,  European  Environmental 
Agency,  members  of  the  TABD,  the  TACD,  TAED  and  TALD  and  their  secretariats, 
Anti-Slavery  NGOs,  UK  Foreign  Office,  US  Embassy  London,  European  Commission 
Delegation  DC  and  the  International  Organization  of  Migration  (see  attachment). 
The  idea  was  to  obtain  both  public  and  'behind  the  scenes'  information  about 
the  input  of  different  types  of  actors  in  the  decision  making  process  in  a  range  of 
policy  sectors.  Intergovernmental  actors'  input  in  the  process  was  determined  mainly 
from  EU-US  Summit  statements,  .  press  releases  and  speeches,  as  access  to  these 
officials  was  not  feasible.  Policy  output  at  the  intergovernmental  level  is  well 
documented,  because  the  NTA  process  is  driven  by  the  desire  for  'deliverables'. 
However,  assessing  information  about  meetings  where  disputes  were  discussed  was 
more  problematic,  as  EU  and  US  press  releases  tend  to  re-enforce  their  individual 
positions  rather  than  the  content  of  joint  dialogue.  Many  official  documents  were 
obtained  from  the  US  Mission,  EU  Delegation  to  the  US,  State  Department,  USTR, 
and  Transatlantic  Information  Exchange  Services  (TIES)  websites. 
ý()()  Interview,  Commission  Official.  Brussels,  May  2000  (29). 
307 Interviews  were  needed  to  determine  'who  does  what'  at  the  transgovernmental 
level,  where  meetings  are  conducted  with  less  transparency.  It  proved  difficult  to  piece 
together  formal,  let  alone  informal  meetings,  from  public  records,  but  elite  interviews 
proved  indispensable  for  these  purposes.  A  vast  range  of  people  work  on  the  topics 
covered  by  the  thesis.  A  number  of  factors  influenced  the  selection  of  interviewees. 
Mostly  civil  servants  working  on  specifically  'transatlantic'  issues  were  approached, 
except  in  the  policy  sectors  covered  by  the  case  studies,  where  the  opinions  of  people 
working  in  domestic,  transatlantic  and  international  forums  was  sought.  In  most  cases 
the  number  of  people  working  on  specific  topics,  for  example  on  the  Summits  or  on 
the  TLD  or  the  TABD  or  TACD  and  on  a  specific  policy  sectors,  such  as  trafficking, 
MRAs  and  bananas,  was  limited.  The  project  was  based  on  the  input  of  both  high  level 
officials  and  specified  policy  'experts',  often  lower  level  civil  servants.  The  selection 
of  high  level  interviews  was  determined  in  most  cases  by  access  to.  officials,  which 
proved  more  problematic.  The  strategy  in  most  cases  was  to  aim  high  and  settle  for 
who  was  willing  and  available  to  discuss  the  project.  Many  officials  failed  to  answer 
letters,  faxes,  emails  or  telephone  messages.  Scheduling  also  proved  problematic  as 
many  high  level  officials  were  unavailable  or  had  to  cancel  appointments.  The  cost  of 
travelling  to  Washington  D.  C.  and  Brussels  meant  that  interviews,  conducted  in 
person,  had  to  fall  within  limited  windows  of  opportunity.  A  number  of  unavailable 
high  level  officials  instructed  members  of  their  staff  to  meet  with  me  in  their  place.  A 
number  of  key  people  in  the  US  Mission,  EU  Delegation  to  the  US,  DG  External 
Relations  North  America  Unit.  to  remain  anonymous  here,  provided  invaluable 
assistance  in  bridgino  contact  to  other  officials  and  generally  offered  advice.  Many 
other  interviewees  also  suggested  people  I  should  contact  for  subsequent  interviews. 
308 Members  of  the  TABD,  TACD,  TALD  and  TAED  were  generally  willing  to 
meet  and  were  more  available  for  scheduled  appointments.  The  TABD,  TACD,  TAED 
secretariat  websites  proved  useful  in  identifying  people  and  secretariat  staff  often 
directly  contacted  members  on  my  behalf.  I  also  acted  as  an  observer  at  a  number  of 
meetings.  I  attended  the  May  2000  TAED  meeting  as  well  as  a  number  of  informal 
meetings  that  were  attended  by  TABD  members.  I  was  invited  to  observe  the  2001 
TACD  meeting  in  Brussels.,  however  was  unable  to  attend  given  prior  commitments  to 
the  US  ECSA  conference.  I  made  two  attempts  to  attend  the  annual  TABD  meeting  in 
Berlin  in  1999  and  Cincinnati  in  2000.  However,  I  was  told  that  I  would  have  limited 
(press  core)  access  to  press  conferences  but  not  working  groups  meetings,  in  which 
case  I  determined  that  the  cost  of  attending  the  meeting  would  outweigh  the  benefits. 
A  relatively  small  sample  of  active  TABD,  TACD,  TAED  and  TALD  members  was 
interviewed.  The  possibility  of  conducting  a  wider  questionnaire  was  discussed  with 
the  dialogue  secretariats.  However,  I  was  warned  against  doing  so.  It  was  argued  that 
member  responses  would  be  more  sincere  in  person  or  by  telephone  or  email,  and  that 
many  businesspeople  and  NGOs  would  consider  themselves  too  busy  to  take  the  time 
to  answer  a  questionnaire. 
While  the  main  focus  on  transnational  actors  was  with  these  structured 
dialogues,  a  number  of  other  private  actors  showed  shaping  capacity  throughout  the 
thesis.  In  particular,  US  Mission,  Commission  and  IOM  officials  suggested  I  contact 
NGOs  working  on  the  problem  of  trafficking  in  women.  A  number  of  NGO  websites 
were  also  regularly  consulted.  In  addition,  regarding  the  banana  dispute,  contact  was 
made  with  European  Banana  operators,  for  whom  Atlanta  corporation  offered  a 
spokesperson.  Dole.  Delmonte  and  Chiquita  Corporations  refused  to  com.  ment  but 
309 their  web-sites  and  those  of  Fyffes,  the  US  Beef  Cattlemen  association  and  the 
Caribbean  Banana  Exporters  Association  provided  useful  information. 
The  reluctance  of  interviewees  to  go  'on  the  record'  was  determined  very  early 
on  in  the  interviewee  process.  State  Department  and  Commission  officials  were 
particularly  concerned  about  anonymity.  In  order  to  allow  interviewees  to  speak 
freely,  all  interviews  for  the  project  were  conducted  on  a  strictly  non-attributable  basis, 
without  a  dictaphone.  Most  interviewees  were  offered,  and  many  insisted  on,  obtaining 
a  list  of  questions  in  advance  of  our  meeting.  Many  interviews  were  followed  up  with 
email  and  telephone  contact,  and  in  some  cases  second  interviews. 
Interviews  were  conducted  using  a  semi-structured  method.  Interviewees  were 
divided  by  policy  sector  and  where  possible  by  'rank',  and  asked  a  number  of  identical 
questions.  Each  interviewee  was  also  asked  specific  questions  relating  to  their  role  in 
the  policy  process,  as  well  as  questions  sparked  by  interviews  with  other  officials. 
The  methodology  employed  in  this  thesis  was  strictly  qualitative.  The 
introduction  to  the  thesis  noted  that  other  studies  on  the  NTA  have  attempted  to 
measure  policy  output  in  quantitative  terms.  This  thesis  did  not  try  to  present  a 
quantitative  measure  of  what  has  been  achieved  under  the  NTA,  for  a  number  of 
reasons:  It  was  difficult  to  establish  a  causal  relationship  between  institutions  and 
policy  output,  because  institutions  cannot  be  eliminated  from  the  equation.  In  addition 
official  documents  provide  only  part  of  the  picture,  particularly  as  transatlantic  policy- 
makers  have  a  tendency  by  transatlantic  policy  makers  to  'recycle'  and  'repackage' 
their  announcement  of  policy  successes.  The  interest  in  the  thesis  was  not  only  in 
substantive  policy  output  but  also  on  the  perceptions  of  actors  who  participate  in  the 
policy  process.  Measuring  'perceptions'  quantitatively  proved  impossible  given  the 
I  Z-- 
xvide  range  of  ansvers  retUrned  by  interviev,  -ees  and  in  most  sectors  the  very  small 
310 sample  of  interviewees,  as  dictated  by  access  to  officials  and  also  the  often  small 
number  of  people  involved  in  individual  policy  sectors. 
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